This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project
to make the world's books discoverable online.
It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject
to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books
are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.
Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the
publisher to a library and finally to you.
Usage guidelines
Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the
public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to
prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.
We also ask that you:
+ Make non-commercial use of the files We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for
personal, non-commercial purposes.
+ Refrain from automated querying Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine
translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the
use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
+ Maintain attribution The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find
additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
+ Keep it legal Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just
because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other
countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of
any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner
anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.
About Google Book Search
Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers
discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web
at jhttp : //books . qooqle . com/
6
a 3 si 2Jo
HARVARD
COLLEGE
LIBRARY
Digitized by
Google
Digitized by
Google
Digitized by
Google
Digitized by
Google
Digitized by
Google
ENGLAND IN THE MEDITEBEANEAN
VOL. H.
Digitized by LjOOQI^
C/-JL
Digitized by
Google
■If.. I, •
ENGLAND
N THE MEDITERRANEAN
A STUDY OF THE RISE AND INFLUENCE OF
BRITISH POWER WITHIN THE STRAITS
160&-1718
BY
JULIAN S. CORBETT
AUTBOB OP
* ABABS ABD AD TUBOB BAYI 1 'TBI SUCCBMOBt OT VBABB' BTC.
IN TWO VOLUMES
VOL. II.
HVr/f TfFO ILLUSTRATIONS
LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO.
99 PATSBK08TBB BOW, LONDON
NEW YORK AND BOMBAY
1804
All rights rtttrTtd
Digitized by VjOOQLC
Digitized by
Google
I
<i
i
5 u
> *
u
J 8
5 «
•J CQ
O x
* H
< X
Digitized by
Google
Digitized by
Google
BY THE SAME AUTHOR.
DRAKE AND THE TUDOR NAVY; with
a History of tho Bis* of England m a Maritime
Power. With Portrait*, Illustration* and Maps.
8 volt. Grown 8ro. 16f .
THE SUCCESSORS OF DRAKE. With 4
Portrait* (8 Pbotogravom) and 18 Maps and
Plan*. •*©. SI*.
LONGMANS, GREEN, * CO., 89 Paternoster Bow
Land**, K*w York, and Bombay.
Digitized by
Google
Digitized by
Google
YJi/j;
II „ ,YIUM
— * ^ to #■»
0*m*+*asA OUwX.
7fc335;33« i G0
/^HARVARD
UNlV£^5ITYl
L!l3 r '/ ')Y
MAY / l$KJtf
Digitized by
Google
CONTENTS
or
THE SECOND VOLUME
CHAPTER FAOK
XIXaH>UNKIRE AND TANGIER 1
XX. The First Occupation of the Straits 28
XXI. Tangier and its Enemies 44
XXII. Tangier as a Natal Station . . 68
XXIII. Louis XIV. and Sicily 83
XXIV. Tangier and the Popish Plot 106
XXV. The Evacuation op Tangier 124
XXVI*— The Naval Strategy of William HX 14 *\
XXVIK— The Main Fleet in the Mediterranean . . 161
XXVIII. The Spanish Succession . . 167
XXIX. The Campaign of 1702 106
XXX. Marlborough and the Navy 227
XXXI. Gibraltar and Malaga 261
XXXIL Gibraltar and Toulon . 277
XXXIII. 'Minorca »»
Appendix : Obioin of the Line of Battle • . . 617
Index 661
4 A Prospect of Tangier,' 1669 FrontupUc*
From « Dr+ving ftp W*nce$laus iMIar,
•A New and Exact Map of Gibraltar* .... To fact p. %M
From mr Nmrw men's * DUcxmrt cvnotrning ikt MHU trr m Mm i
1701.
Digitized by
Google
Digitized by
Google
'1.1 ■■» ,.: n
• f - 1 -. . . • . '
ENGLAND IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
CHAPTER XIX
DUNKIRK AND TANGIER
It has come to be the received opinion that Cromwell's
influence on English history was almost wholly negative.
He broke down much that cambered the ground, but of the
structure he strove to raise on the ruins practically nothing,
it is said, survived him. In all that concerns society,
government, and religion, there is so much to support
the judgment that it will probably stand, yet it is far from
giving the whole truth. If it were applied to foreign
affairs, so far from being just, it would involve a serious
omission. In all that concerned the British attitude to the
outside world he changed much and left much behind him.
He found his country impotent and neglected in the councils
of Europe, and taught her how to speak with a command-
ing voice. He gave her, in the first place, the instrument
—a perfected navy in the true modem sense — a navy of
war ships wholly independent of merchant auxiliaries— a
thing which had never yet been seen in modern times. It
was a stride as great as that which Drake and his fellows
made when they perfected a sailing navy, and the results
for England were no less invigorating. But Cromwell
gave still more. He gave the sentiment for using the
instrument. For he bequeathed to the restored monarchy
VOL. II. B
Digitized by
Google
2 DUNKIRK. JuND TANGIER 1659
; m \ . : v i s; "
v a definite naval policy in tpp Mediterranean and an inde-
1 structible ambition for what we now call imperial politics.
The two things were intimately connected. It has been
v said that Cromwell's war with Spain was an Elizabethan
war, conceived on Elizabethan lines ; but this is not wholly
true. There was a difference, and one of great import-
ance. Cromwell's main strategical idea, like that of the
Elizabethans, was to operate against the American colonies
and Oceanic trade of Spain ; but, unlike theirs, it con-
templated as a condition precedent the covering of those
operations by the seizure of the Straits of Gibraltar and
: the domination of the Mediterranean. The design was
also to be enforced by a close alliance with Portugal that
came near to being a protectorate, and had a shrewd eye to
[ the gradual insinuation of England into her place in the
t Far East. But this too was an Elizabethan idea. The
* . main distinction of Cromwell's conception was that
t - j Mediterranean power lay at the root of it. It is true, as
I we have seen, that although he never let go this conception
altogether, it fell to a subordinate place ; but this was when
his religious zeal boiled to the surface and disturbed the
level flow of his more practical and sagacious line of
thought. When he saw a chance of leading a great
Protestant war on Borne, his imperial policy lost its clear-
ness, and the result was the occupation of Dunkirk instead
of Gibraltar. Still it was but an aberration — a temporary
reaction to an obsolete policy, which even Elizabeth had
regarded with suspicion, and which had no real vitality.
The visionary aim of the zealot died with him, and the
, master current he had found resumed its flow. In this
' way at least, if in no other, his imprint remained and still
remains sharp and undefaced upon British polity.
J When Stoakes and his fleet were recalled in the
summer of 1659, it might have seemed that the situation
Digitized by
Google
1659 VITALITY OF CROMWELL'S INFLUENCE 3
which had been created in the Mediterranean was
going to perish with the rest of the Protector's work.
But it was not so; and of such vigour was the seed
he had sown, that, though almost everything else was
being changed or uprooted, this plant sprang up again
with new exuberance. For awhile indeed there was no
sign it was not dead. The republic was in its agony.
Revolution succeeded revolution, and government govern*
ment in rapid succession, and in the eyes of conti-
nental diplomacy England was once more a quantity to
be neglected. Upon Pheasant Island in the Bidasoa
the French and Spaniard laboriously concluded the
treaty of the Pyrenees, with no regard to her or her
interests. In the interminable list of articles, which were
finally agreed upon, everything was provided against for
a century to come, as though the future of Europe lay
entirely with France and Spain, and England's power to
' interfere had passed away. Yet the ink, as it were, was
, hardly dry when England was seem again standing with
Cromwell's weapon in her hand, and both the great
powers were once more feverishly bidding for her good-
will.
In the famous treaty of the Pyrenees, Spain had
found herself compelled to give way at every point where
Mazarin pressed her. It was a complete triumph for
France. With Portugal in revolt, and declaring itself
once more an independent kingdom, it was impossible
for Spain to resist the pressure that was put upon her.
It was for the sake of reconquering Portugal that she
submitted to the humiliating conditions and the losses
of territory that were forced upon her. The height of
her greatness had dated from the time when, in 1680,
Philip IL seized the vacant throne of Lisbon, and
found himself, for the first time, a great power upon the
»3
Digitized by
Google
4 DUNKIRK AND TANGIER 1669
ocean. With the loss of the Tagus and the Portuguese
marine by the revolt of the Braganzas in 1640, the
real troubles of Spain had begun, and it was clear to the
Court that without Portugal her position could never
be recovered. On the question of Portugal therefore she
had been adamant, and Mazarin, who had been vigorously
supporting the revolt throughout, found himself com-
pelled to abandon his protigL Portugal seemed doomed.
In despair an ambassador flew to England to try to renew
with the new revolutionary Government Cromwell's old
alliance. He found everything in confusion, and it was
not till Monk had dominated all the warring factions,
and was sitting like an uncrowned king in Whitehall,
that he found a ray of hope. It was a time when,
to all who could read the signs, the monarchy seemed '
unexpectedly on the brink of a restoration. It is true
Monk had absolutely refused to have anything to do
with the Stuart exiles. His single purpose was to
preserve order with a rod of iron, so that none of the
revolutionary elements could gain the upper hand, and to
hold the balance true till a free Parliament could be
elected to voice the will of the country. Every day it
became clearer that that voice would be a summons to
the King to return, and every day the desperation of the
more intractable elements became more difficult to
control Monk and his advisers began to doubt whether
it would be possible for them to preserve their neutral
attitude till Parliament could meet, and it was at this
moment that the Portuguese Ambassador saw his chance.
It had been an old idea of the Braganzas, dating
back to the earliest days of their rebellion, to seek
support for their cause in wedding a daughter of the
House with the Prince of Wales. So long as the
Bnglish monarchy kept its head above water, the project
Digitized by
Google
1659 A PROPOSAL FROM PORTUGAL 6
had never been lost sight of, and now that the Stuart star
was once more rising to the ascendant it was immediately
revived. 1 In the Portuguese Court there can have been
little doubt as to the bait that should be offered. The
two treaties of commerce, which England had already
concluded with the new kingdom, sufficiently revealed
the English desire for a share of the East Indian trade ;
and when, after Cromwell's abandonment of the
Gibraltar project, his covering fleet had been compelled
to base itself on Lisbon, every one must have known
what longing eyes England was casting on a naval
station in the Straits. Bombay in the Ear East, and
Tangier, the last of the Portuguese possessions in North
Africa, must have naturally suggested themselves. The
price was a large one to pay even for the English
alliance ; but without that alliance there was every
probability that both places would be lost — Bombay to
the Dutch, and Tangier to the Spaniards or the Moors.
It was clearly the wisest policy to spend them while they
were still in hand, and to spend them in the market
where they would be most highly valued.
These then were the terms, together with the
unprecedented marriage portion of 300,000/., that the
Ambassador had to offer Monk as the price of Charles's
hand if he were restored to the British throne. He was
able to point out to the General — so the story goes — that
' besides the greatest portion in money that ever queen
had, the Infanta was to bring with her Tangier, which
would make the English masters of the trade in the
Mediterranean, and Bombay, which would give them
the like advantage in the East Indies; and over and
above all would serve to humble the proud Spaniard,
which the General, according to the notions he imbibed in
1 Dictionary of National Biography, tub voce • CfttheriiM of ]
Digitized by
Google
6 DUNKIRK AND TANGIER 1660
his younger days, thought to be the greatest advantage
of all.* l The story rings true. In his boyhood Monk
had been brought up in the midst of the hot anti-Spanish
feeling that surrounded Ralegh down in Devonshire.
He had himself a score to wipe off, for his first taste of
military service was at the miserable failure before
Cadiz in 1625. There, it is worthy of note, he had served
as a volunteer under his kinsman, Sir Richard Grenville,
who was the moving Bpirit in the attack that was made
on Lord Wimbledon for not attempting Gibraltar. The
Ambassador's proposal must at least have awakened some
vivid old memories. The whole scheme moreover exactly
hit the soldierlike if crude ideas of statecraft which the
great soldier of fortune had expressed in his ' Observa-
tions on Military and Political Affairs/ the work he had
written during his imprisonment in the Tower. Indeed
there is reason to believe that it was the brilliant
prospect which this proposal opened up that finally
stirred him from his neutrality. Immediately after the
interview he sent his cavalier cousin, that arch-intriguer
John Grenville, with whom he had long refused to speak
a word on politics, to open communications with the
King in Flanders. 2 On the General's advice Charles
immediately made his escape from Spanish territory and
sought refuge in Holland. At the Hague the Portuguese
envoy met him, and subsequently followed him to
Ixmdon. What ensued is hidden, but Monk, it is said,
took the first opportunity of recommending the proposal
to Charles, and with so much weight that in the autumn
the exultant envoy was able to return to Lisbon with
it*s Register, pp. 91, 898, on the authority of Sir Robert South*
well, a tew yean later Ambassador to Portugal.
• Sir John Giemrflle, afterwards Earl of Bath, was the son of Monk's
aunt, Ones, by her marriage with 8ir Betil Grenrille, the elder brother of
his lathcc-in-arme, 8ir Richard.
Digitized by
Google
1661 OPPOSITION TO THE POKTUttUESE MATCH 7
assurances that set the whole of Portugal wild with
delight.
At the last moment, to all appearance, the struggling
kingdom was saved from a second destruction, but in fact
it was Btill far from safe. When the Ambassador returned
in February ICtil with full power to negotiate the marriage,
he found hostility had made its mark. The far-reaching
importance of the project in hand is testified by the vigour
and variety of the opposition it aroused. It is clear that
at first it received but little support except from Cromwell's
men, Monk and Montague, now respectively Duke of
Albemarle and Earl of Sandwich. Clarendon even is said
not to have been converted at once to the Protector's policy,
while to the end it was hotly opposed by the Queen-mother
and the Earl of Bristol, the son of the first Earl, who as
John Digby had tried so hard to get James I. to use
the Mediterranean lever.
The opposition was natural enough. The Dutch, who
were already well advanced in absorbing the Eastern
possessions of Portugal, viewed the prospect of the English
at Bombay as an intolerable check to their progress, while
Spain, who had never recognised the new kingdom and
still regarded Tangier as Spanish territory, openly an*
nounced that an English occupation of the place would
be regarded as a casus belli. At the back of all was the
resistance of the Roman Church. In spite of the pressure
France had put upon the Pope he had stubbornly held by
Spain, and refused to recognise the Braganza Government ;
the Inquisition was doing its best to crush the national
movement; and in view of the frightening which the
Vatican had recently received from Cromwell's cruising
squadron, a Protestant porter at the gates of the Mediter-
ranean could only be an abiding menace to Borne. So
great was the danger which these influences seemed to
Digitized by
Google
* DUNKIRK AN]) TANGIER 1061
threaten, that it is doubtful whether Cromwell's men —
powerful and dreaded as they still were — would have
been able to hold Charles to their views, had not France
come to the rescue. It was only with the greatest reluc-
tance that she had abandoned her Portuguese friends at the
treaty of the Pyrenees, and probably she had always meant
to use the first opportunity of coming to their assistance
underhanded. In Charles's dilemma Louis XIV. saw his
opportunity. Mazarin was just dead, and almost the first
move which the young King made on his own initiative
in foreign politics was to assure Clarendon in the pro-
foundest secrecy that if Charles took the contemplated step
it would have the support of France. With this assurance
the ground of the opposition, inspired as it was by the
Queen-mother, was cut from under it. Till the last hour
the momentous resolution was kept a close secret; but
when finally the full Council was summoned to pronounce
upon the Portuguese marriage, not a single vote was cast
against it.
So, as it were, from its ashes the English Mediterranean
policy sprang again into being, and once more it was the
breath of France that gave it life. What more dramatic
irony can history show V It was at this very moment that
Colbert was preparing to found the only true navy that
Fiance had ever possessed. The day of its most glorious
achievements was breaking, and the evil star that hung
persistently over her heroic efforts to achieve the dominion
of the sea glittered malignantly in the dawn. Once more
we see England hanging back irresolutely from her
destiny, and once more it is France who thrusts her on.
We are on the threshold of a new era — European politics
aie pausing for a fresh departure — and this is the first
step that France takes.
In the changing aspect of continental affairs it must
Digitized by
Google
1661 THE MARRIAGE ANNOUNCED
have seemed natural enough. The era of the Thirty Years'
War was at an end, and the age of Louis XI^V. had begun.
On the morrow of Charles's landing at Dover the young
French King, by virtue of the treaty of the Pyrenees, had
married the Infanta Maria Theresa, and the seeds of the
great wars of succession were sown. Thenceforth France
was to fill the place that Spain had filled, but as yet her
advance must be halting. Her navy was still to create.
For the moment Louis's ambitions were set upon the
Spanish Netherlands, and it was for the time inevitable
that he should follow Mazarin's policy of using the
English fleet. If England were strong in the Medi-
terranean, it was as yet a safeguard to France and her
trade, and not a curb, and as things stood Louis's resolve
was as statesmanlike as it was bold.
Whether the English Government fully grasped the
meaning of the step is doubtful. Men like Monk and
Sandwich, who had had to do with the navy in Cromwell's
time and been in touch with Blake, may have felt, even
if they could not formulate, the strategical importance of
Tangier; but in the public declarations of ministers it
is not clearly defined. When, on May 8, 1661, the King
announced the marriage to an enthusiastic Parliament,
Clarendon explained to them its meaning and intention ;
but he justified the match mainly on commercial grounds
and as a defiance to Spain. He did not even mention
Tangier or Bombay. 1 It is quite possible, however, that the
intended occupation was to be kept a secret until it was an
accomplished fact. In any case, what Clarendon revealed
was enough, and both in Parliament and throughout the
country the news was received with acclamation.
So the new Stuart monarchy boldly stepped out upon
1 See the report of his speeoh in Parliamentary History, It. 190;
and Kennet'e Register, 438.
Digitized by
Google
10 DUNKIRK AND TANGIER 1661
the road which the Bepublic had begun to tread, and it did
so deliberately at the risk of almost certain war with Spain,
* risk from which the King in his still unstable seat might
well have flinched. Among the many causes which had
led to the -remarkable Royalist reaction was certainly the
belief that a restoration would mean peace with Spain —
the most valued field of English commerce. To reopen
the war was to alienate the all-powerful merchant influence,
which was looking forward to a period of quiet and pro-
sperous business on the time-honoured lines. Though the
promised support of France was enough to convince the
King, it was not generally known, and the opposition in
Parliament might have been serious had not the Spanish
Ambassador himself come to the rescue by an excess of
zeal. A pamphlet had been issued pointing out that the
commercial advantages which would flow from the
Portuguese alliance would outweigh the loss of Spanish
friendship. The Spanish Ambassador answered it by
printing a counter-declaration which he had presented to
the Council. His arguments were weighty enough, but he
unwisely presented them in such a manner that he seemed
to arrogate to his master the right to dictate to the King
of England the choice of a wife. 1 The blunder was easily
turned against him with the result that the innocent little
Princess of Braganza became for the moment the heroine
of British national sentiment, and Tangier the stronghold
of the most violent feeling that can rouse Englishmen to
adventurous action. So, when the Spanish Ambassador
went so far, as was reported, as plainly to threaten war
if the King persisted, Charles could safely reply, short and
sharp, that * the King of Spain might do what he pleased-
he valued it not. 9 f
■ LtfUn of Sir Richard Famhaw, p. 67.
• H«vfr]*tar, UMtth 1% Treniham MSS« Hist. M88. Cow. ▼. 169.
Digitized by
Google
1661 THE TWO GREAT SECRETS 11
The action taken was prompt and determined. A power-
ful squadron for the Straits was already well forward under
the old colour of a demonstration against Algiers. Since
the withdrawal of Stoakes's squadron the corsairs had
become troublesome again, and moreover a Dutch squad-
ron with the same ostensible object was also about to sail
for the southward and would require watching. 1
* This month ends/ wrote Pepys on the last day of
February 1661, ' with two great secrets under dispute, but
yet known to very few : first, who the King will marry ;
and what the meaning of the fleet is that we are now
sheathing to set out to the southward. Most think
against Algiers, against the Turk, or to the East Indies
against the Dutch.' A little later the excitement was in-
creased by a second and still larger fleet being ordered.
On June 10 Lord Sandwich, who was now joint
Commander-in-Chief with Monk, informed Pepys that he
had been appointed Ambassador Extraordinary to bring
home the Queen. First, however, he was to proceed to
Algiers to settle the business with the Dey, and then,
having seen his squadron revictualled and refreshed, to
return to Lisbon with three ships, and there meet the fleet
that was to follow him. Not a word was yet disclosed of
seeing that England was not forestalled at Tangier, but
already measures had been taken. It was known that
Henry Mordaunt, now Earl of Peterborough, was to be re-
warded forhis heroic but hare-brained plotting against
the Protectorate by the governorship of Tangier, and was
to be given fifteen companies of foot from the garrison of
Dunkirk. 1
This appointment is the first intimation of another
1 Trentham MSS« HUU MSS. Com. ▼. 166, 170, and tea S**. Nicholas to
OarttM, May 10, 1661, Dom. Col 5S6.
* Ibid. v. 908.
Digitized by
Google
12 DUNKIRK AND TANGIER 1661
and most serious step that was necessary to round off the
policy which Charles had adopted. Of all wise actions
few perhaps have been more mercilessly misrepresented
than the sale of Dunkirk. Justice in recent times has
been done to the good motives of the Government, but
the intimate connection of the surrender with the oc-
cupation of Tangier and the return to a strong Mediter-
ranean policy has passed unnoticed. Yet it is certain
that in the final stages of the marriage negotiations the
two ideas were so intimately related as to form one strate-
gical whole, and there is reason to believe that from the
first they were regarded as inseparable. 1 Owing to the
passions which the sale afterwards aroused the published
accounts of the affair wear different colours, but all of
them agree that Monk was from the first and throughout
the firm advocate of the surrender, and that Sandwich was
no less sore. Indeed Sandwich UBed to say that he was
actually the first to propose it, on the ground that Dunkirk
was wholly nnsuited for a naval port. 9 All the known
facts of the case go to confirm Clarendon's own account
of the transaction. According to him it was arranged by
Lord Southampton, the Lord Treasurer, who was at his
wit 9 8 end to make both ends meet, in consultation with
Monk and 'the best seamen, 9 and its expediency was
practically decided on before the question was ever
brought before him. There seems indeed no doubt what-
ever that the whole of expert opinion regarded the project
as highly desirable on strategical grounds. Clarendon
however was shocked, and, when first approached by his
colleagues, begged the matter might go no further till the
• Kennel's ifcfttfcr, pp. 91, 770; Eehard, History, Oar. IL p. 84.
• Southwell to GUrendoa {L4ybourn*-Popham MS 8. p. 260). Pepys
ale* aajs Sand wieh declared, Mf it should in Parliament be inquired into
I of Dunkirk, he will be found to be the greatest adviser of it'
Digitized by
Google
1«61 THE SALE OF DUNKIRK 13
King's opinion was taken. Whereupon Southampton
persuaded Monk to come with him to Whitehall and
broach the subject to the King and the Duke of York.
After several discussions it was so far approved that
Charles decided it should be brought before the secret
committee of the Council. Besides the King and his
brother and the Chancellor, it consisted of Southampton,
Monk, Sandwich, Sir George Carteret, who had already
won considerable reputation abroad as an admiral and was
now Treasurer of the Navy, and the two secretaries— one
being Monk's kinsman and right-hand man, Sir William
Morice, who had originally arranged the first meeting
with the Portuguese Ambassador. As Clarendon was ill
they met at his house. The result of the conference was
a unanimous opinion that on financial and strategical
grounds Dunkirk ought to be given up.
The political reasons were no less strong. The Crom-
wellian policy to which they were recurring in the Por-
tuguese marriage involved a close alliance with France,
and with the almost certain prospect of war with Spain
this was more than ever necessary. But so keen was
Louis to secure Dunkirk that its retention would pro*
^bably mean war with France as well as Spain, while its
cession would almost certainly buy a French alliance of
the closest description. Moreover, Charles was by no
means satisfied with the mere secret assurance of support
for his Portuguese policy that he had received from
Louis, and this was only wise of him. For by a secret
article in the treaty of the Pyrenees France had an en-
gagement with Spain in precisely the opposite sense.
' Obviously, then, seeing the far-reaching nature of the
policy on which England was about to embark, there was
everything to gain and very little to lose by giving up
Dunkirk to France. It was getting rid of an incumbrance
Digitized by
Google
14 DUNKIRK AND TANGIER 1661
which had no place in the new world-wide scheme of
empire, and acquiring something that for the time at
least was an essential part of it. The decision of the
secret committee therefore was to lay the matter before
the Privy Council, where it was approved with but one
dissentient voice.
Such then is the story as Clarendon tells it, and there
seems no valid reason for doubting its general truth. 1 On
the other hand there are many, as will be seen, for believing
it Though Clarendon himself gives no dates at which the
prolonged deliberations about Dunkirk, so circumstantially
related, took place, it is certain they must have practically
accompanied the marriage negotiations. The match was
finally announced to Parliament on May 8. Sandwich,
who was present at all the meetings about Dunkirk, left
London to join the fleet on June 10, and did not return to
town till the end of the following year. The meetings
must therefore have begun at latest immediately after the
question of the King's marriage was settled. There is
farther the fact that the marriage treaty actually contained
a clause by which Charles bound himself not to surrender
Dunkirk to Spain. It is difficult to believe that such a
proviso could have been admitted had not the King
1 The only serious contradiction comes from Clarendon's own lips.
When the Comte d'Estrades came over from France as Ambassador Extra-
ordinary to arrange the marriage of Charles's sister with the Due d'Orllans,
he had secret instructions to negotiate the sale. At the outset he was staggered
by the high price Clarendon asked. Clarendon told him that as yet he had
only gained over the King and the Duke of York. He had yet to convince
Honk, Sandwich, and the Treasurer, and it was only by Louis*s promising a
high price he could hope to do so. Clarendon clearly gave Estrades to under.
stand that the tale was his own idea, and that the other three men were not
yet in the secret. A week later he told the Ambassador, to Louis's regret,
that they had been informed of what was going on. Clearly, however,
Clarendon, In holding his three powerful colleagues in the background, was
only using an ordinary device to drive a hard bargain* {Lettres et Mimoiru
oraefrvflst, August 17, SI, 27, 1662, Combe's Sals of Dunkirk, pp. 7, 11,
Digitized by
Google
1661 TRUE REASON OF THE SALE , 15
already decided, in principle at least, to give up Crom-
well's conquest and to give it np to France. It is
certain at any rate that Charles lost no time in
broaching the subject. In July the Comte d'Estrades
came over to settle the marriage of the King's sister
with the Due d'Orl£ans. Before even he had made
his public entry Charles sent for him for a confidential
interview. After speaking of the special subject of his
mission Charles casually mentioned Dunkirk and began
to talk big about its being a place (Tarmes from which
he could step to further conquest. The Ambassador, how-
ever, would not rise to the cast. He put the matter off
by saying bis master attached little importance to the
' place strategically, and then proceeded to encourage the
King in the dreams of distant empire to which the
possession of Jamaica and the Portuguese alliance seemed
to open the way. 1
There can then be practically no doubt that here in
Charles's feint and the Ambassador's riposte we have
the real meaning of the sale of Dunkirk. It was a
vital factor in the return to the same policy which the
Protector had adopted when he found his dream of a
Protestant crusade impracticable, and which he abandoned
when his crusading hopes revived. As the zealot in him
had sacrificed Gibraltar for Dunkirk, so now Monk's level
head forced the surrender of Dunkirk for Tangier, and
swung the country definitely into the course that was to
lead it to empire. There was but one serious man who
is known to have doubted the wisdom of the exchange,
and that was Schomberg. The famous soldier was
passing through London on his way to take command
of the Portuguese army, and he seized the moment to
press Charles to keep Dunkirk. But he did not deal with
1 Lettret et Ulmoxrtt fEitrndea. Estradas to Louis, Jolj 11-31, 1*61.
Digitized by
Google
16 DUNKIRK AND TANGIER lHtfl
the seamen's objections or the financiers'. His reasons .
were purely military and his aim religious. The place,
he contended, was a point of entry always tenable by a
power that had command of the sea. The value he
attached to such a point of entry is perfectly clear. He
was a Calvinist, and his advice to hold Dunkirk was
accompanied by an earnest appeal to the King to put
himself at the head of a Protestant league. Thus his
advocacy only confirms the wisdom of the other great
soldier whose opinion was against him. It was but fresh
testimony that Dunkirk was valueless except in view of the
visionary policy of a Protestant crusade. The Elector of
Brandenburg, when the sale was known, rightly read it as
an abandonment of that policy. He too bewailed it, but
only on political grounds. It would, he said, have served
as a bridle both to France and Spain. In answer to his
reproaches he was assured that it was to make the curb
• more severe that the step had been taken. England's
immediate object was to strengthen her naval position,
and from that point of view Dunkirk was a hindrance
t and not a help. It requited a costly garrison, and as
, a naval station it was useless. Its surrender was an
\ economy of strength and money, and the price was to be
I spent mainly upon the navy or laid up as a war fund. 1
1 Banke, iii. 891, ci Burnet, 173. Burnet's account goes far to confirm
Clarendon, though he differs in details. • The military men/ he says, • who
were believed to be corrupted by France, said the place was not tenable do.
The Earl of Clarendon said he understood not these matters, but appealed to
Hook's judgment, who did positively advise the letting it go for the sum
thai France offered. To make the business go the easier the King promised
he would lay up all the money in the Tower and that it should not be
touched but upon extraordinary occasions.' This reads almost like an echo
of Monk's idea expressed in cap. xxix. of his Observations, • showing how
it is for England • • . providently to prepare a rich public
oforehand, either lor the defence of themselves or offending their
For a curious story that Monk 'agreed to and pressed the
I Dunkirk because Sir Edward Harley , the Governor, was timid,' see
Digitized by
Google
1661 CHARLES'S IMPERIAL AMBITIONS 17
This was certainly the idea and intention of Monk
and the seamen. Probably Charles meant it too. His
head at this time was full of imperial aspirations, to
which his marriage seemed to open the way. ' I remember/
says Bishop Burnet, writing of Tangier, ' when I knew
the Court first, it was talked of at a mighty rate as the
foundation of a new empire, and he would have been a
very hardy man that would have ventured to have spoke
lightly of it. 9 1 The King's instructions to the men he
sent out to take possession of his new acquisition fully
bear out Burnet's remark, and show that Charles did not
think of stopping short at Tangier or Bombay. They
disclose, as the Bishop says, dreams of a gradually v^
expanding empire in North Africa and another in the Far
East, together with the domination of the Mediterranean,
and the hope of absorbing the whole trade of Brazil.
1 You know/ wrote Charles to Sir Bichard Fanshaw on
the eve of his departure as Ambassador to Portugal,
1 You know one of the principal advantages we propose to
ourself by this entire conjunction with Portugal is the
advancement of the trade of this nation and the enlarge-, ^
ment of our own territories and dominions.' Fanshaw
himself was wholly with his preceptor and his imagination
ranged higher still. He saw in a rosy future the male
line of the House of Braganza fail, and England, even if
Portugal itself slipped from her, succeeding by right and
might to the vast trade and empire that centred at Lisbon. 1
Hubert Hurley to Sir Edward Hurley, Wclbeck MSS. lii. 616, March 14,
1700.
1 Foxcroft, Supplement to Burnet'* History, p. 80. Burnet first came
to London in 1668 ; he was not actually about the Court till tan years later.
Ibid. p. 468.
* Charles II. to Fanshaw, August 28, 1661, HeatheoU MSS. (Hut.
MSS. Com.) p. 18. Fanshaw's instructions, ibid. p. 90. Fanshaw to
Clarendon, ibid. p. 87. Peterborough's oommission for Tangier, September 6,
1661, DaTis, History of the Second Queen 9 * Royal Hegimmttp.lt.
VOL. n.
Digitized by
Google
18 DUNKIRK AND TANGIER 1061
Well might the Brandenburg Ambassador assure his
master that the real reason of the step which the
English were taking was to be found in the tradi-
tional belief — mistake he calls it — that Great Britain
was a separate world. In truth England was embarked
upon a world-wide policy, and in truth it was an idea
that had been growing ever since the days when the
Elizabethans taught her to know herself. But the
German did not see how the idea had been modified by
the work of Cromwell and Blake. He did not see bow
they had found in the Mediterranean a firmer grip on the
vitals of Europe than any North Sea port could give.
It is then with this great departure, and not with the
humiliation that immediately followed it, that we should
associate the sale of Dunkirk. It should be remembered
for what it meant at the time — and what it came at last to
be — the final departure of England upon her true career.
We should honour the King for his great intention and
the men who brought him to it: Southampton, who
justly measured the resources at his disposal ; Sandwich,
the admiral, who had learned the value of the Mediter-
ranean; and above all Monk, the strategist and statesman,
without whom in those early days the King would not
move a finger, and at whose nod he felt that at any
moment he might have to start on his travels again. It
was these three men who, with Clarendon the Chancellor,
were appointed the secret commissioners to carry out the
sale — a fact which leaves no room for doubt that they
were the real moving spirits in the affair. 1
If we look closely at the men themselves, there remains
as little doubt of the purity and loftiness of their intention.
1 Sennet's Begister. They were appointed on September 1, 1662, while
the negotiation* were still a profound secret The matter was not settled
till three months later. Hanks, Mi. 890.
Digitized by
Google
1661 THE KESTOti/lTlON MINISTEKS 19
In their several persons they typified all the leading forces
and ideas of which Charles's imperial policy was the latest
expression. t Southam pton, was the son of the man who
was Shakespeare's patron and Essex's second self, and
the sharer of all his ventures against Spain. One of the
most ardent vessels of the Elizabethan spirit, he had
become under James the promoter of every colonial
enterprise and the embodiment of the national feeling
which regarded Spain implacably as the hereditary enemy,
and her colonial empire as the promised land. The
alarm caused in Madrid when, in 1617, his name was con-
nected with the first proposed expedition of an English fleet
into the Mediterranean will be remembered. 1 Thomas
Wriothesley, the fourth Earl, though bred under these hot
passions till the age of fourteen, was of a more stable
temperament. A pattern of sober thought and lofty
integrity, a convinced constitutionalist yet loyal subject,
he had won the. confidence of all parties. His appoint-
ment as Lord Treasurer at the Restoration was as quieting
as that of Monk f»s Captain-General, and from the first
the purity of his administration shone like the survival of
a golden age. Of ^Sandwich it is enough to say he was
the pupil of Blake and may be taken as representing the
great admiral's ideas of the higher naval strategy, and
those of the leading men of his school. But it is Monk
whose life most curiously covers the period of develop-
ment and accentuates its most prominent points. Born
and bred in the very womb of Elizabethan romance, he
had fed on the new spirit with his mother's milk. He
was related to all the greatest names of that age from
Grenville to Howard. Their exploits were his nursery
tales. His uncles had fought and died under Drake and
Vere, and at the house of his Aunt Stukeley, hard by
1 Supra, toL L p. 59.
el
Digitized by
Google
20 DUNKIRK AND TANGIER 1061
the place where he was educated, he must have had the
son of Pocahontas for a playfellow and worshipped
Kalegh in the flesh as his boyish hero. A childhood
so coloured was never quite outgrown. When scarcely
out of boyhood he had served throughout Buckingham's
ill-starred attempts to revive the glories of the past age.
Then, like his fathers, he had gone to serve the Dutch
against their oppressors, and after ten years' distinguished
service he returned to England with the reputation of
the pattern Low Country soldier. It was the eve of the
troubles, but as yet all was quiet. The old spirit was
still strong within him and Monk could not rest. Pining
for adventure, he joined the wild scheme by which a
thousand gentlemen, under the leadership of Prince
Bupert and with a million of capital, were to sail away to
conquer Madagascar, and from there to carve out, like
Alexander, a mighty empire in the East. The civil wars
put an end to all such dreams. But when they were
over and Monk had risen to be Cromwell's right hand, it
was intended that he should lead the career of conquest
in the West Indies ; and could he have been spared from
Scotland he might well, as the greatest military adminis-
trator and one of the finest strategists of his time, have
written a very different page on the Commonwealth
history. As it was, he remained to build up a fresh
reputation as an admiral against the Dutch, to command
single-handed the most powerful fleet that had ever sailed
the sea, and to lead it to victory against the greatest of
the Dutch seamen. In his new sphere he lived to com-
plete Blake's work and perfect the soldier's influence on
the naval art. By him it was raised to the position of a
true science, and posterity has recognised him as the real
father of modern naval tactics.
When, therefore, we see such men as these proposing
Digitized by
Google
1««1 THE HOW OF CROMWELL 21
and carrying through the Portuguese alliance and the_
surrender of Dunkirk, as it were in one movement, it is_
dear that, as was always asserted at the time, the two
transactions were parts of one great design. It is clear
too that that design was the expression of all that was
most vigorous and sagacious in the expanding sentiment
of the nation, the product of the forces and feeling that
had been forming it for a century past, and the finger-
post of the characteristic British policy whose most notable
and enduring features are expansion beyond the Oceans
and domination of the Mediterranean Sea. It was Crom-
well who sounded the note and Cromwell who gave the
means for carrying it to action — Cromwell who 9 as his
.best historian has said, was the greatest because the
most typical of Englishmen of all time. So it was the
greatest and most typical of Englishmen who carried the
idea into being — men who represented the central stream
of British opinion — for, of the four, two were the most
sober of the Stuart councillors, and two the most moderate
of Cromwell's men-at-arms.
The failure of the policy to secure the immediate and
wide results that were very pardonably expected from it
soon came to obscure its true intention, and, instead of
being regarded as a loyal effort to take up the bow of
Cromwell, it has survived as the emblem of the Stuart
fatuity. But we have only to follow the history of the
Tangier episode to see how unjustly posterity has
judged it. We have only to see how profound was the
impression in Europe, how nearly success was achieved,
and how stoutly Charles clung to bis original idea while
one after the other all his fondest illusions were shattered,
to appraise the matter at its true value.
Digitized by
Google
CHAPTER XX
THE FIRST OCCUPATION OF THE STRAITS
For the student of history there is no more dangerous
pitfall than the temptation to attach too much reality to
the periods which historians shape for the elucidation of
their work. It is so easy to fall into the error of thinking
that, because those periods are clearly defined to us, they
were also apprehended by the men of the time. Yet
there have been pauses in the great march of events which
were always unmistakable, and such a one is that which
is marked by the treaty of the Pyrenees. Followed as it
was by Louis's assumption of power, by Charles's restora-
tion, and the Portuguese marriage, it was obviously a fresh
point of departure. Europe was plainly marshalled in a
new order, and every one was watching for the first
indication of its outcome.
Since the signature of the treaty in 1(559 until the
middle of the year 1661 the statesmen of Western Europe
had been occupied exclusively with the setting of the
board. It was the sailing of Sandwich's fleet that was
the first move, and as on June 19 he weighed for the
Mediterranean' every eye was upon him. It is true his
ostensible mission was nothing more serious than to bring
Algiers to reason, and doubtless the alleged object was
more than a mere pretence. The security which Crom-
well had given to the Levant trade had done much to
reconcile the powerful merchant interest to his govern-
ment, and Charles could not afford to do less. But no
Digitized by
Google
1661 A WARLIKE OUTLOOK 23
one believed there was not much beyond. Estradas
assured his master that the design on Algiers was a mere
blind to cover an attempt to intercept the Spanish Plate
fleet which Sandwich was to make in concert with a
Portuguese squadron. ' It will certainly happen/ he added,
' if things do not change.' l
Indeed it seemed that the step that England was
about to take was of so high an import that it must in-
evitably precipitate a war between the chief maritime
powers. The Spanish Ambassador in London, as we
know, was openly threatening hostilities if Charles per-
sisted in his design to occupy Tangier. In Holland the
sky was scarcely less stormy. The Dutch were still in a
state of war with Portugal over affairs in the Far East
and in Brazil, and the English marriage treaty naturally
left it uncertain as to how far Charles intended to make
the Portuguese cause his own. Like him therefore they
determined to fit out a squadron to act against the cor-
sairs in the Mediterranean, and De Ruyter was given the
command. Against the Barbary states they had griev- 1
ances enough, but it is clear they were not De Buyter's
first object any more than they were Sandwich's. A fleet
of East Indiamen was due to arrive in the Texel. In view
of the stormy relations with England, it was coming home
North-about round Scotland, and instead of proceeding to
the Straits De Ruyter was ordered to the Doggerbank to
cover its home-coming. This duty accomplished he re-
turned to the Texel, where he was met with the news that
Sandwich had sailed to the southward, and that with the
utmost speed he was to prepare his fleet to follow him.
His corsair story, as usual, was nowhere believed. Every
one smelt a fresh attack on Portugal in the wind. 1 Nor
were they far wrong. The idea in the mind of the States
1 Uttru ffitiitrades, 144, July M, 1601. • HuL MS8. Com. ▼. 1ft
Digitized by
Google
21 FIRST OCCUPATION OF HIE STRAITS 1661
was that De Bay ter should endeavour, in concert with the
Spaniards, to prevent Sandwich molesting the Plate fleet.
To this end a second squadron under Cornelia Evertzen
was being brought forward to reinforce him, and on
July 19, just a month after Sandwich had sailed, De
Buyter stood down Channel after him, bound for Cadiz,
but fully expecting to have to fight his way into the port
through an Anglo-Portuguese fleet. 1 To this delicate
situation must be added the fact that the Dutch had just
concluded a successful war in the Baltic. They were in-
deed fast recovering from the blows which Cromwell had
dealt them, and it was a moment when they were little
likely to sit down quietly under the new bid that England
was making for maritime supremacy in the Levant and
the Far East. Nothing therefore looked more probable
than a great naval war, in which England and Portugal
would be arrayed against Spain and Holland. Such a
catastrophe was all that France could desire, and, judging
by the line which Louis was soon to take, it is even
possible that the prospect had no little to do with the
encouragement he had given to the English King.
Thus, as the Earl of Sandwich's fleet swept southward,
it could only appear as the opening move of a naval drama,
of which no one could foresee the end. He was first in
the field, and, finding that as yet all was quiet, he held
on straight for Algiers. The weather, however, proved so
adverse that he could not make the place, and as he was ill
it was decided to run for Alicante. It was only a bout of
fever, and so soon as the admiral was better they sailed
again and appeared before Algiers at the end of July.
The Dey proved obdurate, and as a bombardment failed
to bring him to reason it was decided to make a formal
1 0. BADdt, La Tude Xlichtl de Rniter, Amsterdam, folio, 1698, p. 159.
Digitized by
Google
1661 SANDWICH AND DE RUYTER »5
attack on the mole. For a week, however, the weather
kept obstinately foul, and by the end of that time, as
in ManseU's case, the Algerines succeeded in making a
formidable boom which seriously changed the prospects
of the contemplated operation. In the existing state of
affairs it was impossible to submit the fleet to any great
risk, and in council of war it was decided to abandon the
attempt. Sandwich, moreover, was now due at Lisbon to
take up his mission as Envoy Extraordinary to settle the
final details of the marriage. He therefore ordered
Lawson, his vice-admiral, with ten sail to maintain the
blockade and bring the Dey to reason by the destruction
of his marine at sea, while he himself with five sail, in
accordance with his original instructions, held away for
the Tagus. 1 About the Straits he encountered De Buyter
and politely returned his salute, though without lowering
his flag. He even gave him a full account of his failure
at Algiers, and then passed on his way. By this time
De Buyter had received the whole of his reinforcements,
but far from proceeding against the corsairs he was cleaning
his ships in batches at Cadiz, ready for his real orders
when they reached him. Scarcely had Sandwich left him
when he received despatches that informed him of the
mystery of his mission. With the utmost secrecy he was
to open communications with the Duke of Medina-Celi,
Governor of Andalusia, and to concert with him measures
for defending the Plate fleet against Sandwich and the
Portuguese. Thereupon he promptly followed in the
British admiral's wake and put into Cadiz.*
Some such move was of course expected by Sandwich,
1 See three letters to Pepye, dated September 10-11, pnbllihed in
Hodghin M88. (Hist. MSB. Cam. rr. ii.), p. 163-9, and Sandwich's 'Di*? •
inKennet'tiieptfor.
1 VitdeDeBuiUr.fr Ml.
Digitized by
Google
36 FIR8T OCCUPATION OF THE 8TRATT8 1661
but at present he had no instructions to bring pressure
upon Spain. As yet she had given no sign of movement
to resist the British occupation of the Straits. On the
contrary, her Ambassador in London had been told to
moderate his tone. Still that in no way relaxed Charles's
warlike preparations. The second fleet, with a formidable
military force, was being organised under the Earl of
Peterborough. It could only be intended for Tangier,
and there was little doubt that the quietness of Spain
covered some deeper design to forestall him. Moreover,
relations with Holland over the Portuguese question had
become more strained than ever, owing to the presence of
De Buyter at the storm centre and to Charles's opposing
their claim to trade with his new ally on an equal footing
with the English. 1 The cloud that hung over Western
Europe was daily growing darker, and at the end of
August Sir Richard Fanshaw was appointed Envoy
Extraordinary to Lisbon in order to relieve Sandwich
and free his hand for action, while in the following week
Peterborough's commission to command the Tangier
expedition was signed. The military force was to consist
of four foot regiments numbering three thousand men
and a troop of a hundred horse. Part were to be newly
raised and part made up from the Dunkirk garrison, and
the whole was to be accompanied by a powerful naval
escort* Such a force took no little time to prepare. Thus,
long before Peterborough could get away, De Ruyter's
fleet, by still further reinforcements, had been brought up
to its full strength of over twenty sail, besides vessels up
1 Fanshaw's instructions, Heathcote MSS, p. 19.
* For Peterborough** commission and details of the troops, see Colonel
Davis, Bittory of the Second Queen'* Royal Regiment* a work in which the
mother has printed or abstracted practically all the really important docn-
ssssjts relating to the English occupation of Tangier from a military point
of view*
Digitized by
Google
1661 ON THE BRINK OF WAR 27
the Straits on convoy service, and the situation had become
in the highest degree critical. The English Government
was fully sensible of the difficulties before them, and with
a man like Monk as war minister they were well pre-
pared to meet them. A peculiar danger was, as they had
reason to fear, that in spite of the marriage treaty Peter-
borough might not be admitted to Tangier. A clause
in his instructions specially contemplates such an eventu-
ality. In case he found it so he was to return home, if —
and this is the significant condition — ' if upon joint advice
with Lord Sandwich you shall not agree upon some
further design for our service.' He had also, be it noted,
express power to occupy any place that might be in a
state of hostility to the British realm. Clearly, if Spain
interfered, Spain was to suffer. She was especially
anxious — and not without cause — not only about the
Plate fleet but also about Gibraltar. Before she knew
she could rely on a Dutch squadron, a message had been
sent out to the Indies to divert the flota away from Cadiz
and order it to Corana instead, while at the co6t of
dislocating the military operations against Portugal large
reinforcements were thrown into the Bock.
As yet, however, nothing was done openly on either
side. Lawson was still operating before Algiers, blockad-
ing the port and playing havoc on its shipping with his
cruisers. All September De Buyter, in accordance with
his secret orders, lay about Cape St. Vincent to cover the
Plate fleet, while Sandwich remained in the Tagus doing
honour to the new Queen of England and gracing the
marriage rejoicings. In the first days of October, how-
ever, an alarm reached him that a combined Dutch and
Spanish fleet was off Tangier. He had by this time ten
sail under his orders, and in the midst of the festivities he
suddenly put to sea and sent forward a despatch vessel to
Digitized by
Google
28 FIRST OCCUPATION OF THE STRAITS 1661
Algiers to summon Lawson to his aid. A week later he
was before Tangier, bat not a sign of an enemy was to be
seen, and in five days Lawson appeared. Tangier was
still safe, but the situation was 'as strained as ever.
De Bnyter had moved down to the Straits. Lawson, on
his way from Algiers, had actually spoken with him off
Malaga. The Dutch admiral informed him that he was
there to make war on the corsairs. As a matter of fact,
although De Buyter bad no intention of leaving the Straits
till further orders, he was for the moment devoting his
attention to the pirates. By the end of September he had
been informed that the Plate fleet was safe in Coruna, and
be had at once taken steps to employ his squadron in the
business upon which it had ostensibly come out. Lawson
was engaged in the same quest, and with rough ingenuity
begged De Buyter to communicate his private signal that
they might co-operate more easily. De Buyter, too old
a hand to be drawn by so barefaced a confidence trick,
refused, and with this information Lawson had joined
Sandwich at Tangier. 1
Clearly in the eyes of the two British admirals De
Buyter was not to be trusted, and all October and Novem-
ber they lay where they were, watching, with a division
continually out in the ' Gut ' of the Straits. Their force
was none too strong nor their stores too plentiful, and as
the weeks passed by without any news of Peterborough
having sailed, Sandwich began to grow anxious. It was
not till December 9 that the Dunkirk regiments were em-
barked, and tbis week the situation at Tangier grew in
excitem e nt. Sandwich's cruisers had got touch with a
Dutch fleet in the Straits. One of his captains came in
to report that Sir John Lawson had been seen ' flying to
1 Vk d§ De Rutier, p. 168.
Digitized by
Google
1661 CRISIS AT TANGIER 29
windward amongBt several of the Dutch fleet/ and that he
had sighted seven of their men-of-war coming oat of the
Straits close aboard the Spanish coast, as though making
for Cadiz. 1 The tension now grew extreme. A combined
Dutch and Spanish squadron might appear at any
moment to force an action before Peterborough could
join. De Buyter's ships were continually being seen
hovering about, and Sandwich and Lawson, with the
fleet in two divisions, took up positions on either side of
the Straits in keen expectation of a fight. There they
watched day after day, shadowing the Dutch ships and
ready for immediate action, till at last it was known that
De Ruyter, with the bulk of his squadron, had retired to
Port Mahon in Minorca to careen. 1 The crisis passed,
Lawson was despatched back to Algiers, and Sandwich
remained on guard alone.
No sooner, however, was one danger over than another
arose in its place. Just as the home Government had
anticipated, the Moors were pressing round Tangier in a
way that began to look ugly, and presently Sandwich
received word from the 'Emperor of Fez 9 that the
Spaniards were urging him to prevent the English getting
hold of Tangier. 3 Similar information came in from
other quarters. The admiral, according to a correspon-
dent, was continually getting intelligence of the great
endeavours in all parts of the world to prevent his
Majesty possessing so considerable a place. 4 So serious
indeed did the Moorish attitude grow that the Portuguese
Governor, who was sullenly opposed to giving up the place
to any one, was compelled to apply to Sandwich for a
promise of assistance if his position became really
1 Davis, 36.
• Sandwich's « Journal' in Rennet's Reguter; VisdsDe Ruitmr, p. ISA.
• Kstrades to Louis, February ft, 1663 (Lettru et Mima** cP Ettromm).
« Luke's Loiter, February 17, 1663 (ALP. Colonial, Tangier*).
Digitized by
Google
» FI11ST OCCUPATION OP THE STRAITS 1602
dangerous. There was a growing suspicion that a secret
understanding with the Moors was the real means by
which Spain in her helplessness hoped to prevent the
surrender of Tangier. But if it was really on Moorish
activity she relied for her end, her hand was ill -played,
and it suddenly turned the game against her. On
January 12, 1662, the Portuguese Governor, galled by the
increasing pressure about him, sallied out for a foray.
On his way he fell into an ambush and was killed. The
result naturally was to embolden the hovering enemy still
further, and a panic seized the garrison. In despair they
sent to beg the British admiral for help. Sandwich was
no man to let such an opportunity slip. Without a
moment's hesitation he landed a large force of seamen
under Sir John Stayner, his rear-admiral, and from that
moment was practically in possession of the coveted port.
At the same time Peterborough, with a fleet of nineteen
sail, besides transports, was sailing at last from the Downs,
and before January was out he had anchored in Tangier
Bay.
Thus England had won the first point in the great
game that was developing, and so far from Charles's
policy having destroyed his prestige, the strength and
decision he had displayed pointed quite the other way.
No other power could show a success to put beside the
hold which Charles had fixed upon the gates of the
Mediterranean, nor had one of them seen its way to
lifting a finger against him. Holland had threatened
with De Buyter's fleet, and it had accomplished nothing.
The impotence of Spain was proclaimed aloud as her
treasure fleet slunk home to a remote and inaccessible port.
France had cut a scarcely more imposing figure. Through
the greater part of the year 1661 a fleet had been in
preparation in Brest and Bochelle under M. de Nieuchese
Digitized by *
Google
1662 TANGIER A BRITISH PORT SI
and Du Quesne. It was destined for the Mediterranean,
but not till the opening of 1662 was it able to assemble ;
and when at last it sailed in February it was only to be
shattered by a storm and driven back to Bochelle. The
intention had been that it should be joined in the
Mediterranean by a squadron from Touloq ; but there
things were even more behindhand ; and when the
English flag was raised over Tangier castle, Charles was
undisputed master of the seas. 1
The contrast between the maritime position which
England had won and that of France quickly brought
home to Louis the mistake he had made, and before the
English had been in Tangier a month he began to repent
the countenance he had given to the move. As has been
said, he probably had no idea the thing would be accom-
plished so easily. He had rather hoped to see the great
maritime nations engaged in a mutually destructive
struggle which would give breathing time for his own
navy to grow up. Instead of this he found his naval
position alarmingly weakened, and was face to face with
the galling fact that the most formidable of the sea
powers was securely established at the most important
strategical point in the world.
To appreciate his nervousness we must remember that
it was only two years since Charles Gustavus had attempted
to secure the domination of the Baltic by seizing both
sides of the Sound, and so alarming was the prospect that
all the sea powers had combined to frustrate his intention.
It was on this business that Sandwich had been occupied
when he was summoned back to England with his fleet
by the events which immediately preceded the Restora-
tion. Now it happened that while the French Atlantic
and Mediterranean squadrons lay helpless in port the
1 Jal, Du Qimjm*, L 846 §t «g«
Digitized by
Google
32 FIRST OCCUPATION OF THE STRAITS 1662
young King was informed that Sandwich's captains,
operating from Tangier, were surveying and taking
sonndingB in places, which aroused his gravest suspicions.
He was convinced that the English meant to establish
themselves in the Straits in such a way that they would
be able to make of it another Sound, and exact a toll from
every ship that passed. With Colbert already at his
elbow his hopes of power were based on the expansion of
French commerce. Here at the outset was the prospect
of an intolerable check, and he wrote to his Ambassador in
England to impart his fears and bid him find out what
was intended. 1 The results of the Ambassador's inquiries
appear to have done little to quiet his master's appre-
hensions. Whatever else Sandwich and his captains
were doing they had certainly already taken soundings to
determine the position of a great mole which Peterborough
was authorised to commence at Tangier, and experts
and skilled masons were being sought for in Genoa and
Leghorn, where the two most recent harbours had been
constructed.
The energy and directness which the English Govern-
ment were displaying in the matter are startling to us
who know to how low a level Charles's administration
was to sink. To the men of that day it must have seemed
1 Lettrts et Mtmoire* d*E strode*, Feb. 26, 1662. Louis's words arc
carious. He speaks of a suspected project of the English to take the
• Alboosiennes Islands. 1 By this he can only mean either * Alboran Island,'
which lies midway between Capes Oata and Tres Furcas, or what is now
called 'Albucemas Island/ on the Biff coast about a hundred miles within
the Straits. In eighteenth century charts it is marked as ' Albousemez.'
Is is difficult to see how the occupation of either place could have increased
the strength of the English position. The inference is either that Louis
■Mffcunlr the character or position of the islands, or else that he had reason
to believe that Tangier would not be given up to the English, and was afraid
thai* in spite of the schemes that were on foot to prevent them, they were
I to establish themselves somewhere or other in the mouth of the
n— if not at Tangier, then at Albucemas or Alboran*
Digitized by
Google
A ROSE-COLOURED DAWN 33
that England was destined to rise only higher and higher
from the point to which Cromwell had raised her, and
Charles's dream of empire must have begun to look very
like reality. ' Our main design ' — so Peterborough's in-
structions ran — ' in putting ourself to this great charge for
making this addition to our dominions being to gain our
subjects the trade of Barbary and to enlarge our dominions
• in that sea, and advance thereby the honour of our crown
and the general commerce and wealth of our subjects/ l
So the pleasure-loving King, whom posterity has come
to regard as a mere feather-headed libertine, announced
a true Mediterranean policy. It was the first official
declaration that England must become a Mediterranean
power, a distinct and bold advance upon the idea of mere
commerce protection that had preceded it. Nor must it
be imagined that it was not in reality the voice of Charles
that spoke. At this time his interest and earnestness in
public aflairB, and especially in all matters connected with
the navy and imperial expansion, were real and active.
With a united nation at his back, as it seemed, and sur-
rounded by the best of Cromwell's men and his own, it
was natural for him to believe that the power behind him
was irresistible and fully equal to the achievement of his
high ambition.
Everything seemed to give way before the prestige he
had acquired. Lawson had done his work so thoroughly
that in April he exacted a treaty from Algiers, and later
in the year concluded similar arrangements with Tunis
and Tripoli.' The French fleet, on the other hand, only
further covered itself with contempt, and fell a prey to
the evils which Mazarin had tried so hard to uproot. It
1 S J\ Colonial, Tangier, i. No. 8.
' Kennel's Regitter, 697 ; Fanshaw to See. Morlce, Dee. 11-11, 1661;
Heathcot* MS8. 61 ; Pepyt' Diary, Nov. 80.
VOL. II.
Digitized by
Google
34 FIRST OCCUPATION OF THE STRAITS 1662
will be remembered that in 1650, when things were going
hard with him, he had found it necessary for the Queen-
mother to resign the Grand Mastership of the Navy in
order that it might be used to conciliate the powerful Due
de VendAme, the King's uncle. Not only was it vested in
him, but it was entailed on his issue ; and now his son,
the young Due de Beaufort, had joined the fleet to serve
his apprenticeship to the high office for which he was
destined. With such a volunteer on board the admirals
naturally soon found they were no longer in real com-
mand, and discipline went by the board. It was not till
March that they managed between them to get through
the Straits and commence operations. Still Beaufort
and the admirals did nothing but quarrel. The junior
officers followed suit; and though Louis had declared
war magnificently on all the Barbary states, the fleet did
nothing but make an ineffective cruise along the African
coast, and then ignominiously put into Toulon empty-
handed. 1 The situation was all the more annoying be-
cause Louis was bent on establishing a foothold in Africa
similar to that which Charles had secured at Tangier, and
the engineer he had sent out to select a spot had just
returned with a report in favour of Stora, the modern
Philippeville, between Tunis and Algiers. But such was
the disorganisation at Toulon that there seemed little
hope of getting an expedition started. The jealousy and
suspicion which the French authorities displayed towards
the English marks clearly the prevalent feeling. In
March Lawson had been refused victual at Toulon. In
July three other English vessels put in to refit, and Du
Quesne was sure it was but an excuse to see what pre-
parations were being made there. Possibly it was so ; for
De Buyter, who still lay at the Balearic islands awaiting
1 Jal, Du QttfifM, 807 #f «#j M and 184, n.
Digitized by
Google
1662 TANGIER AND THE LANGUEDOC CANAL
orders, had detached two ships thither, and it is possible
the English were shadowing them. At any rate, Da
Qaesne reported, with one of his spiteful snarls at his
superiors, that he was taking the greatest care that the
Englishmen saw nothing in the state of affairs which,
might arouse their contempt for the French navy. ' If
that should happen/ he wrote, 'nothing could console
me. M
It is, however, in another project which at this time
began to occupy the French King's mind that we seem
to see the most noteworthy effect of the English success.
For some time past a provincial official called Bicquet
had been making preliminary surveys to determine the
possibility of connecting the Atlantic with the Mediterra-
nean by a canal through Languedoc. Whether it was by
the instructions of the Government is not clear, but
in November 1662 he laid his scheme before Colbert,
pointing out that if the project were put into effect the
Straits of Gibraltar would cease to be a postage ntces-
zaire for France, and that the bulk of the trade, which
found an emporium in Cadiz, would be diverted to French
ports. Heroic as was this remedy for the defects of the
French position, it was immediately taken up in all
seriousness. Detailed surveys were ordered ; by the
spring of 1663 they were complete; and a commission
was appointed to report on the execution of the gigantic
work. 8
Meanwhile the English were equally busy strengthen*
ing their hold on the Straits. It became clearer every
day that they were not to be permitted to enjoy calmly
the vantage point they had gained. The Spaniards and
Dutch were negotiating for a joint fleet against Algiers—
1 Hodgkin MSS. 16S ; Jal, Du Quans, 275.
* Eutoirs da Rkquet, p. 804 Ao.; L$Uru de Colbert, toL W. jmnm*
Digitized by
Google
36 FIRST OCCUPATION OF THE STRAITS • 1668
in itself a suspicious indication. In Cadiz the Duke of
Albuquerque was preparing a powerful armada. Fan-
shaw had reason to believe the Spanish Government was
in communication not only with the Dutch but also with
Guylan, the ' Emperor of Fez/ who by this time had
made himself master of the whole of Morocco, with the
exception of Salee, Tetuan, and the Spanish port of
Ceuta. He had appeared in the neighbourhood of
Tangier with a formidable army. Hostilities were con-
stantly occurring between his men and the British
garrison, till it was thought well to make a serious sally.
On May 3 it was attempted ; the Moors were driven
headlong from their advanced positions ; but so hotly did
the English troops pursue their advantage that they
eventually found themselves surrounded, and were beaten
back with heavy loss. For the time, however, Guylan
had had enough, and, moving off against Tetuan, began to
make overtures for peace. Still he was not to be trusted.
Fanshaw believed that the intention of the Spanish
Government was that Albuquerque should blockade
Tangier, while Guylan suddenly returned to attack it
from the land side. He convinced himself that this was
the meaning of Guylan's recent appearance before the
place, and that it was only the opportune arrival of Law-
son from a cruise up the Straits that had frustrated the
design. 1 Under the circumstances it was determined to
replace Peterborough by a more experienced officer. A
man of the right stamp was at hand in Lord Rutherford,
the late Governor of Dunkirk. A Scottish soldier of for-
tune, who had risen with high distinction to the rank of
' Fanshaw to Clarendon, October SI, 1662 (HtathcoU MSS. p. 87 ;
cL Dora, Armada Etpafiola, t. cap. iv. and App. p. 446). Albuquerque's
feet, according at least to Ms official orders, was intended to oarer the arrival
of the Plate fleet and then to operate against Portugal.
Digitized by
Google
l««3 IX)RD TEVIOT MADE GOVERNOR S7
Lieutenant-General in the French service, he repre-
sented the last word of the Low Country school of
military science ; and with the surrender of Dunkirk he
was free for employment. A fat pension induced Peter-
borough to resign, while an earldom persuaded Ruther-
ford to take his place. In the spring of 1663 all was
ready to make the occupation of Tangier a reality.
Lawson had come home in the winter to replace his
spent ships, and was ready with a fresh fleet to take out
the new Governor with reinforcements and everything
that was necessary for establishing a naval station. In
spite of his growing financial embarrassments Charles
had decided to set aside 30,0002. a year for constructing a
harbour, and a contract to that effect had been signed.
The contractors were Rutherford, now Earl of Teviot,
Lawson the admiral, and Sir Hugh Cholmley, an engi-
neer who had recently completed a pier at Whitby.
They were welcomed at their destination by the news
that Schomberg, at the head of his Anglo-Portuguese
army, had inflicted a crushing defeat at the frontier upon
Don John of Austria, the Spanish General. The victory
greatly relieved the situation by crippling the power of
Spanish interference at Tangier. Teviot, moreover, at
a first view, expressed himself as highly contented with
the place, 1 and got to work at once upon the fortifica-
tions. Two advanced forts were commenced, and the
whole line of outworks strengthened with calthrops,
mines, retrenchments, and every device which the latest
military science could suggest. Scarcely were the
additions complete when Guylan, who had received the
submission of Tetuan, appeared in force, and made a
determined attack upon the new works. As the assault
^ ■ Faaihaw to 8m. Bennet, Jane 7, 1668, HeathcoU M88. p. 110.
Digitized by
Google
88 FIRST OCCUPATION OF THE STRAITS 1663
was delivered between twelve and one, when the men
were dining, it was to some extent a surprise; but, thanks
to Teviot's scientific preparation, and the energy with
which the troops showered hand-grenades upon the
Moors, they were driven back with heavy loss. So soon
as the Moors had retired, Teviot, being a man of grim
humour, sent Guylan a letter complaining of the way he
had chosen to pay his visit of welcome. He objected to
being disturbed at his meals, and reminded the Moor that
it was not customary or polite to pay calls at dinner
time. Guylan appears to have been very favourably
impressed. He replied in the same spirit, and a corre-
spondence ensued which resulted in a truce for six
months. 1
The cessation secured, Teviot, after seeing the works
on the mole fairly started, went home to report to the
King and obtain the men and stores which the place
required. His chief demand was for two hundred horse,
for already he had grasped the importance of the offen-
sive in oriental warfare. Nothing was denied him. He
was thoroughly trusted, and Tangier, as Fanshaw put it,
was regarded as one of the best cards in the English
hand, ' which must not be trumped.' * It had been consti-
tuted a separate department of state under what was
called the Tangier Council, of which the Duke of York,
Prince Bupert, Monk, Southampton, the Governor, the
Master of the Ordnance, the Treasurer of the Navy, and
Samuel Pepys were members. Though Pepys could
discern something very curious in the accounts Teviot
presented, none of the great men said a word, and he,
like a good civil servant, held his tongue. So Teviot had
all he asked, even the permission to take over Salee
a Dfc¥is,a*fM9.
• Fuuhaw toGbmdon, October 31, 1662, BeathcoU M88. p. 89.
Digitized by
Google
1663 8PANISH INTRIGUES WITH THE MOORS SO
castle, if it were offered him, as was not unlikely, since it
was in the hands of Guylan's hard-pressed rival. 1
The energy which Teviot displayed at home was no
more than was wanted. During his absence the danger
that had been menacing Tangier had been making head
fast. No sooner had his back been turned than it was
known that Quylan had had an interview with a special
envoy from the King of Spain between Tetuan and the
Spanish possession of Ceuta. The news was quickly
followed by a still more serious discovery. A short time
previously a German engineer called Martin Beckman,
or Boeckmann, had arrived at Tangier to offer his pro-
fessional services to the British. 1 Employment was
refused him, but he was apparently given to understand
that he might make himself useful as a spy in Spain.
In any case he proceeded to Cadiz and made overtures
to the Duke of Medina-Celi, Governor of Andalusia,
as an expert familiar with the defences of Tangier, and
ready to assist in the recovery of the place to the Spanish
crown. The King authorised the Duke to take the man
into the royal service, but desired him not to commit
himself to anything else until they had heard further
from Guylan. Shortly after this Beckman gave warning
to the English Consul at Cadiz that a design against
Tangier was on foot, and, in a few weeks, so well did he
prosper that he secured copies of a series of letters from
the King to the Duke of Medina-Celi, in which the whole
plan of campaign was laid down. So at least he alleged,
and in England the documents were believed to be
authentic. The scheme appears to have turned mainly
1 Pepys's Diary, September 80, 1668; &JP. Colonial, Tangier, Bundle ii.
October 20.
* His name is variously spelt, bat afterwards, when he rose to high
distinction in the British senrioe, he was usually known as Sir Martin
Bookman.
Digitized by
Google
40 FIRST OCCUPATION OF THK STRAITS 1664
upon the use of the galleons of the Indian Guard. At
the moment they came in, when no one would suspect
them of further action, instead of careening they were at
once to proceed to sea again, and in concert with the
Cadiz galley squadron to make a swift descent on Tangier
and seize it by a coup de main}
The whole of these documents were handed to Teviot,
so that before he left England he was fully aware of
what was on foot. Before the end of the year his
preparations were complete, and he sailed with Lawson
in time to reach Tangier on January 14, 1664, a week
before the expiration of the six months' truce. A further
move was made at the same time by sending Sir Richard
Fanshaw as Ambassador to Madrid with instructions to
mediate between Spain and Portugal, and among other
matters to request immediate permission for British ships
to use the Spanish ports in the Balearic islands and the
Two Sicilies, and especially Port Mahon in Minorca.
To further enable him to force the Spanish hand he
too was furnished with copies of Beckman's docu-
ments. 1
On Teviot's arrival he found that the Acting-Governor,
anxious at the approaching termination of the truce and
having no news of his chief's return, had procured its
prolongation for two months on condition that nothing
further should be done on the mole or the forts. To
this Teviot politely told Guylan he could not agree, as
his master had ordered him to proceed with the works.
Hostilities consequently reopened, and at the end of
1 The King of Spain to the Duke of Medina-Ccli, September 22 (o.s.)
1S6S (Btatkcot* MSS. p. 180). Despatch of Colonel Fitsgerald, Acting-
Governor of Tangier, October 34 (&P. Colonial, Tangier, ii.). Despatch of
ike Cadis Consul, October 99, ibid.
» Letters of 8w Richard Fanshaw, 1702. Instruction dated January 14,
MSft,B.lo*a*f.
Digitized by
Google
1664 TEVIOT DEFEATS THE MOOR8 41
February Guylan attacked in force. After a few hours*
defence Teviot ordered a sally, and with such judgment
and energy was it pushed home that the Moors were
completely defeated with the loss of a prominent general
and his standard. They returned baffled, vowing Teviot
was the devil himself. They had stories that he was
invulnerable, that he never slept except leaning up
against some of his new works, and that he had invented
flying ships and guns that ran alone. 1 The impression
was real and well justified. The extraordinary intuition
he displayed for dealing with orientals marks him for a
high place among our early proconsuls. His conduct
after the victory further reveals his power. Some of the
English dead had been found mutilated. Instead of
retaliating he caused the bodies of the Moors that were
in his hands to be washed and clothed in fine linen
and laid on biers strewn with flowers. Then, preceded
by a flag of truce, he and all his force in review order
solemnly escorted them to his outermost lines and de-
livered them to the Moors. The effect was profound, and
the Moorish warriors with one accord bared their heads
and ungirded their waistcloths, humbled almost to adora-
tion.
After the victory the works went on apace. The main
trouble was lime, which the Spanish officials did their
best to prevent his getting, going so far as to treat his
men, who came to fetch it, not only as enemies but as
rebels. Still Teviot was not disheartened. 'A gallant
man,' he wrote, 'never wanted arms. 9 His only doubt
was the rankling memory of Dunkirk, surrendered after
all the energy he had spent on its fortifications. He was
sure, he said, that in spite of every difficulty Tangier in
' Britf Relation of th* Prtuni SiaU of Tangimrt, 1664.
Digitized by
Google
43 FIRST OCCUPATION OF THE STRAITS 1664
two yean 9 time, unless given up or sold, would be a very
comfortable place and a pleasant too. 1
Meanwhile Lawson with the fleet was exhibiting his
characteristic activity. During the past summer the
Algerines, in spite of the treaty, had been behaving as
badly as ever and preying on British ships in the Straits.
They had even captured Teviot's own ketch. To Algiers
therefore Lawson again betook himself. By the end of
March he had made them disgorge eighteen English
prizes. ' But/ as he wrote, ' till it please God to make
them feel some smart, no peace can be made with them
but what is worse than war.' ' So he remained where he
was, blockading the port and capturing its cruisers with
his wonted success till the work was interrupted about the
end of May by a melancholy summons.
One of those sudden disasters had occurred which
were destined to become so familiar to British arms on
African soil. All through April, by a well-conceived
series of reconnaissances and patrols, Teviot had been
pushing his enemy further and further back while he
completed the lines which he considered the nature of
the ground demanded. His officers delighted to say, he
fought with one hand while he built with the other, and
that it was only half his business to beat the Moors. On
May 3, the anniversary of the disaster in Peterborough's
time, he was engaged in another such operation in force.
He was acting with his usual boldness and with all the
skill and care that his high experience could suggest,
when in a wooded place he suddenly found himself and
his staff cut off by the enemy and his troops surrounded
by overwhelming numbers. In spite of the steadiness of
• T*rk* to Con**] Wwtoombe at Cadi*, April 15, 1664, HtathcoU M8S.
148;Itori*,6a.
• I«wmi to F*n*h*w, Iferah 98, 1664, HeathcoU M8S. p. 148.
Digitized by
Google
1664 SURPRISE AND DEATH OF TEVIOT 43
the men, practically the whole force was annihilated.
Some thirty-five officers and gentlemen volunteers and
nearly four hundred rank and file were killed, and with'
them Teviot himself. Not ten men, it was said, escaped
to bring the tale, and they told how the Governor had
seized a hill with all the men he could rally, and there
had died fighting to the last and dealing death around
him. So perished a gallant and accomplished Scottish
soldier, the first of a long list of others like him who
were to lead the stormy way that Great Britain had
begun to tread. Years afterwards Pepys was assured on
the spot that the death of Lord Teviot was the fate of
the place, ' for he took all the ways to have made it
great.' l
Their victory won, the Moors flung themselves upon
the British lines, but only to learn that if the Devil was
dead his spirit lived. They were hurled back, and so
great were Guylan's losses in the two actions that. for a
while he was forced to leave the place in peace. Then a
reaction set in. The garrison became demoralised and
mutinous. The opportune arrival of two royal frigates
availed to check the evil, but all was not safe till Lawson,
who had flown to the rescue at the first summons,
appeared in the bay with the bulk of his squadron.
1 Smith, Life, Journal, and Ccrrupond*nc$ of Sammd Papfo (Tanpar
Diary), i. 444.
Digitized by
Google
CHAPTER XXI .
TANGIER AND ITS ENEMIES
Tragic as was its conclusion, the governorship of Lord
Teviot had firmly established the British occupation of
the Straits. It was none too soon. New danger was in
the air, and Lawson's ready response to his summons
was doubly welcome. ' Sir John Lawson,' wrote Fan-
shaw on June 5, 1664, ' is now at Tangier worthily con-
cerned for a place of that consequence after so great a.
I06S as it lately sustained, and especially when the
rumours are so hot of a war with Holland/ For the
old quarrel was burning into a flame again, and on all
sides the horizon looked dark for England, and especially
for her Mediterranean power. Holland steadily refused
redress for the outrages which English merchants had
suffered, and De Ruyter with a fresh ' corsair ' squadron
had been sent down to the Straits. The States had
requested the British Government to co-operate with him
against Algiers ; but, although they had a squadron ready
under Sir Robert Holmes ostensibly for that purpose,
they had refused, and Holmes had sailed to the south-
ward. His real orders were to run down to Cape Verde
and there exact reprisals upon the ships and factories of
the Dutch East India Company. At the time this was
of course a secret, but the worst was suspected, and
De Buyter received orders to keep a careful watch on
Lawson. Spain too was still hostile and known to be
Digitized by
Google
1664 rr8 GROWING IMPORTANCE 46
in communication with Guylan. France, far from
friendly, had a powerful expedition on the point of
sailing from Toulon, and no one knew its destination.
The strategical value of Tangier had never been so
apparent, and everything seemed to threaten it. ' Guy-
lan/ continued Fanshaw in the despatch already quoted,
'hath been at them again, but bravely repulsed. The
truth is, I believe there is no nation that knows Tangier
which doth not wish it in any hand rather than that in
which it is.' Charles was equally impressed with its
importance. Neither danger nor disaster could shake
his determination to hold the vantage point he had won.
A new Spanish ambassador was sent to London to pro-
pose friendly terms upon which the place might be sur-
rendered; but it was only to receive from the Sing's
Jips an answer so sharp as to make further discussion of *
the subject impossible. So soon as Teviot's disaster was
known in England, Colonel Fitzgerald, an Irish officer
who had formerly been Deputy-Governor, was sent out
with reinforcements to take charge, and he actively pro-
ceeded to complete Teviot's works. By the middle of
July, Fanshaw could write home again, ' Now that all is
exceedingly well at Tangier, even before the recruits'
arrival, give me leave to say my thoughts : that, whether
the King have peace with all the world or must have
war with all the world, nothing like Tangier, with the
mole speedily finished to perfection, in order to the
quiet enjoyment of the one or vigorous prosecution of
the other.' l
The far-reaching ideas of which Tangier was the
symbol showed no sign of abating. At this time was
published a rose-coloured account of the place, and the
apology the author makes for it in his preface is highly
UtUrt, p. 166, to See. Bennei, July 19-29, 1664.
Digitized by
Google
46 TANGIER AND ITS ENEMIES 1664
significant. He justifies the costly works: 'Firstly,
because here is set down the great passage to the wealth
of Africa and America, where an acre of ground is a
barony and a rood a duchy. Secondly, because this and
the country round is like to be that renowned scene of
action which will render us considerable in this last age
of the world. The French intend to make themselves
famous by seeking out a convenient footing in this
country; no doubt we shall be so also for keeping
ours/ 1
Such enthusiasm was certainly not without justifica-
tion at the moment. By this time the atmosphere in the
Mediterranean was clearing. All through the summer
Lawson and De Ruyter hod been watching one another,
each suspecting the other of an intention to make some
sudden attack. About August Lawson began to get the
upper hand. Thanks, to Fanshaw's diplomacy and
Charles's resolute attitude the Spaniards at least officially
had recognised the status quo at Tangier, and were turn-
ing their backs on the Dutch. Lawson was allowed
liberty of Spanish ports for water and cleaning, while
De Ruyter was everywhere refused pratique. Thus, as
Lawson shifted between Cadiz and Malaga, Tangier and
Algiers, keeping his fleet clean and well furnished,
De Ruyter was at his wit's end to keep his eye on him,
and every day his ships grew fouler. One day, early in
September, the two admirals met off Malaga. Lawson
had been informed by the Spaniards that De Ruyter had
just received orders so pressing that the courier who
carried them had travelled from Holland in seven days.
With cordial civilities he did his best to find out what
the orders were, and, failing, held away to cover Tangier.
The fact was that news had come of Holmes's reprisals
1 A Ducripfam of Tangimrg, 1664.
Digitized by
Google
1664 EVE OF THE SECOND DUTCH WAR 47
at Cape Verde. The mysterious orders which De Ruyter
had received were that he was to follow him with
all speed, and a few weeks later, after vainly trying to
careen his ships at Cadiz, he disappeared out into the
Atlantic. 1
The French danger had also passed. The Toulon
expedition, which had grown to sixty sail of war-ships,
galleys, and transports, after ominously assembling at
Port Mahon under the Due de Beaufort and Du Quesne,
had sailed away up the sea, and were soon busy with
Louis's African venture to the eastward of Algiers, and
well away from the British sphere of action. Tangier
was left in peace, with the result that by October the
whole of the lines and outworks which Teviot had pro-
jected were complete, and thus, as the war drew nearer
and nearer, Colonel Fitzgerald felt he was able to take
good care of himself and his charge.' In view of the
now inevitable war with Hollaed, Lawson went home to
take up a higher command, and Admiral Thomas Allin,
who had been one of Rupert's captains in his pirate days
and was then Commander-in-Chief in the Downs, came
out to succeed him. Before he had been more than a
month on the station he had completed Lawson's work
by procuring from Algiers a renewal of the old treaty,
and in reporting his success he was able to send news of
an event beside which even Teviot's disaster must have
seemed eclipsed.'
Throughout the summer Beaufort with his formidable
force had been busy making good his hold on the African
coast. The place ultimately chosen was not Stora but
1 Michel de Butter, p. 90S et seq.
• Colonel Fitzgerald to Fanahaw, October 8-18, 1664, Heathcote M88.
167.
• Heathcote M88. Norember 18-98, 1664, p. 169. Fan$haw>e Letter*
December 9 (u), p. 847.
Digitized by
Google
48 TANGIER AND ITS ENEMIES 1664
Gigeri, now called Jigelli, a little to the westward. 1 On
July 22 the place had been captured with considerable
skill, but at the cost of some four hundred killed, besides
wounded. Still the news was hailed in France, especially
by the mercantile community, with high satisfaction, and
a convoy was despatched from Toulon under the Marquis
de Martel with an abundance of stores and two troops of
hone. The idea which Louis had in his mind was the
establishment of a permanent naval base similar to that
which the English were creating at Tangier. Colbert,
however, was unwilling to commit himself definitely to
Gigeri until it was clearly ascertained to be the most
suitable spot. He called for a report from the naval
officers. Du Quesne, though not entirely satisfied with
the place, thought it might be made a useful harbour,
and there was every prospect of its being held. About
the middle of October, Beaufort, having seen the military
well established, moved to the westward to make an
attempt on Bougie, leaving Martel and his vessels in the
road. No sooner was he gone than a sort of panic appears
to have seized the troops, and, as some said, the officers as
well. In constant skirmishes with the enemy they had
been suffering serious loss. In spite of their efforts their
assailants were still pressing closer, even erecting fresh
works, till the cry was raised that the French lines were
no longer tenable. From hour to hour, as the enemy's
numbers increased, the panic grew till it became uncon-
trollable. The troops openly said that, unless the place
were evacuated, they would desert and turn Turk, and
finally the officers decided to re-embark them in Martel 'b
ships. Four days after Beaufort had left, it was done- in the
dead of night and in haste. Sick and wounded, the whole
1 la eoatempomy doeumanto the pleoe if called Gigeri, OigherU,
r, Gigery, Jejine, end the like.
Digitized by
Google
1064 RIVAL PROJECT OF THE FRENCH 4©
of the stores and baggage, guns to the number of over a,
hundred —all were abandoned : and so in a shameless flight
ended Louis's first attempt to extend his power in the
Mediterranean. In France the shock was severely felt.
Everything was done to hush up the disgrace, but tlie
loss had been too great for concealment, and the disap-
pointment of the merchants too deep. And to fill the
bitter cup there was always Tangier growing every month
in importance to show what might have been achieved. 1
Thus, in comparison with the French misfortunes, the
English position on the eve of Charles's first struggle for
the dominion of the sea was highly favourable — so favour-
able indeed that Tangier was left to shift for itself. When,
towards the end of November, Allin returned from Algiers
with his squadron, he found orders awaiting him to seize
the Dutch Smyrna convoy as it attempted to pass the '
Straits. It was in anticipation of some such stroke that
De Buy ter had been left shadowing Lawson all the summer ;
but now the coast was clear. War had not yet been
declared, though it had practically begun. By this time
it was known that when De Euyter left the Mediterranean
he had sailed southward against the English factories in
Guinea in revenge for what Holmes had done. Allin's
orders therefore were but another step into the inevitable
struggle that had to be fought out. Unfortunately, before
the Smyrna convoy appeared, Allin met with a severe
disaster. One evening about the middle of December,
having sighted wtfat he believed to be a Dutch fleet in
the last of the daylight, he gave chase through the Straits.
It was a foul and rainy night, and so dark that he and
four of his captains, in their eagerness, ran themselves
ashore on the Spanish coast near Gibraltar. Two of the
frigates were totally wrecked, and, though he managed to
1 Jal, Du Quunt, I 81ft-96 ; Gafein, iii. 156-8.
VOL. II. X
Digitized by
Google
» TANGIER AND ITS ENEMIE8 1065
get his flagship off again, and to save the other two
frigates, they were all severely damaged. He was in this
plight when another Dutch fleet of fourteen sail appeared,
in which were three men-of-war. He had now but seven
of his nine vessels left, but he attacked at once* crippled
as he was. The three men-of-war escaped into Cadiz.
Of the merchantmen he sank two and captured two, one
of which proved a rich prize. Under the circumstances
it was a creditable achievement, and, but for the unlucky
mishap that preceded it, would probably have accomplished
all that had been expected. 1
In pursuance probably of the old policy of concentra-
tion on the enemy's main fleet, Allin was now ordered
home with a convoy, and the Straits were abandoned to
the Dutch. Some anxiety was felt by men on the spot.
De Euyter was still somewhere to the southward ; three
Dutch men-of-war were in Cadiz, only waiting for Allin' 8
disappearance to put to sea, and private vessels were also
being equipped. 2 To give heart to the garrison Lord
Belasyse came out as Governor — a man of little military
reputation, but energetic and sanguine, and a great
person at Court. His appointment at least put an end
to a demoralising rumour. During the winter it had
been persistently reported that Louis, having failed at
Gigeri, had offered to purchase Tangier, and that Charles
had agreed to sell. Quidnuncs could even name the
sum.*
But the tale could not survive the arrival of Lord
■ Allin to Fanshaw, December 17, 1664, Heatheote M8S. p. 179, and
AJ». Dam. cri t 111. Same to same, December 35, HeathcoU MS8. p. 173
aad&P.2X>m.eTiLf.3S.
* 8ame to Coventry, Gibraltar Bay, January 15, 1665, HeathcoU MS8.
p. 174. He did not get away till the end of February, ibid. p. 179.
• Fanshaw to Lord Holies, March 39, 1665, Heatheote MSS. 168.
W. Hhmden to Fanshaw, April 10, ibid., where he says the rumour arose
from an English frigate transporting French treasure.
Digitized by
Google
1665 TANGIER DURING THE WAR 51
Belasyse,and only served to mark the increasing importance
of the place. ' I conceive/ wrote a merchant to Fanshaw,
'it is the most important place in Christendom for his
Majesty and the good of our nation ; and when the mole
is built and magazines, it may maintain itself with little
or no charge to the Crown. It was an obscure place and
not known till delivered to his Majesty, and now the
whole world sees how much the case is altered by the
change of possessor.' Fanshaw himself was entirely of
this opinion, and his only anxiety was lest Belasyse should
not be left ships enough, as he said, ' to make our stake
good in the Mediterranean against an upstart fleet which
the Dutch were then scrambling together.'
But no squadron was spared for Tangier, though letters
of marque were sent out for private ships ; and during the
summer, while the war was raging in the Narrow Seas,
the upstart Dutch fleet blockaded the port. But it mat-
tered little. It had been fully provisioned and the mole
was so far advanced that a battery had been established
upon it that kept the enemy at a distance. The blockade
was consequently loose and easily run by the British
frigates that from time to time appeared with convoys .
or despatches. Merchantmen too were able to use it as
a port of refuge in running the gauntlet through the
Straits. In the autumn a fleet of twenty Levant merchant-
men and victuallers for Tangier, under a weak convoy,
arrived. The Dutch attacked, and though they defeated
the war ships, all but four of the merchantmen got safely
into Tangier and were able to pursue their voyage. 1 The
effect was — according to a calculation made for the first
year of the war — that the Dutch did not capture enough
prizes to cover much more than half the cost of main-
1 8 J*. Colonial, Tangier, ir. t . 10.
■ a
Digitized by VjOOQLC
63 TANGIER AND ITS ENEMIES 1665
taining their squadron. 1 In vain the Spanish officials in
Andalusia did their best to thwart the progress of the
port; in vain they continued their intrigues with Guylan.
The place throve in spite of every difficulty ; the mole
pushed further and further to seaward ; and in the face of
every enemy England was slowly locking her hold upon
the Mediterranean.
If to Spain and Holland the situation was unendur-
able, still more so was it to France. It was impossible
for Louis, seeing what his ambitions were, to sit quietly
and see his fetters forged. The first battle in the war
had resulted in a defeat for the Dutch. It seemed cer-
tain that, if left alone, their sea power must be crushed,
and this Louis could not permit. It would mean that
England, well placed as she was, would rule undisputed
upon the seas both within and without the Straits, and
that hers, not his, would be the inheritance of Spain.
After an ineffectual effort, therefore, to induce England to
make peace, he resolved to force her i.ito it by a declara-
tion of war.
It was no fancied danger that disturbed him. Already
at Brussels, in view of the certainty that sooner or later
France must throw in her lot with the Dutch, the most
far-sighted of Englishmen was at work. No. man so
clearly foresaw the formidable expansion of France as Sir
William Temple, and no one so justly apprehended the
way to curb it. As minister resident at Brussels, he
was deep in the subject with the Spanish Viceroy, and at
his suggestion was urging upon Charles's Government an
offensive and defensive alliance with Spain against the
coming danger. It was always in Flanders, since the days
of Alva, that had sprung and thriven the idea that the salva-
1 Ooonl Weftoombe of Cadii to Fanshaw, December 81, 166*, HtathooU
If 55. p.!
Digitized by
Google
1665 SIR WILLIAM TEMPLETS IDEA 63
tion of Spain lay in an understanding with England, and
it was from there the idea was most likely to grow to
fruition. But in the design which Temple was formu-
lating there was a new factor that made its possibilities
more formidable than ever. A main feature of the pro-
posed alliance, suggested apparently by the Viceroy, was
that Spain should permit England to establish a naval
base in Sardinia. With a squadron of frigates acting
from there, and the command of the Straits at Tangier, it
seemed that the French trade in the Mediterranean, on
which Louis so much depended for his resources, might
be annihilated. Temple received the idea with enthusiasm,
and for doing so has been ridiculed even by his admirers.
' In ascribing to our naval power, 9 says his latest biogra-
pher, ' an overwhelming influence upon the affairs of
Europe, Temple was not justified either by past history
or by the events of this particular war/ ! But he is
certainly justified by future history and the wars to come.
Nor is it clear that, if Spain and England had united for
naval action in the Mediterranean, the result of the par-
ticular war might not have been radically changed. The
French Toulon fleet, as we shall see, could never have
passed the Straits, and the diversion, which prevented a
decisive English victory in the Narrow Seas, would never
have been made.
Of that at least tKere can be no doubt whatever. The
French plan of campaign was founded on a concentration
of their own fleet with that of the Dutch in the North
Sea. Beaufort, who was in command at Toulon, was to
come out of the Straits and effect a junction with the
Atlantic squadron under Du Quesne; and, unless they
were in time to pass the Channel before the English fleet
got to sea, they were to endeavour to join hands with
1 Courtesy, Memoirt of Sir W. TVmpfc, 1S8*, L 7B.
Digitized by
Google
64 TANGIER AND ITS ENEMIES 1666
the Batch main fleet north-about. To formulate the
plan was to be at once confronted with the difficulty of
getting Beaufort out of the Mediterranean. ' To ensure
the security of M. de Beaufort's passage,' wrote Colbert,
• I think the only way is to increase the number of his
vessels by uniting with them a division of those which
are at present on the west coast, and to strengthen his
squadron with the largest number of fire-ships possible.'
As a further precaution he desired that the ships detailed
for this purpose from the Atlantic ports should go down
as far as the Straits and effect the junction there ; and
even so Colbert was doubtful whether the operation could
be carried out successfully unless they were sure of a
friendly reception in Cadiz. 1
With this project in view war was declared in January
1666, but no sooner was the step definitely taken
than Sir Jeremy Smith, an old Commonwealth officer,
was despatched with a strong squadron to the Straits.
His mission was primarily convoy duty to protect the
Levant trade ; but Colbert saw his whole combination
struck at the root, and sent down urgent orders to
Beaufort to get to sea immediately, and drive Smith from
the Mediterranean before he could enter the Straits. But
Beaufort was unable to move. In despair Colbert ordered
the Toulon squadron of galleys to be fitted for sea with
all speed, for, as he said, Smith would probably be rein-
forced before Beaufort could get at him. To spur the
galley commander to his highest efforts he told him he
had the chance of striking the winning stroke of the war —
the coup de partie — in the Mediterranean.' Colbert at
any rate did not conceal from himself where the key of
1 Jalf Du Qmnm, L S7S.
• Lttfrm* CoUfrf, m. L 59 and 69, February 15-35 and March 6-10,
Digitized by
Google
1606 SIR JEREMY SMITH'S MOVE «5
the situation lay, and the anxiety which he displayed
certainly does not belie the importance which Temple
had attached to naval operations in the Mediterranean.
By the middle of February Sir Jeremy Smith reached
Cadiz, where he was allowed to water, and during March
he was about the Straits and in touch with Tangier with
fifteen or sixteen frigates. The effect was immediate.
Beaufort's intended move was checked. In vain Colbert
dwelt on the insignificance of the English force and urged
his admiral to attack. So long as Smith held the station
Beaufort would not or could not stir. Seamen were hard
to get, and yet he kept adding to his squadron and fitting
out fire-ship after fire-ship to the derision of the English. 1
Besides his fire-ships and auxiliary vessels he had thirty
men-of-war of his own of all rates, and eight of the
1 upstart ' fleet, which the Dutch had scrambled together
and which had retired before Smith into Toulon.' Even
so he did not move till a squadron of twelve galleys was
ready to accompany him to the Straits. Ne^er was the
advantage of the Tangier station more emphatically
declared, and yet at the critical moment it was thrown
away.
At home the naval action of the French was not the
gravest anxiety. Louis was also engaged in a formidable
diplomatic campaign to isolate England by a widespread
coalition of all the powers that had reason to be jealous
of her predominance on the sea. In London therefore
the Government was rightly absorbed in the importance
of crushing the Dutch sea power before the threatened
coalition could take effect. The campaign of the previous
1 Lett™ de Colbert, HI. i. 69 ; Jal, Du Quun*, i. 409 ; HeaihcoU MSS.
248.
* It is intonating to note that Beaufort's fleet contained a hospital shin.
The other auxiliaries were tenders or 'Matelotes' to larger ships. Jai,
Du Qutn*, i. 890 ; HeathcoU MSS. 961.
Digitized by
Google
M TANGIER AND ITS ENEMIES 1666
year had fully convinced them of the necessity of concen-
trating at all hazards an overwhelming force in the North
Sea. Its results had been far from satisfactory. The
main fleet had been under the Duke of York, Prince
Rupert, and Sandwich, with Sir John Lawson as senior
vice-admiral. At the battle of Lowestoft they had done
well enough. But in the death of Lawson, who was
mortally wounded in the action, the fleet lost its most
ardent spirit, and the fruits of the victory had not been
gathered with sufficient activity. The two Princes betook
themselves ashore to enjoy the sweets of the victory, and
Sandwich had been left in sole command. In his
inadequate or unwilling hands everything that the late
success should have secured was lost. As usual the
Dutch were plunged into demoralising political dissensions
over their defeat, and could not agree on the appointment
of commanders for the next year's campaign. De Buyter
was the only man likely to secure confidence. Everything
depended on his safe return, and he was still no one quite
knew where. Having taken a full revenge for Holmes's
reprisals on the West Coast of Africa, he had proceeded
to the West Indies, and, after doing considerable damage
both there and off Newfoundland, was feeling his way
home along the coast of Norway. It was a hazardous
end to his great cruise. Encumbered with prizes, and
with his fleet barely seaworthy, he seemed a certain prey
to an admiral in command of the North Sea. Yet
Sandwich, with everything in his favour, failed to inter-
cept him. By a miracle, which he devoutly attributed to
the special intervention of Providence, he reached the
Texel in safety, and just in time to receive the command
of the main fleet, and to give new heart to the despondent
Dutch with the story of his long and eventful cruise.
Monk at the Admiralty was naturally furious. Sand-
Digitized by
Google
1066 MONK GOES TO SEA AGAIN 67
wich had further clouded his reputation with some irre-
gularities about prize money which the stern old Croni-
wellian made the most of. A change of command became
inevitable. The Duke of York was persuaded not to
endanger his life further. Sandwich, to ease his fall, was
appointed Ambassador to Spain with instructions to
complete the negotiations which Fanshaw had been
hitherto conducting. Rupert was to remain, but not
alone. As usual, when in a difficulty, it was to Monk
the country looked to save the situation. During the
terrible year that had passed the redoubtable old General
had remained alone in London to fight the plague when
every one else had run away to Oxford, and he had been
conducting single-handed practically the whole adminis-
tration of the country. With considerable nervousness
the King was persuaded to make a still higher call upon
his patriotism, and sent for him to see if he could be
induced to go to sea again. The devoted old officer
immediately consented with the sole proviso that his wife
must not be told ; and when it was known that Cromwell's
right-hand man, the hero of the old war, was girding on
his sword again, victory was regarded as certain.
It was now apparently that the fatal though perhaps
necessary step was taken. Monk, as we know, had
always been in favour of sacrificing the Straits to his
inflexible belief in concentration on the enemy's main
fleet. Had he been aware of the inefficient condition of
the Toulon squadron his orthodoxy might have been
relaxed. For a time it even looked as though his old
strategy was to be modified. While his preparations for
the coming campaign were pushed forward with all
possible vigour, a small squadron was detached to carry
Sandwich to Spain. It reached Corona in the middle
of March, while Colbert was doing his best to drive
Digitized by
Google
68 TANGIER AND ITS ENEMIES 1666
Beaufort to sea. In the south, where Beaufort's weak-
ness was better known, it was naturally believed that
Sandwich's squadron had come to reinforce Smith and
place him in a condition to hold the Straits. But as a
matter of fact the orders it brought were the reverse of
what was expected. Smith and his squadron were re-
called. It had never apparently been intended that he
should remain longer than was necessary to collect the
homeward bound Levant trade. Smith, moreover, was
an officer on whom Monk placed great reliance, and such
men, as he never ceased to lament, were growing scarcer
every day among the crowd of dandy captains whom
the Court inflicted on him. So once more the Straits
were abandoned at the most critical hour. Still, Monk
can hardly be blamed. It may be that to risk a squadron
at the Straits would have been the more brilliant and
dazing strategy, but it is as certain as war can be that
had either plan of campaign been drastically carried out
all would have gone well.
On April 19 Beaufort at last put to sea. in ten days'
time he was at Alicante, where he was told that Smith
had left Cadiz homeward bound on March 25. The
information was not accurate. Perhaps Beaufort did not
believe it. At any rate he moved cautiously down to
Malaga, and there anchored for further intelligence and
to allow the galley squadron which had lost touch to close
up. On its arrival he ventured as far as Gibraltar, and
finding there certain assurance that Smith had gone home
a month before, he dismissed the galleys and proceeded to
Cadiz. Considering that Beaufort's orders were to make
for the Straits with all speed and defeat Smith before he
could escape, his cautious advance tells a plain tale. He
and his officers knew their fleet too well. In fact, it was
no fleet at all, but a mere mass of ships. Many of them
Digitized by
Google
1066 EFFECT OF SMITH'S RECALL 59
were not even men-of-war, but merchantmen purchased
and hastily equipped. All were still so short of men that
Beaufort had had to send emissaries to Algiers to redeem
captives at any price, and in Cadiz he pressed every
Frenchman he could find in a foreign ship. So lament-
able was his manoeuvring that when he turned into the
bay some Genoese, who had availed themselves of his
convoy, declared they were ashamed to see how the
Frenchmen handled their sails, and that ' twenty English
frigates would rout them all to pieces/ l This was doubt-
less too much to say ; but it is probable that if Smith,
reinforced with Sandwich's ships, had been permitted to *
hold his ground, Beaufort would not have attempted to
pass the Straits until Du Quesne appeared to help him
with the Atlantic squadron. It is certain that if single-
handed he had made the attempt in face of so compact
and formidable a squadron with so strong a man as
Jeremy Smith at its head, his fleet, even if victorious,
would have ceased to be a factor in the campaign capable
of disturbing the English strategy in the Narrow Seas.
As it was, with no enemy to oppose him, Beaufort got no
further than Lisbon. Louis was nervous lest a division
of the English main fleet might be detached against him,
and after passing the Straits he received orders to put into
the Tagus and remain there till Du Quesne could join
him.*
A very serious aspect of the strategy which the
English Admiralty adopted was the danger to which it
exposed Tangier. Every one believed, in view of the
nature of Beaufort's force, that Tangier was his zeal ob-
jective. Fortunately it was in a very favourable condition
1 Oontul Wettoombe to Fuuhaw, Umj 1S-2S, 1666, HvUhooU M88.
•61.
* M. Du Quun$ 9 L 899 n. and 410.
Digitized by
Google
00 TANGIER AND IT8 ENEMIES 1066
for defence. A new Moorish conqueror had arisen who
was pressing Guylan hard, and in alarm he reopened nego-
tiations with the English Governor, which resulted in a firm
peace. This done, Belasyse went home in one of Smith's
frigates, leaving a certain Colonel Norwood in command.
So satisfied was this officer with the strength of the place
that, as Beaufort's great fleet approached, he was in no
way disturbed. Indeed, the prospect of an attack seemed
to him too good to be true. ' We are looking out sharply/
he wrote to Fanshaw, * for Monsieur Beaufort with the
French Armada to attack, as is given out in all ports. I
am so charitable for that nation as to think their affairs
are not managed by such weak counsels ; for if they force
us to set our wits to theirs we shall, to human under-
standing, use them no better than they were treated at
Gigeri/ 1
Norwood was right. The counsels of France were
not so unsound. For all the thorn that Tangier was in
Louis's side, he was not going to risk his fleet for it. In
ordering Beaufort to Lisbon he had told him his first duty
was to preserve his force, which, as he said, was necessary
for an infinity of reasons, and, inactive as it was, it did its
work. As Beaufort lay in the Tagus, forbidden to move,
Monk and Rupert put to sea with a fleet of eighty sail,
dynamically superior to anything the Dutch could bring
against them. But no sooner had they reached the
Downs than a message came from the King to say that
the French fleet was approaching and that Rupert was
to proceed to the Isle of Wight to meet it with one of the
three squadrons. Thus was Monk's strategy entirely
upset It depended for success on throwing the whole
weight of the British main fleet on one division of the
allies. He had chosen it deliberately in preference to the
1 Bmthcots MSS. p. 150, Maj 9-19, 1666.
Digitized by
Google
1666 THE COURT SPOILS MONK'S CAMPAIGN 61
other possible plan of keeping the Toulon fleet within the
Straits. Yet at the worst possible moment Stuart
futility had forced upon him a plan that was neither one
thing nor the other, and it immediately earned its reward.
The wind that carried Rupert to the westward brought
out De Buyter with eighty-five sail; Monk had but
fifty-six ; but, catching De Buyter at a disadvantage, he
made a brilliantly conceived attack, which, if Rupert had
only been present in support, must have inflicted a serious,
if not a fatal, blow to the Dutch. As it was, Monk could
achieve nothing decisive. For two days he fought single*
handed with all his old skill and confident impetuosity.
On the third day Rupert, having found the alarm was
false, managed to rejoin with part of his squadron ; but,
though the fight continued till the fourth day, the English
were too heavily overweighted throughout for their
superior tactics and discipline to tell, and the result of
the King's faulty strategy or, as it more probably was,
the Duke of York's, was a victory for the Dutch. Two
months later, on St. James's day, the balance was re-
dressed off the mouth of the Thames by an action which
gave the English complete command of the sea and kept
Beaufort ingloriously in Brest. Still the effect he had
had on the war was never recovered. Charles's finances
# could not stand the strain of the prolonged struggle
against the combined forces which threatened him, and
peace negotiations were set on foot. They received the
support of Louis, who had gained all he desired in seeing
the two great sea powers cripple one another, and he was
ready to begin his long-nursed attack on 8pain. In
May 1667 a peace congress assembled at Breda. Under
cover of it, when things seemed to be going against them,
the Dutch suddenly appeared in the Thames and carried
out their famous exploit against the ships laid up at
Digitized by
Google
« TANGIER AND IT8 ENEMIES 1667
Chatham. Peace immediately followed, but it was still
as the expense of Holland, for it left England in full
possession of the Dutch colonies in North America, and
with the smart of a humiliation which she never forgot
or forgave.
Her position, too, within the Straits remained un-
shaken. In vain Louis had clamoured again and again
for twelve frigates which the Dutch had undertaken to
send to join his galleys in the Mediterranean. In vain,
too, had he urged them to combine with him in inter-
cepting the fleet which in December 1666 was starting
to supply Tangier. The Dutch were too much disgusted
with the part he had played in the war to disturb their
dispositions for an end which chiefly concerned French
interests. 1 So Tangier remained unmolested, and had
even been able to make itself felt offensively through
privateers which Norwood induced the merchants to
assist him in fitting out. Nor was it only by prizes that
it was enriched. An increasing trade was also springing
up with other Moorish ports, and, better still, as soon as
Louis commenced his war with Spain by the invasion
of the Spanish Netherlands, the French merchants, who
could no longer reside in Andalusia, began to make the
new port their headquarters, and a flourishing trade
•prang up which seemed to promise that the dream of
making Tangier the great emporium of the South might
be realised before many years were passed. 1
1 Jal, Dm Cut**, L 412, 460, 469, 470.
• Horwood to Lcgge, June 16, 1667, Dartmouth MS 8. p. 16,
Digitized by
Google
CHAPTER XXII
TANGIER AS A NAVAL STATION
With the close of the Dutch war the English hold on
the Mediterranean had survived the first great effort which
France made to break it. The coalition with the Northern
powers which Louis had arranged to isolate England fell
to pieces, and was succeeded by the famous Triple Alliance
which Sir William Temple negotiated between England,
Holland, and Sweden, and the French King abandoned
his attempt to deprive England of her commanding posi-
tion at sea by force.
Four years' peace, the outcome of Temple's alliance,
were in store for her, and during that time Tangier con-
tinued to flourish and give promise of all that was hoped
from it. The internal dissensions of the Moors kept it
free from serious molestation from that quarter, and the
works went on quietly with an increasing trade. In 1668
it was thought safe to reduce the garrison to one regi-
ment and half a troop, and in the following year it was
given a civil municipal government, as though it were a
permanent part of the empire. The same year Lord
Middleton, the cavalier soldier of fortune, who had been
Monk's chief opponent in his famous highland campaign,
came out to replace Lord Belasyse, and quickly displayed
his capacity for the post. He made the civil and military
elements pull together, encouraged the growing trade,
and further increased the strength of the defences. Above
all, he devoted his attention to the completion of the
Digitized by
Google
64 TANGIER A8 A NAVAL STATION 1669
mole. As two of the three original contractors were
dead, the Tangier Council took over the work, and it was
thus placed directly under the Governor. In August 1668
Sandwich specially reported from Madrid that 380 yards
were finished, and at the end of 1669 Cholmley, the
engineer, said it had been making continual good progress
for three years. During the storms of that winter, how-
ever, a serious breach was made. It was the first sym-
ptom of trouble, and the noise of it, as Cholmley wrote,
* filled all the gazettes of Europe. 1 1 But if those who
viewed the growing port with apprehension saw hope in
the trouble, they were doomed to disappointment. It
was found that by building the stones in massive wooden
chests and then sinking them in their place, as had been
done at Leghorn and Genoa, the difficulty could be over-
come, and as soon as the system was adopted the work
went on again merrily.
A noteworthy effect of the progress which the place
was making is seen in the increasing importance which
Louis was attaching to his Languedoc canal. The plans
had been finally passed on January 1, 1665, and the
works had been in progress over five years. The canal
was to have a depth of twelve feet and a surface width of
ten 'farises,' or about sixty-four feet, a capacity which
Colbert hoped would be enough for the largest barks,
and even for dismantled galleys. About the time when
he had declared war against England he had pressed the
engineer to revise the plans with the special view of
making the canal passable for galleys. The engineer had
apparently reported that it was not feasible, and the
matter dropped, but not for long.
It was in the year 1669, after the Triple Alliance had
forced upon France the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, that
1 D»ri% L 96.
Digitized by
Google
1669 PROGRESS OF THE LANGUEDOC CANAL 65
Colbert bad set himself seriously to reconstruct the French
navy. Following Mazarin's lead, Louis had succeeded in
getting the Admiralty into his own hands by vesting it in
his baby son. His ambassador in London was ordered to
inquire diligently into the English naval administration
and their syBtem of naval warfare. On the analogy of his
standing army regular marine companies were established
to provide skilled crews for the royal ships ; and on all
sides the work of reform was earnestly undertaken as a
preliminary that was absolutely necessary to French expan-
sion. Among other matters the idea of making the canal
of real strategical value was revived more emphatically
than ever. ' In spite/ wrote Colbert to his engineer, ' of
the reasons iu your letter and report of three or four
years ago, I persist in telling you that if we could make
our maritime canal and the locks practicable for galleys
there would be nothing so greatly advantageous for the
King's service— seeing that if some day there is war in
yonder seas and also in the Channel, the thirty galleys,
which we could pass by the canal, to make war during
June, July, August, and September might very likely
decide all the actions.' He enclosed the dimensions of a
galley, and told the engineer he was to examine the canal
and the locks, and, if they were not capacious enough, to
report how they could be enlarged. The harassed officer
naturally made difficulties over the presumed elasticity of
his works. Six weeks later Colbert wrote again some-
what more reasonably. * You see/ said he, • there could
be nothing so great and considerable for the sea power
of the King as the easy passage of his galleys from the
Mediterranean to the ocean ; but if it is impossible think
no more about it/ In the spring of 1670, however, he
was still harping on the idea, but apparently nothing
could be done. Yet the correspondence remains to mark
VOL. II. p
Digitized by
Google
66 TANGIER AS A NAVAL STATION 1668
the keen appreciation that Louis had of the weakness of
his maritime position and of the mingled obsolete and
advanced ideas with which he sought to remedy it. The
idea that galleys could still redress the balance of sailing
fleets marks an almost startling failure to grasp the new
conditions of maritime warfare, while the project of secur-
ing interior lines by means of a ship canal anticipated the
very latest expedients of naval strategy. 1
The anxiety which Tangier and the condition of
affairs of which it was the outward manifestation were
causing in France was in marked contrast to the calm
which the place itself was enjoying. This was in a great
measure due to the fact that for the time it had ceased to
be for the Mediterranean powers the most serious centre
of interest. It was one of those rare moments when the
intestine quarrels of Christendom were hushed, and the
attention of its kings was called away to the greater
struggle between East and West. At Lisbon Sandwich
had completed Fanshaw's work, and concluded a treaty
which finally recognised the pew kingdom of Portugal
and set free the British troops that had been engaged in
defending it against Spain. At Aix-la-Chapelle, under
the pressure of the Triple Alliance, a still more important
peace had been signed, which ended the war between
France and Spain ; but at the same time, by vastly in-
creasing Louis's power, marked him for the great and
disturbing factor he was to become. The advantage
which England gained by being able to pose as the peace-
maker of Europe was the recognition by Spain of all her
conquests and colonies in the West Indies and America.
But though the pacification was due mainly to the menace
of the Triple Alliance and the overwhelming naval power
1 Hittoir* * Bicquet ; Ltttru <U Coltxrt, UL L 110, and voL It.
JomIS, Aagut*. 1660, March 27, 1670 (oj.)
Digitized by
Google
1668 THE SIEGE OF CANDIA 07
at its command, it was directly brought about by the
mediation of the new Pope, Clement IX. To him
the dissensions of the powers were as heartrending as
ever they were to his crusading forerunners. His eye*
were fixed upon Crete, around which the Candiote war
had been continually raging ever since Blake so nearly
plunged into it, and where the Venetians with ebbing
strength were still heroically holding back the Moslem
flood. For five and twenty years Candia, like another
Troy, had been the centre of the epic strife, pressed by
an interminable siege, to which the adventurous spirits of
all lands gathered to shed their blood and flesh their
swords with all the fierce spirit of Godfrey de Bouillon
and Richard. Still year by year the advantage ever grew
to the Turks. All that the Papal navy and the Knights
of Malta could do to support the exhausted Venetians
availed but little. France, preoccupied at first with her
intestine troubles, and then with her hunger for the
inheritance of Spain, could spare still less to assist. As
for England, who might have turned the scale had Crom-
well done more than dream, she was disarmed by the
maritime and commercial privileges she had wrung from
the Barbary states. Holland, too, no less than England,
France, and the minor Italian states, was more concerned
with the advantage of the Turkish trade than with the
Mussulman peril, and so the maritime forces of Christen-
dom could never be brought at one. 1 But now, at last,
when Candia was in extremity, and the old terror took a
more glaring shape, Clement was able to arouse something
of the lost mediaeval spirit. It was in France, which in
1 The English refused the Venetian request lor assistance lor fear • we
should have all our stook in Turkey forfeited.' See Arlington to Temple,
Jan. 8, 1669 {Arlington L$Uer$ 9 I p. 884). The Dutch, it appears,
ready to help if we would.
F 2
Digitized by
Google
68 TANGIER AS A NAVAL STATION
modern times had been the most backward of all the
Mediterranean powers against the common enemy, that
he found the readiest response. By the end of 1668
Louis had decided to come to the rescue with an expedi-
tion under the Due de Beaufort himself ; but, in order to
avoid an open rupture with the Porte, it was to sail
nominally under the Papal flag.
A really powerful force was prepared. Besides ten
fire-ships and small craft, it included sixteen ships of war,
and as many transports, with a large number of troops.
With this fleet Beaufort appeared before the beleaguered
town early in June 1669. The landing was successfully ac-
complished, and the Turks were being driven from point
to point, when suddenly a deafening explosion hushed the
sounds of battle. It came from a redoubt which the
French seamen had just taken. There was an instant
alarm that all the works were mined, and a panic ensued
that bid fair to degenerate into a rout. To check it
Beaufort immediately placed himself at the head of his
best troops, flung himself on the advancing Turks, and
was never seen again. It was a disaster that could
not be retrieved. The French troops, instead of raising
the siege, could barely hold their ground, and the mutual
recriminations that ensued rapidly demoralised the Chris-
tian army. Thirteen galleys of France, with three fresh
French regiments, arrived a few weeks later, and further
reinforcements were preparing at Toulon. Louis was
putting forth a strength which marked more clearly than
ever his determination to take the place which in the
days of Lepanto had belonged to Spain. But all to no
purpose. One tremendous effort to dislodge the Turks by
a bombardment from the whole of the assembled ships
only ended in fresh disaster. The French troops re-
embarked with a loss of 1,800 killed and 1,500 wounded,
Digitized by
Google
1660 THE CONSILIUM JEGYPTIACUM 69
and at the end of August the Venetians capitulated. So
ended the famous Candiote war in a fresh advance of the
Mussulman power and another rebuff to Louis in his
attempt to make himself felt in the Mediterranean.
What reward he looked to, had success attended the
great effort, we cannot tell. Following as it did upon his
other attempts to spread his power to the South, we
seem to see him seeking in the Eastern half of the sea a
means of redressing the balance that was against him in
the West. Had he perhaps anticipated the vast idea of
the Consilium JEgyptiacum which Leibnitz was about to
present to him ? Already the young German philosopher,
eager to divert tho ambition of Louis from European
conquest, was preparing his famous treatise, in which,
with a wealth of historical and geographical learning, and
a convincing grasp of the economical and political condi-
tions of his project, he was trying to tempt Louis to
conquer Egypt. Seated there, he argued, where the Bed
Sea and Mediterranean met at the centre of the world, a
Prince like Louis would be able to draw into his lap the
wealth and power of the East which his Western rivals
were fast absorbing, and would become the master not
only of Europe but of Asia too. It is hardly possible the
idea was not already in the air. It is certain, at any rate,
that when the proposal of a then almost unknown scholar
was placed before Louis in January 1672, he was suffi-
ciently interested at once to send for the author to explain
Wb design. Nothing further came of it. The influenoe of
*Louvois, Louis's minister of war, was in the ascendant to
hold him to military adventure in Europe, and probably
his unhappy experience at Candia taught him to take a
view of the difficulties too grave for the learning and
enthusiasm of Leibnitz to explain away. 1
1 (Etwr* d$ LmJbmU (ed. Foocher d« OtiiU), vol ?.
Digitized by
Google
70 TANGIER AS A NAVAL STATION
The Turks at least appreciated to the full the signi-
ficance of their victory. In the Mussulman world it pro-
duced a profound impression of returning strength, which
was immediately displayed in renewed activity among
the Barbary states. Fortunately England was once more
in a position to curb them. Already, at the end of 1668,
she had sufficiently recovered from the shock of the
Dutch war to send a squadron into the Mediterranean.
It was under Sir Thomas Allin, who, as Admiral of the
White Squadron in 1666, had largely added to his repu-
tation and had led the attack in the victorious ' St. James's '
action. After demonstrating before Algiers and Salee
with some effect he had gone home. But so soon as his
back was turned their piracies grew as bad as ever, and
in the summer of 1669 he returned with a still stronger
squadron. 1 About the middle of August he appeared before
Algiers with an advanced division of eight sail to pre-
sent the English demands. He had been met with the
news of Beaufort's death, and the retreat of the French
to Toulon. The capitulation of Gandia was already on
foot and it was hardly likely that the Algerines would be
inclined to submission. After some fruitless negotiation
they flatly refused all satisfaction, and the first week in
September Allin commenced hostilities. A day or two
later he was joined by his second division, under Sir
Edward Spragge, a cavalier officer, who, after serving in
the Boyalist army during the civil war, is believed, like
Allin, to have followed Rupert on the high seas. During
the late war he had risen to vice-flag rank in the main
fleet, and had highly distinguished himself in the darkest
horns by his bold defence of the Thames when the Dutch
were trying to force their way up towards London. His
1 His journal lor this voyage is among the Dartmouth MS 8., and
at itaraghen in Hi$L 1£SS. Com. XL v. 17-19.
Digitized by
Google
1670-1 SPRAGGE AT BOUGIE 71
advent brought AUin's force up to eighteen sail, besides
fire-ships. It was the normal strength of the British
Mediterranean squadron and the normal operations
followed. A blockade was established, while with his
detached cruisers Allin soon established a mastery over
the Algerine navy. He continued the work with success
till September 1670, when he was succeeded by Spragge.
Under a revised plan of operations the new chief was set
free from convoy duty and was able to devote his whole
squadron to the Algerine cruisers. Furthermore, arrange-
ments had been made to provide him with a base of
supply at Port Mahon, and acting from there he soon
outdid his predecessor. 1 Prizes came fast, till in May
1671 the work culminated in a really important success.
Having heard that a number of Algerine men-of-war
were lying at Bougie, he proceeded thither with all the
force he could collect. He immediately sent in a fire-ship,
but it miscarried, and before he could prepare another the
enemy, as usual, had time to protect themselves with a
powerful boom. But Spragge would not own himself
beaten. Undismayed, he tried again and quickly demon-
strated what was possible to boats handled with skill and
determination against these temporary defences. Under a
heavy fire the boom was cut, his smallest frigate was sent
in for a fire-ship, and so boldly was it pushed home that
the entire Algerine squadron, consisting of seven vessels of
from twenty-four to thirty guns, was completely destroyed.
So exasperated were the corsairs that a Palace revolution
followed at Algiers. The reigning Dey was put to death
and his successor forced to make peace.
1 Hut. M8S. Com* Varum* Collections, iL 140, 152, 166-7. II m
not purely for strategic reasons that Port Mahon was chosen, bat also to
keep captains out of commercial ports, where they were tempted to cany
merchants' treasure and so neglected their oraising. Allin was said to be
an arch-offender.
Digitized by
Google
72 TANGIER A8 A NAVAL STATION 1671
It was not only in Algiers that the lesson was felt. In
France, too, it was a bitter pill. She had been attempt-
ing to cany on a similar war against Tunis, but with
little or no result, and the success of the English acutely
emphasised the failure that seemed to dog every step she
took upon the Mediterranean. The King, so Colbert
wrote in referring to Spragge's exploit, was weary of
hearing of English successes when his own men did
nothing. 1 All the minister's efforts to give France a
worthy position upon the sea seemed still to be of no
avail Of his own views on the situation in the Mediter-
ranean, and of his idea of ameliorating it, we are per-
mitted a curious glimpse, which reveals him bent on
supplanting England at Tangier. In September follow-
ing Spragge's success, Ralph Montagu, the British Am-
bassador to France, had an interview at Dunkirk with
Estrades, to whom he was commissioned to deliver a
letter from the English King. It was at the time when
Charles was playing his extraordinary secret game* with
Louis, by which through an offensive and defensive alliance
with France he hoped to make himself despotic at home,
and abroad to punish the Dutch and have a share in the
dismemberment of the Spanish empire. Estrades had
not been taken into Louis's confidence, and was naturally
jealous. Moreover, he had reason to believe that he had
also lost the goodwill of the English King, which he had
formerly enjoyed so intimately. He therefore determined
to assert himself and recover his position by warning
Montagu of the dangers in which Louis meant to entangle
his unwary ally. Among other things he cautioned him
that Charles must 'never hearken to the parting with
Tangier.' He knew— so he said— Colbert's heart was set
on it, and that to his knowledge there were some about
\L*ttrt* de Colbert, III. i. 890, n.
Digitized by
Google
1671 COLBERT COVETS TANGIER 78
the English Court who had engaged, when the time
should serve, to persuade the King to part with it. So
far from releasing the hold he had, on any pretence,
Charles should insist, if ever he joined Louis in a war with
Spain, on a promise that the French should seize Porto
Longone in Elba, and hand it over to the English per-
manently. Then, said he, with Elba in his hands as well
as Tangier, Charles would be as much master of the
Mediterranean as he was of the Ocean. 1
The seed appears to have fallen on good ground. At
all events, Charles began to evince a sudden anxiety that
in the plot he was hatching with Louis the Mediterra-
nean should not be left entirely to his fellow conspirator.
Under the new treaty operations were ito begin with a
joint declaration of war against the Dutch, and Charles in
return for a French subsidy had undertaken to provide a
fleet for co-operation with Louis's admirals in the Narrow
Seas. Now, however, about a month after Estrades'
curious confidences, when all was settled, Montagu was
instructed to broach to Louis a proposal for a further
subsidy to enable another British fleet to be fitted out for
service in the Mediterranean. In pursuance of these
orders Montagu did his best to persuade Louis that, in
view of the fact that the Spaniards would most likely join
the Dutch as soon as war was declared, there was no
quarter in which the English fleet could be of so much
assistance to him as within the Straits. Every argument,
good and bad, that could be dragged into the service was '
used to win Louis's consent. But to see the English
strong in the Mediterranean was no part of the French
King's game, and he met the request with a profession of
his absolute inability to furnish another livre.*
1 B. Montagu to Arlington, Sept. 4, 1671, DuccUuch M88. L 600.
■ Same to same, December Iff, 16, and 84, ibid. 007-9.
Digitized by
Google
74 TANGIER A8 A NAVAL STATION 1672
Such then was the position of affairs in relation to the
Mediterranean, when, without making any further con-
cession to his fellow conspirator and dupe, Louis early
- — in 1672 succeeded in thrusting Charles into a new war
with the Dutch. Hi-advised as it was, there can be little
doubt it was at first popular, and a real expression of the
instinct of the nation. The great and rising mercantile
community no less than the Court was still absorbed in
\ the passion for commercial and imperial expansion, which
is the dominant note of the Restoration. In spite of
every effort to live at peace with them the Dutch had been
showing by their behaviour that there was no room for
them and the English side by side in any part of the
world. If British commerce was to grow every one felt it
must be rooted in domination of the Dutch. 1 Blinded by
this pie-occupation, and burning for vengeance upon the
burners of Chatham, public opinion welcomed the war
with something like enthusiasm. But from the first there
were far-sighted eyes that saw more acutely. Beneath
Louis's cunning display of common interest they dis-
cerned a deep-laid plot to set by the ears the two powers
— who stood most formidably in the way of French ambi-
tions. As the struggle proceeded this view quickly gained
adherents. The behaviour of the French fleet throughout
the war again did everything that was possible to foster the
belief in Louis's ulterior motives. The Comte d'Estrees,
in command of the main fleet, attended actions as though
they were manoeuvres he had been sent to study. How-
ever loyally later French historians have sought to palliate
the disgraceful part the French seamen were directed to
play, it is certain that at the time it made a chivalrous
people smart with shame. 1 They, seemed to see their
1 Harts, English Public Opinion after the Restoration, cap. iii.
» Jal ia bis Du Queen* sod Capt. Chevalier in Vol. i. of Histoire de la
Uewme Fr+nj+iee (IMS), both defend the action of the French in this war
Digitized by
Google
1672-3 THE THIRD DUTCH WAR 75
fleet on every occasion hold ingloriously aloof while their
ally sapped her strength and enhanced her glory upon the
common enemy.
It is only in this aspect that the war concerns us.
Charles failed to shake Louis's refusal to assist him in
fitting out a second fleet for the Straits, and consequently,
during the two years the struggle lasted, it in no way
affected the situation in the Mediterranean. Between
them England and France were far too strong at sea for
the Dutch to attempt anything serious to the southward.
It is true that the refusal of the English proposal of a
second fleet brought Colbert his nervous moments, when
he was haunted by the spectre of De Ruyter detaching
a squadron for a raid into the Mediterranean. At such
times he would scold his officers who were destined to
guard the Straits, and who would never get to sea, or,
when they did, accomplished nothing. And so he would
fall to mourning over the bad blood that prevailed among
them, 'qui est/ as he sighed, 'l'esprit de l'ancienne
marine.' l It wa6 after the battle of Solebay in 1672
that he was most anxious, and there it was the action of
the French fleet that had rendered a decisive victory
impossible. The same prudent tactics were repeated the
following year at the battle of the Texel, and so glaringly
that the behaviour of the French was made a ground
in the House of Commons for the refusing the supplies
which the Government asked for the continuance of the
war. ' The last fight,' said Sir John Monson, • was as
if the English and Dutch had been gladiators for the
French spectators.' His speech brought up the Secretary
of State in reply, and it is worthy of note that he
and the previous one, bat it cannot be said that they make oat an entirely
convincing ease against the strictures of Voltaire and the older historian*.
1 Lettre$ de Colbert, IH. i. 431, 438, 435, 496.
Digitized by
Google
7« TANGIER AS A NAVAL STATION 1670-2
particularly urged the danger of losing Tangier if a fleet
were not provided for the coming year. 1
The growing importance of the place had already led
to measures for providing it with a mobile defence of its
own, and they are worth noting as the last attempt to
reintroduce galleys into the British fleet. In a narrow
strait, subject to calms and light airs, they had obvious
advantages, and Henry Shere, a young engineer who
afterwards superseded Cholmley, and about 1670 visited
Leghorn and Genoa to study their methods of harbour
work, says he first suggested their employment. ' My
lord, 9 he wrote from Italy to some one in authority at home
about this time, ' I remember to have discoursed to your
excellency about galleys for the port of Tangier, and now
advise your excellency that here hath lately arrived a
French gentleman, by name Duteil, who is employed to
the state of Genoa and the Grand Duke [of Tuscany]
with ample credentials from his Majesty and his Royal
Highness [the Duke of York], in order to the building
and getting to sea of four or five galleys, two of which
are already on the stocks in the arsenals of the aforesaid
states. ... I was glad of the news, very well assured
that a couple of galleys being carefully employed would
do the King good service in that part, but more than two
would be burdensome and inconvenient.' He concludes
by advising that an arsenal be immediately commenced at
Tangier for their reception. 1 In August 1671 Cholmley
had received orders to this effect, and sent home a plan of
the port, showing how he proposed to berth the galleys
and the modifications in the mole suggested for their
1 ParL HuL 998 : ' Debate on refusing a supply, October 81, 1672.'
* Shere to , Tangier Paper* R.O. 1670, bundle 18, undated, but
be refers to his last letter, which was dated March 10, 1669-70. The mission
of Sir John Baptist Doteil Is mentioned in the summer of 167S, Domestic
G*J*Mlsr t JoljSft,p.8?4.
Digitized by
Google
1672-4* ITS MOBILE DEFENCE 77
protection. 1 During the war, however, the project seems
to have hung fire. In the winter the work of making an
inner harbour for them appears to have been commenced,'
and earfy in 1672 there were several proposals made to
the Government reviving the Elizabethan idea of sending
prisoners convicted of small felonies to serve in the Tan-
gier galleys. 1
Two years elapsed, however, before the experiment
could be tried, and then only one of the galleys, that from
Leghorn, was ready. She was called the ' Margaret, 9 and
the expense of arming her proved so great that, although
the other was to be a present from Genoa to the King, her
completion was left to stand over. The ' Margaret * was
delivered at Tangier about the end of 1674, but during
the two following seasons she appears to have done small,
if any, service. Probably the type was too repugnant to
the ideas of our seamen for her ever to have had much
chance of proving a success. Bowers were a continual
difficulty. The idea of condemning felons to the benches
from home seems never to have been carried out, and
efforts were made to man the oars with Barbary prisoners
taken by the regular cruisers. The only result was that
the galley fell further and further into discredit. In the
summer of 1675 Dutcil, who had been commanding her,
was superseded by an English frigate captain, but all to no
purpose, and in the following spring the ' Margaret ' was
discharged and returned to Leghorn. The Genoa galley
was never. even armed, and so the time-honoured craft
disappeared from the British Navy List. 4 Contempora-
1 Gholmley to the Tangier Council, Aug. 14, 1671, Tangier Paper**
bundle 14, where the original plan is preserved.
# " See plan, date February 8, 1671-2, in Davit, p. 140, oompared with
k Cholmley's original sketch in the Tangier Paper*.
1 Domeetie Calendar, pauim; Drake and the Tudor Navy, i. 402.
* Derrick, p. 89. Luke to Shere, September 16, 1674 (Add, M88. 19872).
Tanner, Pepye Calendar 1674-6, paetinu
Digitized by
Google
78 TANGIER AS A NAVAL 8TAT10N 1076
aeously with their short and ineffective reappearance a
new type of oared vessel, designed after a French model
and much more to the seamen's taste, had been worked
out, and two of thejse were now to take the place of the
obsolete craft. 1
* In the year 76/ says Pepys, 'Captain Wildshaw
came from Toulon, and was telling his Majesty that there
were building at Toulon several galley-frigates " to row
with many oars," and thereupon, at the King's request,
Sir Anthony Deane, the famous naval architect, wrote
to procure particulars of them from an agent of his at
Toulon. The answer being returned/ Pepys continues,
4 A. D. 9 8 son drew the draft of the " James ' ' galley-frigate, and
Mr. Pett the " Charles " upon the same principles, and from
them came that improvement so useful to us against the
Tacks. 9 * The new vessels ranged from 450 to 500 tons,
drew only twelve feet of water, and proved a great success.
Shere called attention to their defect ' in not having some
force of guns between decks/ and Pepys begged him to
continue his observations on their usefulness, as the King
proposed to lay down two more. Shere, who had recom-
mended the galleys, was perhaps prejudiced against the
new type, but their excellence is everywhere praised, and
1 In 1683 George Byng, afterwords Lord Torrington, was appointed lieu-
tenant of a * half-galley ' (meexo-gaUra) attached to the Tangier garrison, hat
Ibis was certainly one of the new type. Memoirs of Lord Torrington (Camden
Sot. 1889), p. 6.
• Naval Minutes, p. 269, quoted by J. B. Tanner in Ena. Hist. Rev.
xiL 699 ft, 765. Wildshaw's suggestion mast really have been made at the
end of 1675. They were both in hand in February 1676, which accounts
for the galleys being discharged at this time. Pett's vessel was launched by
the Duke of York on September 12 the same year. On November 8 both
were pot into commission. Each was to have 80 ' watermen • in her com-
plement to row, and each was to have a special * second boatswain ' for * the
better exercising, instructing, and commanding the gangs of men appointed
to the oars.* Tanner, Pepys Calendar, 2796, 8194, 8428, 8666, 8668-6,
Digitized by
Google
1677 PROGRESS OF THE HARBOUR WORKS 79
they became the prototype of a class of light vessel, using
sweeps, that remained in the navy till recent times. 1 They
were permanently attached to the Tangier station, and,
together with the smaller oared craft, such as ketches,
barca-longas, and the new class of sloop now first appearing
in the fleet, provided all that was wanted of free movement
for the policing of the Straits. 1
The attention that was being bestowed on the defence
of Tangier is not surprising ; for by this time it was
beginning to have a real value as a port of refuge and a
naval base. By the end of the year 1673 the mole was
completed to a length of nearly 450 yards, and in 1675
Shere estimated that, if he were allowed to take over the
works and carry them on upon the principles he had
studied in Italy, he could finish the whole undertaking
in a little over four years, and for less than a hundred
thousand pounds. 3 A man of high scientific attainments,
he was a convinced enthusiast for the place, and was to
spend his best work and mo6t strenuous years in making
it what he knew it might be. It was about this time
that he wrote a treatise on the tides, currents, and climate
of the Mediterranean, and in the course of it his opinion
1 Pepys to Shore, September 16, 1677 (Add. MSS. 19872), and A Die-
course touching Tangier (dated October 1679), Harleian Misc. viii. S97.
* The word * sloop ' had become by this time familiar in the navy, the
older 'shallop* and pinnace disappearing. In 1677 an officer of the
'Woolwich' in Narbrough's fleet speaks of the ' Boneta,' • Emsworth, ' and
• Woolwich ' sloops (see log of the ' Woolwich ' and • Defiance/ 1072-6, HarL
MSS. 1910, f. 23), also of the ' Chatham ' double sloop, and the • Sprig ' doable
sloop, a fire-ship (ff. 24, and under May 4, 1678). The * Young Sprig' had
been a sixth-rate, and in 1677 was made a fire-ship (Tanner, Eng. HisL
Rev. xii. 55 n). No more double sloops appear to have been built They
were probably superseded by the galley-frigates. On January 24, 1678,
Narbrough writes of his intending to attack Algiers with his 'slops' and
fire-ships, Add. MSS. 19872.
• The survey of 1678 certifies 487 yards finished; besides 40 of founda-
tion (Davis, p. 140). For Shore's estimate see Pepys to him, October 9, 1676
(Add. MSS. 19872), in which Pepys points out an error in his figures.
Digitized by
Google
W TANGIER A8 A NAVAL STATION 1074
of the place forces itself out. ' And here/ he exclaims,
in mentioning Tangier, ' were it not a fitter subject for
a treatise than a digression, I might say my opinion
touching this noble port of Tangier, which in a word is
a jewel fit only to adorn the crown that wears it, whose
value I can better conceive than write, and humbly refer
to a more worthy pen or to a truer and more impartial
relator. Time for a few years, in despite of all the
obloquy cast upon it by the enemies of his Majesty's
honour and dominion abroad, will suffice to polish it to
much perfection of use and public service both for peace
and war, as would be very hard for a stranger to believe,
and scarce fit for a modest pen to write.' !
He certainly had some grounds for his enthusiasm, for,
besides being able to give shelter to merchantmen during
the war, it enabled war ships to use it as a station for
watching the Straits. Had this not been so, the Dutch,
who were in close alliance with Spain, and whose cruisers
and convoys were using Cadiz as if it were a port of
their own, would have had an insuperable advantage
against our trade. The last action of the war well
illustrates the situation. Peace was signed at West-
minster on February 9, 1674. A week later Captain
Passchier de Witte in the ' Shackerloo ' of 28 guns, who
was cruising off the Straits mouth, retired into Cadiz.
An hour or so later he was followed in by Captain
1 A Discourse concerning the Mediterranean Sea and the Streights of
Gibraltar, by Sir Henry Shere, p. 20. Ik was fink prinked in 1703, just
before Booke took Gibraltar, and again just after in 1705. It was written,
however, long before. On p. 30 fifhere says he has been in Tangier fou -
jean. He left England for the place in May 1669. (See Diet. Nat. Biog. '
tub voce • Sheeres.') Internal evidence shows that It was written while he
was at heme, and we know he was in England again in 1674 and 1670, just
before he took over the work ak Tangier. Bee letter addressed to him ak
Whitehall in September 1674, and Pepys to him in October 1675, Add. MSS.
19873. He sailed for Tangier ak the end of May 1676. Tanner, Pepys
CeJemdew, t904, 9912, 3996.
Digitized by
Google
1674 ' SHA.CKERLOO • AND ' TIGER ' 81
Harman from Tangier with the ' Tiger ' of 46 guns, who
began to tell every one he had chased the Dutchman in.
De Witte protested he had never even seen the English
ship, but Harman continued to boast he had run from
him. Admiral Cornells Evertsen was in the port at the
time careening, and was at length so much infuriated
with the English captain's behaviour that he told De
Witte that for the honour of the flag it was his duty
to fight him. The Quixotic challenge was given and
accepted. With such disparity of force the result could
hardly be doubtful. In two hours, after an heroic duel
at close quarters, the ' Shackerloo ' was forced to strike
with the loss of 50 killed and 70 wounded, including
De Witte himself. Harman was also wounded, but the
English loss was only 24 all told — an indication no less
of the superior gunnery of the English than of the
determined resistance of the Dutch. 1
If Louis had hoped that the war would shake the
English hold on the Straits he was disappointed. It had
indeed rather the contrary effect. For it drove Medi-
terranean merchants, and French ones in particular, to
use Tangier more than ever, and thus served to give the
place a prosperity it had never enjoyed before. « Tangier/
says a newsletter of the time, 'is likely to prove the
richest port in those parts. During the war it has been
the harbour for all European commodities and may long
continue so.' * Still the inglorious policy which Louis
had been pursuing at sea had left him the richer too, and
in possession of a fleet with which he could seek com-
pensation so soon as an occasion offered. He had not
1 De Jonghe, Nederlandscte Ztewumh UL i. 861.
• U Fleming M8S. 113, and Me Luke to Share, September 1674, Add.
MS8. 19679, f . 9.
vol* n. o
Digitized by
Google
89 TANGIER AS A NAVAL STATION 1974
long to wait. Within a few months after the peace was
signed an opening presented itself, and by the end of
the year France whs once more launched upon a course
which threatened to change the whole condition of
If editenanean power.
Digitized by
Google
\
CHAPTER XXIII
LOUIS XIV. AND SICILY
The significance of the new movement lay in the fact
that the European situation had by this time definitely
assumed the aspect which we associate with the age of
Louis XIV. The Triple Alliance, which Temple had
negotiated, had failed to check the career of France, as
it was doomed to fail, seeing that contemporaneously
with it Charles was arranging his secret understanding
with the French King behind his Ambassador's back.
By the astounding treaty of Dover, which he had con-
cluded under the influence of his idolised sister, Henrietta
d'Orleans, he had practically placed his forei gn po licy in
Louis's keeping. In return for aiding him to establish
a Catholic despotism in England, Louis was to have a
free hand and even assistance in his imperial and counter- .
Reformation policy. So secret was the incredible pro-
ject kept that for generations afterwards historians were
baffled in seeking a key to Charles's bewildering policy.
By the nation it was felt rather than understood — felt
like some ghostly terror which could not be defined or
grappled, but still was there, haunting its rest and
scaring its resistance into insensate panic. The first
manifestation of the great design, as we have seen, was
Charles's joining Louis in the late war upon Holland,
and the first uneasy movement of the nation compelled
him to desert his Catholic ally. The in stinct of the people
began to show them the war was a blow at Protestantism.
^ -" o S
Digitized by
Google
84 LOUIS XIV. AND SICILY 1074
The old feeling rose paramount to all other considera-
tions. The insult which the Dutch had put upon the
country at Chatham was forgotten, the injuries in the
East were atoned, and peace was the result.
Abroad the danger was no less keenly felt. Every-
where the unholy league was regarded as a new step
towards the domination of France, and when Charles
was forced to withdraw his support, Louis found him-
self faced with a new Triple Alliance. The French peril
had galvanised into life the old Hapsburg system, but
with new relations. For the Hapsburgs the preserva-
tion of Holland was now as vital as it had formerly been
to France, and thus the new Triple Alliance was formed
of Holland, Spain, and the Empire. With the domina-
tion of Erance_ta king the place of the old threat of the
domination of Spain, the array of the nations had
changed, but the strategical factors were the same. The
vital points lay still in the old centres— the military in
the Tiow^Jountries, the naval in the Mediterranean. As
the fiiBt alliance had been mainly naval, so the new one
was mainly military. The Low Countries were therefore
the more absorbing factor, but the Mediterranean could
not be for a moment forgotten. Here lay the main
sourctfL-Qf -French wealth, and it was here, according to
the side upon which the balance of sea power fell, lay
the link or the barrier between the two Hapsburg powers.
Here too was the channel by which England could
strike into the heart of the strife with an overpowering
hand. Never had its meaning to the power of the island
realm been more patent. As the sides stood ranged, the
chances were fairly balanced. It is true France was
single-handed. But Louvois had completed his reorgani-
sation of the army ; Colbert had done no less for finance
and the navy ; and the policy which Louis had pursued
Digitized by
Google
1674 HIS FIRST MOVE 86
in the two Dutch wars, while it had shattered the sea
power of Holland, had left France with a fleet intact and
yet trained to war. The fate of Europe seemed to hang
on the part which England would play. The country
was for joining the alliance, the Court for joining France,
and Louis knew that, in the excited state of popular
opinion, all he could hope for was neutrality.
For him it had a double importance. On shore he
could rely with confidence on the unprecedented army
he now possessed. It was in the Mediterranean his
chief anxiety lay, and England held its gate. Already
he had ordered all his available vessels to concentrate
from Brest and Toulon at the Straits, with the intention
of barring the entry of the Dutch and, if possible, of
crushing the Spanish sea power before she could unite
with her new ally. The trouble was that he had no base
from which his fleet could act against Cadis, the naval
centre of the maritime alliance; and the first step he
took, when England broke away from his toils, was to
endeavour to remedy the evil by one of his most
characteristic moves. With the alert appreciation of
public opinion in England, which he was to use there-
after with so much dexterity, he promptly withdrew his
Catholic Ambassador and replaced him with a Huguenot
nobleman, that the request he had to make might arouse
as little suspicion as possible. It was the neutrality of
England which the new Ambassador had to secure, and
something more. His special instructions were to press
for orders to the governors of all British ports that they
were not only to admit French war ships, but to assist
them with all they might require. 1
From what followed it is clear enough which port it
was that Louis had particularly in his mind. The focus
1 Jal, Du Qu4tm % i. 180.
Digitized by
Google
86 LOUIS XIV. AND SICILY 1674
of his naval action lay in the concentration of his Toulon
and Brest squadrons at the Straits. The united fleet was
to be under the Due de Vivonne, who, as Captain-General
of the Galleys of France, was then the highest naval
officer in the service. For his flag-officers he was to have
no less men than Valbelle and Du Quesne. The concen-
tration was carried out with unusual precision in the
early summer of 1674, and at the first trouble from bad
weather the whole fleet came to anchor at Tangier. The
advantage of Louis's action in London, where his Ambas-
sador had obtained his request, was at once apparent. It
was found that no Dutch squadron strong enough to
force the Straits was expected for the present, and at
Tangier, therefore, Vivonne could lie in security while he
leisurely proceeded to work out a design for the destruc-
tion of his enemy's shipping in Cadiz. 1 As it happened,
nothing came of it. For it was while Vivonne was thus
preparing to act from Tangier that an event occurred
which pointed to a much more profitable employment for
the French fleet. All thought of Cadiz was given up,
and the maritime war swung back into the time-honoured
grooves from which it seems almost impossible for a
struggle for the command of the Mediterranean to
escape.
In Sicily, daring the absence of the Spanish Viceroy,
Mess ina had suddenly risen upon her Governor, and,
having driven him from the city, the insurgents had sent
to Vivonne an entreaty that he would come to their aid.
The stirring summons reached him at a moment when
his officers were doing their best to frighten him out of
his projected attack on Cadiz, and he readily seized the
occasion to abandon so thorny an enterprise and to return
to Toulon for orders. The importance of the event cer-
1 Jal, Du Quuhs, 1 188.
Digitized by
Google
1674 REVOLT OF MESSINA 87
tainly justified his action. No more enticing opportunity
could have occurred for redressing the defects of the
French strategical position. Still in the memory of how
France had burnt her fingers in the similar attempts of
the Duke of Guise, and in view of the preoccupation
of the southern French army with an invasion of Cata-
lonia, Louis could not bring himself to take drastic action
at once. Nevertheless, the situation was too full of en-
ticing possibilities not to be kept open, and Valbelle was
permitted to carry a small squadron with arms and stores
for the relief of the besieged insurgents. No sooner was
he arrived than they assaulted him with impassioned
appeals for annexation to France. It was more than the
admiral dare promise. He could only assure them
vaguely of his master's protection. But, his mission
accomplished, he hurried back to Toulon, convinced of
the enormous importance of the opportunity, and deter-
mined to persuade the Government to his views.
The half-hearted intervention had already had a pro-
nounced effect. In view of French operations in Cata-
lonia, the bulk of the Spanish naval forces, including
most of the Armada of the Ocean, was assembled within
the Straits at Barcelona ; but, on hearing of Louis's move-
ment, the whole force had sailed for Messina, and it was
only by taking advantage of a moment when the weather
compelled it to leave the port open that Valbelle had
been able to break out of the beleaguered port. He had
thus had to leave the insurgent city closely pressed by
sea and land, and if, therefore, anything effective was to
be done, it must be done quickly. The strategical advan-
tage already gained was obvious enough to harden Louis's
heart for a more serious attempt to gain possession of the
island. As a preliminary step Valbelle was allowed to
return in December with fresh relief, and he carried with
Digitized by
Google
88 LOUIS XIV. AND SICILY 1«75
hini a distinguished French general as Commander-in-
Chief for the insurgents, and a number of officers to
organise their forces. By dexterous manoeuvres he was
again able to take advantage of unfavourable weather to
run the blockade, and a fresh hold had been taken.
Meanwhile Louis had gone so far as to create M. de
Vivonne_yice*oy^6f Bicily, and had furnished him with a
force which made the appointment something more than
a threat. With Du Quesne as his second in command
he arrived off Messiiia on February 1, 1675, and with the
assistance of Yalbelle's squadron succeeded in a sharp
action in forcing the blockade and compelling the Spanish
fleet to retire to Naples for repairs. Messina, which had
at that time over a hundred thousand inhabitants, and
had been on the point of succumbing to starvation, was
saved, and the central point of the Mediterranean was
effectively ^aJBVenclTpossession. Nor was this all. So
completely was the Spanish fleet reduced to impotence
for the time that the French squadrons were able to pass
between Toulon and Messina without hindrance, and in
the course of the spring Vivonne, who had taken the
command ashore, had received sufficient reinforcements
to enable him to assume the offensive and begin the con-
quest of the island by a move towards Palermo.
It was a situation which the sea powers were not
likely to regard with indifference. About midsummer the
elaborate preparations which the Spanish admiral was
making in Naples began to have a new significance when
it was known that Spain, under the terms of the Triple
Alliance, had applied to the Dutch for assistance, and that
Be Buyter himself was under orders to proceed to Sicily
with a squadron of twenty sail. About England Louis was
scarcely less nervous. In the autumn of 1674 Sir John
Narbrough,a flag-officer who had made a considerable
Digitized by
Google
1676 LOUIS BUYS CHARLES'S NEUTRALITY 89
reputation in the late war, had been appointed Com-
mander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean, and was now
maintaining an effective blockade of Tripoli in ominous
proximity to the storm centre. In view of the condition
of affairs in England it was impossible to tell how far or
how long the chastisement of the corsairs would remain
Narbrough's real object. Charles, who was cynically
oscillating between dependence on Louis and a frank
national policy, might any day come to terms with his
warlike Parliament and fix their devotion by throwing in
bis lot with the allies ; and since England during the
past century had established a sinister reputation of
always commencing hostilities without a declaration of
wjar, Louis might find the balance in the Mediterranean
turned against him at any moment. By the middle of
September De Ruyter was in Cadiz concerting operations
with the Spaniards and preparing for an effective junction
with their squadron in Naples so soon as it should be
ready for sea. Vivonne had failed in his offensive move-
ment ashore, and Du Quesne, who was in Toulon trying
to get to sea with a fresh fleet for his relief, was in immi-
nent danger of never being able to reach Messina. The
.tension of the situation was acute ; nor was it relieved
till Louis found himself comp elled to indu ce Chaste* to
prorogue his aggressive Parliament with. the promise of a
pension of half a million a year.
At this cost Louis was able to reduce the balance to
equality. But De Ruyter was already at Melazzo, where
Vivonne's advance towards Palermo had been checked.
Du Quesne was still in Toulon. The operations that
ensued mark the definite establishment of Prance as a
firat-rate naval power. The bulk of the Spanish ships
with which De Ruyter was to co-operate were in Palermo,
not yet ready for sea. In Messina was a French squadron
Digitized by
Google
90 LOUIS XIV. AND SICILY 1076
of eight of the line and several frigates, under orders to
endeavour to join hands with Du Quesne as soon as he
appeared. This squadron De Buyter immediately re-
solved to attack and destroy in detail before the Toulon
squadron came on the field. Having seen Melazzo safe,
therefore, he weighed to enter the straits without waiting
for his Spanish colleague. As luck would have it, how-
ever, the wind went into the south-east, and he found it
impossible to get in. For two days he stood off and on
between the mouth of the Straits and the Lipari islands,
waiting for a shift of weather. Seeing that De Buyter's
object was to prevent a junction between the two French
squadrons, these islands were the key of the situation ;
for, lying as they did in the direct course from Toulon,
they gave every opportunity for evasion to a squadron
from that port seeking to get touch with Messina. On the
third day he received intelligence that a French fleet had
been sighted from Alicudi, the most westerly of the
islands. The news pointed to an intention of Du Quesne
to reach Messina by passing between Melazzo and Vul-
cano, the southernmost of the islands, and De Buyter
promptly occupied the channel. Here, on the fifth day,
he was joined by the Spanish galleys that were lying at.
Melazzo, but a stiff south-wester came on, and they had
to go back. De Buyter held his ground. He was still
hoping to get into the Straits, but towards evening he
saw on the heights of Lipari the fiery signal that a fleet
was in sight, and, as the wind still held at south-west,
he resolved to deal with the new-comers first. Next
day saw him among the islands, between Stromboli and
Lipari, where he heard from fishermen that a fleet was
in sight from Salina. Officers were quickly landed to
climb the heights of that island, and towards evening they
returned with the report that they had seen thirty sail
Digitized by
Google
1675 DE ttUYTER AND DU QUESNE 91
some six leagues to the north-west standing towards
them. Steering northward all night, De Ruyter at break
of day sighted the enemy some three leagues ahead and
to leeward of him, standing west-north-west almost
athwart his course. He immediately crowded all sail in
general chase, and about noon, as the French continued
to hug the wind in a determined effort to weather him,
his ten leading ships were within range. But instead of
holding on he suddenly hauled his wind, and, standing
with the French out of gunshot, made the signal for line
of battle.
To the French it seemed he was declining an action.
Conduct so contrary to the usual impetuosity of the old
fire-eating admiral has been misunderstood by others
besides the astonished French. The highest modern
authority has endeavoured to account for De Buyter's
action on the supposition chat, finding himself in inferior
force, he did decline the action, but with the deliberate
intention of giving the enemy the wind, so as to compel
him to attack to leeward, and that he thus inaugurated
the defensive tactics which the French so long used with
success against the British admirals of the eighteenth
century. 1
In face, however, of De Buyter's own despatch, this
view is not tenable. It is true his information led him to
believe that Du Quesne's fleet was more numerous than
his own, but it is clear he did not yet realise how much
stronger it was. There was nothing to show that the
bulk of the enemy were not store ships and transports,
and his own galleys were now close at hand at Lipari.
His movement was solely made in order to keep the wind
and to allow his rearmost ships to get into battle order.
8o far, however, had they fallen to leeward that it was
1 Hfthan, Influence of 8§a Power on SUtury*
Digitized
*by Google
82 LOUIS XIV. AND SICILY 1676
three o'clock before the line was formed. At seven it
would be dark, and he saw that in those confined waters
it was too late in the day to win a decisive victory. The
action must be fought on the morrow, and, calling his
captains aboard him, he exhorted them to fight to the
death. Each officer grasped the old hero's hand and
passed his word, and then all night long he hang upon
the enemy with the galleys in company. The two fleets
were sailing close-hauled on the same tack to the south-
westward. Half-way between them De Ruyter had a galley
to keep contact and signal him if the enemy attempted
to elude him by a change of course. But as the night
advanced the wind grew unsteady with ugly squalls.
Later it increased to half a gale, and the contact scout
with all the rest of the galleys bad to run for Lipari for
shelter. Now was Du Quesne's chance, and sure enough
through the roar of the gale De Ruyter soon heard
his signal to tack. He immediately did the same and
the French move was parried. No man ever worked
harder or better to keep the advantage of the wind.
Du Quesne, under a press of sail, was using all his art to
outmanoeuvre his antagonist, but against the first master
of his craft his efforts were useless. Chance at last gave
him what he could not win. Towards dawn the wind
again chopped round, and when day broke on December 27
De Ruyter saw the French fleet about four leagues
from him and well to windward. The fickle weather had
lost him the game, and, worse still, daylight showed him
that the French fleet was composed mainly of war ships
bigger than his own. Then, and not till then, he knew
he was in serious inferiority both in numbers and force.
StOl the hard-bitten veteran would not give way, and,
seeing the weather gage hopelessly gone, he bore up till
he was in such a position that the enemy could not
Digitized by
Google
1675 THE BATTLE OF STROMBOLt 03
reach Messina without fighting him, and there awaited
Da Quesne's attack. 1
What followed is described by De Buyter in words
that leave no doubt as to the intention of his tactics.
• At daybreak on the 8th/ he wrote in his official despatch,
' we saw them again edging past us, and, the wind being
six points against us, they had the weather gage. So
that, instead of our chasing them and their wishing to
avoid an action, as we had supposed, they bore down on
us about nine o'clock in the morning/ ' The action was
fought somewhere between Filicudi and Stromboli. For
three hours or more it raged, as was admitted on all sides,
with unexampled fury. A calm put a stop to it, and by
the help of his galleys De Buyter was able to withdraw
his fleet from an enveloping movement which, in accor-
dance with the latest tactical ideas, Du Quesne says he
was about to make. 1
Both sides claimed the victory. Neither sought to
renew the action. The technical advantage was certainly
1 See Brandt's Michel de Ruiter, and De Jonge's Geeehiedenis van hst
Nederlandsche Zeewczen. Both authors used De Ruyter's despatch written
on Jan. 9, 1676 (n.s.), the day after the action. Though Jal (Dm Quesne,
ii. 203) gives part of this despatch, he omits the earlier and more interesting
portion, and somewhat mistranslates other parts. Captain Mahan, not
having access to these two excellent Dutch works, or to the later French
ones, was unfortunately induced in his great work to rely too much
on the French 'official • naval history of Lapeyrouse, which a brother naval
historian, himself by no means an impeccable scholar, has called 'una
malheureuse compilation, due a un ex-officier de marine, M. Bonfils la
Bltaie ou Laperouse, sous le titre trompeur d'histoire de la marine ; ear ii n'j
a pas trace d'histoire seneuse dans cet ouvrage dont le minister* de la
marine, a defaut du publio, s'est fait 1'acqucreur, et dont il a empoisonne lea
bibliotheques des ports et b&timents de l'etat, pour enseigner aux marina
sans doute le contrepied du bon sens et de la verite ' (Ouerin, Hietmt*
Maritime de la France, iii. 405). Of Guerin's work another French eritio
writes: 'Cette ceuvre de seconde main est au milieu de nos bona lines
d'histoires d'aujourd'hui ee qu'est le vulgaire oison dont parle Virgile an
milieu des cygnes harmonieux.' See De la Bonders, L 27, note (6).
•Jal,lt20». • Seaport, p. 968.
Digitized by
Google
M LOUIS XIV. AND SICILY 1675-6
with De Ruyter. With an inferior force he had held his
ground, and prevented Du Quesne's getting through to
Messina. On the following day he was joined by the
Spanish admiral, and together they devoted themselves to
trying to draw Du Quesne to the westward away from the
Straits. He held, however, resolutely to Stromboli and
refused to move till the Messina squadron slipped out and
joined him. The allies were now in an inferiority of two
to one, and, after again trying to induce Du Quesne to
chase to the westward, De Ruyter decided to return to
Melazzo. So long as he kept his fleet there intact within
striking distance of Messina he knew Du Quesne dared
not enter the straits for fear of exposing his rearguard
to destruction. The move was a complete success. Du
Quesne, even though he had succeeded in effecting the
junction, was beaten. For all his superiority he had left
the allied fleet in being, and was compelled to attempt the
relief of Messina south-about. So hard pressed was the
garrison, and so uncertain the wintry weather, that this
in itself constituted a victory for the Dutch. The chances
were that Du Quesne could not arrive in time to save
Messina, and as soon as the French move was known
De Ruyter retired into port to refit. The time for which
his services had been engaged was expiring, and in
pursuance of his original orders he prepared to go home,
content that he had done for the Spaniards fully as much
as their unreadiness deserved.
With the small force at his command be had certainly
added new laurels to his great reputation. Still, after all,
the lasting advantage was with the French. Against all
expectation, lucky shifts of wind enabled Du Quesne to
reach Messina in time to save the situation. Nor was
this all, or nearly all. Afte^years of blundering-and
pusillanimous failure the FroncE^iavjLcasne^o^t of the
Digitized by
Google
1676 BATTLE OF AUGUSTA 05
action with an established reputation. Not only had
Da Qaesne crossed swords with the most renowned sea-
man of his time and suffered no defeat, but by the
generous admission of their opponents the French had
handled their fleet with consummate skill and in admi-
rable order. 1 It was clear to all men that Louis's navy
had begun to be something that it had never been before.
Thanks to Colbert's efforts and the cheap experience it
had won by pretending to co-operate first with the Dutch
and then with the English in the late wars, it had reached
a degree of discipline and tactical efficiency little if any-
thing inferior to that of its masters ; and from the hard-
fought battle off Stromboli dates the commencement of
the time when France could feel real confidence in her
naval forces.
Nor did the remainder of the war belie the first ex-
perience. Towards the end of February De Ruyter,
having received at Leghorn despatches authorising him
to continue the campaign, moved to Palermo, where he
concerted with the Spaniards a combined attack on
Messina by sea and land in hopes of destroying Du Quesne
where he lay. The attempt took place at the end of
March. De Ruyter succeeded in carrying the fleet into
the Straits, but once before Messina he saw that the
currents made an attack impossible. At the same time
the Spanish troops were defeated in their assault, and the
fleet went southward to Reggio, hoping to draw Du Quesne
into the open.' The French did not refuse the challenge,
and before long the two fleets met again off Augusta,
a little town that lies between Syracuse and JEtna. The
Spanish contingent, wholly inexperienced in the new
1 See De Ruyter's despatch in Jal, ii. 90S, and of. Brandt and De Jonge,
ubi supra,
» Brandt, Michel de Ruiter, book xviii.
Digitized by
Google
96 IX)UIS XIV. AND SICILY ld76
tactics, proved themselves incapable of acting in unison
with the smart manoeuvres of the Dutch. Another in-
decisive action ensued, which was terminated by nightfall.
Again the French more than held their own against the
combined Dutch and Spanish fleet, and, to add to their
sense of victory, the veteran De Buyter, who from the
first had felt he was going to his doom, was mortally
wounded. Verschoen, his vice-admiral, had been killed at
Stromboli, and De Haen, the original rear-admiral, suc-
ceeded to the command. He at once withdrew the allied
fleet to Palermo. Here the exultant French a month later
resolved to deal the allies a final blow. Vivonne himself
took command, and De Haen, disgusted at the hopeless
blundering and inefficiency of the Spanish captains with
whom he was condemned to act, resolved to abide the
attack at anchor. By skilful tactics, which added still
further to their prestige, the French succeeded in concen-
trating their attack on a portion of the enemy's line, and
by a timely use of their fire-ships to inflict so crushing a
blow as practically Jo remove the hostile fleet from the
board. Twelve ships were completely destroyed, many
more disabled, and De Haen, with two of his flag officers,
was killed.
Having thus within six months fought three successful
actions against two of the great sea powers, the reputation
of the French navy was firmly established, and their
position. inJhe Med iterra nean secured. Du Quesne could
safely retire to Toulon for stores and reinforcements, and
in the middle of July was able to sail again with three
thousand infantry to reinforce the French Viceroy. There
was nothing to intercept him. In vain the Spaniards
urged the Dutch to make one more effort. The admiral
said he had instructions from home to go to Naples to
await further orders, and Du Quesne and the rest of the
Digitized by
Google
1676-7 SICILY 4 IN EXTREMIS' 97
army that was following him passed unmolested. The
fact was the Dutch were disgusted with the futility of
their ally, and in August, when the second period for
which they had promised to serve in the Mediterranean,
was expired, the fleet was recalled. France was at last
in command of the sea, at liberty to throw in what
force she chose to complete the reduction of Sicily. As
things stood it was but a question of time. With a real
army at his back Vivonne began to reach out towards
Syracuse, and by the autumn Taormina, the romantic
spot from which the Greeks two thousand years before
had begun their Sicilian dominion, was in his possession.
Single-handed it was hopeless for Spain to expect that
she could prolong the situation indefinitely. By pursuing
those evasive tactics in which, since the days of Drake,
she had always shown so high a skill, she was still able to
support her hard-pressed officers. Yet, unless something
intervened to relieve the tension, it was inevitable that
France ^ould soon be in possession of the heart of the
Mediterranean.
But already the heat of her success, both here and else-
where, was drawing out of the North the cloud that was
destined at last to chill and wither the system of the Grand
Monarque. His evil genius had arisen. Since the murder
of De Witt the monarchical constitution had been restored
to the Netherlands, and William of Orange, as Stadt-
holder of the States, had become the focus of resistance
to Louis. At present his prospects were dark enough. The
land campaign in Flanders was going far from well ; and on
that side the relations between the Dutch and the Spaniards
were growing as bad and mistrustful as they were in the
Mediterranean. In his trouble William turned to Charles,
and while Vivonne was in the act of again setting out for
a grand attack on Syracuse, Bentinck, the Prince's most
vol. n. H
Digitized by
Google
98 LOUIS XIV. AND SICILY 1677
confidential follower, came over to feel the ground for a
match between the houses of Stuart and Orange. The
attack on Syracuse proved abortive. Bentinck's mission
was in every way a success. Vivonne's whole campaign
fell to pieces, and while Louis was chafing at his Viceroy's
failure, William was at Newmarket approving the attrac-
tions of Princess Mary, the eldest daughter of the Duke of
York. At the same time, Sir John Narbrough, who had
gone home after successfully completing his work at
Tripoli, reappeared in the Mediterranean with a fresh
fleet, and Louis began to take serious alarm, as well he
might.
During the last inglorious years the British navy, the
one factor in the situation which, if thrown into the scale
against him, Louis could not hope to resist, had well
maintained its prestige, and above all in the Mediterra-
nean, where most it was to be feared. It was Narbrough,
moreover, who had most brilliantly kept the old "fire
burning. The blockade of Tripoli, which he had esta-
blished and maintained throughout the year 1675, had
proved a complete success. A number of the corsairs'
vessels were captured or destroyed by his cruisers and
boats, and in January 1676 he had made a bold attempt
on four vessels that lay in the harbour itself. The flotilla
by which the attack was made was led by a young
lieutenant named Cloudesley Shovell, afterwards the
famous admiral, and without the loss of a man all four
vessels were destroyed. Subsequently Narbrough landed
a party and succeeded in burning a quantity of naval
stares, but in spite of the lesson the Dey remained obdu-
rate. He had still four powerful vessels at sea, but these
Narbrough soon fell in with. Besides his own ship, the
'Hampshire,' he had only one frigate with him, but he
did not hesitate to engage. A bloody action ensued, in
Digitized by
Google
1676 NAUBKOUGH'S SQUADRON W
which, though he did not capture one of the enemy, he
forced them to fly into Tripoli, cut to pieces, and with the
loss of six hundred men. With his navy practically
annihilated, the Dey at last came to reason. On March 5,
1676, a treaty was signed, conceding to England the
maritime privileges she demanded, and agreeing to an
indemnity of eighty thousand dollars. So abject a sub-
mission produced a revolution. The Dey was expelled
from the city, and the new Government defied the
admiral. Thereupon he once more stood in to threaten a
bombardment, and the new Dey found himself compelled
to ratify the objectionable treaty. Fresh from this suc-
cess, Narbrough returned to Tangier, and his mere
presence there was enough to coerce Salee into a treaty
similar to that which he had exacted from Tripoli.
Louis himself was able to cut a scarcely more dignified
figure than the corsairs. His protests that the English
were practically protecting Dutch commerce against his
privateers instead of assisting him to destroy it only
resulted in his having to agree to a commercial treaty,
whereby he gave up his belligerent rights and exempted
British vessels from molestation by his cruisers, whether
they were carrying enemy's goods or not. 1 But even this
humiliating concession brought him little rest from his
main anxiety. Though the ostensible object of Nar-
brough's return to the Mediterranean after his exploits
at Tripoli was merely that some Algerine cruisers had
captured one or two English merchantmen, the fleet he
was to command was to consist of nearly thirty sail ; ' but
what is most extraordinary/ as a newsman wrote, * is that
the Duke of Monmouth goes to sea with this fleet in
quality only of captain of the "Resolution," a ship of
1 LiUm d* Colbert, UL I No. 440, Sept 7-47, 1676. Bank*, ir. 36.
M *
Digitized by
Google
100 LOUIS XIV. AND SICILY 1675
between sixty and seventy guns.' ' Eventually the young
Protestant hero did not sail, but the fact that he thought
of doing so remains as evidence of the importance attached
to the fleet in Court circles and the menace it contained
for Louis.
A further point is not without significance and of high
interest as showing the germ of an idea on which the
British Mediterranean power came ultimately to be largely
based. In the spring of 1675 Pepys had written to Nar-
brough instructing him to arrange a base to which rein-
forcements might be sent for a more vigorous prosecution
of the war with Tripoli. Since Leghorn was too distant
and too ill-disposed and Messina blockaded, the King and
the Lords, he was told, considered Malta, fittest for the
purpose. Eephallonia had also been suggested, but the
final decision was to be left to the admiral. Narbrough
had no hesitation. He chose Malta, and seeing that he
was operating against the nearest and most formidable
enemy of the Knights, he had no difficulty in securing
their permission. As soon as this was known at the
Admiralty, the Tangier careening hulk and all the stores
that were going out to Narbrough were ordered to Malta.
In June 1675 Pepys, in submitting a memorandum of the
Navy Estimates to Parliament, asked for a grant • for the
providing of stores to be lodged at Malta for answering
the wants of the fleet under Sir John Narbrough,' and a
month later a frigate sailed from Spithead to convoy the
Tangier hulk to the new base. 1 The arrangement pro-
bably terminated with Narbrough 's successful conclusion
of the war, but as he expended his indemnity on the spot
1 La Fleming MSS. (HuL USS. Cam.), sii. vii. 189, UQ.
* 8m ityjtf Calendar, 1676; Pepys to Narbrough, April 19, May 10,
Jane 14; am to the Speaker, Jane 19, July 6; name to Bett, July 6
(ordering the 'Earopa' balk from Tangier to Malta); and sanio to Ear-
i September 8*
Digitized by
Google
1675 PEPY8 ON INCREASING THE NAVY lOl
in ransoming captives, amongst whom were several
Knights of Malta, he was clearly in a position to prolong
or renew his advantage as he pleased.
Besides the indication of the intended field of Nar-
brough's operations which these proceedings afforded,
there lay in them a still higher menace. In view of the
alarming growth of the French fleet, the House of Com-
mons had passed a resolution to take into consideration
the whole state of the navy, and called upon the Admi-
ralty for a return. In presenting it, Pepys, to enforce his
argument for an increase of strength, produced one of those
comparative tables — now so familiar — which showed the
French fleet actually superior to our own. ' Our neigh-
bours 9 force,' said he, ' is now greater than ours, and they
will still be building, so that we are as well to overtake
them for the time past as to keep pace with them in the
present building.' Not only had they passed us in num-
bers, but also in the individual power of their ships. In
strength, staunchness, and general sea endurance, their
recent construction had gone beyond us. He therefore
urged the immediate laying down of a number of the larger
rates ; and recommended our ' building ships more bur-
densome, stronger, and giving them more breadth. 9 This
would 'make them carry their guns better — that is higher —
our great ships failing therein, especially in bad weather ; *
'enable them to carry more timber and thicker sides,
less easily penetrated by shot ' ; give more stowage room,
and fit them for the heavier guns that were coming into
, favour. In the ehd the House voted a large grant for the
^constractioiMjfJihirtyjiew-flhips, and though conditions
were attached to it which Charles could not agree to,
the programme was soon after taken in hand. 1
It mattered little therefore that when, towards the
1 Tanner, Engl Hist IUv. xli. 691 $t «g.
Digitized by
Google
102 LOUIS XIV. AND SICILY 1077
end of 1677, Narbrough reappeared in the Straits, the
misconduct of the Algerines afforded an excuse for his
presence. Behind him was a strenuous naval revival,
directed to a declared end, and he carried in his hand a
threat there was no concealing. His arrival was followed
by a report that Cornells Evertsen was coming down to
join him with eighteen sail, and Louis saw he must take
rapid and decisive action. 1 Vivonne, since his late failures,
had been showing as little heart as ability for his posi-
tion, and it was now decided to allow him to return to
his naval command at Toulon, and to replace him with
one of the most accomplished soldiers in France. It was
Marshal d'Aubusson, Due de la Feuillade, on whom Louis's
choice fell, and in the last months of 1677 an expedition
was prepared for him, strong enough to carry French arms
from end to end of Sicily. At the same time Charles,
having decided to offer his mediation, was pressing Louis
to make a reasonable peace with Spain. But, so far from
listening, the French King continued to extend his opera-
tions in Flanders, f»nd on New Year's Day, 1678, Charles
and the Prince of Orange signed a treaty to unite their
forces in compelling France to end the war. Clearly there
was no time to lose; Feuillade had already left Paris,
and was riding night and day down to Toulon to take up
his command. By January 14, 1678, he was clear away
to sea, and by the end of the month carried bis fleet into
the Straits of Messina. On February 3-he took the oath
as Viceroy, and proceeded at once to strengthen the
French advanced posts for immediate offensive action.
For about a month his preparations continued, and when
they were complete he invited the leading citizens to a
banquet In their enthusiasm they brought with them
the sacred banner of Sta. Maria della Lettera, which had
been placed infa general's hands since, a century
1 L$Um * Colbert, UL i. No. 470, November 7-17, 1677.
Digitized by
Google
1678 EVACUATION OF MESSINA 10S
before, it was given to Don John of Austria on the eve
of Lepanto. For a power that was about to take the
place which Spain bad then held the honour was appro-
priate enough, and Fenillade accepted it complacently.
After the ceremony he begged them to adjourn to the Senate
House that he might publicly announce his niaster'sorders.
To the surprise of the citizens they heard that these orders
were for every French soldier to be immediately vrith-
drawa.fromSiciiy. The King, so the Marshal said, re-
quired them for a secret expedition, and he hoped to be
back in two months with still larger forces. The Mes-
sinians had no suspicion of the word of the general passed
under their sacred banner, and Feuillade was allowed to
proceed without interruption.
So the unhappy insurgents were left to their fate.
It was this that had been intended by Feuillade's appoint-
ment. The decisive step which Louis had felt himself
compelled to take was not the conquest of Sicily but its
evacuation, and once more by a threat of action in the
Mediterranean the Northern powers had laid a mastering
hand upon the European situation. In France, so far
from there being any hope of retaining a hold upon
Sicily, the fear was that they would not even be per-
mitted to abandon it. Narbrough was on the spot, and
there was no telling what his orders were. ' We ought,
I think,' wrote Du Quesne, ' to assume that, if the English
declare themselves, it will be as they habitually do, by
firing the shot at their own time, just as they did when
they declared against the Dutch in 1672 by Holmes attack-
ing the Smyrna convoy/ He might, as we know, have
added many other instances, which gave to a British fleet
ready for action in the Mediterranean its peculiar weight
in the councils of Europe. The English, however, did not
declare themselves. The threat was enough, and the
French garrison returned direct to Toulon unmolested. r ^ '
Digitized by
Google
101 LOUTR XIV. AND SICILY 1678
On his northern frontier Louis was not so easily
checked. Though a pence congress was sitting at Nymwe-
gen f to Englishmen it seemed that, if the Spanish Nether-
lands were to be saved, war was inevitable. The Duke of
Monmouth went over to the Low Countries with an English
force ready to co-operate with William of Orange. In July
an engagement actually occurred between the opposing
forces at Mons; and at sea conflicts between French
and English vessels from time to time intensified the
situation. Preparations, moreover, were being made in
the British ports for fitting out a fleet of ninety sail.
It was the last year of Pepys's able administration, and
the navy had never been more ready for war. Eighty-
three vessels were actually in commission, the magazines
were packed with reserve stores, the ships in harbour
were in excellent condition, and thirty new ones of the
first three rates were upon the stocks. 1 Here lay the
greatest anxiety for France ; and throughout the summer,
while the negotiations continued, Colbert had ever a
nervous eye upon Narbrough's fleet, for fear of the
spark which would set the seas in a blaze. In order to
improve the French position at the Congress he was
still bent on using the Toulon squadron either against
Catalonia or the Dutch Smyrna convoy, but all Du
Quesne's orders were strangled by the condition that at*
all hazards he must keep out of- Narbrough's way. 2
With his hands thus tied'Du Quesne could of course
effect nothing to restore the balance in favour of the
French arms. Louis was compelled to give way in every
direction, and a general peace was concluded in Sep-
tember.
1 Bqpyi, Mmm rin* touching the Royal Navy.
* L*tr*$d* Colbert, Ul. i. No. 494, May 8-18; 496, May 4-14; 496,
Mayis-ts.
Digitized by
Google
CHAPTER XXIV
TANGIER AND THE POPISH PLOT
Like the other treaties by which the powers had sought
to curb the career of Louis, that of Nymwegen proved
but a mere breathing place in his advance. Much as he
had gained, it served only to whet his appetite and increase
his confidence. With his army triumphant and unex-
hausted, his wealth increasing, and a navy that had
just given signs of maturity, he was not likely to rest
content, and least of all in the Mediterranean, where the
promise was highest and the failure most marked. The
pressure that had forced peace upon him had been irre-
sistible, but in peace he knew how to work for his ends
as well as in war. To oust the English from Tangier was
still one of those ends.
How far his hand was in it we cannot tell, but it is
certain that no sooner was the treaty of Nymwegen signed
than a new and insidious form of attack upon the place
began to make itself felt. There is no direct evidence
that it was Louis's work ; but, seeing what the condition
of affairs was, it is impossible to believe that it had not
at least his countenance. Since he had lost his hold on
Charles, he had allied himself with the Anglican opposi-
tion. Indeed it was they who had forced him to make
the peace, and it was still by secret influence in English
political circles that he was trying to keep the British
power out of his path. At the moment the situation was
dominated by the notorious papist scare. The tenor,
Digitized by
Google
106 TANGIER AND THE POPISH PLOT 1678
which had been haunting the popular imagination ever
since the treaty of Dover was signed, had burst out
into ungovernable fury against all papists; and Tangier at
this time had Lord Inchiquin, son of the old Irish Catholic
leader, for Governor. Now it will be remembered that
Estrades had warned Montagu that there were men
about the King ready to suggest the abandonment of
Tangier so soon as an occasion served. It was such an
occasion now. The Moors had recently become actively
hostile again, and it was clear that sooner or later, if the
place was to be kept, the reduced garrison would have
to be brought up to its original strength. This meant
increased expense and something worse. Tangier had
already won itself an evil name with Protestants. Lord
Inchiquin was not its first Catholic Governor: its
garrison had always been largely Catholic, and it was
openly branded by many as a nursery for papist troops.
What better opportunity then could there be for suggest-
ing that, instead of raising fresh troops to preserve the
place, the double danger should be avoided by its evacu-
ation?
Like most similar efforts to influence public opinion
the origin of the movement is difficult to trace. Pepys
believed on the highest authority that it was the Earl of
Sunderland who first suggested the evacuation to the
Sing. 1 He certainly had motive enough. His last
diplomatic appointment had been to replace Montagu,
who had been recalled in disgrace from the Embassy at
Paris, and after the conclusion of the treaty at Nymwegen
'- On Oct 2, 1683, Lord Dartmouth, who was privy to the whole design,
told him at Tangier that 'it was first proposed by my Lord Sunderland
about three years ago* ('Tangier Diary* in Smith's IAfe % Journals, and
CmtttpomtUme$ of Sawmd Pepy*, £*g. FM.8. i. 880). This would plaoe
the origin of the movement in the autumn of 1680, but it was certainly
in tfca air a year earlier.
Digitized by
Google
1679 RUMOURS OF ANOTHER SALE 107
he had returned to London to begin his unscrupulous
political career as in effect prime minister of the ' Chits *
administration. An arch opportunist from the first, he
was aptly described in a lampoon of the time as
A Proteus, ever acting in disgnige,
A finished statesman, intricately wise;
A second Machiavel, who soared above
The little types of gratitude and lore.
Having posed all his youth as a strenuous Protestant,
he was now seeking his inspiration from Mademoiselle de
Kfroualle, Duchess of Portsmouth, or in other words from
Barillon, the French Ambassador, and there is little
reason to doubt the general correctness of Pepys's informa-
tion. Indeed Sunderland himself afterwards admitted the
idea was his own. 1
The known facts of the case are these. After an
existence of eighteen years, the Restoration Parliament
had been dissolved. In the early spring of 1679 a general
election had taken place, by no means so favourable to
the Court a? had been expected, and so soon as the new
Parliament met, it fell savagely upon Lord Danby, the
Old Cavalier minister whom they regarded as responsible
for all that was evil in the King's policy, both at home
and abroad. In the midst of the proceedings for his
impeachment a rumour arose that the King was in treaty
with Louis for the sale of Jamaica and Tangier for a
sum of money which would enable him to dispense with
the aid of Parliament. Whether any such idea was in the
air or not, it seems clear that Barillon knew nothing of
it. The opposition, however, took the matter very
seriously, and worked themselves into such a state of
nervousness that on April 7 they ordered a bill to be
brought in for annexing Tangier to the Crown of England-
1 Pepyi to Lord Dartmouth, April 6, 1684, Smith, ii. 48.
Digitized by
Google
108 TANGIER AND THE POPISH PLOT 1679
Nobody in bis senses — so Montagu assured the Ambas-
sador — believed the rumour to be possible. Moreover
the Court party was able to point out to the House how
unwise was the bill ; since if it were passed it would
saddle Parliament with the burden of the garrison. But
the country members were far too excited to listen. The
bill was brought in, and committed to the most violent of
the opposition to draft ; but even then they could not
rest. The King might deal with Tangier, as he had
dealt with Dunkirk, before the bill could pass, and so
high was the feeling that, three days later, immediately
after their refusal to accept the Lords' milder proposals
about Danby, the Commons passed a resolution, nemine
contradicenie : ' That this House is of opinion that those
who shall advise his Majesty to part with Tangier to any
foreign prince or state, and be instrumental therein, ought
to be accounted enemies of the King and kingdom/ '
Though the meaning of these proceedings is clear
enough, it is uncertain from what quarter came the note
of alarm. Barillon affirmed that it was believed to have
originated from Danby himself; but it is much more
probable that Montagu was at the bottom of it. He
had been deprived not only of his embassy, but also of
his seat in the Council, and was bent on revenge. Danby,
by warmly supporting the Orange match, had incurred
Louis's enmity, and Montagu, in return for a substantial
gratuity, had offered to bring about the obnoxious mini-
sterns fall It was in this way the attack of the Commons
had begun. Montagu's unscrupulous method of proceeding
was to make the unpopular statesman appear responsible
lor Charles's degrading bargains with the French King,
which Danby had done his best to neutralise, and of
1 Common* Journal*, ix. 5SS. Barillon to LouU, April 17 and S6 (n.s.),
lfTO, U.O. BamkH TramcripU, 40.
Digitized by
Google
1679 THE TANGIER BILL 109
which Montagu himself had been the instrument With
this end in view, nothing could tell more sharply against
his victim than a hint that Tangier was in the unsavoury
market. Such a suggestion, moreover, had a further
advantage for Montagu. To take foreign pay in those
days by no means meant that a man had lost his patriotism.
Montagu could earn his money without betraying his
country, and nothing could serve his purpose better, both
for calming his conscience and turning suspicion of
French influence from himself, than warning the opposi-
tion of what he had heard from Estrades. Thus pro-
tected he would be able to attack Danby with all the
virulence he pleased ; and at this time he had been so
successful in his game that the House had taken him
under its special protection and impounded his papers to
prevent the Court getting hold of them. It is extremely
probable therefore that we may trace the action of the
Commons to Montagu. In any case they were so far in
earnest that the bill was read a first time some six weeks
later, and had not the King suddenly prorogued Parlia-
ment in order to save Danby from its animosity, the
Tangier bill would certainly have become law. 1
Thus it is most probable that it was by Louis's own
pensioner that the movement against Tangier, if there
was one, was checked. But Sunderland remained at the
head of affairs, and the nervousness continued. A similar
rumour recurred early the following year. This time it took
the form that, if Parliament would not vote enough
money for the fleet, the Dutch were ready to lend it on
the security of Tangier. As the place had not been
formally annexed, it was argued that it was in the King's
power to deal with it, and that in the hands of the Prince of
1 Common* JournaU, it. 635, M*y 90, 1670. A oopy of (Km bill it
dared in Hi$t. MSS. Com, r. 890.
Digitized by
Google
110 TANGIER AND THE POPISH PLOT 16*0
Orange, who was to command the garrison, it would be
as useful to England as if it were in English hands. It
was a suggestion— so Barillon wrote to his master— of the
Dutch party at Court, who were urging an alliance with
Holland instead of with France; but he found comfort
in the alarm it aroused, not only with the Parliamentary
opposition but with the great mercantile community. 1
The feeling that prevailed is further reflected in the
activity of the pamphleteers. In the autumn was pub-
lished The Present Danger of Tangier ; or an account of
its being attempted by a great army of Moors by land and
under apprehensions of the French at sea. It purports to
be a letter written from Cadiz on board the ' Hopewell/
but is clearly a political tract. After referring to the
popish plot and the religious troubles in Scotland, the
anonymous author describes Tangier and the army of
fifteen thousand Moors which he alleges is encamped
against it. He fears that unless quickly succoured it will
be lost, and if, he says, it should fall into some people's
hands it would cause the loss cf all our Mediterranean
trade. Besides the danger from the Moors, he affirms
that the French have forty sail of galleys threatening it
from Gibraltar, and throughout he is clearly writing to
create a public feeling for strengthening the place
instead of giving it up.*
The manuscript of a similar tract, apparently of this
tune, exists in the Pepys collection, which dwells particu-
larly on the strategic importance of the place. ' Tangier/
it argues, ' being a most convenient station for our naval
forces, which may give law to all that sail upon the
Midland sea, when once our mole is finished, as also a
• BtriQon to (Km King, Feb. IS and 30, 1680, R.O. Bucket 2V<m-
41.
'Dro* pp. 1*0-1.
Digitized by
Google
1680 TANGIER PAMPHLETS HI
safe port for vessels of trade/ The author sharply
censures those who call it a useless expense, since already,
he urges, it has forced the French King to make his
Languedoc channel, make spacious harbours, and keep
a large naval force on foot, to wit, thirty galleys at
Marseilles with eight or nine thousand men always
aboard them. In peace and war, he says, it has supplied
merchantmen and ships of war with victuals and intelli-
gence. So formidable a threat, moreover, was it to com-
merce that it inclined foreign princes to peace, since about
the Straits they could now discover almost no sail but what
bore St. George's Cross. The ugly reputation which the
garrison had acquired for insubordination and lewd living
he was obliged to admit, but this, he contended, was no
essential evil, due to the climate, but to be attributed rather
to want of business and action. It was caused by idle
hands ' enjoying their neighbours' troubles, and delighting
in scandalous reports, especially 9 — so he adds— 'the
women, whose tongues are not to be limited.' '
A still more important tract was issued the following
year, 1680, which with considerable power and at length
sets forth the advantages that had been already reaped
from the occupation. To begin with, the author points
out how at the very commencement it compelled the
King of Spain to draw his forces from the Portuguese
frontier down into Andalusia, and so at the most critical
period of their struggle for independence it gave the
Portuguese respite for a whole campaign. 'Tangier/ he
proceeds, ' is so advantageously situated that it surveys the
greatest thoroughfare of commerce in the world ... so
that no ship or vessel can pass in or out of the Mediter-
ranean unobserved from thence. . . . Here it was that a
1 BoUand 1 * MmUUrransa* Pajxn, No. 15, in the PepyiUn Libra,
Magdalene College, Cambridge.
Digitized by
Google
113 TANGIER AND THE POPISH PLOT 1680
squadron of the Dutch, on two several occasions during
that war, lay in wait for our Newfoundland fleet, who had
no recourse for safety but to Tangier, where they were
protected and secured till the danger was over.' He then
goes on to speak of how Allin and Narbrough had won
all their greatest successes by being able to hold this
station, and had thereby destroyed the pirates' power.
Already it was a real port of refuge and naval base.
' With what ease and expedition, 9 he says, ' did Sir John
Xarbrough, the last year, careen and refit the ships under
his command within the mole. I have often heard him
say with great satisfaction that he would undertake to
refit a squadron [there] in half the time and with half the
charge that it could be done anywhere else out of
England/ He then dwells upon its high strategical
advantage in case of war with France or Spain, both for
the protection of our commerce and the power of offence
against theirs. In the case of the Dutch wars its
value was particularly conspicuous. For in the first war,
when it was in its infancy, 'the mole of little benefit,
nor the ministers then not so much enlightened in its
usefulness, ' the Hollanders did with a small squadron of
ship6 scour the whole Mediterranean,' whereas in the
last war they themselves were barely able to trade within
the Straits at all. Finally, it had proved itself, if rightly
managed, capable of being an absolute prevention to the
Barbary corsairs.
'If/ he proceeds, 'Tangier be a jewel of so many
extraordinary virtues, it were a great deal of pity it should
adorn any prince's crown but he who wears it/ So he
speaks of an alarming rumour that the place was to be
sold to the French, and urges the terrible danger to our
position and prestige if it were not only lost to us, but
gained by them. He warns men against complaining of
Digitized by
Google
16 80 NEW DIFFICULTIES 113
its expense, and reminds them how just the same was said
of Dunkirk and how they have repented the sale. It is
no more expense, he argues, than one first-rate ship in
war. ' Yet/ he asks, ' did ever anybody complain that our
ships were a burden ? '
In conclusion he dwells on the commercial importance
to which its position seems to entitle it over and above
its strategical advantages. He foresees it may become
the great emporium of the American, East Indian, and
Levant trade — the main centre of distribution for all
Europe, if only it be kept a free port. *It is an easy
matter therefore/ he concludes, ' for the Prince of Tangier
to command our northern world, and to give laws to
Europe and Africa. The situation of Borne, of Carthage,
of Constantinople, of London, Paris, and other imperial
cities is nothing near so advantageous for that purpose as
Tangier if all things be considered/ '
It is clear therefore that by this time its true value
was fully appreciated, and the attempt to bring it to the
fate of Dunkirk failed. Still no help for its adequate
maintenance was to be had from the House of Commons.
A new Parliament met in October 1679 ; but the King, in
face of the movement for the exclusion of his Catholic
brother from the succession, dared not let it sit, and it was
continually prorogued. Still, in spite of his penury, he
contrived to send out reinforcements. In the course of the
year 1680 the garrison was brought up to two battalions :
and the help came none too soon. Towards the end of
the previous year the pressure from the Moors began to
increase to a dangerous degree. All work on the mole
had to be stopped, and the money allotted for it hastily
1 *A Discourse touching Tangier,' in a Utter to a person of quality, to
which is added * The Interest of Tangier, 9 by another hand (Harleian
MiscsUany, ed. 1810, rol. riii. 891 ft $eq.). The Discourse it dated Oct 90,
1G79.
VOL. II. I
Digitized by
Google
114 TANGIER AND THE POPISH PLOT 1680
spent on the fortifications. By the end of March 1680
the Moors had sat down before the new works in force,
and formed a regular siege. Sir Palmes Fairborne, who as
deputy governor was commanding in Lord Inchiquin's
absence, at once recognised that he had to confront a
situation such as had never yet threatened the place. In
the great school of arms which had formed round the siege
of Candia there were numbers of Mussulman soldiers
who had gradually acquired a high degree of skill in the
European methods of siege work. When the capitulation
put an end to their employment, it was natural for the more
adventurous of them to seek further service with Muley
Ishmael, the rising star that had supplanted Guylan in
Morocco. At Tangier then it was no longer a question
of untutored warfare and ill-directed assaults as in the
earlier days, but of a formal siege with all the order of
trench and mine that modern science could suggest.
Fortunately, Fairborne was just the man that was
wanted. He too had served his apprenticeship to arms in
the Candiote school under the Venetian colours, and had
been an officer in the Tangier regiment from its formation
in 1661. No one knew the possibilities of the place better
than he ; he was a soldier born and bred, with a high reputa-
tion both for courage and conduct, and Tangier had never
been so well ordered as during the years he had been acting
governor. The chance had come to show his mettle, and
at every turn the utmost skill of the Moors in devising
approaches was promptly met and foiled with equal art.
The fleet too was doing its best to support him. It was
now under the command of Arthur Herbert, afterwards
famous as Lord Torrington, an officer of quite the modern
type. Having joined the service in 1663 at the age of six-
teen, he had been on active service almost ever since.
In both Dutch wars he commanded a ship, and had
Digitized by
Google
1680 A FORMIDABLE SIEGE 115
served in the Mediterranean in almost every squadron
that had gone there. He had had a ship under Allin,
Spragge, and Narbrough. In Narbrough's last and most
important fleet he held the rank of Vice-Admiral, and
when in May 1679 Narbrough went home he remained in
command of the station. A year later he received his
commission as Admiral and Commander-in-Chief. Sur-
rounded by a devoted band of captains, and thoroughly
familiar with his work, he was able to render material
assistance to the Governor. Tangier was in his eyes, as
in Narbrough's, an invaluable naval station. He regarded
it as his headquarters, and in the modem fashion had a
house in the town. 1 Fairborne could not have wished for
a better colleague or one who had the preservation of the
place more earnestly at heart. But none knew better than
he that all modern experience showed how the defence of
fortified places must ultimately be beaten by a regular
attack. Under the conditions that existed, and against
the great odds to which it was exposed, the place could
not hold out indefinitely. Bit by bit the Moors were
eating their way in. By the first week in April they had
isolated two of the outer forts. For more than a month
both of them held out; but, on May 12, one had to
surrender while the other was cleverly evacuated, and
Fairborne was able to secure a truce of four months.
But he was too good a soldier not to see his fate before
him, unless Charles was ready to put forth a strength to
which he was probably unequal. To Pepys, the secretary
of the Tangier Council, he wrote a private letter in which
he laid bare his thoughts, and clearly sounded the last
1 Smith, i. 401. Pepys censures him (or this, and generally give* him a
bad eharaoter. Bat Pepys was so devoted an adherent of his patrons
that we can attach no more importanee to his dislike of Herbert than weean
to his dislike of Monk. Admiration for Lord Dartmouth was at the bottom
of the one, for Lord Sandwich of the other.
it
Digitized by
Google ■
116 TANGIER AND THE POPISH PLOT 1680
note. ' I only desire/ he wrote in sending home a report
of the situation, 'that you possess yourself with the
opinion that it will be impossible ever to maintain this
garrison by any other ways but by open war, unless the
enemy would condescend in time of peace to [our] fortify-
ing the town, which, so far as I can learn, they absolutely
refuse, but upon consideration of powder are willing [for
us] to carry on the work for the mole ; by which you
may conclude that the enemy do only defer their attempt
against the town till the mole be made more convenient
for them. Therefore it will be more for the King and
kingdom's service (I say, if his Majesty cannot maintain
it with such a force that we may be able to beat them in
the field) to blow up both town and mole. This I have
endeavoured to digest amongst my friends as most proper,
and what I foresee must be the end.' l
But Charles could not so easily bring himself to lose
the most glittering jewel he had added to the British
crown. It was all that remained of the brilliant hope
and high purpose with which he had begun his reign.
Struggling as he was with the influences that were dragging
him down, he still clung to it with a last effort of his
better self. With Tangier would go his last claim to be
considered a great power in Europe. Nor was he without
support. In the ministry was Sir William Temple to
counteract Sunderland's influence, and in him he had at
his elbow an adviser who had perhaps the clearest view
of any man of his time how the prestige of the country
could best be preserved.
The newsletters of the time clearly reflect the anxiety
that prevailed. • All fear/ says one of them on June 12,
•that Tangierswill fall,' and again on July 31, 'There
• BodfUm MS8. {But. MS8. Cam.), p. 176, May 24, 1680.
Digitized by
Google
1680 ENTHUSIASM FOR ITS RELIEF 117
are hopes we can still hold Tangiers. 9 1 The Govern-
ment had, in fact, determined to make a serious effort
to save it. The Court — so Barillon kept informing Louis
—was wholly absorbed in the affair. The merchants re-
garded the preservation of the place as essential to the
safety of the Levant trade, and, in spite of the danger of
letting seasoned troops leave the country at so critical a
political juncture, something had to be done. True, as
he says, there were courtiers who began to whisper that
Tangier was of no use and had better be abandoned* ' I
believe/ wrote the Ambassador, ' if they did not fear what
would happen when Parliament met, they would make
up their minds to abandon Tangier after destroying the
works that are in progress on the mole. 9 s For the time,
at any rate, public opinion and Charles's remnants of
ambition were too strong for 6uch counsels to be listened
to. Thirteen companies of infantry, including five of the
Coldstream Guards, were to be ready to go out in June,
and more were to follow, and Spain was persuaded to
provide two hundred horse. To complete the testimony
of energy, Lord Ossory, the Duke of Ormonde's idolised
son and the Bayard of the English Court, was induced to
accept the governorship. The most brilliant of the golden
youth eagerly volunteered to accompany him. At sea, on
land, and in diplomacy he had won equal distinction, and,
if Tangier could be saved, every one knew he was the man
to do it. Adored by the seamen no less than the soldiers,
and the darling of society as well, he gave to the King's
resolution a distinction which left nothing to be desired.
But a cloud had settled over Charles's star that not even
his brilliance could dispel. Ossory himself received the
1 U Fleming Jfc'&.pp. 108, 170.
' Barillon to the King, July 81, 1080 (n*.) Also his despatches from
May V to Augunt 34, U.O. Banket Trantcripts, 41.
Digitized by
Google
118 TANGIER AND TUB l*0PI8H PLOT 1680
appointment as his doom, and saw open before him the
grave of his reputation. As he told Evelyn, he was being
thrown away, not only on a hazardous venture, but on
one that in most men's minds was an impossibility. Yet
he prepared himself to obey, sinking every day into a
gloomier foreboding, till, before he could sail, death came
mercifully to his release. With him died the newly
kindled enthusiasm. No one was appointed to succeed
him. The King wearily abandoned his effort. The Cold-
streams and the other old troops were countermanded,
and it was decided to send a small relief of fresh levies,
and leave the rest to Parliament when it met. 1
Meanwhile the truce at Tangier was fast ebbing away.
As no new governor had been appointed, the command
remained in the capable hands of Sir Palmes Fairborne.
The truce expired on September 15, and the Moors im-
mediately reopened hostilities; but Fairborne, having
received some reinforcements and being backed by
Herbert's fleet, had everything in order. He at once
assumed the offensive, and, having now a sufficiency of
cavalry, was able to do so with success. During the
following months, by a series of skilfully designed opera-
tions boldly carried out, he succeeded in reoccupying all
the positions he had been forced to abandon by the terms
of the truce, and firmly built out a position from which
he meant to strike the Moors a final blow in the field.
During all these operations he superintended the work in
person, exposing himself on horseback in complete con-
tempt of the enemy, till on October 24, in directing a
far advanced work that practically completed his scheme,
he was seriously wounded. The Moors seized the oc-
casion for a strenuous effort to recover the ground they
had lost, and during the following days redoubled their
1 BtrilloQ to Ix»U, Aug. 34, 1680 (n.s.), R.O. Banket Transcripts, 41
Digitized by
Google
1680 A VICTORIOUS SORTIE 119
efforts in the trenches with alarming insistence. But
Fairborne equally saw his hour had come, and determined
on a sally of the whole garrison in force. On the 27ih all
was ready. Herbert organised an important diversion
with his boats to threaten the enemy's flank on the
opposite side of the bay, besides taking command of a
battalion of seamen in the main attack of the troops*
Fairborne, whose wound had taken a dangerous turn, was
unable to sit his horse ; but, though he was compelled to
resign his place to Colonel Sackville, his second in com-
mand, he had himself carried to a chair on his veranda,
whence he could survey the whole field of operations.
The movement began with a feint by the Spanish
horse to the westward against the enemy's left, supported
by the workmen engaged on the mole, who had been
furnished with drums and colours to give them the
appearance of infantry. At the same time the boats of
the fleet developed their demonstration to the eastward
against the enemy's right, and succeeded in holding a large
force of Moors in that direction throughout the day.
The real attack was made from the centre with five
battalions of infantry, the naval brigade, and the three
troops of British horse. With splendid dash the men flung
themselves on the advanced trenches of the Moors, where
a stubborn fight at push of pike took place, till one by
one they were carried and the Moors pressed back to
their original lines. But Sackville was not yet content :
he had only just begun. There was no pause except for
filling up the trenches to make a passage for the horse.
This done, the advance was renewed, and all the horse,
including the Spanish who had now joined the main
attack, passed over. The resistance of the Moors was
fiercer than ever, especially from their cavalry, who charged
again and again to protect the beaten infantry. But all
Digitized by
Google
190 TANGIER AND THE POPISH PLOT 1680
•
was of no avail. As the Moors were dislodged from the
trenches, Sackville's cavalry kept dashing into them and
cutting them to pieces until a complete rout declared
itself. The British infantry and seamen rushed the
enemy's camp, killing the Moors, who all refused quarter,
among the tents, while the cavalry pursued them with
great execution a mile or more into the open country.
The victory was complete; Fairborne's methods had
proved irresistible, and it was the crown of his life. All
day long, as he had watched the resistless advance, he
had been slowly sinking ; and when the exultant troops
were returning with shouts of triumph to their quarters,
he passed away. So died a fine soldier and a worthy
pioneer of British Mediterranean power. He had passed
all his best years, as he said in his last words, ' doing my
endeavour for the advancing of my King and master's
interest, to withstand the Moors' attempts and gain my*
self reputation.' He was honoured, as he richly deserved,
with a monument in Westminster Abbey,. and Dryden
wrote the epitaph. It refers to his early service at
Candia and tells how —
His 700th and age, his life and death, combine,
Ai in some great and regular design,
All of a piece thonghout and all divine.
Still nearer heaven his virtue shone more bright,
Like rising flames expanding in their height ;
The martyr's glory crowned the soldier's fight.
He had saved Tangier, and not only that. For so
hard were the Moors hit that they made advances for a
cessation of arms, and Sackville was able to exact from
them, on his own terms, a truce for six months. The
position was still further secured by the arrival of the
new reliefs. They took the form of Colonel Percy Kirke
with his newly raised Second Tangier Regiment, destined
to be famous as the ' King's Own,' and notorious in
Digitized by
Google
1680-1 COLONEL KIRKE 131
Monmouth's rebellion as 'Kirke's Lambs/ Still Sack-
ville did not conceal the fact that the inherent defects of
the situation, on which Fairborne had insisted, were still
unchanged. He reported home that things could not
continue as they were. A much wider line of defence
must be secured in order to take in the positions which
commanded the place if it was to be rendered perma-
nently tenable, and * unless/ said he, ' the King can send
ten thousand foot and eight hundred or a thousand horse,
it is impossible ever to possess that ground, which must
be had before these fortifications can be made according
to the draft sent his Majesty/ l The estimate for com*
pleting the necessary works was 800,000Z. a year for ten
years, an outlay which he feared was too large for his
Majesty's undertaking.
Meanwhile the only hope of securing the place was to
convert the truce into a lasting peace. For this purpose
Sir James Leslie had come out as ambassador. It was
characteristic, however, of Charles's administration that
when he sailed his presents had not been forthcoming, and
he dared not go to Fez without them. The Emperor con-
sequently began to take an ugly tone. From a potentate
whose favourite pastime was believed to be the invention
and trial of new tortures, and whose frenzies of self-impor-
tance were as ungovernable as his cruelty, anything might'
be expected, and it was necessary to keep him quiet at all
costs. It was Colonel Kirke who stepped into the breach
and boldly undertook a mission to the Moorish capital
The effect was remarkable. There was something in the
Colonel's fierce and reckless personality which hit the
tyrant's fancy. He treated Kirke with marked affection,
1 A sketch of the proposed works by Bookman, who bj this time had
been received into the British serriee, is among a number of water-oohmr
sketches of Tanner, all from his hand, in Add. U 88. 8SSM.
Digitized by
Google
123 TANGIER AND THE POPISH PLOT 1680
consented for his sake to receive the dilatory ambassador,
and finally vowed that so long as Eirke remained in
Tangier there should never be a gun fired at the place,
but that it should be furnished with provisions and enjoy
the benefits of a hearty peace. Thus all difficulties were
removed and Leslie was able to conclude a peace for four
years on the sole condition that no new fortifications
should be erected.
The retention of the English hold on the Mediter-
ranean now depended on whether the King could come to
terms with his new Parliament. In no other way could
he hope to get the funds necessary for Tangier. Louis,
fully alive to the situation, was again straining every re-
source to prevent an accommodation, and so far French
influence had been successful. For a whole year after
the general election successive prorogations had pre-
vented any business being done; but at last, in October
1680, about a month before Sackville's victory, Parlia-
ment had been allowed to meet, and in his opening
speech the King had particularly requested the Commons
to help him in preserving Tangier. But the scare of
the popish plot had not yet burnt itself out, and the
new Parliament at once showed itself absorbed with the
exclusion of the Duke of York. When the news of the
battle arrived Charles ventured to send them a mes-
sage reminding them of his desire. The message was
duly considered, but it resulted only in a resolution to
present the King with an address on the dangerous state
of the kingdom. In this address they recalled to the
King that Tangier had had several popish governors, that
one of them then lay in the Tower for complicity with the
popish plot, and that the garrison had always consisted
largely of popish troops. They therefore ventured to
hope that if they voted a supply for the place they would
Digitized by
Google
1680 ITS KNELL IS SOUNDED 123
receive assurance that they should not thereby augment
the strength of their popish adversaries. The address
was repeated a month later, and Charles replied by beg-
ging them to state what assurance they required, trusting
that they would consider the present state of the kingdom
in such a way as to enable him to preserve Tangier. Then
came the final blow. The Commons could not be turned
from the one question on which it seemed to them that the
future of the country hung. They bluntly announced the
condition of their assistance must be the passing of the
Exclusion Bill and the dismissal of every minister who
opposed it. 1
So the knell of Tangier was sounded. Three days
later Parliament was dissolved, and after a despairing
effort in March to hold another at Oxford, which was
dissolved after a week's session, Charles's attempts at
constitutional government came finally to an end.
1 Commons Journals, uu, November 15, 17, 39, December SO, 1680, Mid
January 4, 7, 1681.
Digitized by
Google
CHAPTER XXV
THE EVACUATION OF TANGIEB
Louis had won an incalculable victory. At last he had
succeeded in sowing irremediable dissension between
Charles and his Parliament. He had neutralised the
only factor in the European situation that was beyond
his strength, and the master of the seas was once more
forced into the position of his pensioner, with no hope of
escape. Charles, it is true, had finally triumphed in his
ill-starred attempt to dominate the constitution, but it
was at the cost of his position in Europe — the position
which had been the one lofty sentiment of his life. On
every side Louis was ready to pursue his career. In the
Mediterranean he had never been better placed. The
Ijanguedoc canal was finished, and in the summer of 1681
it was opened with high festivity, while at Toulon Vauban
had been at work doubling the capabilities and strength
of the port and arsenal, and Du Quesne, ranging the
Mediterranean with a formidable squadron, was at last
asserting a real mastery over the Barbary corsairs. It
was a moment of all others when Tangier should have
reached the position that had so long been sought for it,
and which, at the expense of so much blood and treasure,
it had nearly attained.
For a couple of years longer it lay undisturbed under
the governorship of Eirke, who succeeded Sackville.
His relations with Fez, though salted with constant
Digitized by
Google
1081-2 KIRKETS GOVERNORSHIP 19S
bickerings, remained most cordial ; the place continued
to be regularly supplied ; squadrons acting from it
under Herbert and Cloudesley Shovell cruised against
the corsairs with every success, and nothing beyond the
iniquities of the garrison under Kirke's loose notions
of good manners sullied its appearance of prosperity.
While Kirke was allowing the place to become a sink of
immorality and corruption, the Emperor continued to
assure him of his admiration for the ' whiteness and clean-
ness of his heart/ and to tow 'he was the best of all
Christians that ever were.' Still Kirke mistrusted him
for many reasons. When the fleet went home to refit,
the Emperor openly renounced the maritime clauses of
the peace, the 'Sea treaty' as it was called, and the
depredations of his ships went on as before. Kirke felt
the peace could not last, and, while taking every pre- ^
caution against surprise, never ceased to demand rein-
forcements and supplies. His importunity and his
anxiety no doubt did something to hasten the end, but
Charles continued to hold on. At the end of 1682,
Herbert came out again with a powerful squadron to
enforce the * Sea treaty,' and with him he brought large
quantities of stores and drafts of troops. The Moors
then changed their note and were all obsequiousness, so
little did it seem to require to keep Tangier safe.
Yet that little was more than Charles could spare in
the crowd of difficulties that he had made for himself.
The navy, moreover, had been going rapidly downhill.
When the papist scare had sent the Duke of York abroad
and Pepys to the Tower as a suspect, the office of Lord
High Admiral had been put in commission. The men
chosen for the duty, if we may believe half that PepyB
says, were very ill chosen, and the old evils and abuse*
rapidly declared themselves. The King was robbed
Digitized by
Google
126 THE EVACUATION OF TANGIER 1688
right and left, and everything about the service except
the budget was neglected. 1 Financial difficulties began
to press the Court more and more severely, and, in
the confusion and dishonesty that prevailed, Ttagier
naturally presented itself as a ready means of economy.
Thus, early in 1683, Charles had to face the inevitable
end of his autocratic policy, and Tangier was doomed.
In February, in answer to Kirke's continued demands
for reinforcements, Sir Leoline Jenkins, Secretary of State,
wrote to him complaining that Tangier was already cost-
ing more than all the home garrisons put together. The
letter was followed by the arrival early in March of
Admiral Sir John Berry with orders for Kirke to banish all
the Jews. Kirke had already reported that through them
the Moors had established a regular system of intelligence
by which nothing in the garrison could be kept secret.
This order was the first indication of what was coming.'
Up to that time there appears to have been little sus-
picion in Tangier of the fate that overhung it. Kirke,
with his hands strengthened by the men and stores which
Herbert had brought out, was more busy than ever
strengthening the fortifications and preparing for any out-
burst from his truculent admirer. Absolute secrecy was
still maintained and no further sign was given. Though
rumours began to disturb the garrison, they were little
regarded. The secrecy indeed with which the resolution
of the Government was shrouded was so profound that
1 Pepys, Memoires touching the Royal Navy.
• Kirke to Jenkins, February 22, 1663, Tangier Papers, bundle 39. See
alto * The first proposals for Tangier,' Dartmouth MSS. p. 84. The paper
is u nda t ed, bat it mentions Berry's mission, and thus fixes the time about
which the evacuation was decided on. Berry reached Tangier on the
Thursday before March 8, 1688, ibid. p. 80. The • First Proposals ' must
i have been drawn up before he sailed, or early in February—
, the time, that is, of Jenkins's complaint to Kirke. This is con-
Iky what Dartmouth told Pepys. Bet post, pp. 127, 181-8.
Digitized -by
Google
1668 SUNDERLAND'S PART 127
its immediate cause is nowhere on record. Still, what it
was is scarcely doubtful.
Sunderland^ opportunism and the wiles of the French
Ambassador had led him into supporting the Exclusion
Bill, with the result that in February 1681 he had been
struck off the Privy Council. He lost little time, how-
ever, in trimming his sails, and by Louise de Kiroualle's
influence was reconciled to the Duke of York in August
the next year, and at his request readmitted to the Council.
But Barillon and the French mistress still pressed him
forward, and with so much success that in January 1683
he re-entered the Government as Secretary of State for
the North. It was just at this time the momentous
Tangier question was reopened. Pepys indeed was ex-
pressly told by the man who had the best means of
knowing the truth, 'that it was taken up again upon
my Lord Sunderland's coming in again. 9 The King,
he said, was himself the first mover of it, but clearly
he thought that it was Sunderland's idea. There is
indeed but too much reason to suspect that Sunderland
went even further than urging the evacuation. There
is evidence that about this time he made some kind
of overtures to Barillon with a view to selling the place
to France. Barillon apparently could not believe the
offer was seriously made, and, suspecting some snare,
refused to take the matter up, but the suggestion remains
as one more stigma on Sunderland's name. 1
The motive of Charles's advisers is clear enough.
They were in the midst of their attack on the municipal
1 Barillon to Louis, Aug. 15, 1688: -Je oraindrais do parlor tor oottt
affaire a cause do oe qui s'est passe il y a six mois. . . • Milord Sunderland
m v a deje dit : " Vons Toyes que l'offre qn'on vons a fails ostail effective si
qu'il n'a tonn qu'au Boi voire maisire d'avoir Tanger." ' R.O. Batch*
Trmtuenpti, 44. Ii does not appear, from any despatch of BariUon's in
ths early pari of the year, thai he communicated this offer to Levis at the
time.
Digitized by
Google
128 THE EVACUATION OF TANGIER 1683
corporations, and had just determined to clinch the King's
constitutional triumph by an attack on the charter of
London itself. To this end they desired not only to cut
down every avoidable expense, but to get into the
kingdom all the troops that could possibly be collected.
The original draft scheme for the evacuation is much
more concerned with the disposal of the garrison when &
returned than with how to get it safely out. Barillon
traced the whole scheme to the Duke of York, Rochester,
and Sunderland, the nefarious triumvirate in whose hands
Charles was now but a puppet. The Marquis of Halifax,
Barillon's and James's chief opponent, did his best — so the
Ambassador says — to stop it, supported by all who still clung
to a hope of parliamentary government being restored. 1
But all was of no avail. The discovery of the Bye
House plot had put a fresh weapon into the hands of the
King's evil counsellors, and they had their way. It was
this surrender that marks Charles's final lapse into mili-
tary despotism, and with the determination to evacuate
Tangier he cut the last tie that bound him to the ideas of
the Great Rebellion. It was that pregnant upheaval that
had carried England to Mediterranean power, and it was
its ebb that sucked her back.
In such haste was the Government to get the troops
home that it was originally intended that all the ships
available should assemble at Tangier in May. Some one,
however, must have pointed out that it was an operation
which could not be conducted in a hurry. At any rate
the execution of the scheme was delayed for more elabo-
rate preparations, and it was not till July 2 that the final
instructions were signed. As a preliminary step to their
execution, Herbert was recalled, and the project was kept
an absolute secret, known to no one outside the King's
i to Looift, Aug. 15, MSS, R.O. Ba$ch*t TrantcripU, 44.
Digitized by
Google
1683 DARTMOUTH AND PEPY8 129
immediate circle, except to Pepys's informant, George
Legge, recently made Lord Dartmouth. It was to him
the obnoxious commission was to be entrusted. He had
served with distinction throughout the Dutch wars as a
naval officer, and had since risen through various offices to
that of Master-General of the Ordnance and Master of the
Horse to the Duke of York. It is in this appointment
we see the hand that really loosed the British hold on
the Mediterranean. Dartmouth was the most devoted
partisan that James had, and 6ince the defeat of the
Exclusion Bill had settled his position as heir to the
throne, the inevitable effect had been that it was he, not
Charles, who was king. James's real reign began with
the dissolution of his brother's last Parliament, and
Dartmouth was one of the men he chiefly looked to for
the repression of any attempt at resistance to his rule.
The story of the melancholy business, which this fine
officer thus had thrust upon him, has fortunately been
enlivened by Samuel Pepys. The manner in which he
became connected with it is eloquent of the extreme
secrecy in which the whole affair was wrapped. Every-
thing had been done personally by the King and his
brother. Neither the Admiralty nor the Tangier Council
had- been permitted to have a finger in the preparations;
but on Saturday, July 28, Pepys, who since his release
from the Tower had been closely attached to the Duke
of York, received sudden orders to repair within forty*
eight hours to Portsmouth, where the fleet was assembled.
Not a word of explanation was given him, nor was it
apparently till the following Friday, when Lord Dart-
mouth joined, that he was informed he was to go out
on his staff. Still the secret oi the expedition was
withheld from him. Some hesitation seems to have
pr evailed at Court, Dartmouth had not yet been handed
vol. n. K
Digitized by
Google
130 THE EVACUATION OF TANGIER
his commission, and no sooner had he reached Portsmouth
than he received an intimation from Sunderland that he
tou not to sail till farther orders, which would probably
reach him not later than Monday. But on that day,
instead of sailing orders came a summons to Windsor
4 to speak with the King once more/ What the trouble
was no one could tell. All they knew was that the prepara-
tions for sailing were to proceed, and Sunderland assured
the General there was nothing serious. ' I will only tell
you now/ he wrote, ' that the occasion of these directions
can be of no prejudice, and may be of advantage to your
journey and the business you go about/
It is Barillon who lets us into the secret. The fact
was he had just and only just learnt what was in the
wind, and he immediately hurried off a special messenger
to Louis to ask how he was to act. He had further dis-
covered that the Portuguese ambassador had also fathomed
tbe secret, and was making the most strenuous efforts to
be allowed an option of purchase. Arlington had be-
trayed the project, and wha*. Barillon was so anxious to
learn from Versailles was whether his master would prefer
to see the place destroyed or in Portuguese hands. In
view of his behaviour over Sunderland's offer six months
previously, he did not think well to move in the matter
directly, but clearly he had hopes that a purchase by
the Portuguese might be made a step towards a French
occupation. It was to consider this proposal of the
Portuguese envoy that Dartmouth was summoned to
Windsor. But every one was against it — James and
his confederates because they believed the necessary
negotiations would delay too long the return of the
troops— Halifax because he feared it covered an eventual
cession of the place to France. In vain the Portuguese
envoy went so far as to call on Barillon and beg for
Digitized by
Google
PEPtfS LEARNS THE SECRET 131
his support. The opposition was too well* united, and
all he could exact was that if a properly accredited
plenipotentiary met Dartmouth at Tangier with fall
authority to accept the British terms, the thing might be
arranged. Two hundred thousand crowns was believed
to be Charles's price, though probably it was never
seriously thought the suggestion would come to a head. 1
At any rate the Portuguese move was not allowed to
cause any further delay. In two days Dartmouth was
back again and every one embarked the same day. Still
they could not sail, for the weather kept obstinately
adverse. Every one, as they lay idle at St. Helen's, did
his best to penetrate the mystery ; but, though Pepys was
named in Dartmouth's commission as his sole councillor
in the fleet, he was still no wiser than the rest. He had
even written to his friends, he tells us, in perfect good
faith to assure them that the rumours about the evacua-
tion of Tangier had no foundation. He pardonably ima-
gined that, if there had been any truth in them, he of
all people would have been told. It was not till August 13,
as they still lay windbound under the Isle of Wight, that
Lord Dartmouth took him into his cabin and told him
in the strictest confidence that the object of the expedi-
tion was the disarmament and destruction of Tangier.
To Pepys it was a severe shock. It did not receive his
approval, and since he had been so long Tangier secretary
he was not a little nettled at not having been consulted.
' I shall, 9 he wrote, ' by the grace of God give the same,
and perhaps more, obedience both passive and active to
it than I might have done had my mean advice been
preconsulted in it.' '
1 Bullion to Iiouis, Aug. 6-15, 0-10, and 13-28, R.O. Jkuehst Tran^
icripU, 44 ; Smith, Tangier Diary, 826 it Mg., Dartmouth US 8. pp. 87-6.
* Pepys to Houbloo, St. Helen's, Aug. 16, 1683, 8mith, L 883.
e2
Digitized by
Google
U2 THE EVACUATION OF TANGIER . 1683
In this praiseworthy spirit he continued to act.
Dartmouth handed him a note of the reasons for the
step which had been agreed on in the Cabinet, directing
him to embody them in a minute. They were lame
enough, but Pepys was equal to the task, adding fresh
considerations which his pliable and well-informed brain
was able to suggest. His work was of peculiar delicacy
and importance. The fact was that every one concerned
was highly nervous about what they had got to do. Tan-
gier was the symbol of the new-born spirit of imperialism
that pervaded the country. There was no doubt its
abandonment would be unpopular, and unless it could be
clearly justified there was the danger that Dartmouth
and his staff would be made the scapegoats, and that
Tangier would be used against them as Dunkirk had
been used against Clarendon. Pepys with his way to
make in the world was as anxious as any one. The hard
part of it was that there were no definite instructions to
ease the responsibility. In theory they were going out to
report on the place and to act accordingly; and there
was talk among the staff that the King meant to break
the news to his people by saying that the experts had
pressed him to do it against his will. Pepys therefore
bluntly asked his chief how things stood. 'Before we
parted/ he said, ' I asked my lord whether the King was
indeed satisfied in this business ; for,' he added characteris-
tically, ' we should be able to give our advice accordingly
in reference to what he might expect from it, whether
the success was good or bad. He answered in plain
words • . • that the King was the fondest man in the world
of it, and had declared to Lord Dartmouth at his coming
away that it was the greatest service any subject could do
him. On my lord's adding that he had understood
persons at Court did nevertheless labour to render
Digitized by
Google
1688 NERVOUSNESS OF DARTMOUTH 138
this ill to the King, to do him hurt ... I took occasion
to say something of my being, sorry for it ; but he was
not the first that had been so used in obeying the King's
commands and labouring to serve him. He answered, it
did not trouble him (though by his looks and manner of
speech I saw sufficiently it did), for the King would do
him right in it and did at this time discourse publicly of
the folly of keeping Tangier any longer.' l
Haying thus ascertained the official view, Pepys saw
his way clear before him and promptly crystallised his
opinion. ' Lord ! v he exclaimed, as on September 14 they
anchored in Tangier road, ' how could anybody ever think a
place fit to be kept at this charge, that, overlooked by so
many hills, can never be secured against an enemy ? ' On
this note he continued to harp to his great comfort, and
indeed it was the real crux of the situation. Not only was
it the one valid excuse for the evacuation, but also a grave
cause of anxiety as to whether the operation could be
carried through without disaster. So far had the lines
advanced, and so near to completion and well-built was
the mole, that it was clear the work of demolition would
take much longer and therefore be much more hazardous
than was expected Dartmouth began to doubt whether,
with the force and stores at his command, it was even
possible. He became seriously depressed and was barely
prevented by Pepys and others from officially informing
the Moors what was intended, and negotiating their
forbearance. He had hoped the whole affair would be
over in three weeks, but it was three weeks before it
could be really begun.
A very necessary preliminary was to secure from the
captains of the fleet a declaration that the place was unfit
for a naval station. This difficult duty was entrusted
1 Tangiir Diary, p. 880.
Digitized by
Google
184 THE EVACUATION OF TANGIER 1683
to Sir John Berry, Dartmouth's vice-admiral, a 'tar-
paulin ' officer who had worked his way up from the fore-
castle by sheer merit and hard fighting. In Charles's
first war he won an action in the West Indies against
the French and Dutch, and at the battle of Solebay had
earned his spurs by rescuing the Duke of York when
be was nearly overpowered by superior force. He had
also served with distinction under Allin and others in the
Mediterranean. He was assisted by Sir William Booth,
the most successful of Herbert's captains against the
corsairs. But even these men found the task extremely
difficult. ' Sir William Booth/ wrote Pepys on October 14,
* gave me an account of the ado he had had with some of
Herbert's young fellows to get signed the paper my lord
desires about the mole and harbour of Tangier.'
It was no wonder. The mole was now 475 yards long
with a mean breadth of nearly thirty-seven yards, and a
height above low water mark of eighteen feet, and for the
past four years Herbert and his captains htvd been making
it the base of their successful operations against the corsairs.
Yet they were expected to say that, owing to the nearness of
4 the Great Ocean/ it was impossible to render the harbour
secure except at a ruinous cost, that even if it could ever
be completed it would quickly silt up, and that it was * alto-
gether unuseful to his Majesty for receiving, careening, or
preserving his Majesty's ships.' With such a document
to be signed it was certainly to Herbert's credit that it
had been thought expedient to recall him. His stubborn
independence and strong convictions were difficulties not
to be faced at such a crisis. He had, however, left be*
hind him several junior captains, who were devoted to
him and his ideas. These men Dartmouth had express
authority to command to his flag, provided he did not
thereby interrupt the operations for which they had been
Digitized by
Google
1688 OPPOSITION FROM THE NAVY 135
detailed. Dartmouth did call them to his flag, and— so
Pepys tells us— went out of his way to gain their good-
will. Nevertheless, as it seems, they resented the super-
session of their old chief, and it was among these men
— * Herbert's creatures,' as Pepys calls them in loyal indig-
nation — that the ringleaders of the opposition were found.
The most obstinate were Cloudesley Shovell, who had
been flying his first flag as commodore of the little cruiser
squadron that Herbert had left behind, Francis Wheler, — -
and Matthew Aylmer — all of them men destined to rank
among the founders of British Mediterranean power.
But Pepys had no patience with them and the ideas their
experience had given them. 'Though they have been
prevailed with by Booth,' he says, ' to sign this, yet they
did declare to Booth their satisfaction in the harbour
when they signed it, and will be ready to do the like when
they come into England. This is your men of honour
and gentlemen ! at least the two latter.' ' Shovell was . —
only a ' tarpaulin,' and presumably not expected by Pepys
to forswear himself to oblige his chief. Aylmer was a
young Irish officer of the ' courtier ' type, who had only
entered the service four years before, under the wing of
the Duke of Buckingham. He rose to be Commander-in-
Chief in the Mediterranean, and afterwards, as governor
of Greenwich Hospital, was the founder of the Naval
School. Wheler also was to hold the same high
command, and to be lost with his flagship and all hands
in a gale off Gibraltar. Among other of 'Herbert's
young fellows ' was George Booke, destined by a strange —
turn of fortune to be the means of giving back to his
country what Pepys was helping to throw away. For it ;
was when he was flying the Mediterranean flag that
Gibraltar rose like a phoenix from the ashes of Tangier.
1 Tangier Diary, pp. 803, 89S, 411, 488. Dartmouth M88. 89.
Digitized by
Google
136 THE EVACUATION OF TANGIER 1688
Still he was by nature a courtier and politician, and,
whether from conviction or not, he seems to have made
no bones about doing what was wanted. 1
Against Pepys's ingenuity the indignation of the
stalwart Mediterranean men was of no more avail than
Booke's compliance. A series of cunningly framed ques-
tions were put to them, from which they found it impos-
sible to escape. Both Booke and Shovell had careened their
ships under shelter of the mole, but they had to confess
it was done with some difficulty from the swell. Then
they all had to face the ugly fact that on a recent occasion
Herbert, having to refit his squadron, had carried the
repairing hulk, which had been established at Tangier,
and all the necessary stores over to Gibraltar, as being
a better place for the work. 1 Entangled in admissions
which they knew did not express their real judgment, it is
no wonder they remained stubbornly in their old opinion.
Whether or not the harbour could ever be made fit to
receive the higher rates, they knew it was already a prac-
ticable station for the class of vessel that was best adapted
for keeping a firm hand on the Barbary pirates, and for .
obtaining intelligence in time of war, no less than for
harbouring the smaller merchantmen which were inca-
pable of protecting themselves. Still there was no escape
from Pepys's skill, and in ten days, about the middle of
October, all the signatures were affixed. At the same
time a similar declaration was obtained, apparently with-
out difficulty, from the officers of the garrison as to the
military defects of the place, which were real enough,
and the work of demolition could proceed.
Of a Portuguese plenipotentiary nothing had been
1 Dims, p. SSI. He wai then thirty-three and had commanded a ship
both Xarbrongh and Herbert
■ Sea the Captains' Beport, Tangier Papen, bundle 40, Oct. 18, 1688,
7and8.
Digitized by
Google
1668 THE DEMOLITION BEGINS 137
heard. The ambassador in London did not for a moment
relax his efforts, and on Louis's instructions Barillon kept
urging the Duke of York to agree. He went to see the
Prince several times, as though on his own initiative, and
pressed upon him the loss of prestige which the destruc-
tion of the fortress would entail, and the disgrace of so
complete a reversal of policy. James would only reply
that it was no disgrace for the King to reverse the policy
of ministers that had given him bad advice, and it was
better for the royal interest to have a strong body of
troops at home than a weak naval station abroad. Any
chance, moreover, which there might have been of the
matter being carried through with sufficient promptitude
was ended by the death of the Portuguese King, and
Dartmouth had no alternative but to act on his obnoxious
orders. 1
It was a laborious undertaking and its difficulty gave
the lie to the declaration that had been wrung from the
seamen. Shere, the engineer who had succeeded Cholm-
ley, calculated that without the foundations the mole
then contained nearly three million cubic feet of concrete
and masonry, weighing near 170,000 tons, all of which
must be destroyed, and that it would take a thousand
men over two hundred days to do it. Lord Dartmouth
wrote home that the part which Shere had built was as
hard as the rocks. It appeared almost indestructible,
though, as the General said, ' he was showing his great
abilities in the destruction of his own building/ As no
ordinary military methods would touch it, he was blasting
it to pieces with drills and small charges in the modern
way, which to Pepys at least was new. Yet, in spite of all
Shere's skill and zeal, like a man butchering his own child
as they sympathetically said, it was soon clear that his
Barillon to Louis, Aug. 80-Sept. 9, R.O. Ba$che?$ ZVmucrtpts, 44.
Digitized by
Google
188 THE EVACUATION OF TANGIER 1088
estimate of the time the demolition would take must
prove correct. Month after month went by with con-
tinuous and infinite labour of the whole force at Dart-
mouth's command. Storms constantly hampered their
efforts, and at the end of the year it was still far from
done. 1
As the work, upon which so much blood and treasure
and so much high purpose and devotion had been spent,
stubbornly yielded to Shere's ingenuity, lamentations came
in from all sides. Typical of these is a letter written to
Pepys by an Englishman in Cadiz before the work had
actually begun. ' I heartily congratulate/ he says, ' your
safe arrival at Tangier, but if you come about what we
are persuaded here you do, I had rather you and all that
come about the design had tarried at home. I am sure
in no age, nor by any people, was ever Tangier thought
useless and contemptible ta not worth keeping, till this
we live in, and that by our own countrymen. If we go
as high as history affords us records, we shall find Tangier
always esteemed . . . When the English had got Tangier,
they, as well as all the world, believed they had a con-
siderable and important place, as well for their conveni-
ence in all respects as for its capacity for prejudicing
their enemies. . . . The French covet, the Spaniard and
Hollander dread it, one as to trade, the other from
neighbourhood and the prejudice they may receive from
it. Then of the safeguard and convenience to trade in
case of war with Spain, none that knows anything is
ignorant. After all must a place, qualified by so many
advantageous and unequalled benefits, be parted with on
the score of its being chargeable, and we the only people
1 la the Tangier Paper$ (R.O. Colonial), bundle 40, is an interesting
flea showing how the mole was destroyed by blasting and crosscuts, end
1 to fool the anchorage.
Digitized by
Google
1683-4 DESTRUCTION OF THE MOLE 139
that ever thought so ? Where is the honour and reputa-
tion of the nation? . . . . The parting with it in any
manner will render us very inconsiderable and necessitous
to all the world : for what will they think of us, esteem
or dread us, if we cannot maintain a place so much to
our convenience to preserve ? . . . You are, as much as
any man, sensible of what advantage Tangier is to us here,
and to the nation in general. If anything is designed
against it, pray use your endeavours to prevent it. 9 1
Such protests were useless. At home the political
struggle was uppermost in men's minds and everything
had to be subservient to it. A week after the seamen's
declaration was signed, Shere's first charge was fired. A
week later again the Mayor and Corporation were em*
barked. Thereby the tie which bound Tangier to the
Imperial Crown of Britain was severed, and, curiously
enough, it was to George Rooke was assigned the duty of
carrying them home. By the first week in November the
last of the inhabitants were shipped away, and the work of
demolition could go on without impediment. All through
the winter it continued as well as the storms would
permit, and with one eye always anxiously on the Moors.
By the end of January the navy captains were able to
^report that the mole was ruined and destroyed, the harbour
filled with stone and rubbish, and ' made unfit to receive,
harbour, or protect from the weather, ships or vessels of
any pirate, robber, or any enemies of the Christian faith
or any other/ The delays and difficulties had been pro-
digious, owing to the complete miscalculations of the
Cabinet, and, as Pepys tartly says, to their misguided
determination to keep the secret from the proper officers
of the navy and army, whereby it had been impossible to
provide the expedition with the necessary stores. * Hence
1 Charles BiuteU to Pepy*, Cadis, October 7, 16S8, Smith, L 886.
Digitized by
Google
140 THE EVACUATION OF TANGIER 1884
I say/ he growls, ' how necessary that Ministers of State
be men of general knowledge, and, among us, especially
in sea matters. 9 His strictures were certainly not with-
out excuse. The force was continually on tho brink of
starvation, and there were times when the forbearance of
the Moors alone rendered food procurable.
To these and his other anxieties Lord Dartmouth had
to add the depressing conviction that he was abandoning
the Mediterranean to Louis. While he was breaking his
heart over the destruction of the English foothold, France
had attained a dominating position within the Straits.
Du Quesne, by means of the newly devised bomb-ketches,
or galliots as they were then called, had bombarded Algiers
with a success no one had yet attained, and Toulon „was
more formidable than ever. 'Lord Dartmouth, 9 wrote
Pepys, ' is mighty full of it, that the King of France
designs by his late and present dealings with Algiers to
make himself master of the Mediterranean, making the
Turks his friends, and thereby enemies to us and others.' !
The mole destroyed and the harbour choked, there yet
remained the more dangerous task of dismantling the
fortifications on the land side and the withdrawal of the
garrison. It took another month to accomplish, but it
was done with consummate skill and thoroughness. Not
a fort or redoubt was left standing, and yet the troops were
embarked without the Moors attempting to interfere. On
March 5, 1684, the fleet weighed, and Tangier ceased to
be a British possession.
With it passed away the last claim of Charles's reign
to distinction. For more than twenty years it had re-
mained as a symbol of the higher aspirations which
redeemed the cynical levity of his character, and through
1 Smith, iL 41, March 29, 1684. Of. Dartmouth memorandum on this,
r 10, 1688, Dartmouth MS 8. p. 103.
Digitized by
Google
1684 ITS EPITAPH 141
fair weather and foul he had clung to it as though to raise
a real monument to his better self. A6 it was, he could
only write upon its remains the epitaph of his hopes. f By
the King's direction/ says Burchett in concluding his
account of the destruction, ' there were buried among the
ruins a considerable number of crown pieces of his
Majesty's coin, which haply, many centuries hence, when
other memory of it shall be lost, may declare to succeed-
ing ages that that place was once a member of the British
Empire.'
So with a smile, half humorous, half cynical, Charles
dismissed his failure. What more pathetic glimpse could
we have of all it meant to him? With the occupa-
tion he had inaugurated an imperial tradition that bade
men look beyond the limits of their narrow lives. With
its abandonment he marked his inability to understand
those conditions of sympathy between government and
people on which alone a lasting policy of empire can be
based. With his final fall into despotism his dream faded
from him. Could he but have brought himself to grasp
the depth of that national sentiment on which what we
now call ' Little Englandism ' is based, his aspirations of
empire would have received the support they deserved.
The resources for which he pleaded so pathetically would
have been granted in abundance, and Tangier would never
have been abandoned. England, in retaining her hold
upon the Mediterranean, would have kept the dominating
position in Europe which Cromwell had made for her,
and which Charles believed he could enhance.
His hope was no mere indolent fancy. He was a
true sea-king, and intuitively understood, perhaps better
than any of his councillors, all that the commerce of the
Straits meant for the expression of his sea power. - He
has knowledge of many things/ wrote Burnet, ' chiefly
Digitized by
Google
142 TIIE EVACUATION OF TANGIER 1«84
in all naval affairs. Even in the architecture of ships he
judges as critically as any of the trade can do, and knows
the smallest things belonging to it.' Pepys, than whom
there was no better judge, could write of him in his most
private memoranda, as a king ' who best understands the
business of the sea of any Prince the world ever had,' and
assures us that 'his Majesty possessed a transcendent
mastery of all maritime knowledge.' ! In the times of his
deepest desperation at the intractability of his Parliament,
it was always for his fleet and for Tangier that he pleaded
most humbly. Never, except in Cromwell's best years,
had the navy been so well administered as during his reign,
never had the fleet been so intrinsically powerful, and
never before had a regular naval station been established
beyond the Narrow Seas. If Charles failed it was because
he came to believe the fallacy that a strong imperial
government can only rest on despotism. Abroad it may
be so. For men of British race it is untrue. The ruins of
the Tangier mole and Charles's buried coins bear witness
of the truth, and there they still rest as Dartmouth left
them to remind the world of the English King who tried
to build an empire on the sands.
1 Foxouft, Supplement to Burnet 1 $ Hi*tory % p. 48, and Tanner, Eng.
Digitized by
Google
CHAPTER XXVI
THE NAVAL STRATEGY OF WILLIAM HI-
It is a curious fact, the significance of which it would be
] as wrong to ignore as to exaggerate, that the period during
: which England abandoned tfate Mediterranean coincides
; exactly- with the zenith of Lo uis XTV.'s power. Within
six months from the lowering of the British flag at
Tangier, the truce of Batisbon was signed, which cop-
firmed to France her hold upon the Empire, and is
usually taken as marking the culmination of Ixrais's
triumphs. Within a year of the reappearance of a British
fleet within the Straits, Namur capitulated, and Louis
was facing the first of that series of reverses which
brought his empire about his ears.
In dealing with European history from one aspect,
nothing is easier than to lose our sense of proportion, to
exaggerate the importance of our particular point of view.
1 We have now traced, step by step for nearly a century, the
remarkable phenomena that accompanied the interference
of the two Northern sea powers in the Mediterranean.
We have seen how constantly that interference or its
removal seemed to shift the whole action of the stage.
We have now to witness the last act of our drama, when
those two powers were joined in one, and after in-
effectual efforts to baffle the ambitions of France they at
last threw the mass of their strength into the Mediter-
ranean and immediately saw the gigantic system of the
enemy begin to totter. Many were the forces at work, and
Digitized by
Google
144 NAVAL STRATEGY OF WILLIAM III. 1686-9
in watching the one that turned the scale we must never
for a moment forget it was part of a whole. Still it
would be hard to say that any other part was so powerful,
and for that very reason we must be on our guard not to
place it too high. With this warning we may safely set
, out to trace the last phase of the epic to that resounding
catastrophe which finally fixed the position of England as
a great power in Europe.
For a time it seemed that the evacuation of Tangier
bad definitely arrested the development of British navaT
power. Charles II. did not survive the loss of his most
cherished possession a year, and the accession of his
brother made England internationally more than ever a
dependency of France. In Germany the Emperor formed
the famous League of Augsburg to curb Louis's further
aggression. But with the British power neutralised it
could barely restrain his advance, and still less break his
hold. It was not till the accession of William restored
. England to the European system that anything could
be done. By us that far-reaching event has come to be
regarded as a purely domestic revolution. To William
himself and to all the rest of Europe it was a stroke of
international politics that brought the wealth and the
fleets of the two great Protestant powers into line against
France, and it is in this aspect that it concerns us here.
England was immediately plunged into the war of the
League of Augsburg, and Louis found himself confronted
withnhnost the whole of Europe. Although the British
sea power was the real life of the new coalition, it was not
for some time that it was able to assert itself. During
the first years of the war we can discern no trace of the
farther development in naval strategy which we have
been following from early Stuart times. Louis's splen-
did organisation enabled him to take the initiative, and
Digitized by
Google
168&-K HIS APPRENTICESHIP 144
i
William's fleet was kept busy in trying to obtain the
command of the Narrow Seas in order to secure the
English coasts from invasion and to recover Ireland from
James and his French allies. The break in our naval |
history had been so complete that it seemed to go back a
century, and as it were recapitulate itself. It is mote
than doubtful whether William perceived the true direc-
tion in which our naval policy had been gradually
drawn, until the recapitulation brought him by ex- !
perience to the point where Charles II. had been forced
to break it off. We seem at first to go back to the i
i
almost mediaeval strategy of the wars of Henry Yin.
No attempt was made to strike a real blow at France in 4
the main seat of her power. Action towards the Mediter-
ranean was quite subsidiary. It was confined to ill-con-;
ceived attempts to prevent squadrons from Toulon passing
to Brest, and to protect the Levant trade. Both were
unsuccessful. De Tourville's victory off Beachy Head'
marks the one failure ; his swoop upon the great Smyrna
convoy the ether. Even after Bussell's victory off La*
Hogue had given William the command, it was only
used in the old way. The fleet was mainly employed in
attacks on the French Channel ports, and in raids upon
the coasts, which had no higher object than that of
crippling the action of privateers and confusing the
strategy of the French armies by diversions.
For William as for Henry VIII. the war was at first *
\ I a military war, and the fleet was kept subsidiary to the
, military operations. So soon as he had secured the corn-
it , mand of the Narrow Seas, and had recovered Ireland, he
; [ naturally flung himself into the old cockpit in the Low .
; Countries, which to a soldier seemed clearly the key of
| the situation, and it was not till the fifth year of the war'
that a radical change in Louis's strategy opened William's
! vol, n. L
Digitized by
Google
146 NAVAL STRATEGY OP WILLIAM III. 1608
eyes to his real power. Then there was something
Napoleonic in the rapidity and completeness with which
he grasped the new idea and changed his front. It has
been the accepted view that it was his tastes and limita-
tions that had made the war mainly military, that he was
a man who could only see war with a soldier's eye, and
was incapable of viewing the great contest as a whole,
in which the sea must play its inevitable part. It is
difficult, however, to see how this censure can survive a
study of the conditions under which he resumed the
broken thread of English action in the Mediterranean.
When, in the autumn of 1693, William returned from
his defeat at Landen to meet his British Parliament, it
was to find the air heavy with the disaster that had
overtaken the Smyrna fleet. During the spring the
whole North Sea, Baltic, and British trade, that was
bound for the Mediterranean and the southward, had
assembled in the Channel, waiting to get safely past
Brest. British, Dutch, German, and other vessels
numbered nearly four hundred sail, and the protection
of this huge convoy was assigned to the main fleet,
then commanded jointly by the Tory admirals, Eilligrew,
Delaval, and Shovell, who had ousted Russell after La
Hogue. Their orders were to escort it to a safe distance
beyond Brest, and then detach Sir George Booke, who
had just received his knighthood, with the British and
Dutch Mediterranean divisions to take it on. Having
gpne some fifty leagues beyond the point of danger, the
fjlmir^lg considered their duty done, and parted company
with Booke and the convoy. Unfortunately, they had
not taken sufficient care to ascertain whether Tourville
was still in Brest. The port was so well screened by
cruisers, as they afterwards explained, that it could only
be reconnoitred by a squadron. Why they did not use
Digitized by
Google
1603 LOSS OF THE SMYRNA FLEET 147
a squadron was never explained. The result was that
when Rooke reached Gape St. Vincent on his way to
his rendezvous at Cadiz, his scout vessels discovered
that there was an enemy's force of unknown strength
in Lagos Bay, on the south coast of Portugal. He
himself was for holding back till he found out what it
was; but Van der Goes, his Dutch colleague, protested
that if they stopped for every little squadron they got in
contact with they would never finish the voyage. Besides,
the wind was fair and they could certainly run through
anything that was likely to be in front of them. Rooke
gave way, and the whole fleet stood into the bay.
Some French vessels that were seen at anchor at once
cut their cables and ran, setting fire to the store ships that
were too slow to escape. This, and some false informa-
tion given by two French naval officers who were taken
prisoners, confirmed the impression that what was in
front of them was merely a small squadron hurrying from
Brest into the Mediterranean. As a matter of fact it was
Tourville himself, with the whole Brest fleet of seventy
of the line. Though the prisoners asserted that the
hurried retreat which deceived Rooke was due to the
belief that his force was the British main fleet, Tour-
ville was and is still believed to have cunningly devised
the whole scene in order to draw Rooke into his meshes.
In any case it had the desired effect. Next day, as
Jkhe allies held on for Cadiz, they found themselves in the
presence of the whole French fleet. Rooke— so he says-
was for fighting and sacrificing his squadron for the
convoy. Van der Goes was against it, advising flight;
and in face of the Dutch admiral's protests Rooke did not
feel justified in persisting in his desperate course. Seeing
how completely they had been entrapped the flight was
managed with considerable success. Tourville, being
Digitized by
Google
148 NAVAL STRATEGY OF WILLIAM III. 1093
far to leeward, had launched his light division in general
chase to take hold of the allies' rear till he could get up.
Hooke and his colleague, however, by a bold show of
fight, frightened the officer in command of the chasing
squadron into forming line of battle, and the result was
that three-fourthsof the convoy and the whole of Booke's
division escaped. The loss fell principally on the Germans
and Dutch, not more than five-and-twenty English vessels
being taken, and some of the richest of those only because
they took a line of their own and were caught afterwards
in Gibraltar and other Spanish ports. Still, the loss was
bad enough, and the shock which the sense of insecurity
produced in London was very severe. On no point was
the Exchange more sensitive than on the ' Smyrna fleet,'
' as it was called, from what was then the chief Levant
port ; and to think that the costly navy, for which they
had to sacrifice so much, could not protect it pointed to a
piece of incompetence that was not easy to forgive. -
Nor had William anything to show against the
•French success. Although, during his defeat at Landen,
he had inflicted such loss on his enemy and so skilfully
retrieved his position afterwards that they gained little or
nothing by the victory, yet everywhere else the campaign
had added to the lustre of Louis's arms and diminished
? the hopes of the allies. On the German side the quarrels
of the members of the League and the successes of the
* Turks had enabled him to more than hold his own. On
the Italian frontier, where the Duke of Savoy, in the
f pay of England and Holland, was on guard between the
Gulf of Genoa and the Alps, the French Marshal Catinat
had won a decisive victory, and laid open the way into
Piedmont, while over against him the Due de Noailles had
forced his way into Catalonia and seized the fortress port
of Bosas in the Gulf of Lions. Thus not only was Louis
Digitized by
Google
1093 SPAIN AND SAVOY 140
in a fair way to secure in the next campaign the focal
point on which the cohesion of the Hapsburg system had
always depended, bat he had also a base through which
the invasion of Spain could be nourished from Toulon and
Marseilles. Louis, who was beginning to feel severely the
exhaustion of his titanic struggle, immediately recognised
the value of what he had gained for relieving the un-
endurable strain. By vigorously pushing his advantages he 4
saw he might force Savoy and Spain out of the alliance,
and, with his rear thus secured, he would be able to
throw the whole weight of his power against William and
the Empire. So fickle was Savoy, and so faint the
Spaniard, that success was certain if only he could*
control his own portion of the Mediterranean, and so
once more the struggle for European dominion swung
back to the old centre.
After Tourville's brilliant exploit on the Smyrna
convoy with the Brest squadron, he had passed on into
the Mediterranean, and towards the end of the summer
of 1693 he and D'Estr&s were in Toulon with a fleet '
such as had never been seen before within the Straits.
It consisted of ninety-three sail of the line and sixty of the *
lower rates, representing nearly the whole naval force
of France which had survived Russell's victory at La
Hogue. 1 It was no wonder that William saw the need
of changing his strategy. With such a force to overawe *
them it was impossible that the weaker Mediterranean
powers could remain staunch to the Grand Alliance. It
is true that Tourville with some sixty sail passed out
again to Brest and Bochefort, but this was mainly to
relieve the pressure in the Toulon arsenal, and was not
necessarily an indication of a change in Louis's Medi-
1 Chevalier, Hist, do la marim franfaUd juuu'au traiti d$ paiw d$
176*, p. 198.
Digitized by
Google
150 NAVAL STRATEGY OF WILLIAM III. 1604
teiranean policy. There was every possibility that
Tourville, who was busy refitting as many of the Brest
squadron as the failing French finances would allow,
would repeat his move as soon as he was ready for sea,
and the first object of British strategy therefore was to
prevent his getting back into the Mediterranean.
It was clear to every one that the campaign of 1694 „
was^ likely to be themost critical of the war, and for the
allies the horizon could scarcely look blacker. Fortunately
it was one of those occasions when at home the national
spirit manifested itself at its best. The bungling and
disasters of the past year, instead of shaking the country,
had hred a sullen determination to see the thing through
and stand by the man it could trust. It was the Tory
ministers, not William, on whom displeasure fell. They
were dismissed together with the Tory admirals. Bussell
was restored to the post of Commander-in-Chief, and
William reopened negotiations with the Duke of Shrews-
bury and the Whigs. So, though men might scold and
grumble, when the King came to ask his Parliament for
help, they poured treasure into his lap, and a fleet of
nearly three hundred sail was able to be commissioned
during the year. 1
The 'main fleet in the Channel and for service in
the Mediterranean/ as it was expressed, was originally
settled at ninety-two sail, besides fire-ships, bomb-vessels,
auxiliaries, and small craft. 1 This fleet included the usual
1 See the returns made to the House of Lords the following winter (Hotus
of Lords MSS. new series, i. 461, 467, 472 ct seq.). The abstract shows
348 navy ships, of which 181 were rated ships, and the rest tenders and
auxiliaries. There were also 23 hired ships, of which 17 were fourth and
fifth rates, and the rest hospital and store-ships. Besides these there were
24 vessels building. The main fleet absorbed 08, Wheler's Mediterranean
sqnadron 28, cruisers and convoy ships on specified stations 98, besides 14
en the northern coasts. The rest were for the most part in the West Indies
or fitting in the dockyards.
* H*rUwnl£8S.im, f.82«f ate;., where the whole estimates and details
Digitized by
Google
1694 DISTRIBUTION OF THE FLEET 151
Mediterranean squadron, but it must not be inferred that
the estimates indicate any distinct departure from the old
lines of Mediterranean action. If such a departure already
existed in William's mind, he seems to have kept it to
himself, at least during the winter months^ when he was
, wearily endeavouring to form his new administration, and
to remove Shrewsbury's scruples about taking office.
The ships intended for service in the Mediterranean were
merely a cruising squadron, though stronger than usual,
detached in the old manner from the main fleet for convoy
duty and commerce protection. It consisted of some twenty
sail of third to sixth rates, besides fire-ships and auxiliaries,
under Sir Francis Wheler, and in the last days of 1693
he repaired to his station in company with a smaller
Dutch squadron under Vice-Admiral Gerard Callenburgh. 1
His instructions were to convoy the Levant trade as far
as Cadiz, to remain there a month to cover the home-
coming of the Spanish treasure fleet if it had not already
arrived, and then, after detaching a small squadron to
take back the homeward-bound trade, to proceed with his
convoy into the Mediterranean. On his return he was to
arrange a junction with the admiral of the Spanish
Armada of the Ocean, and co-operate with him for the
guard of the Straits and the defence of the Spanish coasts. 9
of the various squadrons an set oat The extra vessels over and above the
1 rated' ships included fire-ships, bomb-vessels or galiots, maehine vessels
(i.e. explosion vessels), five hospital ships, besides brigantines (oared despatch
boats), and yachts.
1 Burehett {Transactions at Sea, tM$-M7, P- 901) gives the squadron
as 16 third rates, 7 fourths, 1 sixth, 6 fire-ships, 3 bomb-vessels, a hospital
ship, and a store-ship, or 84 in all. The HarUian MS. gives it as it actually
sailed, as 8 third rates, 6 fourths, 1 fifth, 4 sixths, and 6 fire-ships, or 15
in all.
* See * Considerations touching the employment of the King's and Dutch
ships in the Mediterranean and at Cadis, • Home Office, Admiralty, v. 81-77,
wrongly assigned to 1683. Wheler's instructions are ibid. L 888,
November 80, 1688, and Burehett, p. 801.
Digitized by
Google
153 NAVAL STRATEGY OF WILLIAM III. 1694
80 far, then, there is no indication of any radical
change of strategy. The combined squadron at the
Straits was clearly little more than a development of the
Cromwellian idea of commerce protection with a powerful
cruising squadron, such as Blake had wielded in the old
days. No doubt it was intended to prevent small detach-
ments of French ships slipping out of the Atlantic ports
and passing into the Mediterranean. But the main fleet
was still bound to the Narrow Seas, and the chief design
for frustrating a concentration at Toulon was to be
the surprise and capture of Brest before Tourville could
8afl. Some idea there probably was that Russell should
subsequently employ part of his fleet in acting with
Wheler against the expected operations of the French in
Catalonia, but the development of the design cannot be
traced till events forced it to the front. Up till the end
of March there is no indication of it in the Admiralty
oiden.
The tendency was even in the opposite direction. On
arriving at Cadiz Wheler 1 reported that he was very
doubtful as to how far he could even protect the trade with
the force at his command. The Mediterranean was said
to be swarming with French cruisers and privateers.
The fleet at Toulon was being fitted out with diligence,
while the Spaniards had not even begun work on theirs,
and could not possibly be ready for sea for three or four
months. 1 The intelligence he sent home was no doubt
confirmed through other channels and his orders were
immediately modified. He was now directed not to enter
the Straits at all, but to return to Cadiz and secure his
ships there till the Spaniards were ready for sea or till he
received reinforcements from home. If he hears for cer-
tain that the Toulon fleet has come out and is bound for
I Cjfb* Admiralty y. 866, January 19 and 99, 1694.
Digitized by
Google
1004 RUSSELL AND WHELER 153
the north, he is to return forthwith and rejoin the niain
fleet. Bat even this discretion was not long allowed him.
In a few days the news of the French activity became so
serious that he was ordered to return immediately. 1
. For the moment, „ at _ an jl rate, the idea, pfjirastis.
action in the Mediterranean was given up.. Following
Wheler's recall Russell on the last day of March received
instructions from the Admiralty to take command of
ninety-three specified ships, of which forty-six were of
the first three rates, nineteen fire-ships, seven bomb-
vessels, four hospital ships, and four brigantines or des-
patch-boats, and with these and such others as might
from time to time be sent to him, he is directed to ' pro-
ceed with the Dutch fleet to the westwards and do his
best to harass the enemy without expecting further orders,
and to protect the trade passing in and out of the
Channel.' ' Not a word yet of the Mediterranean— at
least publicly.
A few days, however, before these orders were issued
and while Russell's fleet was still far from ready for sea,
a very serious piece of news came to increase the critical
aspect of the situation. Wheler's statement of the diffi-
culty of his position in no way indicated that he shrank
from carrying out his orders, and before his recall could
reach him he had already sailed for the Mediterranean
with his convoy, determined to fight his way through the
French cruising squadrons. As ill-luck would have it,
however, he met off the mouth of the Straits a storm of
exceptional fury, and mistaking Gibraltar Bay for the
fairway he was cast away and lost with his flagship and
a number of his squadron and convoy. His vice-admiral,
Hopsonn, had been already detached with the homeward-
1 Home Office, Admiralty, ▼. 878 and 882.
• Houuo/LordiMSS. (Hut. MS8. Cam.). toL i. (da) p. 468.
Digitized by
Google
154 NAVAL STRATEGY OF WILLIAM III. 1694
bound trade, thus farther weakening the fleet, and
CaUenburgh, the Dutch admiral, by virtue of his rank,
succeeded to the chief command of the combined force.
Bear-admiral Nevell, the remaining English flag-officer,
was still for going on ; but CaUenburgh, in view of the
expected junction of the Toulon and Brest squadrons,
declared it would be madness, and Nevell was thus
forced to return to Cadiz to refit, with no hope of being
able to protect the trade in his charge, and still less of
effectually opposing the passage of the Brest or Rochefort
ships through the Straits. 1 At the same time it was known
in London that D'Estr6es and Tourville had left Paris
for their commands at Toulon and Brest, and that
Marshal de Noailles was about to take the field in Cata-
lonia. Thus, so far from there being any prospect of
interfering with the French initiative, there was every
likelihood of the Straits squadron being attacked and
destroyed in Cadiz.
It waaclear therefore that something drastic had now_
to be done -to save the situation in the Mediterranean; _„
and yet so behindhand were the naval preparations at
home that it was not till the end of April that Russell
had been able to go down to Portsmouth to hoist his flag.
On him had rested the bulk of the work during the winter,
and for his reward he was named, on the eve of his depar-
ture, First Lord of the Admiralty. His place at home
was filled by Rooke, who, so far from being involved in
the disgrace of the other Tory admirals, was given a seat
on the Admiralty Commission and retained William's
confidence as a naval expert throughout the rest of his
1 8m Nettll's despatch dated Cadis, May 6, 1604 (Home Office,
Aimvutty, **.). •** another from Gibraltar, March 11 (ibid. vii. 9). De
Jonge confirms his statement that it was CaUenburgh, as Commander-in-
Chief, who d«nded to retire into Cadis, citing his despetoh to the States
, dated March 90, Ned$rk u uUch* Z-w$aen, it. i. 619.
Digitized by
Google
1094 RUSSELL'S INSTRUCTIONS 156
reign. The instructions which Russell received at Ken-
sington, on taking his leave, disclose the first definite
conception of the new strategy. They were of the most
confidential character, under the King's sign manual, and
• they reveal the exact stage which the project of a Medi-
I terranean campaign had reached in William's mind:
( ' It being not yet known/ they run, ' in what manner the
/ French will dispose of their fleet this summer, Admiral
1 Russell is directed, (1) in case the French fleet is at Brest
f or Belle Isle, to attempt to burn or destroy it ; (2) in case
' he hears it is at sea, to search for it, but not to go beyond
the latitude of Finisterre ; and (3) in case he has trust-
worthy information that it or part of it has gone to the
Mediterranean or south of Finisterre, to follow and attack
it. The Admiral is not to wait for further orders, but is
to report from time to time to a Secretary of State and
to the Admiralty. 9 1
The whole responsibility for the momentous step
that was in contemplation was thus thrown on Russell's
shoulders, and as things stood the orders filled him with
misgiving. Before he reached Portsmouth, intelligence
had come in that on April 12 Tourville had received
orders to repair overland to Toulon ' to order affairs there/
and that, though the first and second rates at Brest were
laid up for the summer, a squadron of the smaller ships
of the line was about to sail for the Mediterranean under
Chateau-Renault.' The French were again screening the
port so well with their cruisers and privateers that cer-
1 The resolution tu laid before the Committee ol the Council on
April 10, 1604 (see See. Trenchard's notes, Home Office, Admiralty,
▼ii. 18), and agreed to on April 19 (ibid, t 88). The final orders wen
dated • Kensington, April 34, 1694.' See Home of Lord* MSS. (Hisf.
U88. Cam.) vol. i. (n*) p. 469, where will be found the whole ol the
fleet orders at this time, as they were famished to the Lords in response to
their call for papers in January 1696.
• BeeeWed April 87, Home Office Admiralty, ifL 19.
Digitized by
Google
156 NAVAL STRATEGY OF WILLIAM III. 1694
tain intelligence was hard to come by. About the same
time, however, a captain who had been scouting came in
to report that with great difficulty he had succeeded in
looking into Brest and had seen a French fleet standing
to the southward. 1 Such information, combined with
Tonrville's departure for Provence, could only indicate
that the main action of the French navy was to be
developed from Toulon, and it was there with his old
adversary that Russell's heart was.
Still he was bound by his orders to make sure of Brest
before moving, and this was no small difficulty. At Spit-
head he found nothing ready for attacking a fortified
port. Troops, bomb-vessels, and stores had not yet arrived,
and half the fleet was not paid, and could not be moved
till it was. Still, with thirty-five Dutch and English vessels
that were available, he put to sea the first week in May to
look into Brest ; but it is clear he wished to leave it alone
altogether. 1 By this time his friend the Duke of Shrews-
bury had accepted office, and, though no more than Secre-
tary of State, was in effect Prime Minister. To him Russell
began to pour or t his woes in a correspondence which has
left us a picture of the whole episode so vivid and intimate
that we still feel the feverish pulse of the time beating
as it were under our touch. ' I am afraid/ he wrote
from the ' Britannia * at St. Helen's, as soon as he had
hoisted his flag, ' these two designs, Brest and the Straits,
will hinder one another and may make neither effectual. . . .
I have no very good prospect of success on Brest — that is
if the ships are gone from Brest Water/ ' This under
1 Captain Wright's despatch, flow* Office, Admiralty, vii. 81.
* Ha took 19 English and 16 Dutch ships with him, leaving behind 80
English and 7 Dutch unpaid. See list sent up by Sir C. 8hovell, May 4,
l€N,flMfM»irS&lS9e,i.S8.
3 Sea Gose's Co rresp o nd ence of Charles Talbot, Duke of Shrewsbury,
p. ltt, when will be found all the more secret papers relating to Russell's
Others are in BuecUnch H88* vol. it
Digitized by
Google
1094 SHREWSBURY'S VIEWS 157
his instructions was the main point he had to decide, and
next day he weighed and stood away for Brest.
In Shrewsbury's answer the note of vagueness and
indecision is still clear. ' I have long apprehended/ he
wrote on May 5, ' that these two designs will interrupt
and spoil one another. I am not enough instructed in
what can or cannot be done at Brest to give judgment
upon that matter ; but I doubt if, after the resolutions
have been taken for the Mediterranean and the instruc-
tions you have received thereupon, any great prejudice
should happen to that service by delay, people would be
apt to impute the faults to you, unless you have positive
orders to warrant you in it. If you should go before
Brest and find that squadron not yet gone to the Mediter-
ranean, I suppose you will think it advisable to spend a
little time if anything could be attempted upon them . . .
but I cannot tell even in that case whether you might
not think it reasonable to make some detachment which,
joined with Neville's ships, might be in a condition to
keep the Toulon squadron from giving any assistance to
the besieging a Spanish seaport town, which the French
in Catalonia seem to aim at. But that which I think
most likely to be the case is that the Brest squadron will
be gone for the Straits before you come thither, and then
in my poor opinion all possible haste should be made to
follow them/
These vague counsels, which rather indicated than
solved the difficulties, can only have served to increase the
nervousness which Russell felt in having practically to
decide the direction which the war was to take for the
year. It was not long, however, before he saw his way
plainly pointed out. The first week in May the King had
left London, as usual, to conduct the military operations
in Flanders; and the first news that greeted him was
Digitized by
Google
168 NAVAL STRATEGY OF WILLIAM III. 16M
r that the rumour of the Brest squadron having sailed, and
Bailed for the Straits, was true. 1 Whatever his hesitation
before, he now came to an immediate decision. JFhe old
tradition could bind him no longer, and, taking the whole
responsibility on his own shoulders, he sat down to pen
an order which should be treasured as one of the leading
documents of British naval history. ' There can be no
longer any doubt/ he wrote to Shrewsbury on May 14,
* that the squadron which left Brest cm the 7th (n.s.) of
this month has sailed for the Mediterranean after joining
the ships from Rochefort, so that Admiral Russell has no
time to lose in following them ; and although it is not
your department I am well assured you will use your
endeavours to hasten his departure, and persuade him to
leave to the squadron which remains in these parts the
execution of the attempt on Brest.'
Political and financial difficulties had kept the King
so late in England that he found himself deprived of the
initiative in Flanders, and his main hope for the year was
now centred on what the fleot could achieve in the Medi-
terranean. On that he boldly resolved to stake his all, and
so with the high resolution that marks the great captains
from the small, he penned his memorable order. Russell
needed no persuasion to obey. The King's decision reached
him when at the end of May he returned fuming from
his reconnaissance to pick up the remainder of his fleet at
St Helen's. He had found Brest practically defenceless
and was raging that the chance was lost for want of the
troops and bomb-vessels that should have been with him.
• The delay/ he wrote in his breezy way, ' must lie where
it ought, on that driveller, the General of the Ordnance/
Possibly he was right, for Henry Sidney's tenure of the
1 OL fba lafonnatfeii of Daniel Palot, received some time in May, saying
tint be 1m4 eeen Chafteaa-BenaiiU nil for Barcelona with 23 of the line,
tarl'eocntodeara/andtteailinall. Home Office, Admiralty, y. m.
Digitized by
Google
ie©4 A CRITICAL SITUATION 160
office, though it procured him the earldom of Romney,
is only remembered by the brilliant display of fireworks
with which he greeted William's triumphant return from
Namur the following year. Russell no longer believed in
the practicability of surprising the place, and was only too
glad to leave the attempt to a subordinate. Moreover,
the news from Catalonia made him keener than ever to
be away. De Noailles had already laid siege to Palamos
below Rosas, and if it fell there would be nothing between
,<the victorious French army and Barcelona. Not know*
ing that Noailles was even more hampered for want of
money than himself, his abiding fear was that he would
be too late, and he fell to excusing himself and scolding
the Treasury in the most modern fashion. 'I will not
say where it stuck, 9 he wrote, ' but it is not hard to guess,
and pranks of this kind will some time or other, besides
disappointing the services designed, put you to greater
hazard if not looked into ; for as the navy of England is
the most certain security to the country, so it is a service
neglected till every petty thing is provided for.' The King
was no less impatient and anxious than Russell. ' I am
under great uneasiness,' he wrote to Shrewsbury on May 22,
1 lest our squadron should arrive too late in the Mediter-
ranean. If you could expedite this business by writing to
Admiral Russell or by despatching the ships that remain,
it would be of the utmost importance. 9 And again, three
weeks later, ' God grant that Russell may soon arrive in
the Mediterranean, as from that alone we expect success
in this campaign. May God confer on us this favour I '
But Russell had needed no urging. He was already
gone. So important, however, was the Brest design still
considered that in the mouth of the Channel he had
detached nearly half his own fleet and a number of the
Dutch against it under Lord Berkeley, with Shovell as his
Digitized by
Google
100 NAVAL STRATEGY OF WILLIAM III. lew
vice-admiral, and General Tollemache in command of
the troops. 1 Little as Russell thought of the enterprise,
such a force, in s pite of the betrayal of the design by
Marlborough and others, should have achieved something
better than the costly repulse that awaited it. Russell at
least had done all he could for its success, and, free of the
task he mistrusted, he held away southward with all
speed the weather would permit. Without calling at any
Spanish port, he sent in to Cadiz to summon Callenburgh
and Nevell to his flag ; but so baffling and stormy was
the weather that it was not till July 1 that he reached
his rendezvous off the mouth of the Straits. Without
counting an almost worthless Spanish contingent that at
last had been patched up for sea, he had now a fleet of
sixty-three of the line, and a full proportion of minor
rates and auxiliaries ; but the long delays at starting and
the tedious voyage had permitted things to reach so
critical a stage that it was very doubtful whether he was
not already too late. s
1 BusseU's nunc, to Berkeley, May 29, Horn* Office, Admiralty, v. 460,
and tee Houee of horde MS8. (n.s.) vol. i. p. 485. The division, which
included SO of the line and 10 fire-ships, numbered 40 sail, and with the Dutch
division of 19 ships and 4 bomb-vessels, 68. Russell was left with 32 of
the first low rates and 58 British ships in all, of which 9 were fire-ships.
Fire-ships at this time, it mast be remembered, were not merely old vessels
intended to be burnt in action when occasion arose. They were primarily
second-class cruisers, as we should now say, and were armed, manned, and
commanded like any other navy ship of their rate. Their dual function
was indeed curiously like that of * Destroyers ' in a modern fleet.
■ De Jongs (op. ctt p. 521), from the Dutch official documents, gives the
fleet at 75 of the line (50 to 100 guns). Of these, 41 were British, 24
Dutch, and 10 Spanish. The Dutch included four 90-gun three-deckers,
and the British four first and second rates (90 to 100 guns). There were
19 fire-ships, In the Memoir* of Byng, who was BueseU's first or flag-
captain, the force is given as 64 of line, English and Dutch, and 41
Spanish of all rates. Memoir* relating to the Lord Torrington (Camden
Society, 1889, cd. Prof. Laughton), p. 67. This work is a principal
anthority lor the campaign, ' the business of the fleet,' as it says, * passing
the first captain of the admiral, and he being esteemed as his
Digitized by
Google
CHAPTER XXVII
THE MAIN FLEET IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
A few days after Russell had left London to hoist his
flag, Tourville had received orders to move out of Toulon
and take up a position in Hy&res Roads. In his eyes the
move was strategically unsound, but after pointing oat to
Louis the disadvantages of the position, in case he should
be attacked, he obeyed. The order was followed by
a request from Noailles that he would join him at
Rosas, which was to be the base of his operations
against Palamos and Barcelona. Thither he accordingly
moved about the middle of May, and Noailles at once
took the field. Advancing to the banks of the Ter, where a
miserable Spanish army was in position to bar his road
to the southward, he completely defeated it on May 17.
The very day of the victory, Ch&teau-R£nault with the
Brest and Rochefort squadrons joined Tourville's flag.
Palamos was forthwith invested by sea and land, and
taken by storm before the end of the month. Gerona, the
district capital, situated at the point where the great
inland road to Barcelona crossed the Ter, was then
attacked and reduced in less than a week with barely a
show of resistance. There was now practically nothing
between the victorious marshal and his objective except
the insignificant fortress of Hostalrich, and Tourville's
fleet had already moved down to blockade Barcelona
pending the advance of the army. 1
1 Memoirs of the Due de Noailles, L 860 4 $$$. (PetUot, voL hot);
Stanhope, 8pain under Charles II.
VOL. II. If
Digitized by
Google
UB THE MAIN FLEET IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 1694
Such was the news that greeted the impatient British
admiral. Barcelona was still safe, but in the direst
danger. The French fleet, as it was reported to him,
consisted of seventy sail, and was echeloned from Barce-
lona as far south as the Ebro, as though feeling to get
contact with him. There was still time, therefore, and
lie was in high hope of a fight — a second La Hogue to
retrieve the situation. ' I will not lose one moment's time
to get at them, 9 he wrote to Shrewsbury, ' that if they
design to stay for us, as I suppose they will, if they
be the number reported, we may soon come to a deciding
blow; that when all are killed that are to be killed, the
rest may return home before cold weather and Michael-
mas storms come in, which I apprehend for these three-
deck ships/ l This fear, in view of what followed, must
be noted. Added to the overwhelming sense of responsi-
bility that was oppressing him, it was almost more than
he could bear ; nor must he be blamed for it, seeing that
for the first time since Drake persuaded Howard to
attempt to destroy the Spanish Armada in Coruna in
1588, the fortunes of the country were being staked on a
bold offensive beyond the limits of the British Seas.
4 Surely/ he wrote privately to Shrewsbury, ' a 6hort time
with a fair wind will put it to the trial, and then I may
hope to be coming home again. It is a very pretty thing
to be an admiral ; but really I think to have three king-
doms at one's disposal after one year's fatigue at sea is
not a reward to a man that can live ashore and has no
ambition to be great/
To increase his trouble the fair wind would not come.
For a whole week he had to lie under Cape Espartel with
a succession of fogs and easterly winds. 9 But a westerly
1 He also wrote in almost identical terms to Secretary Trenehard, July 1,
HX>. Admiralty, y. 60S, and cf. BuccUuch MSS., II. i. 74.
I to Trenehard, Cartagena, July 18, ibid. t. 668,
. Digitized by
Google
1604 RUSSELL ENTERS THE STRAITS 163
breeze came to release him at last, and then, with a fall
sense of the gravity of the step that was being taken,. he
carried the fleet through the Straits, and the die was cast
that committed British naval policy to its final shape.
It is for his not too decisive victory at La Hogue that.
; Russell is chiefly remembered in British naval annals.
Yet were it not for the often spurious importance which
' actions give to naval movements, he would rather be
remembered as the man who first led the British main *
fleet into the Mediterranean.
The reason he was denied the battle which he expected,
and which would have given his great movement immor-
tality, is no less significant than the movement itself.
For the French immediately met the new strategy by a
parry which inaugurated the defensive line that thenceforth
they were destined to take in the Mediterranean almost
without interruption. It was Tourville himself who, when
Louis's fleet began to be overweighted by that of William,
had first adopted the characteristic naval policy of the
French. By his famous J^canapaign au Uzrge^.he had
shown how, by keeping a powerful fleet in being, the
English could be compelled to keep their ships also
together in fleets and thus leave the seas more open to
the action of cruisers and privateers. From that policy
he had been forced by higher orders into the disastrous
day of La Hogue. His defeat was rightly rewarded by
a repentant king with the baton of a Marshal of France,
and his ideas now ruled supreme. In these ideas his
faith remained unshaken. Louis was naturally still
anxious to see his costly fleet supporting his military •
movements, but after the lesson of La Hogue he could
no longer be persuaded to ride roughshod over Tourville's
judgment. As De Noailles, therefore, was receiving the
capitulation of Gerona, and was about to pursue his
MS
Digitized by
Google
164 THE MAIN FLEET IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 1694
triumphant march to Barcelona, a letter was pat into his
band from Louis, warning him that a British squadron
of forty-five sail was starting for the Mediterranean. He
was authorised, therefore, to take Gerona, an operation
on which the Marshal had insisted as a vital preliminary
to Barcelona, if he had not already done so, but on no
account was he to venture farther till the naval situation
was more certain. The fact was that Louis, mindful of
Tourville's teaching and of his original protest against
leaving Toulon, had authorised him to avoid an action
with Bussell. Tourville did not wait for a second word.
Though Bussell was still far away he immediately
abandoned the blockade of Barcelona, and, regardless of
his colleague ashore, he hurried his fleet back to Toulon.
There was plenty of time, but he would risk nothing.
The main point in his eyes that overrode all others was to
preserve the fleet, and as he explained to Louis, in defence
of his sudden abandonment of De Noailles, he wished to
reach Toulon in time to get all his ships into its inmost
basins, out of the reach of Russell's bomb-vessels before
the British fleet appeared. He was convinced that when
the waning of the summer should force Bussell to begin
his homeward voyage, there would still be time to
complete the Catalonian campaign ; and so it was that,
when Bussell entered the Straits, Tourville was har^ at
work with booms and batteries fortifying his fleet in
Toulon. 1
Barcelona was saved, at least for the time, and De
Koaflles*8 campaign, for which Louis had sacrificed
operations everywhere else, was brought to a standstill.
6101, thanks to Tourville's embarrassing caution, the
1 The Enoch dcspetchee relating to these movements will be found in
to Delarbre'e Tourville et la marine d$ mm ta*j» and the
i Dm d$ Noatftof ubi supra.
Digitized by
Google
lew THE KING SEES THE WAY 165
situation was difficult enough for Russell. A continu-
ance of baffling weather prevented his reaching Barcelona
before the end of July. It was already time to think
of returning, and Russell was at a loss how to proceed.
' I wish/ he wrote to Shrewsbury from Barcelona on
August 3, ' I was able to give any hopes of success in
these seas as you desire, but the French will not let me
see them and I dare not venture to attack them at
Toulon. By what I can inform myself the place is too
strong, and a mortification or repulse would be of very
ill consequence. With probable hopes of success I would
venture a great deal, but the time of year obliges me not
to spend much time. ... I long to be rid of this trouble-
some affair. I have neither head, body, nor temper to
undergo all I do. Pray God bless you and send you all
you wish and desire, and that I may have the good
fortune to see you at Christinas.'
However distracting were the thoughts of the harassed
admiral, there was fortunately one man who saw his way.
with heroic clearness. . William was no man to do
things by halves, and, though his admirals might falter,
lie himself was far from the end of his resolution. The
failure at Brest and the impossibility of doing anything
effective in Flanders determined him to cling at all
hazards to the advantage and prestige he had gained in
the Mediterranean, and towards the end of July the
Council was startled by receiving from him a proposal
that Russell should remain out all the winter. It was
clear that if he was to winter in England he must return
at once. The Mediterranean move would then sink to
a mere demonstration. The moment Russell's back was
turned, Tourville would put out again, and Barcelona
must fall. As Shrewsbury, who was inclined to approve
the idea, put the case in his answer to the King : ' The
Digitized by
Google
166 THE MAIN FLEET IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 1694
reputation your arms have gained by being master of
that sea will vanish with the loss of that town in the
autumn. 9 It was at Cadiz, he argued, the fleet should
winter, and thereby secure what we now call 'interior
lines.' ' There/ Shrewsbury continued, ' they would be
ready to act as you should command the next year, and
be in such a place as they would certainly watch the
motions of the French, [so] that in case they should send
a squadron into the ocean to be stronger here, a squadron
of like strength should be immediately despatched from
Cadiz to reinforce us also.'
The difficulty, as William knew, would be to persuade
the Council and Russell to adopt the suggestion loyally.
< To the Council the move would naturally appear as a
1 sacrifice of the immediate interests of England to the
* Dutch King's far-reaching views of continental policy ;
; while as for the admiral it was clear his heart was no
• ( longer in his work and that he was ripe to avail himself
I of any technical excuse to get home again as soon as
possible. As it happened, this idea bad already been put
before him. It was obvious at the first glance to every
one in the fleet, that Spain was in no condition to resist
Louis's attack single-handed, and that, unless the fleet
remained to command the sea, Barcelona would be taken,
and its fall would probably be followed by the reduction
of the Balearic islands. To prevent the French thus
obtaining a firm hold in the western Mediterranean, ' a
noble lord v in the fleet, whom we would gladly be able
to identify, proposed to Russell that he should winter
. within the Straits. Naples, Messina, and Port Mahon
wene suggested, but Russell rejected them all. Naples
was not well enough defended, Messina was too small,
while at Port Mahon, the only possible station for so
large a fleet, no provisions were to be had. But his
Digitized by
Google
1604 A DISTURBING PROPOSAL 167
strongest objection was a strategical one, that 'should
such a strength be absent from England and Holland all
the winter, the French might make themselves too strong
for us in the Channel.' l
That Cadiz met all these objections he perhaps did
not care to see ; but it is only fair to say that there was
certainly much excuse for his view. Tourville at least
shared it, and it was on the supposition that Bussell could
not stay that his strategy was based. Within a very
few days of the subject being broached in the English
Council it was known, like everything else, to Louis.
Marlb orough had betrayed the Brest design, and
somebody took care to betray the new one. Tourville
Vas warned, but he replied that in his opinion the
English could not possibly intend to winter in the
Mediterranean, though it must be said there is a ring of
apprehension in his letter that belies his expressed con*
fidence, and tells how the possibility had come upon him
with a disturbing shock. 1
From the Council, on whom William naturally wished
to throw the heavy responsibility, he could get no definite
opinion at all. In days when a serious error of judgment
meant in all probability a trial for high treason — and
few of them' were quite clear of the taint— responsibility
was a serious matter. First they summoned liooke and
his fellow Commissioners of the Admiralty to ask them
1 Burchett, Transactions at Sea, 16S8-1697, p. 243, published originally
in 1703, and subsequently incorporated as Book iv. in the Naval History,
1720. In July 1694 he was named Joint Secretary to the Admiralty, and
thus becomes a first-hand authority from this time onward. He was
originally a servant of Pepys, and subsequently attached himself to
Bussell (Diet. Nat. Biog. tub voce). See also Owyn to Harley, July 7, 1694,
Welbeek M8S. ui. 561. 'I hear this poet Sootherne is giving up the
Secretaryship of the Admiralty, and that Bridgman and Admiral BuseelTs
Birket (tic) are to be joint secretary* in his room.' The spelling m
interesting as giving the contemporary pronunciation of Burchett's i
' Delarbre, Tourville, Tourville to Louis, August 8 (n.s.), 1094.
Digitized by
Google
168 TOE MAIN FLEET IX THE MEDITERRANEAN 1694
whether they thought it possible to overhaul and revictual
the fleet so far from home. But from the Admiralty they
got no relief. The Commissioners promptly replied they
could be ready to send out everything that was required
for revictualling and careening the whole fleet in two
months, and that there would be no difficulty about the
operation provided Russell had full liberty of the Spanish
ports ; but they suggested that the Council should ask for
the removal of the present Governor of Cadiz, who was
suspected of French sympathies. 1 The ministers were thus
forced to consider and give an opinion on the revolutionary
proposal which William had laid upon them, and the
report we have of their curious proceedings shows how ,
heavily a movement which for us is a commonplace
weighed on the spirits of the statesmen of that time.
Dauby, now Marquis of Carmarthen and President of
the Council, said it was too nice a point and refused to
give an opinion either way ; Lord Normanby was one day
' most clear and violent for the fleet's remaining ' and the
next as positive against it. Dorset and the Lord Steward
stayed away. Shrewsbury and the rest, so far as they
had not been cunning enough to conceal their opinions,
were on the whole favourable, but insisted on the extreme
danger of the fleet's having to depend oh stores sent out
across the Bay. of Biscay in midwinter. If Russell could
remain out till the next summer, Shrewsbury said he
believed that the fleet in Toulon might be destroyed, and,
even if that were impossible, the mere threat of retaining
the command of the Mediterranean would probably incline
the French to a reasonable peace during the winter. On
one point only were they all agreed, and that was, ' that
the decision ought to be left to Mr. Russell/ To make
of 11m Committee of Council, H.O. Admiralty, vii. July 81,
Digitized by
Google
1094 THE KING GIVES THE ORDER 1«0
sure do responsibility should in any case rest on them-
selves they begged that, whatever orders the King decided
to give to Russell, he would send them under his own hand
direct by way of Genoa. 1
At such pusillanimous trifling, which was all the more
marked from the candid way in which his own States
General had supported his idea, the King was seriously
annoyed ; but still he did not shrink. ' I do not know/ be
wrote on August 2, in answer to Shrewsbury's report, ' if
I rightly comprehend, but it appears that the Committee
ate of opinion that Admiral Russell should winter at Cadiz,
but dare not declare that opinion, through fear of being
responsible for the event. I do wish that they had spoken
more clearly on this occasion, and indeed they ought to
have done, so as to prevent my being exposed to the
supposition of acting solely from my own opinion. Bat
as there is no time to deliberate, I am reduced to the
necessity of coming to some determination, and I have
accordingly resolved to order Admiral Russell to winter
with his whole squadron at Cadiz. May God grant that
this may succeed for the good of the kingdom and for the
welfare of our allies/
Even then the nervous ministers could not harden their
hearts to send the admiral a positive order to remain, but,
in concert with the Queen, framed one, which gave him
considerable latitude to return if he thought proper. 1 It
was more than the King could endure. He knew, as he
told Shrewsbury, 'that wherever there is an unwilling-
ness to do anything, reasons against it are easily found to
prove that impossible which is not so in effect. 9 He made
sure Russell would exercise the discretion allowed him by
76.
Minutes of the Committee of Council, Aug. 8, H.O. Admiralty, *iL
Trenchard to Russell, Aug. 4, H.O. Admiralty, v. 754. • Yesterday/ 1m
*, I received a copy of the orders he (the King) had sent. 9
says, I received a copy of the orders he (the King) 1
■ Privy Council Minutes, Aug. 0, DuceUueh MSS. II. L 111.
Digitized by
Google
170 THE MAIN FLEET IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 1004
returning, and he was more than ever anxious for hiin to
remain. He therefore sent him a peremptory order to
stay, and even then could not be at rest. He poured out
his heart to Heinsius, the famous Grand Pensionary of
the Netherlands, to whose clear head and devotion both
he and Marlborough owed so much of their success, telling
him how anxious he was lest his order should not reach
the fleet in time to stop it, since he was convinced that
its wintering at Cadiz would prove the winning stroke of
the game. 1 To Shrewsbury he wrote in the same strain
of anxiety. 'I am under great alarms,' he said, 'lest
Admiral Russell should not receive my order to continue
in the Mediterranean, and the more I consider that affair
the more important it appears to me. I know, from the
best authority, there is nothing France so much dreads.'
And finally, as a last precaution, he ordered a ship to be
sent to meet Russell with orders that, even if he were
already on his way home, he was to turn back.
So the momentous step was taken to adorn William's
memory with one of its finest ornaments. It was he and
be alone whose act it was, and his should be the undying
credit. For the honour of his ungenerous ministers it
must be said that, when he had once assumed the respon-
sibility, they did all they could to support him. ' The
letters,' wrote Shrewsbury to Russell, so soon as the first
fiat had gone forth, ' which will come to you with this
packet are of the greatest moment to yourself and England
of any that perhaps ever came to your hand.' He urged
him with friendly advice to remain at Cadiz, since, as he
said, *it will be very glorious to interrupt all the King of
France designs this autumn in the Mediterranean, and
ride the next summer master of both seas as you have
done this. 9 He feared, so unprecedented was the order,
1 Ife *Ǥ* JfcfcrluiMbrA* Zwwuen, it. L 537, note, August 10-29.
Digitized by
Google
1094 RUSSELL'S DISMAY 171
tbat Russell's unruly temper would tempt him to disobey,
and he warned him that, though his Majesty had gone
beyond any advice the council had given, yet in his
high determination the feeling of the country was with
him. Presently he fell to coaxing. ' Though by your
letter of the 3rd/ he wrote on August 26, ' I find you are
not in a very good humour, I doubt the orders you have
received since will put you in a worse. The doctrine you
used to preach to me that public good ought to be con-
sidered before private ease will now come to your share
to practise in a more tedious and troublesome manner
than you could foresee. . . . Dear Mr. Russell, let a man
who truly loves and values you prevail on you to practise
submission and patience/
Russell was wise enough to take his friend's good
advice, but he consoled himself with an exaggerated pose
of martyrdom, natural enough when men were accus-
tomed to leave the seat of war each year to enjoy the
winter season in London, but almost ludicrous when we
remember the long vigils of Nelson and Collingwood or
the service that men blithely endure to-day. ' Really/ he
replied to his friend, ' I am so surprised at receiving the
King's positive commands to winter with the fleet at
Cadiz that I do not know whether serving six months, as
I have done, a-shipboard and six months to be at Cadiz,
and six months more a-shipboard, it be not better to put
an end to a troublesome life as I have made it' He ex-
pressed himself wholly opposed to the King's strategy and
was certain that, if the French chose to send a squadron
round to Brest, his fleet would be in no condition to
oppose them. He was in despair, but resigned. 'I con-
cluded what would be the event/ he laments, ' well know-
ing the King's passionate desire to have ships in these
seas, without considering how reasonable it may prove
Digitized by
Google
ii
172 THE MAIN FLEET IX THE MEDITERRANEAN 1694
to the other services. He fancies the defects of a ship
are as easily repaired as mending a bridle or stirrup
leather/
It must not be supposed, however, that in spite of his
lamentations Russell did not loyally carry out his orders.
When they reached him he was already on his way home.
Seeing the hopeless condition of the Spanish army and
the limited time at his disposal, he had found it impossible
to assist the Spanish commander-in-chief in any of his
proposals for the recovery of the ground which De
Xoailles had won, and towards the end of August he
found the state of his stores made it imperative that
he should move down to repass the Straits. Neither of
the orders which William had sent overland through
Genoa had reached him. Both had been intercepted by
French cruisers between Genoa and Marseilles, and so sure
was Tourville that Russell could not dare to remain
out all the winter that he believed the orders were
meant to be intercepted as a ruse of William's to deceive
him. 1 So Russell had sailed with the pleasant prospect
of a winter season in London, and he had reached as far as
Malaga, ready to pass out of the Straits, before he was dis-
illusioned. There the vessel sent to intercept him met the
fleet, and he received under ' the sign manual and royal
signet ' William's peremptory commands. 2
The effect upon him we have already seen in his letter
to Shrewsbury. To the Secretary of the Council he
expressed himself no less pathetically. To do him justice
his first complaint was that he had not been told in time,
bo that he might have stayed longer off Catalonia aild
effected something against the French. In his mortifica-
tion he then suggested he should be relieved. The strain
1 DelsrM, TomvilU, Appendix, Sept 6-16.
* The order ih dated Aug. 7, Torrmgton Memoirs, p. 70.
Digitized
by Google
1694 RUSSELL OBEYS 173
was too great for him. ' Could I have imagined/ he wrote,
4 this expedition would have been detained here so long,
I would much rather have chosen to live on bread and
water. . . . The business of the conducting part is so
terrible . . . that I am at present under a doubt with myself
whether it is not better to die. 9 Still he did not flinch from
the task laid upon him. He immediately called a council
of war. Callenburgh was for carrying on to Cadiz there and
then ; but Russell says he thought the idea * so preposter-
ous a proceeding ' that he persuaded him to go back at least
as high as Alicante. He himself was for going to Minorca,
but the Dutch officers would not go without the stores they
were expecting. So it was settled, Russell declaring he
did not mean to go to Cadiz till October, unless he was
sure the French had disarmed their fleet. 1
The intention of his movement back to the Balearic
islands was to foil an expected attempt by Tourville
to slip past him out of the Straits, and to this end he
forthwith detached Novell with a squadron of ten sail to
cruise between Formentara and the African coast, and at
the same time sent away intelligence vessels to Minorca,
Oran, and Tetuan to make sure the French should not
escape his cruising squadron undetected. Before, how-
ever, he himself could do anything with the main body of
the fleet he was struck down by dysentery and had to go
ashore at Alicante. He had just strength left, he says, to
sign an order to his vice-admiral, Aylmer, to take command
of the fleet and do whatever the council of war decided.*
It was resolved to join Nevell at once with the bulk of the
fleet and to fight or pursue any French ships they found
at sea. In this posture the fleet was kept till Russell was
1 Russell to Trenchard, Malaga, September 5, Home Office, Admiralty.
▼• 934.
• Buasell to Trenchard, Alicante, September 91, ibid. 1056.
Digitized'by
Google
174 THE MAIN FLEET IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 1694
recovered. By that time his intelligence and the ad-
vanced season made it fairly certain that the French
were fixed at Toulon for the winter, and accordingly in
the first week in October, as he had intended, he carried
the whole fleet round to Cadiz. 1
Even then Russell was not left in peace. Louis,
habituated to unhalting success, was exasperated with
the failure of his campaign, and directly it was known
thai the allied fleet had left the Mediterranean he
began pressing the Due de Noailles and Tourville with
desperate orders to renew the attempt at Barcelona.
Unpaid and inactive, Noailles v s army had become hope-
lessly demoralised by plunder, and he protested that,
even if they were fit to march, unless the fleet could
support them, the move would only be sending them
to destruction. Tourville no less energetically repre-
sented the unwisdom of exposing the fleet in any such
hazardous attempt. Still the effect of Louis's pressure
this continual alarms from Barcelona that Noailles was
moving and Tourville at sea. In spite of the excite-
ment of the Spanish officials, Bussell refused to believe
the rumours, but nevertheless held the bulk of the fleet
in constant readiness to re-enter the Straits. It is said
that Tourville actually sailed from Toulon in October
with a large body of troops for Barcelona, but was
promptly recalled again on news that Bussell was coming
1 Borchett, who was Russell's secretary, says Aylmer was ordered ooi for
a week, and returned to Alicante, September 10, which would imply that
BttsseU left the sea open during all the rest of September. Burchett's date
h owever is dearly a misreading. Bussell did not acknowledge William's
orders at Malaga tfll September 7-17, and did not announce his illnets at
Alicante and Ayhner's sailing till the 91st. Burohett also had dysen*
tery and went ashore with his chief. Byng says Novell was detached on
September 10 and that Aylmer started for his cruise on the 18th, was
joined by HotcH on the SSnd, and returned on the 28rd, Torrington Mtmoirg,
f»9sV
Digitized by
Google
1604 EFFECTS OF THE MOVE 175
back. 1 After that there was no sign of movement.
Keeping a squadron of cruisers always in the Straits and
the bulk of his fleet in continual readiness for sea, Bus-
sell set to work to refit piecemeal for the next year's
campaign, and winter settled down to seal William's
triumphant move.
The effect had been extraordinary. While William
had been able to score his first success in Flanders by the
capture of Huy, the French had made no progress in
Italy, and the Duke of Savoy had held firm to the Allies.
Noailles's army never recovered the demoralisation of its
inactivity. Degenerating more and more in their efforts
to support themselves by marauding, they fell into
excesses which brought upon them all the terrors of a
guerilla war, and the exasperated Catalans, of whom Louis
had hoped to make loyal subjects, were driven to fierce
and successful retaliation. At Toulon things were little
better. Its resources were not equal to refitting the
whole fleet, and the only hope of breaking William's hold
on the Mediterranean was to commission the first and
second rates that had been laid up in Brest, and man
them from Tourville's spent ships Large numbers of
seamen were 6ent for the purpose overland to Brest.
On the way they deserted in hundreds ; they could never
be gathered again, and Louis's fleet never recovered the
blow. And all this was directly the result of an enemy
dominating the Mediterranean and keeping a fleet inter-
posed between the two seats of the French maritime
jpower.
The effect on Louis's prestige was even more severe.
His career of conquest was checked, the panic in Spain
Mtnunr$ of De NoailUs, p. 895. Kuetell believed it was a design to
draw him from Cadiz and permit Tourville to eeoape. Ooxe, S hnw bm j
Correspondence, 200.
Digitized by
Google
176 THE MAIN FLEET IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 1604
allayed, and the wisest diplomatists in Europe began to
be sensible of a new development in international politics
in what the Venetian Ambassador at Madrid called ' the
unprecedented and grand resolve to place and maintain
the fleet at the Straits.' 1 In England it was thoroughly
appreciated. 'The resolution,' wrote Shrewsbury to
Bussell, ' of the fleet's wintering at Cadiz was not only
met with general applause in Christendom and extremely
disappointed the French designs, but it is approved here by
almost all sorts of people, as the only step that has been
made by us this war that looks like a vigour and a mind
to put an end to it. ... I cannot think but that you are
at this time in much the considerablest station of any
subject in Europe.' * After a full inquiry into the
conduct of the war at sea, the House of Lords voted their
thanks to Bussell, and a resolution was also carried
approving the King's strategy and begging him to increase
his fleet so as to enable him to keep a force superior to
that of the enemy permanently in the Mediterranean. 1
Everything was expected from the coming campaign.
Booke and his brother Commissioners were as good as
their word, and sent out all the stores, artificers, and
officials that were necessary to turn Cadiz into a British
navy yard. The whole ' terrible business of the conduct-
ingpart 9 was taken off the admiral's hands and he had
leisure to* think. The result was a clear warning
to the Government that the expected success depended
1 *L' insolita e grande risolusione di raettere o fermar la flota alio
Stretto serve a raddolcire gli animi,' Ac. ReUuioiii Venete, Spagna, ii.
m.
* This, no doubt, was partly in answer to Russell's request for a
commission as general, ' for admiral in Spain,' he complained, ' is squire
tn England, so insignificant a name Sb it in these parts. It is not a new
thing. Lord Sandwich, Black Dean, and several others had it,' Coxe, 209.
The —— » s— s^i WM granted him, ibid. 224.
• LordM Journal* xv. 511.
Digitized by
Google
1695 WINTERING AT CADIZ 177
entirely on his being able to bring the French to action
and defeating them. If Tourville refused to put to sea,
the situation of the past year would recur. At the end of
July he would have to turn homeward and leave the Medi-
terranean open to the operations of the Toulon squadron.
He therefore urged that the Channel division of the main
fleet should be given sealed orders to be opened towards
the end of summer, directing it to proceed to Cadiz. At
the same time his own fleet would slip away, and, before
the French could know what was going on, the fresh
force would have changed places with the stale one. In
this way the situation might be held for a second winter,
and, unless it was so held, there was no certain hope of
success. In reply he was told the King generally
approved his plan, though, as his own division of the main
fleet was so much larger than that he had left behind, it
would be impossible to replace the whole of it, and some of
the ships would have to remain. In any case it was the
King's flattering desire that he himself should continue in
command, Russell excused himself on the ground of his
health, and then set to work to show his zeal.
By April, though he had kept squadrons out even far
up the Straits all the winter, the whole fleet was ready
for sea. Some eighteen sail he had sent home by the
King's orders. In their place he had asked for some
bomb-vessels as well as three regiments of foot, and one
of the new marines to fill up his complements and furnish
a landing force. These had now arrived, and on May 2
he put to sea with forty-five of the line, Dutch and
English. The meaning of the new additions to his force
was that he meant to break the deadlock by striking a
direct blow against Toulon or Marseilles. By that device
he hoped to drive Tourville out of his astute strategy
virr him *° fight **• ° rder *° keep "■ ***
Digitized by
Google
178 THE MAIX FLEET IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 1006
troops for the operation his first object was to fetch a
Spanish force, which had assembled at Finale, near Genoa,
to secure Catalonia against the remnants of De Noailles's
army.
Accordingly, after showing himself at Barcelona and
communicating with the Spanish Viceroy, he passed on
to the eastward. The trouble was that the practicability
of Russell's design depended wholly on the possibility of
inducing the Duke of Savoy to co-operate. British in-
terests at Turin, his capital, were in the hands of the
famous Massue de Buvigny, Deputy-General of the
Huguenots, one of the many valuable subjects whom
the revocation of the edict of Nantes had given to
William. His mother was a Russell, and he was now
a British subject and Earl of Galway for his services
as a general of horse in Ireland. In Savoy he com-
manded the subsidised contingent and was also Envoy
Extraordinary. To him Russell now addressed a letter
to inquire if there was any hope of inducing the artful
prince to co-operate with him in his grand design.
Having looked into Toulon and found all quiet, he was
content to despatch Nevell with a small squadron to
deliver his letters and fetch the troops from Finale,
giving him a rendezvous at Hyeres. In the interval
he despatched Admiral Mitchell with the chief military
officers and Sir Martin Beckman, of Tangier fame
and now one of the leading British engineers, to make
a close reconnaissance of the Toulon defences. 1 Then
his plans were suddenly upset. A gale sprang up, which
blew for three days and nights, and drove him clean off
the coast ; and by the time he was able to get back to
cover the passage of the Finale transports past Toulon he
• Ib Torringtv* Memoir*, p. 78, it if Mud they were gent *to view
.* Burchett says Toulon.
Digitized by
Google
1095 THE 8ECOND CAMPAIGN 170
had to ran to Sardinia for water and to protect the home-
ward-bound Smyrna fleet.
Before he was again ready for action, Casale, the
immediate objective of the operations of the Duke of
Savoy and his Imperial allies, had fallen. With scarcely
a show of resistance it had suddenly capitulated — so
suddenly indeed that Galway suspected all was not
right. The astute Duke was clever enough, however, to
allay all suspicion, and no one could yet tell what was in
the wind. As a matter of fact Louis had recognised that
William's move in the Mediterranean had beaten him,
and the sacrifice of Casale was the first step in a new
opening to detach Savoy from the League and remove
Italy from the board. Ignorant of all this subtilty, Kussell
only saw in the allies' success fresh hope of carrying
off his great combined move against Toulon, and so finally
crushing the French sea power in the Mediterranean.
Having seen the Smyrna convoy safe for Alicante, he
proceeded with his fleet to Barcelona. It was here,
about the middle of July, that he heard the news of
Savoy's success, and he was about to sail for the coast of
Provence in high expectation when letters reached him
from home that again raised his ugly temper to bpiling
point.
William had once more taken a high hand with the
navy. Disregarding Russell's plan, or knowing perhaps
that it was now impracticable, he had bluntly decided
that he must remain in the Mediterranean till the
autumn. For the King it was the only way in which .
Tourville's defensive strategy could be met. All he did
to meet the seamen's objections, was to say that if a
few of the ships were unfit to keep the sea so late, they
might be sent home, and Booke must replace them. In
vain the ministers protested, and, fortified with Rooke's
Digitized by
Google
180 TOE MAIN FLEET IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 1696
opinion, urged that by that time the condition of the
ships would be such as to render them unfit to face
equinoctial weather. ' Not one but every seaman/ Shrews-
bury wrote to the King, ' that any of us have discoursed
with, do not only say the hazard is very great, but almost
certain ; that ships of the first or second rate have not till
very lately been ventured to those seas, and if they are to
return in the winter, Sir George Booke's expression to me
was, " It is a thousand to one several of them miscarry." '
The King would not listen. Having failed to penetrate
the French lines in Flanders, he had just made his bold
move on Namur, and had sat down before the place in
form. The risk he was taking must have made those
which he was forcing on Russell seem light, and the orders
went forward as he had resolved.
On receipt of them Russell delivered his temper once
more in a letter to his friend at Court. After representing
the madness of his orders he fell to abusing the Dutch
squadron, which was never up to strength and always
short of victuals, and roundly accused the King of being
under the thumb of the Admiralty of Amsterdam. He
begged sarcastically to be informed at least what force
<p-as coming in September and who was to command it.
4 For at present, 9 he said, ' I know nothing but that after
that month I may be drowned in coming home.' The
end he hinted would probably be another order that he
himself was to stay out, and if it came he plainly said he
should disobey it. This letter he had the recklessness to
send through France, regardless in his temper of the
possibility of its being intercepted. As a matter of fact
it reached the Sing's camp in Flanders, and William
opened it, but there is no trace of his ever having visited
the indiscretion, if it was no worse, on his testy servant's
head.
Digitized by
Google
1095 DESIGN ON TOULON 181
Again, having vented his spleen, Russell obeyed, and
still further reduced his force by sending home his most
defective ships as convoy for the Smyrna fleet. The only
consolation for the angry admiral was that there was still
hope of solving the situation by a stroke against Toulon
or Marseilles in concert with the troops of Savoy, if only
he could induce the Viceroy of Catalonia to lend him his
squadron of twelve galleys. 1 On this exploit his heart
was still set ; but to add to his irritation the Viceroy met
his application for the galleys by an application that he
would first assist him in recovering Palamos. Seeing
what his instructions were, and how badly he wanted the
galleys, he could scarcely refuse. But, as the Spaniards
had no material for a siege, he thought himself justified
in stipulating that his troops should be landed for a week
only, and not so long if danger threatened from Toulon in
the meantime. Early in August therefore the troops
were landed at Palamos, and a vessel sent to watch Toulon.
Combined operations were opened immediately, and were
meeting with unexpected success, when Russell's advice
boat returned with two prisoners who asserted that at
Toulon sixty sail of the line were lying in the road ready
for sea. At the same time five fresh Dutch ships joined
from Cadiz. Russell insisted on immediately re-embark-
ing his troops, and, advising the Spaniards to return to
their previous position, he sailed off in search of the
French. He was in high hope that he had gained his end.
He thought that the news of his having sent home his
. unseaworthy ships must have induced the French to
.come out and fight; but the intelligence was false. At
Toulon, it is true, he found indications that the ships were
being prepared for sea, but, after hanging as close in to
the port as the weather would let him, he made certain
1 Torrington Memoir; p. 74.
Digitized by
Google
182 THE MAIN FLEET IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 1695
they had no more intention of fighting him than before.
As for his darling project of an attack upon the place in
force, he had now to learn there was no hope of help
from Savoy, and for his own force it was far too strong.
In any case September on that coast was no place for
such a fleet as his, and he once more retired to his original
station at Alicante.
Ho had heard that Sir George Rooke was coming oat
with some fresh ships to relieve him, and it had been his
intention to stay where he was till the end of the month
in pursuance of the King's desire, or at least till he heard
Booke was at Cadiz. But Callenburgh considered that so
long a delay at Alicante was incompatible with his own
orders to return before the Dutch ports became icebound ;
whereupon Russell resolved to go home at once with all
the first and second rates in accordance with William's
instructions, leaving his rear-admiral, Sir David Mitchell,
in command of the rest with orders to establish himself
at Cadiz, and from there do all he could to protect the
trade and embarrass the French.
So ended the two campaigns— the type of so many
that were to succeed them. How often were their maih
features to recur ! The French fleet helpless in Toulon
— not blockaded, but refusing to stir; the fitful opera-
tions on the Spanish coast hampering in greater or less
degree the military operations of the French army ; the
fruitless efforts to achieve something on the coast of
Provence by the help of preoccupied or faint-hearted
allies. Nor was this the whole. As always, beneath the
apparent failures and disappointments there was still,
unseen and almost unnoticed, the silent pressure of the
chafing fleet that was felt to the farthest borders of the
war, even to the far-off Meuse, withering the lilies on the
walla of Namur.
Digitized by
Google
$5-
L0UI8'8 OOUNTERSTROKE 183
In truth, Russell's fleet had been eating into the roots |
of France, ancfc William showed no sign of loosing his hold. ..
Sir George Rooke reached Cadiz after a tempestuous
voyage of five weeks in the middle of October, and with
Mitchell's and the Dutch squadron could show a force of
thirty ships of the line, besides bomb-vessels and others.
It was of course insufficient to deal with the Toulon
fleet, but reinforcements were being brought forward in
England which were to join his flag during the winter for
an early campaign in the spring. Louis saw himself
threatened with a continuance of the exhausting situa-
tion. At all costs the tension must be broken, and he set
to work to effect it in his grand manner with one of those ^
broad strokes that are the fascination of his epoch. A
century later the greatest of his successors found himself
forced by the same pressure to attempt the invasion of
England. In this Napoleon was but repeating Louis's \
expedient. In mid-winter, while the bulk of the British
fleet was in harbour, a force was rapidly concentrated at
Calais, where James joined it, prepared to throw himself
across while the seas were clear, and put himself at the
head of all that was Jacobite and reactionary in his lost
kingdom. The design promised all success. It happened
however that a continuance of westerly winds had prevented
the sailing of the last division of the Mediterranean fleet
It was at once ordered to the Downs with every available
ship that could be got out of harbour. Russell in person
went down to comniancir^nd Rooke was recalled. The
situation in the Narrow Seas was saved, but that in the
Mediterranean was lost. James returned to his hopeless
exile, and the Toulon fleet put to sea. Every effort was
made to prevent its getting into Brest, and although after
many delays Rooke early in May was able to get off
Ushant with a sufficient fleet, he was just too late.
Digitized by
Google
184 THE MAIN FLEET IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 1096
Chiteau-Benault was safe in Brest, and William's
Mediterranean venture came to an end.
The finan cial crisis through which England was
passing made it impossible to renew the strategy which
had promised so well. Still its effects continued. The
dislocation of French finance and of the naval administra-
tion which had been caused by William's two years'
command of the Mediterranean left its mark. Though
the fleet was concentrated at Brest, it was in no condition
to effect anything, nor for the rest of the war did French
action rise above commerce destruction and colonial raids.
Every one except Spain, whose impotence had been the
cause of all the trouble, was anxious for peace. The
absurd pretensions of the Court of Madrid were the main
obstacle to its conclusion, and, even had William been
able, he was certainly unwilling to support her unreason-
able attitude by again sending his fleet to the Straits.
In any case the necessity of withdrawing the fleet
had been followed by events which made peace inevitable,
and at the same time marked with fresh emphasis what
the command of the Mediterranean meant in European
affairs. If it be thought that too much weight has been
adjudged to William's great move, the rebound which
came immediately the pressure was removed should
certainly justify what has been claimed. It was in Italy
the most convincing effect is seen. 'The measure, 9
wrote the despairing Galway to Shrewsbury, ' which the
Sing finds it necessary to adopt of recalling his fleet is a
misfortune to our affairs in general, as the French are
thus relieved from the greatest embarrassment which
they have hitherto experienced.' And again, ' My lord,
permit me to represent to you that the most important
affair is to think of the fleet which the King would have
in the Mediterranean/ And yet again, when the danger in
Digitized by
Google
1696-7 EFFECTS OF THE FLEET'S RECALL 185
the Channel was over : * I am glad, my lord, that you are
well convinced of the necessity of having a fleet in the
Mediterranean, and I am thence induced to hope that the
King will send one. The enemy have laid up the squadron
which sailed from Toulon to Brest with the exception of
twelve ships. So no more than twenty-five or thirty of
these ships are left in the ocean in three squadrons.
Why then do we keep in your seas a fleet of eighty sail
and not send a squadron of twenty-five or thirty into the
Mediterranean ? If it should please his Majesty to order
on hoard only two battalions, he will divert a force of
the enemy equal to twenty thousand men, and change in
his favour the aspect of affairs in all this country and all
Italy/
No clearer exposition of the true lines of British
strategy could be desired ; but it was not to be. The
Duke of Savoy, while he had the effrontery to beg for the
return of the fleet, was making separate terms for himself.
The surrender of Casale proved to be the firstfruits of an
accommodation, by which Savoy deserted the alliance and
Louis secured from Spain and the Empire the neutralisa-
tion of Italy. In view of the military impotence of the
Spanish King at home, this pusillanimous arrangement
was no less than a complete abandonment of the position
in the Mediterranean. It was in forcing that position that
William had come to see his only hope of bringing the
war to a successful issue. It is small wonder then that
his patience broke down. With such allies it was
impossible to work, and when Louis adroitly seized the
moment to offer honourable terms of peace, William
insisted on their consideration. A congress, after inter*
minable delay, assembled at Ryswick, near the Hague,
but it was only to be the scene of every kind of obstruction
that the pride and folly of the Hapsburgs could suggest,
Digitized by
Google
**6 TOE MAIN FLEET IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 1607
id the pedantic diplomacy of the time invent. Still
obstruction availed the malcontents nothing. William
^nrith his fleets was master of the situation, and, driven to
exasperation, he resolved to take the matter into his own
Iiands.
A little wayside diplomacy between Lord Portland
and Marshal Boufllers behind the back of the Congress
quickly settled a give-and-take line for a firm peace.
It amounted roughly to the status quo ante bcllum, with
the substantial addition that Louis recognised his arch-
enemy as King of England. The malcontents, who had
set the example of private arrangements with the common
enemy, were naturally furious at seeing the tables turned.
Spain, who had the least right to complain, was the
loudest in her vituperation ; but the mere threat that, if
the war continued, no fleet from the North would again
appear in the Mediterranean forced her to acquiesce.
Deprived of the protection at sea which William had
refused to continue, Barcelona had already fallen. At the
same time came news that on the Spanish Main Cartagena
had been sacked by a French squadron under Pointis,
and Spain, for all her overweening pretensions, could be
under no hallucination as to what a continuance of the
war would mean for her without the goodwill of the
sea powers. She had no choice but to lower her note,
and on September 20, 1697, peace was signed at Ryswick
on the lines which William had arranged with Louis.
Digitized by
Google
CHAPTER XXVIII
THE SPANISH SUCCESSION
Though the Congress of Ryswick gave peace to Europe,
it was far from staying the struggle for the Mediter-
ranean. It simply transferred the contest from the sea to
the cabinets. The nightmare of the Spanish succession
still hung over Europe. The childless King of Spain, in
ever failing health, still lingered on, and any day the
news of his death might blow into flame the embers
which the peace had merely covered over. Every power,
oppressed almost to exhaustion with financial embarrass-
ment and the dislocation of trade, was pining for rest, and
none more than France. The only possible escape from
the intolerable situation was to arrange it diplomatically
while the King of Spain yet lived. No sooner therefore
was the peace signed than Louis set to work, and the
result was the famous negotiations for the ' Partition
Treaties/ which form perhaps the most extraordinary
chapter in diplomatic history.
With the failure of the male line of the Spanish
Hapsburgs, three claimants could show a title on the
distaff side — the Dauphin, the eldest son of the Emperor,
and the Electoral Prince, son of the Elector of Bavaria.
The real struggle lay of course between France and
Austria, who alone could hope to assert their claim to the
undivided succession ; but both Bourbon and Hapsburg
had to face the fact that Europe would not sit down
Digitized by
Google
1SB THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 1698
quietly while either house added the vast dominions of
Spain to the possessions that already made each so
formidable. Before either could hope to enjoy its
prospective rights in peace, Europe must be satisfied,
and since the late war Europe for this purpose meant
William. To him therefore Louis had deferentially
to apply, and to beg him to say how it would please him
to arrange the balance of European power.
The crux of the whole question, as it had always
been in the rivalry between France and the Empire, was
the command of the Mediterranean. The possession
of the Spanish crown meant also of course the possession
of the Spanish Indies, but it is impossible to read the
correspondence of the time without seeing that this was
the minor consideration. The real and recognised value
of the Peninsula was that, as the powers were then
ordered, it would give to its possessor the dominant
place in the Mediterranean, and the Mediterranean, as
William had so clearly demonstrated, was the keyboard of
Europe. 1
Accordingly, since William's recent demonstration of
his power and determination to play upon it, the first.
necessity was to come to terms with him if the vacant
succession was not to prove a bed of thorns. And at
every turn of the negotiations we see that it was the
freedom of the Mediterranean that was uppermost in
William's mind. With Cadiz in French hands the
Straits were in their hands, and his power ofdividing_
the two seats of their maritime power was gone. Cadiz
in the late war had acquired a new strategical coefficient
that had never been quite clearly recognised before.
Its former importance was mainly that it was the seat
LitUn of William III. and Louis XIV. and of thsir
Digitized by
Google
1096 PARTITION NEGOTIATIONS 189
of the American trade of Spain and of her Oceanic sea
power. But since William had had the use of it, he
had demonstrated its higher value to be that it com-
manded the Straits. As no first-class n aval p ort th en
_existedLin_ the Straits themselves, it stood in fact for_
_what Gibraltar stands for to-day. Unless therefore
William had the liberty of it, or of an equivalent, it
would be impossible for him in a future struggle to
repeat the masterly stroke which had brought home to
Louis the length of his arm. In the negotiations all
this was of course expressed in terms of trade— it was
for the freedom of his Mediterranean trade that William
evinced his main anxiety — but behind it, and scarcely
disguised, was the higher strategy of war.
Louis's overtures began by pointing out the extreme
danger of reviving the domination of Charles V. if
the Spanish dominions and the Empire were to become
reunited in the Austrian Hapsburgs. To avoid such
an accumulation of territory round one throne, he was
prepared, if William supported the Bourbon claim, to
settle the Spanish crown on the Dauphin's second son,
and so secure its separation from that of France. As a
further security for the trade of the maritime powers, he
would be prepared to cede to William Ceuta and Oran,
the remaining Spanish possessions on the 'African coast,
for the benefit of England and Holland. To this
William would not listen. He protested he had nothing to
fear from Austria upon the sea, however great her empire,
but that so large an addition to the French sea power as
was proposed was a danger not to be borne. If Louis
wished to negotiate with a view to sharing the vast
inheritance, it must be on the basis of a partition between
. the three claimants, which would make none of them
predominant. By way of a counter proposal therefore
Digitized by
Google
190 THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 1698
lie introduced the Prince of Bavaria, the third claimant,
and proposed, after various interchanges of views, that
to him should go Spain and the Indies, while Louis's
grandson contented himself with Naples and the Italian
islands, and while Milan, Sardinia, and the Netherlands
went to the Archduke Charles, the second son of the
Emperor; or, in the alternative, if Louis had set his
heart on Spain and the Indies, then Italy and the
Netherlands must be divided between the Electoral
Prince and the Archduke ; but in this case— if, that is,
Spain and the Indies went to a French prince — then
England must insist on a guarantee for the freedom of
the Mediterranean, not only by the cession of Ceuta and
Oran, but also of one or two really serviceable ports
^within the Straits.
Louis was now more than ever disturbed. In the
arrangement which William had proposed he had said
nothing about Sicily, and at Paris it was feared
that he would demand the island France had coveted
so long, and if not the whole, at least its naval centre,
Messina. But the fact was that both Louis and
William were secretly oppressed with their own internal
difficulties, and were overrating each other's strength.
William had really little hope of bringing Louis to any
reasonable terms, or of inducing his war-weary subjects
to permit him a display of force. He had no faith in
negotiations that were not carried on sword in hand, and,
in face of the growing anti-military spirit in England,
all he could do to whet his diplomacy was to increase
the usual Mediterranean squadron and beg the Dutch
to do the same. The effect of the expedient was neces-
sarily to enhance the importance of the Mediterra-
nean demands and increase still further Louis's anxiety.
Eventually William declared that the place he had in
Digitized by
Google
1098 ' WILLIAM DEMANDS MINORCA 191
his mind within the Straits was Minorca. Portland,
his ambassador in Paris, also mentioned Gibraltar, but
in spite of his urgent advice William would not insist on
it, thereby again displaying his remarkable strategical in-
sight. For there is no doubt that, so long as England held
Minorca, the extra advantage of Gibraltar was certainly not
worth the cost and bad blood its occupation must entail
Louis, misunderstanding his opponent's apparent modera-
tion, now took a higher tone, and declared nothing would
induce him to cede a port within the Straits, since such
a concession would give the mastery to the maritime
power. William, in his quiet way, immediately hardened
down. His irreducible minimum was the power of
keeping a fleet permanently in the Mediterranean, and
without Minorca or some other Spanish port it was
impossible for his fleet to winter there.
In every word he wrote we see his firm grasp of
the controlling factors in European politics which he
had discovered, and his far-sighted appreciation of what
the late war had taught. Louis, as wise as he, resisted
with all his diplomatic force, but he resisted in vain.
In vain he suggested that, if William were bent on a
port within the Straits, he might in apportioning
Southern Italy reserve one for himself out of the Arch-
duke's share. William would not recede an inch from
the position he had taken up. He told Portland that he
absolutely refused to treat at all for Louis's possession of
Spain, except on the basis of the cession of Port Mahon.
Then, when a renewal of the war began to look inevitable,
Louis gave way. Bather than give William a footing
in the Mediterranean he decided to abandon to the
Electoral Prince his claim to Spain and the Indies, and
to content himself with the alternative arrangement, which
would give him the control of Italy. One effort he made
Digitized by
Google
192 THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 1098
to improve the exchange, by proposing that Milan
should go to Savoy instead of to the Emperor. This
idea was of course that the pliant Prince should give
Savoy to France in exchange for Milan, and then Louis
would control almost the whole coast of the Medi-
terranean from Sicily to the Pyrenees. William treated
the suggestion almost as an impertinence. So incensed
-was he with the Duke of Savoy for the treacherous
desertion which had robbed Russell's great move of
complete success, that he would not permit his name to
he mentioned, and Louis had to content himself with
the original proposal.
Still it was much that he gained — all indeed or
nearly all that France had been striving for since
Mazarin's day. For besides Naples and Sicily he was to
have Orbitello and the other Spanish ports on the Tuscan
coasts, Elba and the adjacent islands over which so much
blood had been shed, and the port and marquisate of
Finale, while in return for concessions elsewhere he was
also to have Guipuscoa with its famous ports of Passages
and St. Sebastian. The latter concession of course in no
way affected the situation within the Straits, except
for the increase it gave to French naval resources. No
division could well have been fairer. France gained at
least half the Spanish sea power with a substantial
strengthening of her position both within and without
the Struts, while at the same time she gained nothing by
which, as she had hoped, the Western Mediterranean
would be constituted a French lake. William had re-
solutely kept the gate open, and held France back from
the Spanish sphere.
The main interest of it all is as a step in the gradual
solidification of the naval policy which William inau-
: guxated. .Its effect was not seen till the war was
Digitized by
Google
1700 THE KIXG OF SPAIN'S WILL 1M
renewed. The treaty itself never came into operation.
When all had been settled it was not the King of Spain
that died, but the young Electoral Prince. The succession
thus lay entirely between France and Austria, and
William's well-framed edifice fell to the ground. Every-
thing had to begin again from the foundations. A whole
year's negotiations followed before the second partition
treaty was signed ; but throughout all their shifting phases
Louis never once made any proposal which could give
William a loophole for claiming a port in the Mediter-
ranean. Further than this the negotiations and the
final terms of the treaty do not concern us. They were
indeed a mere pretence that covered the determined
efforts of France and Austria to secure the whole succes-
sion by intrigue at the Court of Madrid. It was Louis
who won the unsavoury game. When at last, in
November 1700, the King of Spain died, it was found he
had bequeathed the whole of his empire to the second
son of the Dauphin, Philip Duke of Anjou.
With this fatal catastrophe the bloodstained century
came to an end. So terrible was the prospect to all
Europe, and so weary was the world of war, that the
inevitable struggle did not at once break out. Every one
shrank from striking the first blow and was absorbed in
securing the strategical points with which he was most
concerned. The main causes of anxiety were, firstly, the
4 Barrier Fortresses ' along Louis's northern frontier, which
since the peace of Byswick had been garrisoned by
Dutch troops so as to secure the Spanish Netherlands as a
real ' buffer state ' between France and Holland ; secondly,
the Duchy of Milan, which gave to its possessor the
command of North Italy ; and finally the entrance to the
Mediterranean. The naval importance of the ports in
the first two areas was a tradition in European politics.
vol. 11.
Digitized by
Google
1M THE SPANISH SUCCESSION' 1700
That of the third was new, and the unprecedented weight
attached to it reveals the impression which William's
strategy had made.
No sooner had Louis declared his intention of accept-
ing the fatal will than he begged the Junta of Regency
to take steps to secure and strengthen their ports,
especially Cadiz, Port Mahon, and Gibraltar, and officers
were immediately despatched for that purpose. The
resident agents of the Protestant powers at once spread
the alarm. 'What will become of the Protestant re-
ligion/ wrote a correspondent of the Elector of Hanover,
* and what will become of the commerce of the English
and Dutch ... if he [the King of France] has Gibraltar
fortified and keeps a strong garrison there with a good
squadron of galleys and ships of war ? If once he is in
possession of this port, it will not be difficult to seize
Tangier, on which to all appearance he has had his eye
for a long time past. Then, monseigneur, the Straits
will be indeed closed, and what effort and cost will not
England and Holland be put to to open it 1 . . Would to
God there were in Spain five or six of the most discreet
and enlightened members of the House of Commons ! ' l
His lament was well justified. Ever since the peace
of Byswick Parliament had been doing its best to thwart
William's far-sighted efforts to fortify the country against
the coming danger. As the means he had taken to that
end became known, the hostility of the nation increased.
The partition treaty had been received with something
1 Bucdeveh MSS. i. 867. The document is undated, but Assigned in a
note to * 1701 or after.* It was certainly not after, but perhaps before.
The Junta of Begency to which it refers was in power only from November 1,
1700, to February IS, 1701. It is also stated to have been written ' some
weeks 9 alter it was known in Spain that Louis had accepted the will, which
would give its date about the latter part of December 1700, or at latest the
ear|y part of January 1701*
Digitized by
Google
1700 HOSTILITY OF PARLIAMENT 195
like an outburst of indignation. The King of Spain was
not yet dead when it became known, and public utterance
took the high moral line that it was little short of highway
robbery thus to divide the possessions of an ally. Beneath
this cry William believed that he could detect its real
grounds. He put it down to the ever increasing sensitive-
ness of the country about its Mediterranean trade. He was
probably not far from right in believing that the opposi-
tion to his work arose from the fact that France was to
have Naples and Sicily, so that, as the Levant merchants
said, they would have thenceforth to go to the French
Court for license to trade. He had therefore set to work
to remove the difficulty by arranging an exchange where-
by Louis should take Savoy and its North Italian terri-
tories, and the Duke of Savoy Naples and Sicily. 1 Louis
appeared to favour the idea, but, before anything was done,
Parliament met in the worst of tempers. At the very
hour when the King of Spain lay dying, they had been
busy forcing William to disband his army, and had left
him powerless to face Louis with effect in the late
negotiations. The failure of those negotiations, which was
mainly due to their own want of sense, they visited on the
King's head, and he in disgust had come to contem-
plate retiring to Holland and leaving them forever. But
suddenly a strong revulsion of feeling set in. Early in
Feburary 1701 Louis by a sudden move surprised the
Dutch garrisons in the Barrier Fortresses and was in
practical occupation of the Spanish Netherlands. Parlia-
ment was in the act of reassembling. It met with the
sound of the occupation in its ears. It was a sound
which, in its traditional jealousy for the North Sea ports,
Parliament could not fail to understand. At the same
time, to leave no room for doubt, a new French project far
1 GrimUot, vol. ii.
9*
Digitized by
Google
196 THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 1701
keeping England busy with a Stuart invasion was
disclosed, and the country's foolish mistrust of its
sovereign was laid bare. The Commons promptly passed
a vote of confidence in the King, and in a burst of
repentance he was given carte blanch* to negotiate a new
Grand Alliance.
William was at once himself again. He asked and
obtained an increase in the fleet, and made overtures for
the restoration of the Barrier Fortresses. The French
refused to treat, and Kooke, who through all the shifts of
party politics still remained William's most trusted naval
officer, was named Commander-in-Chief. Fire-breathing
petitions came up from the country, and by June Parlia-
ment was unanimous for war in support of Holland and
the Empire. Negotiations began at the Hague for a re-
newal of the Grand Alliance, and in July William, whose
strength was fast failing, went over to Loo to watch them
and to rest, after leaving all prepared for an outbreak
of war. Indeed peace barely existed. Ten thousand
British troops were already in Holland under Marlborough's
command. An Imperial army under Prince Eugene of
Savoy, fresh from his triumphant campaign against the
Turks, had entered Northern Italy to forestall the French,
and a French army under the veteran Marshal Catinat
was in motion to turn them out. In Brest Ch&teau-
B£nanlt had ready for sea a squadron which was supposed
to be under orders to take possession of the Plate fleet ;
and, as William passed over to Holland, Booke received his
final instructions. 1
A powerful Anglo-Dutch fleet was gathering at Spit-
head, and with this Booke was to make a demonstration
1 Rook* 9 * Journal (Navy Records SdcUty), p. 130. The exact nature
of thee* {attractions is not known, bat their tenor may be gathered from
•'* marks about them, ibid. pp. 133-128, 135, 180, 183, 185.
Digitized by
Google
1701 ANXIETY FOR GIBRALTAR 107
before Cadiz with the intention apparently of emphasising
William's arguments in his characteristic manner, and .
even of preventing the occupation of the harbour by a I
French squadron. It was a threat at once to the Spanish
American trade and to the French position in the Medi-
terranean — a spring straight at the key of the naval
situation. On the Straits William's eyes were fixed as
keenly as they had been throughout the late negotiations ;
and with good reason. Louis's designs there grew more
patent every day. Within two months of the first warn-
ing a kinsman of Pepys's had visited the place by his
direction and had found there two French officers already
at work planning an extension of the harbour and new
fortifications. ' I was well satisfied,' he wrote, ' with the
sight at Gibraltar, and should have taken a step to Ceuta
but for the haste I was in for my getting back in time
to Madrid. . . . The Straits are much narrower than I
thought, and with the addition of some forts and carrying
the moles out further at Gibraltar, which two French
engineers are now actually designing, I fear the enemy
will have a secure harbour there for a squadron of ships
sufficient to exclude us the Straits.' l
Throughout the year Count Schonenberg, William's
envoy at Madrid, kept sending home similar reports — how
Louis had persuaded the Spaniards to denude the for-
tresses towards the French frontier in order to strengthen
those of Andalusia, how the forces of Catalonia had been
sent to Gibraltar, how Kenaud, one of the leading French
engineers, had come to superintend the remodelling of tho
defences of the Straits ports. But, unlike Pepys's corre-
spondent, he knew the Spaniards too well not to laugh at
it all, and was sure that in the end nothing would be
1 J. Jackson to Pepys from Cadis, March 36, 1701, HodgHn USS.
184.
Digitized by
Google
198 THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 1701
done. In his last letters, written at the close of the year,
lie was able to report that Cadiz was still in no state to
resist an attack, that Gibraltar was practically without
fortifications or defences, and that Kenaud was angrily
complaining he had been sent on a fool's errand ' to build
castles in Spain.' ! With such information as this
streaming home there can be little doubt of the intention
of the proposed demonstration. But Rooke, whose lack
of imagination must ever deny him a front place among
naval commanders, did not like the idea. Thoroughly
orthodox, his mind could only dwell on the risk involved.
lake all English admirals of the time he was nervous
about taking a first-class fleet to the southward so late in
the year. The difficulty of getting it 6afely back into the
Channel in the late autumn oppressed him, and Van
Almonde the Dutch admiral agreed. All through July,
while the negotiations for the Grand Alliance were going
on at the Hague and the fleet was getting ready for sea,
they continued to protest against the orders which British
commerce approved and which William regarded as an
essential backing to his diplomacy.
The negotiations themselves were conducted by
Marlborough, to whom William had become reconciled
since the Queen's death. As the King's increasing in-
firmities warned him that his own end was approaching,
he looked for some one on whom his cloak might fall —
some one who could worthily grasp and handle foreign
politics with his own wide imagination. It was on
Marlborough his choice had sagaciously settled, and he
bad taken the ambitious general with him to the Hague
as plenipotentiary, that he might in good time become
familiar with the intricate ropes. The pupil proved
1 See 8dMMntaig's despatches, April to November, 1701, 8.P. Foreign,
71
Digitized by
Google
1701 MAKLBOROUGH AND ROOKE 190
worthy of his great master, and henceforward, if we look \
for the hand that held the helm of British naval policy \-
steady for the Mediterranean, we find almost always that
it is Marlborough v 8. It was so from the first. The main
idea for the moment was to endeavour to save the
situation on the basis of the last partition treaty. For
the Emperor William demanded Milan and the Nether-
lands, and for himself guarantees in the Mediterranean
and the West Indies. On this Marlborough tells us he
insisted — even against the jealousy and faint-heartedness
of the Dutch — as the sole condition on which a peaceful
settlement by a new partition treaty would be accepted
in England. 1 A week after he had made this declaration
the negotiations were broken off and Booke received
orders for immediate action.
The admiral's protests had had their effect. Instead
of carrying the whole fleet down to the Straits he was now
ordered to blockade Brest, or if he found Ch&teau-B6nault
had put to sea he was, as he himself had suggested, to
cruise off the mouth of the Channel and cover the trade.
At the same time he was to detach a squadron of thirty-
five of the lesser ships of the line, uuder Benbow and Sir
John Munden, to the Azores to forestall the French in
intercepting the Plate fleet and to ' take care of it for those
who were entitled to it.' With these orders, so Eliza-
bethan in flavour, Booke put to sea, and, having detached
Benbow, he proceeded to Brest. He found Ch&teau-
B£nault had gone. A few days later, news came that the
Plate fleet had been stopped at the Indies. Benbow
was recalled, and Booke in council of war decided it was
f» time to bring the main fleet into Spithead.
The outbreak of war was thus averted. There was
1 Marlborough to Godolphin, July 22, 1701, in Coxa's Lift </ Jlaii-
borough, chap. is.
Digitized by
Google
200 THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 1701-2
still hope. Marlborough had succeeded in negotiating an
alliance with the Emperor and the Trotestant powers,
which might yet bring France to reason, when an event
happened which Louis recklessly used to make all further
negotiation impossible. As Marlborough's treaty was
being signed, James II. died, and Louis, in defiance of
the treaty cf Byswick and of the tenderest susceptibilities
of English public opinion, recognised his son as King of
England. The insult was unpardonable, the provocation
glaring. In the height of the war fever a general election
was held, and a new Parliament met, pledged and even
on fire to back William against his old enemy to the
utmost limit of their resources. Forty thousand troops
and as many seamen were immediately voted, and the
war had come at last.
From the point of view of the higher naval strategy
no war has more illuminating instruction for our own
time than that of the Spanish succession.* In many
respects the conditions and objects of naval power closely
resembled those which exist to-day. It was a war to
prevent the dangerous preponderance of an ambitious and
powerful military state ; it was also a war for the freedom
of commerce ; and the one element against which no con-
tinental power had an equal card to play was the British
navy. During the late peace the strain of Louis's army
had been too great to allow him thoroughly to re-
establish his navy, while on the other hand the jealousy
of a standing army, which in England had destroyed
William's military resources, had not extended to the
navy. Its power and efficiency had been well maintained. , J .
Ships had been kept in good condition and the peace r
footing settled at fifteen thousand men. Every one recog-
nised it as the most trenchant weapon in the armoury of
the alliance, but no two strategists agreed on how it could
Digitized by
Google
1702 UIVAL STRATEGICAL SCHEMES 201
be best employed. The Emperor hoped to see it at
Naples, and in the spring made a formal proposal to that
end ; bat he was informed politely that it was too late in
the year for the great ships to go so far, as there was as
yet no intermediate port available for wintering. Next
year moreover he would probably be better able to co-
operate, and in the meanwhile it should be disposed with
a particular regard to his interests. 1 Prince Eugene, who
was actively engaged with Marshal Catinat in Lombardy, i
more modestly desired that at least a portion of it should |
be sent into the Adriatic to protect his communications j
with Trieste, which were being threatened from Toulon, j
On the other hand, the Dutch and North German Princes
who had joined the alliance, ignoring the lessons of the
late war, would have had it operating on the north coast
of France with a view to relieving by diversions the
pressure on their own frontiers.
Booke's imagination could reach no higher. In
January 1702 he presented to the King his plan of
campaign. A main fleet of fifty English and thirty Dutch
of the line was to be formed. Its objective he does not
mention, but it was certainly not for the Straits. For
4 the southward ' he proposed a secondary fleet of thirty
English and twenty Dutch 'to go abroad with eight
thousand English and Dutch soldiers to attempt some-
thing on Spain or Portugal.' The remainder of the
available ships, being thirty sail of the line with frigates
and smaller craft, were 'to remain at home for the
security of the Channel.' ' This appears to be little more
than the vague defensive strategy of the Elizabethan
Government which Drake had tried so hard to break
1 • The answer to Count Wratislaw's proposal,' April 19, 170*, AO.
Admiralty, 10.
* Rooke's Journal, p. 144, January 10, 1702. Sot also ibid. p. S5S,
where the plan appears in detail, but under date by error Jan ua ry 10, 1708.
Digitized by
Google
202 THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 1702
/
down.' William's genius had left it far behind. His
extraordinary capacity for seeing the vast theatre as a
whole fixed his eyes on Cadiz. His unerring judgment,
no less than his experience during the late war, showed
it to him as the first strategical point to make, and there
in its spacious roadstead, and amidst its well-defended
dockyards, he saw the true position for his naval base.
All its manifold significance was clear to him. Its
possession would give him the command of the Straits
and the West Indian trade ; it would enable him to cut
in two the naval position of France, and at the same time
would open a door for military and political action at the
point most distant from Louis's base, and draw into his
own system the life-blood of Spain.
Booke's instructions leave little doubt as to which of
these considerations was uppermost in William's mind.
The true object of the expedition to Cadiz, with which
the war opened, has been generally missed. It has been
assumed that it meant no more than the similar expeditions
that had preceded it in Elizabethan and Stuart times —
that it was in fact, like them, aimed primarily at % the
American trade and colonies, and intended secondarily
as a diversion. Its main object, however, was certainly
the command of the Straits— a first step to the develop-
ment of a true Mediterranean policy. This is clear from
the instructions which Kooke received when war was
actually declared. It was not, unfortunately, by the
King's hand that they were delivered. William was dead,
and Anne reigned in his stead. Still all had been settled
beforehand. The only difference was that the change
of the crown and a consequent change in the Admiralty
led to delays that were irreparable. War was declared
through the fleet on May 4. A fortnight later Prince
George of Denmark, the Queen's consort, was made Lord
/
Digitized by
Google
1702 CADIZ OR GIBRALTAR 203
High Admiral and Booke Vice-Admiral of England, and
it was not till June 7 that he received his official instruc-
tions. With the military force that was to accompany
him he was first to endeavour to surprise and capture
Cadiz. ' But in case it shall appear/ they continue, ' upon
your arrival at Cadiz, that there is such a considerable
garrison of disciplined troops in the town and such a
squadron of ships in the bay or harbour as may render
the attempt impracticable, you are then to proceed to
Gibraltar, or take on your way home Vigo, Ponta Vedra,
Coruiia, or any other place belonging to Spain or France
as shall be judged proper by a council of war/ He was
further authorised to assist the military commander in
holding any captured place that was tenable, and leave
there a sufficient squadron. The main idea became still
clearer in the additional secret instructions which were
to be communicated to no one but the Duke of Ormonde
who was in command of the troops, and not even to him,
as they say, ' till after the success of your undertaking
at Cadiz or Gibraltar is known/ Then, and not till then,
he was to detach a squadron and two thousand troops to *
the West Indies. 1
These instructions must be carefully noted. It is
apparently from having missed thcin that the highest
authorities have been led to an entire misconception of
William's strategy. _It is almost universally said that his
main Object was the capture of the Spanish American
colonies ; that it was with this object he meant to begin
by attacking Cadiz, the headquarters of the Armada
of the Ocean ; and that it was only by accident that the
main action of the fleet was eventually in the Mediter-
ranean. In the third year of the war, as a consequence
of the adhesion of Portugal to the alliance, the Arch-
1 Home Office, Admiralty, xiiL S.
Digitized by
Google
204 TI1E SPANISH SUCCESSION 1702
dake Charles resolved to land at Lisbon, and thence,
with the support of the Portuguese and the maritime
powers, to enforce his claim by an invasion of Spain. But
for this, so it is generally asserted, the allied fleets would
have been primarily occupied with the West Indies.
Booke's orders, following in the direct line of William's
previous naval action and his recent diplomacy, show
clearly that this was not the intention. They show that,
from the first, action against the West Indies was to be
secondary, and that the main action of the fleet was
to be directed to the dislocation of the enemy's sea power
at its origin by seizing the command of the Straits and
controlling the Mediterranean. That William could con-
ceive a plan of action so advanced, and Marlborough
develop it as he did, entitle them both to rank as high
among naval strategists as they do in their own special art.
That Booke was authorised, if neither Cadiz nor
Gibraltar could be had, to attempt one of the more
northerly ports in no way detracts from the clearness
of the conception. The meaning of this was that Louis,
in his eagerness to secure his position in the Spanish seas,
had succeeded in making a treaty with Portugal by which
the ships of the allies were to be excluded from its ports.
Lisbon could not be used as an advanced British base as
it had been formerly, 'and it was therefore necessary, as
a step to further action in the Mediterranean, to secure
another port as near to the Straits as might be. Booke's
alternative orders, therefore, only confirm the determina-
tion to make the Spanish seas the centre of British naval
action.
If any doubt were left, it would be removed by the
instructions of the next two years, which, as we shall see,
are based on the fixed idea of the main fleet acting within
the Struts, before ever the Archduke was landed in
Digitized by
Google
1703 MARLBOKOUGII AND TOULON 205
Lisbon. Even then the intention of the British Govern-
ment was to use the main fleet to secure for the allies
the invaluable lines of Mediterranean communication, to
support the war in Italy, to establish there a base for an
invasion of south-eastern France, and so to cut Louis
off from the sea from which he drew the bulk of his
extraneous resources. From the first it was recognised
that Toulon was ' the key of the situation/ and, at least
in Marlborough's mind, every movement of the fleet was
but a step to this goal. From his place in the House of
Lords years afterwards, when the conduct of the war in
Spain was under inquiry, he put the matter beyond doubt.
4 My Lords/ said he, ' I had the honour of the Queen's
command to treat with the Duke of Savoy about an
attempt upon Toulon, which her Majesty from the
beginning of this war had looked on as one of the most
effectual means to finish it. Spain did not enter into the
design. The war there was to be managed on its own
bottom.' In other words, the invasion of Spain was, from
the naval and military point of view, a mere diversion
which political exigencies rendered desirable. It was the
command of the Mediterranean that was the real object,'
and Toulon the ultimate objective ; and so far from the
presence of the Archduke in Spain determining the action
of the fleet, the truth is from first to last it did nothing
but hamper and spoil it.
Digitized by
Google
CHAPTER XXIX
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1702
Otctcg to various causes of delay, not the least of which
was the ill-advised destruction of William's standing
army, it was past midsummer before the expedition was
ready to sail. But, vexing as was the difficulty of
procuring troops in time, there came from it a priceless
boon. For it was at this time the famous corps of
Royal Marines was permanently established with the
view of providing the fleet with a landing force that
should be always available. Experience had shown how
limited was the potentiality of a fleet that had no such
extension of its arm. We have seen how Cromwell's
design on Gibraltar had to be abandoned for want of
such a force, and the events of the coming war were to
prove its value up to the hilt and lay the foundations of
a regimental reputation unsurpassed in the history of
warfare. Attempts to solve the problem may be traced
back through the • Maritime Regiments ' of Restoration
times to the • Sea Regiments ' in the Elizabethan
fleets. The idea took more definite shape when at
the end of 1689 William III. had raised his First
and 8econd Regiments of Marines. But even these
were intended quite as much to supply the dearth of
seamen as to create a landing force. Burchett assures
us that one of the principal motives in raising them was
that they should be a nursery for seamen, and so soon
Digitized by
Google
1089 ORIGIN OF THE MARINES 207
as a marine could qualify as a foremast hand he was
passed to the ship's books and his place in the regiment
filled up with a recruit. 1 Burchett really understates
the case. From the numerous orders issued for the
regulation of the new force, and the controversy to which
it gave rise in the press, it is clear that it was based on
the marine regiments of Colbert. The main idea, as in
France, was to provide a standing force of trained and
disciplined men who would be at hand as a jracleus for
mobilisation at any moment while seamen were being
collected, and who would give a better tone to the crews.
To this end two three-battalion regiments, each three
thousand strong, were to be raised. Half were always
to serve with the fleet and half ashore alternately. While
ashore they were to be trained as soldiers and employed
in the dockyards as riggers and labourers, so as to be
available for equipping and transporting ships at any
sudden call. Afloat they were to be trained not only in
musketry, but as seamen and gunners. It is evident
that no mere landing force was intended, but rather an
anticipation of our present system of continuous service
which was not established till the eve of the Crimean
War.
Well meant as the scheme was, we can see it was too
military in conception to be an entire success. It is true
it had saved the situation when Russell was at Cadiz and
the men had done well ; but the organisation was faulty
and led to much abuse. In spite of several prohibitions,
numbers of sea-officers obtained commissions concur-
rently with their ordinary ones, and for this and other
reasons the force fell into confusion and dwindled. At the
end of the war an attempt was made to reorganise it in
four regiments, but the suspicious antipathy to a standing
1 Naval History, book t. chap. U.
Digitized by
Google
208 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1702 1702
army was growing irresistible, and the defenders of the
force were not able to show a good enough record to
overcome it. The new regiments were actually raised,
but the hostility only increased, and in 1699 they were
swept away in the short-sighted policy that deprived
William of his army. 1
William's attempt, it will be seen, was really aimed
at providing the navy with a backbone of men trained as
the bluejacket is to-day, rather than at creating a true
marine force as it was afterwards understood. But
whether or not such an achievement was possible in
those days, the difficulty of getting troops at a pinch
for Booke's fleet abundantly emphasised the importance
of a standing military force to act with the navy. No
less than six regiments were raised, but they were put on
a different footing from their predecessors. There was
no longer any idea of their being a nursery for seamen,
and the men were not allowed to pass into the working
crews of the ship. They were to be and remain a purely
military force paid out of the navy vote, and under the
command of the Admiralty. We may well believe that
one of the principal motives this time was to elude the
rooted objection to a standing army, which Parliament
had lately so unhappily displayed, by making the new
regiments part of their beloved navy. But, however
this may be, the Marines rapidly, as we shall see, asserted
their own intrinsic value apart from any constitutional or
political consideration. As Burchett wrote, when they
1 Major Edge, History of tlte Royal Marine Forces. The author rejects
the idea that WiDiam'a marine regiments were raised as a nursery for sea-
men, baring, in spite of his exhaustive research, missed Burchett's direct
statement on the point. The official and pamphlet evidence that he has
collected gives abundant proof that Burchett was not mistaken. For
further evidence of the political antipathy to the Marines, see •A Seaman's
Opinion of a Standing Army in England,* January 1699, in the Collection
cfSimU Trncfc, temp, William III., u\ 684.
Digitized by
Google
1702 OBSTRUCTIVE ATTITUDE OF ROOKE 209
had been well proved, ' experience hath shown that these
regiments have been very useful, but more especially
upon fitting out squadrons of ships for any immediate
expedition ; for as they are constantly quartered, when
not at sea, as near the principal ports as possible, namely,
Plymouth, Portsmouth, and Chatham, so were they
with great facility put on board such ships as had most
occasion for them, for they were under the immediate
direction of the Admiralty.' It was not too much to say ;
for to their readiness and to the rapidity and length of
stroke which they gave the fleet were due the two
achievements which established England in the Medi-
terranean.
Had they been in existence at the beginning of the
war there might have been a different tale to tell. Much
obstruction and delay must at any rate have been got
rid of, which spoiled the British initiative. Most of it
came from Rooke himself. As the season advanced, his
old anxieties recurred, and he began to fight shy of
taking the fleet so far as Cadiz. 'I must repeat my
opinion/ he wrote to Prince George on June l f « that no
service can balance the hazard of bringing our great
ships home in the winter ; ' and he added that, as it was,
1 the expedition was pretty much to pieces to execute
this great design/ It is clear from his letters at this
time that he wished nothing better than that it should
remain ' in pieces ' till it was too late to sail for the
Straits. 1 The whole plan of campaign was opposed to
the views he had expressed. It was Marlborough's, not
his, and already he was finding himself displaced in the
naval councils of the nation by Marlborough's brother,
George Churchill, who was installed at the Admiralty
w the Prince Consort's right-hand man. From the first
1 H.O. Admiralty, xi.
VOL. II. p
Digitized by
Google
210 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1702 Jvxr
therefore he 6et himself in sullen opposition to the
official scheme. ' Booke,' says Burnet, ' spoke so coldly
of the design he went upon before he sailed, that those
-who conversed with him were apt to infer that he
intended to do the enemy as little harm as possible.'
The worthy Bishop had always an ill word for Booke, and
his caustic comment must be received with discretion.
Still, there is no doubt Booke was not quite loyal to his
orders, and that he did everything he could to get his
own plan of campaign substituted for that which Marl-
borough had received from William.
As it happened, an alternative presented itself.
Earlier in the year Sir John Munden had been sent out
to prevent a French squadron from Bochelle reaching
Corona, where the outgoing flota was awaiting its
escort to Mexico. He had failed, and the two fleets had
got together into Coruna. Kooke's council of war
therefore decided that their best course was first to
direct the force against that place, and endeavour, by
combined land and sea operations, to destroy the fleets
where they lay. If, on their arrival, they found them
gone, they would then consider Cadiz. This plan,
which, as being directed against an important fleet of
the enemy, was sound enough, received the sanction of
the Government ; but at the same time Booke was told
that his former instructions were to stand, and that as
for his anxiety about his great ships he was to run the
risk of getting them home in the storm months rather
than give up Cadiz, or, if that could not be done, he could
leave them behind in any port he took, and stores should
be sent out to refit them. 1
1 Hedges to Booke, Jane 17, 1702, and • Further Instructions,' July 13
{BatUm-Finch Papert, Add. II SS. 210501), where most of the orders and
> relating to this campaign are collected.
Digitized by
Google
July CLOUDESLEY SHOVELL ON NUMBERS 211
An advanced squadron of twenty-two of the line, or
nearly half the fleet, was sent forward under Sir Stafford
Fairborne, son of the famous Governor of Tangier, to
blockade Corona till the main fleet arrived. This was
Rooke'8 first step towards getting his own way ; and as
Marlborough was absent, fighting in the Low Countries,
the admiral's plausible views were difficult to resist. His
next move, as July came and the expedition was still at its
moorings, was to induce Van Almonde, the Dutch admiral,
to write to his Government impressing upon them the
risk of carrying out the original programme. 1 He was
further backed by Shoyell, to whom was committed the
task of blockading Brest and guarding the Channel in the
absence of the main fleet. He complained that thirty
ships of the line was a force inadequate for the purpose.
The words of his protest are worth recordings c The mis-,
fortune and vice of our country/ he wrote to the Earl of
Nottingham 'is to believe ourselves better than other
men, which I take to be the reason that generally we send
too small a force to execute our designs ; but experience
has taught me that, when men are equally inured and
disciplined, in war/Tas, without a miracle, numbers that
gain "the victory. For both in fleets, squadrons, and
single ships of nearly equal force, by the time one is beaten
and ready to retreat, the other is also beaten and glad his
enemy has left him. To fight, beat, and chase an enemy
of the same strength I have sometimes seen, but have
rarely seen at sea any victory worth the boasting, when
the strength has been near equal. 99 It was sound
sense enough, and especially for the ears of a minister ; but
fortunately it was a doctrine which British admirals have
1 Rookc's Journal, July 13, 1703.
* Home Office, Admiralty, iL, July 19,1702. H« repeats thett riewi <*
July 38, ibid.
Digitized by
Google
212 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1702 July
been wont to honour more in the breach than the
observance.
These protests and complaints were also supported by
Iiord Pembroke in his last words as Lord High Admiral
before he resigned in favour of the Prince Consort. 1 For-
tunately Churchill's growing influence over the easy-
going Prince was strong and firm enough not to let Booke
off altogether. Though he was released from the neces-
sity of attempting Gibraltar, he was held to Cadiz with
{he more northerly ports as alternatives if the place
were found impracticable. So far from relenting, the
Government had new reasons for holding him to their
plan.
Owing to the demonstration which William III. had
made with Benbow's and Munden's squadrons before the
war broke out, it was two years since a Plate fleet had
come home, and so great was the consequent financial
stress in Spain that early in the year ChAteau-Renault
with twenty-three of the Brest squadron had gone out
to the West Indies to fetch it. 9 On July 14 news was
received from Benbow, who was in the West Indies,
that Ch&teau-B6nault with his priceless charge was about
to sail for Europe. Both in England and France it was
expected he would make for a French port, and from this
moment the British Government became preoccupied with
the determination to prevent the vast treasure falling
into Louis's hands. It was decided that Shovell with
an increased force should take up a station from which
he could cover Brest, Bochefort, and Port Louis, and the
1 See hii protest against the Mediterranean policj, H.O. Admiralty, xi.
and xvL, May 20, 1702.
■ Dnre, Armada Espahola, vol. vi. eap. ii. and Appendix, Dieaetre en
fioa. For Shorell's and Byng's movements see Memoirs of Torrington,
p. 90s* a*. 8ee also Booke'e Journal and Life of Copt. Stephen Martin
(Jfevy Beeorde Sec), and Onerin, iv. 119 et eeq.
Digitized by
Google
July THE PLATE FLEET 213
immediate importance of Rooke's fleet was that he should
close Cadiz and the adjacent ports, and so head Ch&teau-
Rinault into Shovell's arms.
It was this consideration, so far as we can judge,
rather than Booke's opposition that modified the original
plan of campaign. His objections were met one after
another with determined astuteness. As he continued to
grumble about the safety of his three-deckers, Shovell was
told to proceed westward immediately, and if he could
come up with Booke before he sailed he was to relieve
him of his largest ships and give him in exchange an
equivalent number of third rates. In this way the ground
was cut from under Booke, and at the same time Shovell's
request for an increase of force would be met. But it was
a solution of the situation that was little to Booke's
mind, and, finding himself outmanoeuvred, he got away
to sea before Shovell could reach him. It was all the
Government required, and they contented themselves
by sending orders after him, that, so soon as he had
carried out his instructions, he could return home,
leaving Shovell reinforced with ten or twelve of his best
ships to intercept Ch&teau-B&iault if he had not already
arrived. 1
With these orders Booke cleared the Channel on
July 25, leaving Shovell, as we have seen, to lament his
inadequate force. Booke's fleet, including the Dutch con-
tingent and Fairborne's squadron that was ahead of him,
numbered fifty of the line, some ten frigates, about twenty
bombs and fire-ships, and no less than seven hospital ships.
Besides these there were fifty transports, and the whole
fleet, with ordnance and store ships, amounted to nearly two
1 Hatton-Finch Paper$, Add. MSS. 89591, when are collected all the
orders Ac. relating to the intercepting of the Plate fleet See alio Rooks'*
Journal, July 94, p. 170, and H.O. Admiralty, xili. 89, July 90.
Digitized by
Google
214 TJIE CAMPAIGN OF 1702 August
hundred sail. 1 Off Finisterre he ascertained that Coruna
was empty. The birds had flown before Fairhorne's
squadron could arrive to shut them in, and, after spending
some time in finding him, Booke held on for Cadiz. His
information assured him that it was strongly garrisoned—
too strongly at least to be taken by a coup de main. But
instead of leaving it alone, as their instructions directed,
Ormonde and the Council of War decided to land
and occupy the neighbouring port towns, and so reduce
it by degrees. A landing was accordingly effected at Rota,
on the opposite side of the bay, -but not till August 15,
three days after they had appeared before the place.
Had the whole force been under one capable and re-
solute hand, there was still no reason why Cadiz should not
have been taken and held. But with the divided and
inefficient counsels that disturbed the expedition success
was impossible. Ormonde had neither the experience nor
the character to hold it together. His second in command,
Belasyse, was no better. Booke, who disapproved the
whole affair and was unwell, had taken to his bed as soon
as he had cleared the Channel, and was concerned for
nothing but getting his fleet safely home again.* Not
only did soldier pull against sailor, but there was no agree-
ment either in the army or the fleet, nor between the
Dutch and the English. To make matters worse, the
most capable man in the force was the representative of
the Emperor, Prince George of Hesse Darmstadt, whose
mission was political. As Governor of Catalonia during
the late war he had endeared himself to the people and
. the heart and soul of their resistance to the French
• Journal, 160, S48. It is interesting to note that, before sailing, Book*
I to No tting h a m again st his small force of frigates being further
• far/ he said, • we have fower cruisers than any fleet of this eon-
ever had.* S.O. Admiralty, xi., June 16, 1702.
* See p. 315, note.
Digitized by
Google
August THE CADIZ FIASCO 215
after Russell had been compelled to abandon them.
Under Bourbon influence he had been removed, and at
the outbreak of the new war he had been sent forward to
Lisbon to endeavour to persuade Portugal to desert the
French and accede to the Grand Alliance. From that
port, before he had achieved any success, he had joined
the fleet, and was now bent on preventing any action
which might alienate the Spaniards from the Hapsburg
cause.
This, unhappily, it was out of his power to prevent.
Aimless and undisciplined operations about Port St. Mary
and the neighbouring suburbs of Cadiz ensued, in which
the army demoralised itself by plunder and drink and
destroyed all hope of Spanish co-operation. Though
Fairborne, full of his father's spirit, was always ready
with some vigorous design for supporting Ormonde's pro-
posals, he could not overcome the dead weight of Booke's
inertia, and the army could never get adequate support
from the fleet. Whether from pique or because he was
really ill, the admiral was still in bed, and indeed he
remained there almost continually throughout the ope-
rations before Cadiz. Vice- Admiral Hopsonn, his second
in command, who had to write his despatches for him,
said he had gout in the hand and a touch of fever, and
was ' extremely ill/ • In three weeks' time things bad
come to such a pass that it was resolved to burn the
Spanish magazines which they had captured and re-embark
the troops. Hopsonn began to despair of taking the
place. It was too late for the fleet to attend a regular
siege. ' A vigorous and severe bombardment/ he said, was,
the only chance. The soldiers were of the same opinion,
1 Hopsonn's despatch, August 20, Add. MSS. 29691. This is eon-
firmed by a despatch of Van Almonde's to the States General, De *
iv. ii. 218.
Digitized by
Google
210 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1702 August
and this method it was resolved to try. But here the
Prince of Hesse stepped in. A bombardment of the first
port in Spain was not calculated to increase the popularity
of the HapsburgB with the Spaniards, and Booke found a
technical excuse for abandoning the project.
There was then no thought but of home. In vain the
Prince of Hesse urged them to winter in some Spanish
port, and told them the Hapsburg cause was lost if they
retired without effecting anything. He suggested the ports
named in Booke's commission, but Booke got an opinion
from his pilots against them all. He suggested a port
within the Straits near Alicante, whence he promised ho
could raise the whole of Valencia, Aragon, and Catalonia
against the Bourbons. Rooke's last instructions forbade
him going south of Cadiz. The Prince told him plainly
that he knew he had not been in earnest from the first,
and all along had only been seeking an excuse to return.
Booke was unmoved, and a few days later his Council
of War decided to go home in spite of the protests of
Ormonde and the Dutch general.
So lame a conclusion was the last thing the home
Government expected. The country was rejoicing over
Marlborough's successes in the Low Countries and Eugene's
hard-won victory in Italy. The capture of Cadiz — the
easiest of the three main operations of the campaign —
was regarded as a foregone conclusion. A week after the
troops had landed the good news from Flanders was sent
out to Booke, and with it fresh orders for his further move-
ments. It is these orders that leave no doubt as to the
lines on which the war had been designed. In the despatch
which brought them the Government makes a last effort
to get the stubborn admiral to understand the true object
of their eagerness to get hold of Cadiz. Their chief in-
centive was not political, but naval. As in the last War,
Digitized by
Google
August ROOKE'S NEW ORDERS 217
Cadiz was to be made a base from which to control the
Mediterranean and the military operations upon its
shores. He was informed that a small French squadron
under Forbin was harassing Prince Eugene's communi-
cation and interrupting the passage of his supplies in the
Gulf of Venice. It was believed that the Comte de
Toulouse, who was in command at Toulon, intended to
join him for more serious operations, and Booke was told
that, so soon as Cadiz was in the hands of the allies, he
was to detach a squadron of eighteen or twenty sail to
the Adriatic to parry the French move. Toulouse, the
Government had ascertained, had about ten ships and
six galleys, and Forbin three frigates and two fire-ships.
But this was not all, or nearly all. Marlborough,
regarding the fall of Cadiz as a practical certainty, was
already at work preparing his further blow at the heart
of the French Mediterranean power, and in the new
orders is the first indication of what was in the wind.
Cadiz was but a stepping-stone to Toulon, and Booke,
without any explanation, was quietly informed that he
need not run the risk of bringing home his great ships
before winter. The Queen intended in the next year
to have a much larger fleet in the Mediterranean, and
that he was therefore to refit as many ships as possible
in the Cadiz yards in readiness for the next campaign. 1
In all this we may trace with certainty Marlborough's
hand. Sir David Mitchell, Russell's old flag captain and
his second in command in the Mediterranean, who was
now on the Lord Admiral's Council and represented in
politics all that was antagonistic to Booke, was over in
Holland negotiating with the States for further naval
co-operation, and Marlborough, in the midst of his arduous
1 H.O. Admiralty, ziii. 58, Augtut 91, 1703, and Add. U83. 39*92,
tame date.
Digitized by
Google
218 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1702 Saw
campaign, was guiding his hand. 1 Marlborough's unfailing
readiness to assist his great rival, Eugene, is one of the
brightest features in his character ; but in this case it was
not to be. Unless Cadiz fell, the expedition to the Adriatic
was impossible. About a month later, after Hopsonn's
despatch had been received with its unsatisfactory account
of the admiral's health and the state of the operations,
the Government resigned themselves to their disappoint-
ment and wrote patiently to both Booke and Ormonde,
bidding them, as they were not likely to succeed at Cadiz,
to try something else. 2
The truth is that at this time they were more than
ever absorbed in their anxiety to intercept Chateau-Renault.
The old hankering after the treasure fleet in fact was
beginning to distort their strategical aims as seriously as
it had done those of the Elizabethans. All August intelli-
gence of the French admiral's movements had been coming
in, and it was immediately sent off to both Booke and
Shovell. Shovel!, after his complaint, had been rein-
forced, and for the moment Cadiz was not the first con-
sideration. The last intelligence received by the home
Government assured them that Chateau-Renault was after
all going to try to get into Cadiz and not Brest. The
main consideration therefore was to keep Booke on the
Spanish coast. The information was hurried off to him,
and at the same time Shovell was given authority to
stretch down as far as Finisterre to bar the way to Coruna.
Soon after writing their indulgent despatch, however,
it would seem that something occurred to brace the
Government back to their original high intention, and that
at the same time they received some intimation that the
1 Marlborough to Mitchell, August 14, 1702, Dnpotclta, J. 18. The
letter refers mainly to a West' Indian expedition, bat that was not
Kitchen's main business. See Marlborough to Nottingham, ibid. p. 8.
• EJO. Admiralty, ziii. and Add. M8S. 20591, September 10, 1702.
Digitized by
Google
Sept. ROOKE TAKEN TO TASK 219
real cause of the failure at Cadiz, as they had too much
reason to expect, was Rooke's obstinate refusal to give to
Ormonde the support that he had the right to demand.
At all events their note changed, and a week later they
sent him still more unwelcome orders, which were indeed
not far removed from a reprimand. He was told that
the Government regarded the occupation of Cadiz as a
matter of the highest importance. Instead of coming
home, therefore, he was to continue to support the
operations of the troops and to remain out till further
orders, or until the land officers agreed that further
operations were useless. When the great ships could no
longer keep the sea he was to send them into Lisbon and
winter them there. 1
Here then we have a firm determination of the
Government, in spite of their preoccupation, to hold Rooke
to the original plan of campaign, or in other words to the
Mediterranean. They were beginning to lose hope of
the Plate fleet. Since it had been so long in appearing
they feared it must be already somewhere safe in harbour.
Moreover, the effect of the fleet's being off Cadiz so long
without any sign of opposition from France was that the
attitude of Portugal was becoming more favourable and
the prospects of the Mediterranean looked more rosy.
But already, as the sharp despatch was being penned,
Rooke was in the act of abandoning his position ; nor,
when the proposal to winter in Lisbon reached him direct
from Methuen, the British Ambassador to Portugal,
did it have any effect. For some time past it was known
in the fleet that its presence had caused the Portuguese
1 Add. MSS. 39591 {Hatton-FincJi Papers), September 14 and 84. Alio
H.O. Admiralty, xiii. At this point there is unfortunately a gap in this
Entry Book, bnt the Haiton- Finch Paper* to some extent continue the series
of despatches.
Digitized by
Google .
220 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1702 . Skpt.
King to back out of his engagement to France, though
as yet he hesitated to throw in his lot with the allies.
Methuen believed that it only required a squadron to
winter in the Tagus and other Portuguese ports to make
him take the plunge, and a despatch hinting this reached
Booke on September 21 as the fleet rendezvoused off
Lagos on the south co^st of Portugal for the homeward
voyage.
Methuen had arranged to communicate with Booke
through the British consul at Faro, and as the fleet
passed it a Dutch cruiser was sent in to bring off de-
spatches. In view of what afterwards occurred this
becomes highly important. On receipt of Methuen's
suggestion a council of war was summoned, but it decided
that his proposal was too vague to act on, and that there
was no time to wait for a more definite explanation. The
decision, it would seem, was taken by a bare majority, for
Ormonde, Hesse, and the Dutch generally continued to
support the idea so warmly that a fresh council was called.
It was only to endorse Booke's determination. Whatever
chance of Portuguese support, it was argued, there may
have been when Methuen wrote, the whole situation was
changed by the failure at Cadiz, and Portugal could no
longer be trusted. In accordance, therefore, with the
original instructions, six of the line and a dozen transports
with three thousand men were detached to the West
Indies, and Booke was soon speeding northward, ignorant
that before him lay an exploit which was to retrieve his
reputation and finally place Portugal at the disposition
of the allies.
What had happened was this. Having evaded Benbow
in the West Indies, Ch&teau-B6nault and his priceless
charge had reached the Azores in safety. There he had
received information of the British movements to inter-
Digitized by
Google
Skit. THE PLATE FLEET IN VIGO Ml
cept him, and had done his best to persuade his Spanish
colleagues to seek safety in Brest or some other French
port. To so insidious a proposal they absolutely refused
to listen, and the only thing for Ch&teau-R£nault to do
was to try a dash through the enemy's cruisers. St
Vincent and Finisterre were the points of danger. There
the English had been wont to lie on such occasions ever
since the days of Elizabeth. Vigo lay midway between
them. To Vigo therefore it was decided to go, and there
on September 11 Ch&teau-B£nault arrived, having cleverly
slipped in unobserved between Rooke and Shovell.
For this Rooke both then and since has always been
severely blamed. He is accused of wholly neglecting the
treasure fleet and of taking no steps to get intelligence
of it, and by no one more acrimoniously than by Methuen
himself. But, however badly Rooke behaved during
the campaign, this charge is one that cannot be upheld.
As we have seen, he duly sent into Faro and received
Methuen's labt despatch. Although the Plate fleet had
been in Vigo five days when he wrote it, it contained no
mention of it, except a rumour that Chateau-Renault was
expected — a rumour which Methuen himself clearly did not
believe. 1 Rooke also, before passing St. Vincent, sent three
cruisers with the home transports into Lagos to water, and
later on three more into Lisbon to bring Methuen back to
England. It is true these detachments were apparently to
make their own way home, but it is clear that, if Methuen
had any news, he had abundant opportunity of sending it.
Meanwhile, on the 18th, the ambassador had heard
of Chateau-Renault's arrival at Vigo and was sending
messenger after messenger to the coast. The first one
reached the British consul at Faro late on the night of
the 22nd. The fleet had just passed westward out of
1 RooWi Journal, pp. 317, 231.
Digitized by
Google
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1702 Swrr.
sight, and while the council of war were deciding to
continue the homeward voyage the consul in person was
pursuing Kooke in a hired boat. In spite of his efforts
he failed to find the fleet and had to return dis-
comfited. It so happened, however, that Methuen's
messenger, a certain Don Josef Cisneros, who was also
carrying despatches from the Imperial ambassador to the
Prince of Hesse, was on his own account pursuing the
fleet by land along the coast. At Lagos he found the
horse transports still watering, and fell in with some of
the officers of the ' Pembroke,' one of the escorting frigates.
By the help of their chaplain they quickly ascertained his
news and carried him on board to their commander, Captain
Hardy. The glorious news was promptly communicated
to the commodore, Captain Wishart, and be at once took
the responsibility of sending off the * Pembroke ' to catch
the fleet. 1 It was a hard chase. The weather proved
very bad — so bad indeed was it that the cruisers which
put into the Tagus with Rooke's letters, showing he
had not received the news, could not put to sea again,
in spite of Methuen's urgent orders, and he despaired of
catching the fleet before it left the coast. Unknown to
him, however, there was yet another chance. The news
had already reached London, and orders were being sent
off far and wide in eight duplicates, directing Booke and
Shovell to concert measures for the destruction of Ch Ateau-
Benaolt wherever they found him, either at sea or in
Vigo.* All was over before they came to hand. But
■ with all these strings in play it is clear that it was by no
mere chance, as it is always said, that Ch&teau-B£nault
1 HaUou-Finch Papers {Mclhuen Correspatukncc), Add. M88. 39590, cap.
1. 133, 137, 151, and Methuen's despatch of October 5. For the chaplain's
stay see Z*f tarri, ii. 753, u. ,.
* Add. USS. 39591, October 4 and 17; Admiralty, Secretary's Out-
LcUtn, 39, October 5, 17, 30.
Digitized by
Google
Oct. HESITATION TO ATTACK 223
was caught. The Admiralty, Methuen, Shovell, and
Rooke between them had taken steps which made his
escape practically impossible.
Still Rooke had already reached as high as the
extreme north of Portugal, close to Shovell's new station,
before Hardy overtook him, and even then so fool was
the weather that it was twelve hours before he could
communicate his news to the admiral. At the time
Rooke had his few remaining cruisers spread before him
in a way that very probably would have got him the
intelligence independently. So soon as he heard Hardy's
report he called them in and formed a chain to connect
him with Vigo and signal him a confirmation of Hardy's
intelligence. The whole fleet then stood in after them,
and the following day, when the weather had abated, he
called a council of flag-officers. The question of attacking
Chateau-Renault where he lay appears to have met with
considerable opposition. The danger of risking a great
fleet so late in the season on that wild coast was insisted on,
and some, it would seem, were in favour of still continuing
their homeward voyage, since they regarded the treasure
fleet as now beyond their reach. Eventually, however,
the more vigorous men prevailed, and, without consulting
the military officers, it was decided to attack forthwith. 1
As they approached Vigo they fell in with Captain
George Byng, who had lately reinforced Shovell with a
small division. From him they heard that the Channel
1 This view of what occurred is mainly on Dutch authority. Their
tradition is that the decision to attack was due to the resolute attitude of
Van Almonde in opposition to Rooke 'as well as most of the English and
Dutch flag-oflicers.' 8ee De Jonge, iv. ii. 221 and note. In Torringtom?*
Memoirs is also mentioned a report that Books was not in favour of attack*
ing. Burnet says • Books turned his course towards Vigo very unwillingly,
as was said.' But neither of these authorities can be trusted in any state-
ment derogatory to Booke. It may however be true, for be still thought
himself too ill to leave his cabin.
Digitized by
Google
224 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1702 Oct.
squadron had reached its new station and was cruising not
far to the westward, and Rooke resolved to call Shovell to
his aid. In vain Byng begged to be allowed to stay and
share the feast. To his intense disgust Rooke would not
listen, and he had to carry the summons to his admiral.
Still there was no thought of waiting till Shovell joined.
The doomed fleet was found in the inmost recesses of the
gulf, protected by a powerful boom and fort, and the
vessels well arranged for a concentrated fire. The risk
of attacking in waters so confined was enough to have
staggered the stoutest hearts, but they did not flinch.
To Vice- Admiral Hopsonn was committed the honour of
leading the assault, while Rooke again took to his bed,
and there Byng found him when he returned in the
height of the action.
As the ships advanced they were forced to anchor pre-
maturely for want of a breeze. The troops were never-
theless landed, and luckily before they could reach the
batteries a fair wind sprang up. Hopsonn promptly cut his
cable and, with a press of 6ail, charged the boom. Under
hi6 great impetus it broke, but, before his supporting ships
could follow, the breeze died away, and Hopsonn was left
alone anchored within the boom between two French ships
of the line. For awhile his situation was in the highest
degree critical, but he fought on desperately till the breeze
returned, and one by one his consorts, Dutch and English,
hacked or forced their way through. At the same moment
the troops carried the batteries ; and then, as Captain
Stephen Martin says, ' for some time there was nothing
to be heard or seen but cannonading, burning, men and
guns flying in the air, and altogether the most lively
scene of horror and confusion that can be imagined/
All the afternoon the work of destruction raged, and when
the son went down Chateau-Renault's fleet had ceased to
Digitized by
Google
)
Oct. ROOKE ABANDONS VIGO 225
exist. Rooke, by the prompt daring of his officers, had
gained one of the most complete victories in British naval
aunals. The French flagship and six others were burnt,
four were captured afloat, and the rest driven ashore, and
the galleons were similarly dealt with. Most of the
treasure had been sent up country, but a good deal was
saved, besides valuable merchandise.
Four days after the action Shovell came in, thirsting
but forestalled. To him Rooke handed over the command
with orders to float all he could, burn the rest, and so bring
the fleet home. In vain, at the eleventh hour, Ormonde
and Hesse returned to the charge and begged him to leave
behind an adequate squadron so that they might establish
themselves where they were for the winter, and so support
Methuen in his efforts to bring Portugal to a decision.
By sending home the victuallers and surplus stores,
Rooke had made any such project impossible, and nothing
would induce him to move from the attitude he had
taken up. There was therefore nothing to be done but
re-embark the troops. Captain Hardy for his reward was
hurried off with despatches, and the next day Rooke with
an easy conscience weighed for Spithead with sixteen
sail, including the six great ships, to whose safety in his
eyes all strategy had to subserve.
So he had his way at last. By forcing the campaign
into the shape he had desired from the first he had been
able, in accordance with his original memorandum, to
4 attempt something on the coast of Spain 9 and come
home before winter. He had seen the Government's
project for seizing the control of the Straits covered with
disaster, while his own miraculously had secured a victory
beside which the successes of even Marlborough and
Eugene looked pale.
It must not be supposed, however, that he came off
vol. n. Q
Digitized by
Google
826 THE CAMPAIGN OF 170*2 Dkc.
scot-free. On Ormonde's complaint a searching and
hostile inquiry into the admiral's conduct was held in the
House of Lords. He came out of it very badly, but his
influence in the House of Commons was too great for
him to fear a serious condemnation. With calm effrontery
he defended himself by contemptuously denouncing the
plan of campaign he had been called upon to execute
against his better judgment; and the bungling way in
which the expedition had been prepared for him made it
impossible for the ministers to meet his defence without
exposing themselves. So Ormonde was quieted with the
Lord-Lieutenancy of Ireland, and Booke whitewashed
with a seat in the Privy Council. Between the new
strategists and the old it was a drawn battle, and it re-
mained to be seen whether Marlborough would yet have
his way.
Digitized by
Google
CHAPTEB XXX
MARLBOROUGH AND THE NAVY
It was not till the end of November that Marlborough
was able to get back to London. In his last days at the
Hague he had been urging the home Government, at the
request of the Dutch, to send a squadron to secure the
Portuguese and offer to co-operate with them in capturing
Vigo or any other place they preferred. The news of
Rooke's exploit was enough to modify the pressing
necessity for such a move, and about a week after Marl-
borough came home the 'Secret Committee, 9 as it was
called, which was the Supreme Council of War or Com-
mittee of Imperial Defence, had adopted a plan of action
after his own heart.
The decision was taken early in December at a meet-
ing at which both he and Rooke were present. It will
be remembered that in the previous year the Emperor had
been given to understand that in this campaign the fleet
would co-operate with him in capturing Naples, the object
on which his heart and policy were mainly set. Accord-
ingly it was now arranged that by the beginning of
February a squadron of thirty sail, to which the Dutch
were to be asked to add twelve or fifteen more, was to
be ready to sail for the Mediterranean, and the Emperor
was to be informed that it could be at Naples by May
and remain there till the middle of July. The advan-
tages of this plan were obvious. While it would divert
French attention from Toulon, it would afford an oppor-
Q2
Digitized by
Google
223 MARLBOROUGH AND THE NAVY 1703
trinity for attacking it at the most favourable season of
the year, and in the meanwhile the Emperor would be
kept in a good temper, and the pressure upon Eugene in
the North of Italy relieved. It was only by the most
brilliant generalship and dogged determination that he
had been able to hold his own against the superior forces
of the French, and owing to the vacillating attitude of
Savoy his prospects were far from bright for the coming
campaign. Booke, it would appear, was not to conduct
a move which was so contrary to his ideas. In fact he
was probably regarded as too unwell to go to sea at all :
for it is noted in the margin of the minutes ' Sir G.
Booke will take care of the Admiralty.' 1
Why this project was not carried out we do not
exactly know, but it may well have been that, owing to
the late return of Booke's and Shovell's squadron, it was
found impossible to get sufficient vessels ready in time.
The more probable reason however is that the Emperor
found he would be unable to detach a force to co-operate
with the fleet, and this from the first had been a condition
of the British offer of assistance. Such co-operation was
now out of the question. Owing to the serious condition
of affairs in Hungary the Emperor had even found it
necessary to summon Eugene to command the operations
against the insurgents and to abandon altogether the idea
of a vigorous offensive in Italy.*
However this may be, early in the new year, 1703, the
idea of a Mediterranean squadron was considerably modi-
fied. At the end of January the ' Secret Committee '
decided the general lines of the campaign. Marlborough
was again present, together with Booke and the rest of
1 Secretary Clarke's rough minutes of the • Secret Committee/ HaUon-
JSucfr P«j*r», Add. M88. 89591, December 8, 1703.
• Test Anetb Prim Bitgen von 8avoym, L 119 tt uq.
Digitized by
Google
1703 IDEA OF A MAIN FLEET 220
the Lord Admiral's council and the Dutch admiral, Van
Almonde. The main fleet wa3 to consist of ninety-six
of the line, English and Dutch. They were to be ready
for sea by April 20 and victualled for six months. In-
case a squadron should be thought necessary for the
Mediterranean — so the minute runs — it was to be detached
from the main fleet and its strength fixed according to
the distribution of the French navy. 1 We thus see'
already established the most modern view of British naval
distribution, which had been in practical operation ever
since William had set his mark upon it. The root idea' j
was the concentration of the bulk of the navy in one
main fleet, organised so that it could act as one unit or
in two divisions, as events demanded, either in the home
waters or the Mediterranean, or in both simultaneously.
There is clearly no idea of. two. fleets — one for the
Channel and one for the Mediterranean — but from the
first it is the conception to which our naval strategy
has recurred after two centuries of experience — the con-
ception of two divisions of one homogeneous force that,
without noise or friction, can develop united action at
any point where danger or opportunity calls for special
pressure. To a modern student nothing can be more
interesting or instructive than the way the idea of the
great soldiers of that time was worked out by the seamen
who so imperfectly grasped their meaning.
In spite of the hypothetical resolution of the Com-
mittee it is clear that Marlborough clung to his idea that'
a strong Mediterranean squadron was necessary. By
March it had been fixed at twenty-four of the line,
English and Dutch ; and just before Marlborough returned
to Holland, Booke, who was better, was approached
as to taking the command. He replied, in words that •
1 Add. MSS. 20591, January 36, 170*.
Digitized by
Google
290 MARLBOROUGH AND THE NAVY 1708
clearly betray the limits of his understanding, that he was
drilling to obey the Queen's wishes, but felt it was a com-
mand ' too small for his character.' If it were the same
to her Majesty he would rather continue with the main
fleet than be separated * with so small a detachment
on a remote service.' l On receipt of this answer the
Secret Committee ordered a squadron to be made ready
immediately for Shovell's command. It was to consist
of twenty of the line, besides a Dutch contingent, with
a full proportion of hospital ships, cruisers, bombs, and
fire-ships. It was to carry a year's stores besides two
months' victuals in store ships, and further supplies of
wine and oil were to be prepared at Leghorn or
Genoa. 1
The chief and indeed the only interest that attaches
to Shovell's force is the object for which it was designed.
Though frequently modified in harmony with the changing
aspects of the great struggle, Shovell's instructions display
throug hout a high a ppreciation of the vaLue.of . a Mediter-
ranean squadron as a diplomatic and strategical asset.
As originally designed they appear to aim mainly at a
diplomatic demonstration. Shovell was to renew the
trea ties with the .Barbary states, and if possible induce
them to declare war on France. He was also to appear
at Leghorn jind force the Grand Duke of Tuscany, who
was openly leaning to the French, to pursue a more
strict neutrality. Venice was to be treated in the same
way, and while in the Adriatic he was to clear out the
French and secure the Imperial communications with
Trieste. Nor was this all. For the second time Malta,
appears within the range of British action. Shovell was
to go there, but. with what object is not clear. He himself
■ Add. MS8. 29501, March 8, 1708, f. 193.
* Ibid, March 10, 1703, C. 195.
Digitized by
Google
1703 SHOVELL'S INSTRUCTIONS 231
asked for more precise directions on the point, but, before
his orders were finally drafted, Malta for some reason was
left out of them. 1
Subsequently his instructions were cast in a more
strategic mould. Although the withdrawal of Eugene
and some of his best troops to Hungary rendered serious
operations in Italy impossible, a diversion by the
maritime powers to relieve the pressure on the Imperial
troops that had to hold the position was still highly
desirable. By no other means could they hope to resist
the French advance. Under his new orders therefore
Shovell was to take down the trade, and after seeing it
safe on its way to the Levant he was to proceed, in
accordance with the original idea, to Naples and Sicily,
and co-operate with such Imperial troops as he should
find there, and assist them with his marines. He had
also authority to attack Cadiz, Toulon, or any other place
in France or Spain, and to destroy any French maga-
zines* he might hear of about Genoa, and to protect
the Imperialist communications in the Adriatic if the
French were disturbing them, as indeed they were, very
seriously. 1 All this reads as something of a counsel of
perfection, and indeed it may only have been intended
mainly to satisfy Marlborough's demands, or to keep
the Emperor in a good humour. The instructions, at
any rate, were accompanied by a covering letter, in
which Shovell was told that, after seeing the trade safe
into the Eastern Mediterranean, he might proceed as far
as Leghorn. Having done his business there, he was to •
cruise as he thought best,. or in accordance with orders
1 Hattoii-Finch Papers, Add. MSS. 29591, f. 199; Particular* pro-
posed by Shovell, March 17, ibid.; Minute of Lord Admiral's Cooaeil for
altering Shovell's instructions, H.O. Admiralty, xilL 71, April 9S.
• H.O. Admiralty, xiii. S3, May 7.
Digitized by
Google
M2 MARLBOROUGII AND THE NAVY 1703
he might receive, until September, when he was to come
home with the returning trade. 1
Thus, when Marlborough's back was turned and he
was absorbed with his military duties in Flanders, the
Mediterranean squadron seems to sink to the old and
. narrow conception of a force primarily destined for
commerce protection. Booke had so far got his way
that he had been given command of the main fleet for
the defence of the Channel. As for offensive operations,
his orders were as old-fashioned as he could wish. Vast
as was the force at his command, all he was expected to
do was to enter the Bay of Biscay and annoy the coasts
and trade of the enemy ; and all the relief that the m&in
fleet would afford to the position of the allies in the
Mediterranean was by the demonstration possibly divert-
ing some of the French army of Italy to the coasts of
Guienne. Still, even with this easy task before him, he.
would not get to sea. Week after week he lingered at
Spithead to the exasperation of the Government. At
last* towards the end of April, on an alarm apparently
that a French squadron was passing from Toulon to
Brest, he received peremptory orders to sail. Still for a
week he clung to his moorings, protesting he was too
ill to move. Losing all patience, the Government sent
off Churchill to relieve him. It had the desired effect.
Before Churchill could reach Spithead Booke was away.
The incident did little to improve his reputation.
'Booke's health/ says Burnet in his most caustic vein,
' returned happily for him, or he thought fit to lay aside
. 4 that pretence and went to sea. 9 There can be no doubt
that Booke was one of those men whose popular reputa-
tion will sometimes remain proof against the most glaring
exhibition of incapacity and lack of understanding.
Admiralty, Secretary's Ou(.T*Uers t 80, May 8.
Digitized by
Google
1703 SIIOVKLI/S SAILING DELAYED 238
l Under his guidance the main fleet was absolutely
; wasted. All it achieved in harassing the French coasts
i and confining the Brest and other Atlantic squadrons
( could have been done with half the force, and the rest
I would have been free for action where its operations
\ would have thrown the whole of Louis's strategy into
I confusion.
That the Mediterranean squadron was not detached '
from the first fleet that was ready, as Marlborough wished,
is to be the more lamented because the interminable delays
of the Dutch in furnishing their contingent prevented
Shovell's sailing till it was far too late for him to accom-
plish anything of value. Indeed, in justice to the British
strategy, it must be said that the failure of the Dutch
to fulfil their engagements was the main cause of the
trouble. It was a source of irritation and difficulty that
was to increase with every fresh campaign, and already it
was accentuating the growing ill-feeling between the
British and Dutch flag-officers. 'Everybody/ wrote
Marlborough, 'is so much out of humour at the great
disappointment we have long laboured under for want of
their Mediterranean squadron/ '
Owing mainly to the time that had been wasted in
getting Rooke to sea, it was not till the middle of May
that Shoveirs squadron was far enough advanced for him
to hoist his flag. By that time an entire change in the
situation was believed to be at hand, which for the
moment shifted the main naval interest to a point outside
the Straits. Godolphin, the Prime Minister, was the
man most closely in Marlborough's confidence. He had
married the general's daughter and was indeed his other
self in England ; and what was actually uppermost in their
minds may be gathered from a private letter written by
1 To Stanhope, Despatch**, i. 1S8, and of. Do Jong* it. ii. S5&.
Digitized by
Google
»4 MARLBOROUGH AND THE NAVY 1703
the minister shortly afterwards to Fairborne, Shovell's
lice-admiral. He was asked for his opinion — not as to the
best means of relieving the Imperialist position — but how
best to protect trade, countenance Portugal, and at the
same time secure the British coasts. He replied with a
solid directness which shows that, if our seamen could
not quite appreciate the diplomatic and political tangle
with which the strategical problem was confused, they
at least had not forgotten the time-honoured methods of
catting the knot. Louis, with his whole combination
6haken by the defection of Portugal, and exposed to a dis-
astrous blow in the Mediterranean, was endeavouring to get
the Comte de Toulouse to sea from Toulon. All intelli-
gence, Fairborne said, pointed to a concentration of the
various French squadrons in Cadiz. His advice therefore
was that Shovell should be reinforced from forty sail to
sixty, with orders to bring the French fleet to action,
even if he had to follow it into the jaws of Toulon. 1 It
was sound and seamanlike advice, showing a lively
appreciation of the elasticity of action, which the homo-
geneous organisation of a single main fleet afforded, and
could it have been brought to effect the whole difficulties
of the position would have been solved.
But, as it happened, before the arrival of the long-
expected Dutch contingent allowed Shovell to sail, yet
another new element in the situation had arisen. In the
previous year the Protestants of the Cevennes mountains
had risen in revolt, and, owing to Louis's preoccupation
beyond his frontiers, the insurrection had reached alarming
proportions. The revolted district lay in the hill country
some forty miles north of Cette, the new port at which
the Langnedoc canal reached the sea, and stretched east-
wards towards the frontier of Savoy. As Savoy was
• Godolpki* Comspondtnc*, Add. MSS. 28055, May 80, 1708.
Digitized by
Google
1708 THE CEVENNOIS AND SAVOY 285
beginning to show a more marked inclination to throw
in her lot with the allies, the insurrection assumed a
very serious strategical aspect. It was clear that, by co-
operation from Savoy on the one side and from the sea
on the other, the Cevennes might be developed into a
barrier which would cut the French communications with
Toulon and Italy, and seriously encumber those with
Spain. It was mainly with a view of aggravating this
situation that Rooke had been sent into the Bay of
Biscay, but it was a situation that lent itself still better
for well-directed naval action in the Mediterranean. It
is no wonder therefore that when, about the time Shovell
was hoisting his flag, a Cevennois agent appeared at the
Hague and asked for assistance, the idea was warmly
taken up. 1 Co-operation upon the coast of Languedoc was
speedily arranged, and it was decided to reinforce Shovell
with five of the line from the main fleet, provided the
Dutch would agree to increase their contingent in pro-
portion. Fresh instructions were sent him, directing that
he was to make it his first business to get touch with the
Cevennois in the Gulf of Narbonne, and furnish them
with arms and munitions, and that above all he was to
get away to the Mediterranean with all possible speed in
order to convince the Duke of Savoy of the length of the
sea powers' arm, and push him to a decision. 2
Everything, it is clear to see, was still pointing to
Toulon as the ultimate objective. It was at this time that
Marlborough was endeavouring to negotiate a joint attack
upon the place with the Duke of Savoy, and nothing could
so well induce him to take the plunge as the support of
the Cevennois revolt and the appearance of an. allied
1 Stanhope to Hedges, May 18-20, 5.P. Spain, 75.
* Admiralty, Secretary's Out-Letters, 80, June 9; H.O. Admiralty, xiiL
June 16 ; Life of Leake, p. 65 ; De Jonge, it. ii. 350.
Digitized by
Google
236 MARLBOROUGH AND THE NAVY 1703
squadron on his coasts. Owing however to Rooke's failure
at Cadiz the main link in the necessary chain was still
missing ; but now arose a fresh chance of supplying it,
which produced yet another change in Shovell's orders. In
the last days of June, while he was still lying at Spithead,
definite news arrived in London that Portugal had for-
mally joined the Grand Alliance, and it was further known
that the Toulon squadron was preparing to come through
the Straits and deal her a blow while she yet lay unpro-
tected. To the Tagus therefore the centre of gravity
had for the moment definitely shifted. Seeing what
Marlborough's views were of drastic action in the Medi-
terranean, to support Portugal on the terms of the new
treaty of alliance was in his eyes a matter of vital im-
portance. So clear to him was the necessity that he
immediately offered to sacrifice his whole campaign in
the Netherlands and remain upon the defensive, if troops
could not otherwise be procured for Lisbon. It was in
anticipation of this new situation that Godolphin had
asked Fairborne's advice, and consequently, on the eve
of sailing, Shovell was told, as Fairborne had suggested,
that he was to be reinforced with eight of the line and
that his whole proceedings were to be subordinated to
the primary object of preventing the Toulon squadron
passing the Straits and bringing it to action if it did. 1
On July 1 Shovell at last put to sea. He would not
wait for his reinforcements. They were to follow him to
the Tagus under Admiral John Leake, a typical seaman
officer, who was destined to hold a place of singular dis-
tinction among the founders of the British Mediterranean
power. Having established his reputation at the relief
to Nottingham, June 14, Despatch**, I 117. Shovell's
Mil KO. Admiralty, zlli Jane 29; and cf. Torrington Memoir*,
Digitized by
Google
1703 WHAT SHOVELL ACHIEVED 237
of Londonderry by forcing the boom, he had been in
active and successful employment ever since, and had just
been promoted Vice- Admiral of the Blue. He was a man
who could be trusted not to lose time. Shovell must have
known as well as any one that he was already too late
to execute a tithe of his complicated programme, which
was still uncancelled. To follow his movements is
needless. The only result of importance that he achieved
was to deter the Toulon squadron from putting to sea. .
Louis, unable to believe that so small a part of the main
fleet was to be attached to Shovell, gave up the game
and ordered the Toulon squadron to be dismantled. The
Portuguese were thus convinced of the capacity of the
sea powers to protect them, and so far all was well.
The rest was a failure. Bound as he was to return in
September, Shovell could barely reach Leghorn before it
was time to turn homewards. What time he had was spent
in trying to overawe the Grand Duke of Tuscany. Two
vessels were also despatched to Narbonne, but the precon-
certed signals were not answered, and they failed to get
touch with the ill-fated Cevennois. A squadron too was
detached under Byng, Shovell's rear-admiral, to visit
the Barbary states ; but, though they were civil enough,
they would not commit themselves to a declaration oi
war. It was all that could be hoped for, seeing how
Shovell's hands were tied. It is true that, some two
months after, he sailed, orders were sent him to leave
behind him a squadron to clear out the Adriatic, where
the French had been playing havoc with the Imperialist
supplies ; but even if they had reached him his fleet was
too sickly for him to have been able to obey. 1 The whole
design was hopeless from the first. Indeed we are told
that when off Lisbon Shovell showed his orders to his
1 H.O. Admiralty, xiii. 95, September 0.
Digitized by
Google
238 MARLBOROUGH AND THE NAVY 1703
colleague, Van Almonde, the Dutch admiral could hardly
believe he had no others. 1 To complete the disappoint-
ments of the campaign his home-coming was marked with
one of the most terrible disasters in our naval annals. As
he lay in the Downs with his disease-stricken fleet, a
storm of unprecedented fury fell upon it. Nine ships of
the line were lost, besides four other vessels, with fifteen
hundred hands, and half the rest that were saved were
little better than wrecks.
In so appalling a visitation of Heaven his failure was
condoned. Indeed, long before he could return with his
fleet storm-torn and decimated by sickness, all interest
in his movements had been lost. The Government was
absorbed in developing its action from the new base it
had acquired in Portugal. Savoy had joined the alliance,
and already Marlborough, in concert with Eugene, was
shaping that stupendous campaign which was to raise
him to the highest rank of the great captains and for good
and all to establish England as a Mediterranean power.
One day, as Shovell lay before Leghorn truculently
showing the distracted Grand Duke how he stood between
the devil and the deep sea, far away inland men were
startled with the roar of his guns thundering over the
marshes. He had been informed by the Imperial am-
bassador that the Austrian Archduke had been proclaimed
Charles ILL, and in the heart of the Mediterranean,
for all the world to hear, the maritime powers were
saluting the Hapsburg King of Spain. Had Shovell been
* Towwmgton Memoir*, 119. Other authorities for the voyage are
Leake** Life and that of Gapt Stephen Martin (Navy Records Society).
Tan Almonde** view of it i* in De Jong©, it. ii. 249 et $eq. For the
Karbonao episode see Cfaarnoek, Biog. NavcUis, tub voce Robert Aires or
Ajres, who was in oommand. BhoreU's despatch from the Downs to
Nottingham, giving an aoconnt of his whole action, is in Add. M88. «9«91 f
tfU»Ko*smbern.
Digitized by
Google
/
1708-4 THE WAR TRANSFORMED 230
bombarding the port hi^ grins could not have spoken with
a louder voice. _It had been an essential point, in the
treaty under which Portugal entered the Grand Alliance,
that the Archduke Charles should be landed at Lisbon,
and thence, with an allied army and the fleet of England
, and Holland at his back, undertake in force the conquest
of his new kingdom. The struggle was transformed.
During the year 1703 France had shown heraelf more than
capable of holding her own against the great coalition,
but now all was changed. She was confronted with
another land war, as far as possible removed from her
base, added to those in the Netherlands, Italy, and Ger-
many. For the allies, widely as the four seats of war
were divided, all were held together and nourished by an.
overwhelming sea power, while at the same time, by the
adherence of Savoy to her enemies, France found her
own connecting link exposed to a blow from the sea
which she had no means to parry.
It was on this basis that the memorable campaign
v , of 1704 was designed— the grandest probably that up to
y. J that time had ever been conceived. Marlborough's heroic
resolve was suddenly to shift his whole force from the
Netherlands to the Danube, and so tear Bavaria from the
arms of France and fling Louis back from the Imperial
frontier. The project was still a secret even from the allies.
The objectives of the fleet were scarcely less well hidden.
In midwinter Rooke had started to carry the new King
to Lisbon, and though he was once driven back by storms
he eventually reached the Tagus by the end of February.
It was a duty, though his force was but Blender, that he
found not ' too small for his character/ Transports with
the promised troops accompanied or followed him, as the
men could be got together, and in due season the bulk
of the main fleet was to gather to his flag.
Digitized by
Google
240 MARLBOROUGH AND THE NAVY 1704
How far he knew this is uncertain. The whole plan
of campaign was certainly not communicated to the
Admiralty, and for a while at least it seems to have been
kept even from Rooke. There exists a rough memorandum
of about this time in Godolphin's hand, in which he notes
for consideration how much of the Queen's intentions may •
be communicated to the Lord Admiral's Council with
a view to their issuing the admiral's orders, and how
much must be conveyed to Rooke in secret by a Secretary
of State. 1 It jyas not till March that the design began
to take shape. Marlborough had been over to Holland
to arrange the preliminaries of his great move, and while
there he had written to the Duke of Savoy to assure him
that at his (the Duke's) request the Queen had decided to
send a powerful fleet into the Mediterranean in the spring
to support and facilitate his designs. The greater part of
the ships, be said, were already at Lisbon, and he himself
was going to make an important diversion which would
effectually prevent the French increasing their force in
Italy, or even, he added, against the Emperor. 9
In the middle of March, about a fortnight after
Marlborough's return from the Hague, we have the first
secret draft of Rooke's final orders. He had already been
informed that, besides operating on the coast of Spain in
concert with the Portuguese, he might, if he saw his way,
do the same on the coast of Provence with the assistance
of Savoy. But now his instructions were made more
definite. The French, in order to recover the position
which they had lost by the adhesion of Savoy to the
allies, were threatening Nice and Villafranca, the two
Savoyard ports by which the Duke commanded the
coastwise route from France into Italy and was in direct
1 BMm-Fmck Paper*, Add MSS. 29591, 1 958.
* UMomugh Itapafcto, ii. 281, February 10, 1704.
Digitized by
Google
1704 MARLBOROUGH'S MASTERPIECE 241
touch with the maritime powers. Rooke was therefore to
he informed that he was to hold himself in readiness to
proceed to their relief at all hazards, and the moment he
heard from Savoy that either place was in danger, he was
to sail without waiting for his reinforcements to reach him. 1
This draft is marked as haying been read to Godolphin
and Marlborough as though up to this time the secret
was confined to them. Ten days later his instructions
were drawn up and signed. Generally they were an exact
repetition of those which Shovell had received the pre-
vious year, but with this difference, that Rooke's first
duty was to relieve Nice in case it were besieged, and
that, for fear of being too late, if a summons for help
reached him, he was, if he possibly could, to enter the
Mediterranean at once. To leave no doubt as to what
the Government were aiming at, the formal instructions
were accompanied by an ' explanation.' The Queen, he
was told, desired above all things to havp # -a fleet in the
Mediterranean so as to be within striking distance of
Nice at any moment. As for the rest of the campaign,
she would leave it to the fleet council of war ; but Rooke
was to do his best to persuade his flag-officers that nowhere
could they be so useful as in the Mediterranean. So long
as they held that station Louis would be prevented from
supporting or supplying his army in Italy by sea, while
at the same time they would keep open the only line of
communication which thi <-viperor had with his troops
in Piedmont. As for assisting the Austrian party in
Spain, which up to this time Rooke regarded as his main
object, he could do it better by acting on the Mediterranean
coast, and especially in Catalonia, than by any operations
outside the Straits, 1
1 H.O. Admiralty, zvi. 39 and ibid. xiii. Ifaieh 14, 1704.
* Ibid. liti. March 24, J|04.
VOL. II. ^ B
Digitized by VjOOQLC
242 MARLBOROUGH AND THE NAVY 1704
, So. far went Booke's open instructions, which every
one concerned was to know, and never before perhaps _
_was th e h igher strategji..of_ the Mediterranean more
luminously formulated. In its breadth and firmness we
feel the touch of Marlborough, the hand not only of the
great general, but of the great war minister, who sees in
their true proportions the' scope.. and end of naval action.
To the sailor the aim of naval strategy must always seem
to be the command of the sea. To the soldier and the
states man it js.only the means to afrentb — Forthem the
end must always be the furtherance or the hindrance
of military operations ashore, or the protection or
destruction of sea-borne commerce ; for by these means
alone can governments and populations be crushed into
submission. Of the two methods that of military pressure
must always come first, where resources allow, just as
an assault, where practicable, is always preferable to the
more lengthy blockade. If, therefore, it- be possible to
give sudden emphasis to vital military operations by
momentarily and without undue risk abandoning the
sailor's preoccupation — by ceasing for a moment to aim
solely at the command of the sea — a bigoted adherence to
it may become pedantry and ruin the higher strategy of
the campaign.
On these fundamental principles of warfare Rooke's
instructions were framed, and framed in the best possible
way. The portion of the far-reaching design which
Marlborough wished Booke to carry out was not forced
upon the fleet. It was merely placed lucidly before the
flag-officers that they might clearly perceive their place
in the great whole so far as it could be safely disclosed.
It was left to their judgment and loyalty to say how far
the limitations of their art enabled them to carry into
effect what the Government looked to them to perform.
Digitized by
Google
1704 ROOKIES SECRET ORDERS 345
Moreover, although the military exigencies of the situation
were pressed upon them, their own immediate concern
was not forgotten. From the spies and agents of the
admirable intelligence system, which was then in existence,
was flowing a constant stream of reports of French naval
activity both in Toulon and the western ports. The secret
of their intentions had not been penetrated. The reports
variously pointed to a concentration either in the Medi-
terranean or in the Atlantic, or possibly to separate
squadrons acting in each arena. 1 To meet this uncertain
situation the last clause of Booke's instructions informed
him that he was to prevent a junction of the Toulon and
4 West France ' squadrons, and that, if the Toulon squadron
got out of the Straits, it was to be his first duty to follow
it and bring it to action. This in fact was a naval
condition to which every military necessity must subserve.
The brilliance and lucidity of the whole design come
out still more clearly when we consider what were Booke's
secret instructions and how admirably the open ones were
constructed to prepare the way for their execution. As
the campaign existed in the minds of Eugene and Marl-
borough, it was to rest upon a secret and sudden concen-
tration against what may be called the right flank of the
French at the Danube. At their opposite flank was to be
a minor attack or diversion in the form of an invasion of
Spain by Portugal and the Hapsburg King. Though this
movement was to receive the support of the fleet, it was
not Booke's main object. The memorable and unexpected
fruit of his campaign has long ago obscured what that
object was. It was in truth nothing less than the fruition
of Marlborough's long-pondered design. It was. upon
*"~ Toulon — the French centre as we may regard it— thai
T the weight of his force was to be thrown— There, by a
[ l Admiralty Stcrttary, In-LsUm, toL 8W0.
IS
Digitized by LjOOQLC
244 MARLBOROUGH AND THE NAVY 1704
sadden and secret blow in concert of the Duke of Savoy's
army, he w as to seize and destroy the seat of the French
Mediterranean power. Not a soul was to be informed ;
but, so long as the Duke of Savoy held to the project,
Booke was to regard the operation as taking precedence
of everything else, excepting only the relief of Nice and
the shadowing of the Toulon fleet if it got out of the
Straits. The operations on the Spanish Mediterranean
coast were to extend no further than was desirable for
masking the real objective. So soon as the blow at
Toulon had been struck he was to set about reaping the
fruit of the victory by proceeding direct to Palermo.
There, by using private signals with which he was
furnished, he was to get into communication with the
Austrian party and endeavour with their co-operation to
induce the city to declare for the Hapsbiirg King. The
same was to be done at Messina, and from these points
he might endeavour to reduce the whole of Sicily, and
subsequently, with tho same end in view, proceed to
Naples. 1
Such in its entirety was the g/and design of this
memorable year. We have only to bear in mind the
leading idea of the main attack upon the Danube to see
how each part assists and amplifies the rest. The
ambitious programme assigned to liooke was of course
scarcely practicable, and it depended too much upon the
unstable factor of Savoy. Still it must not be dismissed
as a dream. We should take it rather as an indication
of the incalculable power of strategical disturbance that
lies open to a Mediterranean fleet. By judicious handling
of his force and a clear grasp of the situation it was in
Booke's power to contain at least four French armies,
and to prevent support being sent from any of the points
• BX>. Admiralty, xiii. Maroh 89, 1704, and ibid. zvi. 128 et teq.
Digitized by
Google
1704 THE CAMPAIGN OPKNS 245
that lay within the length of his arm, to the vital battle-
ground in Central Europe.
It was, as we have seen, in the last days of March that
Rooke' s orders were settled, and before a week was out
Marlborough was at Harwich waiting for a wind to carry
him across to Holland that he might set in motion the
vast machinery which he and Eugene had adjusted. Rooke
was already at work. Early in March Leake arrived in the
Tagus from England with a combined English and Dutch
squadron. Rooke had put to sea at once, and in ac-
cordance with his first instructions had spread his fleet in
cruising formation between Capes St. Vincent and Espartel
with the threefold object of covering the English Levant
trade in its passage through the Straits, intercepting
some enemy's ships expected from Buenos Ayres, and pre-
venting men-of-war slipping out from Toulon to join the
squadrons in the West France ports. 1 Though the Buenos
Ayres vessels were missed in dirty weather, two ships of
the line were taken, and towards the end of April Rooke
had returned to Lisbon. There he found his new
orders awaiting him, and communicated them, so far as
they were not secret, to his council of war. In concert
with his Dutch colleague a decision was quickly arrived
at. It was agreed to proceed immediately into the Medi-
terranean and pass as high as Barcelona with the double
object of supporting the Hapsburg party in Catalonia,
and being at hand to relieve Nice and Villafranca if
they should call for assistance. Ro oke's real object was
of course to get unsuspected within striking distance
of Toujfoi^Jrat of this he said not a word, nor of Sicily
and /Naples, although Charles was very anxious that a
demonstration should be made there as well as off Bar-
celona. With the Dutch contingent Rooke had some
1 Torrington Afaiiotr*, 127.
Digitized by
Google
246 MARLBOROUGH AND THE NAVY 1701
forty sail, and with them he entered the Straits in the
first days of May, and watered by force in Altea Bay. 1
In Toulon, according to the intelligence which the
Government had, a fleet of about thirty of the line was
being brought forward for the Comte de Toulouse — a force
-which would probably be about equal to that of Rooke, at
least on paper — and it was believed to be the intention of the
French to pass it out of the Straits and endeavour to
form a concentration at Cadiz with the Atlantic divisions
from Brest, Port Louis, and Bochefort — together scarcely
inferior to the Toulon squadron. This Atlantic or ' West
France ' squadron was to be dealt with by the Channel
squadron under Shovell, with Fairborne and Byng for his
flag-officers. Shovell had also the charge of the mass of
trade proceeding southwards, and of the stores for Rooke
and the transports for Lisbon. About the middle of
April, on an alarm that the Brest squadron was coming
out, he received sudden orders to hoist his flag and get to
sea. If he found the news was true and that the French
-were in superior force, he was to retreat with all his
convoy into the Thames ; otherwise he was to proceed off
Brest, and if the squadron was still there he was to send
on the trade and transports under convoy and devote his
fleet to preventing a concentration of the three 'West
France ' divisions. If however he found the Brest division
had sailed and had reason to believe its destination was
the Straits, he was to detach in chase a force that would
make Rooke superior ; and if it were necessary to detach
the greater part of his fleet, he himself was to go in
command and place himself under Booke's flag.*
Here then again we have the British naval strategy
1 Lift cf Sit John Leake, p. 77 ; TorringUm MemoWi, p. 127 ; Capt.
* Torrington Memoir*, 122.
Digitized by
Google
1704 MOVEMENTS OF 8HOVELL 247
resting firmly on the fundamental idea which William III.
had inaugurated, that the Channel and Mediterranean
squadron must be regarded as one main fleet, to be used
wholly or in part either within or without the Straits as
the distribution of the enemy's force demanded. Marl-
borough, who alone of Englishmen appears to have grasped
the true potentialities of the Mediterranean, had at last
' got his way, and at the outset he was employing that very
policy which we regard as among the latest and highest
developments of modern naval thought.
With these well-conceived instructions Shovell put to
sea, and by the middle of May, with his whole charge, was
off the Lizard, his first rendezvous. Here he received
intelligence from the Admiralty that Toulouse himself
had suddenly arrived at Brest and taken the squadron to
sea a fortnight since, and as the news was confirmed by his
own scouts he resolved to carry on and feel for Toulouse
in the Soundings. Finding no trace of him there he
concluded he must have gone for the Straits. According
to his orders he therefore gave chase in person with the .
bulk of his force.
Nothing, it will be observed, was said in Shovell's
instructions of the secret object of Rooke's fleet. The
fact was that the situation had changed in a way that
necessarily modified the original design. When Hill, who
was charged with the negotiations with Savoy, reached
Turin at the beginning of April, he found the Duke had
grown ominously cool about the projected attempt on
Toulon. The Dutch, who were stubbornly bent on keep-
ing their fleet to protect their commerce, had informed
the Duke that they were averse to engaging it in so
desperate an adventure, and he demanded a definite
assurance that Booke would come, and come soon. Hill
said all he could and promised the Duke two hundred
Digitized by
Google
248 MAKLBOROUGH AND THE NAVY 1704
thousand crowns so soon as Toulon was in flames. But
all was in vain. It soon became known that the French
had abandoned their designs on Nice and Villafranca, and
that the troops raised for the purpose were being sent to
reinforce the army of Italy. The result was that the Duke
found it impossible to spare enough troops to act with
the fleet, and Hill had to send word to Booke that there
was no hope of Savoy's co-operating with him in Provence
This unwelcome news arrived home as Shovell was
passing down Channel collecting his fleet, and it was at
once sent on to Booke. He was further informed that
the Imperialist forces in Italy were so few and bad that
it was useless to attempt to co-operate with such material.
He was therefore to fall back in order to concert operations
with the Archduke Charles and the King of Portugal on
the coast of Spain, and above all to intercept Toulouse if
he got away from Brest and attempted to enter the Straits.
At the same time he was informed of Shovell's orders
and told to look out for him. 1
Marlborough, who thus saw one half of his grand
design wiped clean' away, received the news with his
usual cheery good humour. He had already reached
Ladenburg in the heart of Germany with his cavalry. In
ten days he hoped to be on the Danube, and the meaning
of his heroic move was apparent to all concerned. In his
answer be contented himself with approving the step that
had been taken and with warning the Government, which
was nervous about an attack on the English coast, of what
Toulouse's intention most probably was. 'There is no
doubt, 9 he wrote, ' of his being gone from Brest, but I am
apt to think his orders are to sail directly to Cadiz, so that
I am glad care is taken to reinforce Sir George Booke,
1 HOl's dsspatehes, April 11-1S, 8.P. Foreign, Savoy >W>\ Booke*sin-
, May 9 V H.O. Admiral!* xiii. 14S.
Digitized by
Google
1704 HOOKE'S FEINT ON BARCELONA 949
and that he has fresh orders to co-operate with the
Portugal troops on the coast of Spain ; for I fear, with-
out the assistance of our naval force, we shall not be
able to make any great progress at present on that
side.' !
Meanwhile, as the great symphony developed, Booke,
in accordance with his secret orders, had moved on to
make his feint J at Barcelona. He was still ignorant of '
the altered conditions when he anchored in the Say, and
no one but himself knew what his real intention was.
Hesse, who was with the fleet, was as ignorant as the rest,
and as eager as ever to decide the campaign with his
beloved Catalans. He had been assured that he bad
only to appear before the place for his friends to rise and
declare for Charles III. So sure was he of his power that
on the way he had persuaded Kooke to make something
more than a demonstration, and permit him to land the
marines and bring the smouldering insurrection to a bead.
This was accordingly done. Barcelona was summoned in *
the name ot the Hapsburg King, but for answer Hesse
got nothing but defiance. There is no reason to believe
that his information was false, but he had not calculated
on the personality of the governor, Don Francisco de
Velasco. This man, by the ascendency of his character
and adroit tact, was able to keep under the disaffected
element and to inspire his adherents with bis own de-
termination. He pointed out the smallness of the force
that had landed, and that the Archduke bad not had the
courage to come in person. The result was that not a
man moved. A bombardment was tried, but that only
made matters worse and turned lukewarmness to exaspera-
tion. It was clear the experiment had been miscalculated,
and Booke, after letting Hesse try his hand for a fortnight,
1 To Sir Charles Hedges, June 4, Itopafote, L M&
Digitized by
Google
2TO MARLBOROUGH AND THE NAVY 1704
would wait no longer and insisted on re-embarking his
men for hjp main design. 1
For the failure therefore at Barcelona Rooke was in
no way to blame. For him the whole affair was only a
feint, though, seeing what the information was, he certainly
exercised a wise discretion in permitting Hesse to torn
the feint into a coup de main if he could. He was equally
'wise in refusing to allow him to continue the operation
for any length of time. He was still secretly bent on
Toulon, nor did he give a hint of his intention beyond
detaching Bear-Admiral Witks with a small division to
look into the port. The rendezvous he gave was the
Hyferes islands, and his council of war believed they were
going as far as Nice and Villafranca, to see them safe
and then to return and attack Barcelona in force. His
real object was of course to get into communication with
Hill in order to concert operations with the Savoyard army.
Whether he did so or not is uncertain, nor can we tell
whether or not he had by this time received his amended
orders. All we know is that at Hy&res he heard from
Methuen, the Ambassador at Lisbon, that the Brest fleet
had passed the Tagus on its way to Toulon. The council
of war immediately determined that this fleet must now be
their sole objective, and, without waiting a day, Rooke sent
woid to Hill that he was turning back to meet Toulouse.'
War of Succession, L 97 ; Duro, Armada BspaMa, vi. 51 ;
\ Jlemoirt, 127 ; Life of Leake, IB.
* Jawrmml of Roche** Voyage, 1704, Brit Mat. 810, m. 38, pp. 179 et eeq.
Digitized by
Google
CHAPTEK XXXI
GIBRALTAR AND MALAGA
With the change of front which had been forced upon
Eooke and the British Government a practically new
naval campaign commences. Owing to the inability of
Savoy or the Imperialists in Italy to provide the necessary
military element, the elaborate design which Marlborough
had formed for breaking into the centre of Louis's wide-
spread position had to go by the board. Without the
co-operation of an adequate military force Booke could
do nothing. It was only on the extreme opposite flank
to that upon which Marlborough was closing that this
condition existed. True, the army of the allies in the
Peninsula was weak and unsatisfactory enough ; still, as
they stood, it was the only point where naval and military
co-operation could be brought into play, and it was there-
fore only in this quarter of the vast field of hostilities that
Booke could hope to make the enemy feel the smart of
his command of the sea.
For the moment, however, that command was
threatened. By the escape of the Brest squadron Booke
was in danger of finding himself in inferior force at the
vital point, and his sole and immediate object became the
defeat of that squadron in order to prevent its junction
with that of Toulon. It was now a purely naval ques-
tion, with which Booke was quite at home, and, rightly
disregarding all political and military distractions, he
Digitized by
Google
252 GIBRALTAR AND MALAGA 1704
spread his cruisers to get touch with Toulouse. With
his council of war he had settled the exact course they
were to pursue. If the enemy was sighted before they
reached the Straits they were to do their utmost to deal
him a blow ; if not, they were to hurry on to Cadiz and
seek an occasion of bringing him to action there. If he
refused they were to proceed to Lisbon, to meet Shovell
and replenish with stores. They knew that Toulouse's
intention was to join hands with the squadron which he
expected to come out of Toulon to meet him, and they
believed that, whether the combined French fleet entered
the Straits or attempted anything on the Portuguese
coast, they would be in a position to give a good account
of it. 1
It was not long before their action was decided for
them. On the second day after the council the scouts
signalled the enemy in sight, and on the morrow the two
fleets were in contact. The French, to the number of
about fifty, with thirty-one of the line, were to windward,
and as they formed line of battle Kooke went about to
the northward to cut them off from Touloir. Though
the French were slightly superior, they refused an engage-
ment and held on for their destination, and being clean
they soon began to show their heels to Rooke's foul fleet.
All that day, however, he struggled on. The next the
weather fell almost calm, and it became clear that nothing
could prevent the French admiral making Toulon if he
chose, and that Booke's only chance of bringing him
to action was in the mouth of the port where the allies
would be exposed to an overwhelming attack from both
the French squadrons. It was therefore resolved to
1 De Jong*, iv. li. 293, quoting the Dutch • Minute* of the Joint
of War hold on board H.M.8. "Royal Catherine," off the Hyeret
Hay it, 1704(0*)'
Digitized by
Google
1704 JUNCTION OF ROOKK AND SHOVELL 253
abandon the chase and make the best of their way to
join Shovell in the Tagus preparatory to farther action. 1
The French had fairly won the first round of the
game. Bat Shovell was speeding southwards, and a
few days later he pat into the Tagus for water and
provisions so as to be ready to get to sea the moment
he received a summons from Booke. Here, however,
he heard what had happened. Toulouse had entered
the Straits, and, fearing Booke might be overpowered, he
very properly decided to go in search of him without
waiting for orders. Thus it was that on June 16, just as
Marlborough was joining hands with the Margrave of
Baden, Booke and Shovell met off Gape St. Mary, and
at both extremities of the French position the situation
was ripe for the catastrophe.
Had the admirals been left to themselves they would
have been in no doubt what to do. They were all in favour
of holding to the resolution taken off Hy&res and entering
the Straits in search of the now united French fleet. -
But there were political considerations which complicated
the problem. Their last orders were to co-operate with
the Kings of Spain and Portugal in supporting the land
war in the Peninsula, and it became necessary to send
into Lisbon to know what was required of them. At the
same time Toulouse's fleet in Toulon remained their chief
consideration, and while awaiting an answer they resolved
to get into the best position they could for dealing with
it if it moved. To this end, as Marlborough was in the
act of defeating the Bavarians at Schellenberg and secur-
ing his passage of the Danube, they decided to enter the
Straits and water by force at Malaga. There they would .
be well placed, both for engaging Toulouse if he attempted
1 De Jonge, iv. ii. 394, from the Journal* and Despatches of the
Dutch admirals, and Life of Leake, p. 80,
Digitized by
Google
SS4 GIBRALTAR AND MALAGA 1704
to reach Cadiz, or to go to the rescue of Nice or any other
port of the allies if he intended a stroke in that quarter.
Nothing could have been better under the circum-
stances. The two kings appear to have had no objection
to the movement, and had contented themselves with
requesting that on its way to the Straits the fleet would
attempt something on the coast of Andalusia. Cadiz was
the place particularly indicated in the admirals' instruc-
tions, and this they knew was what the two kings would
most like to see undertaken. They had therefore expressed
their willingness to attack the place if sufficient troops
could be provided to act with them. Now Shovell had
already ascertained at Lisbon that it was extremely un-
likely that such troops would be forthcoming, and they
had therefore every reason to believe that the answer
from Lisbon would set them free to proceed up the
Straits and devote themselves to bringing Toulouse to
action. 1
For a week baffling easterly gales prevented their
entering the Mediterranean. A further delay was caused
by false intelligence that a French squadron had taken
advantage of the weather to slip through and had got
into Cadiz. Nor was it till July 7 that they reached
- M alaga and seized the watering places. When the whole
fleet was watered, Booke put to sea, and, while waiting
for his answer from Lisbon, occupied the entrance of
the Straits in readiness for Toulouse if he appeared. In
a week the answer came and the memorable council of
war of July 17 was called to consider it.
The proposal of the two kings, as the admirals
expected, was for an attack on Cadiz, but as no troops
could be promised it was promptly rejected. Then it
was that in considering how best to pursue their own
1 Tonrington Memoir$ f pp. 128, 199.
Digitized by
Google
1704 TI1E MOMENTOUS DECISION 256
object, and at the same time to satisfy their instructions
and the expectations of the two kings, the momentous
word was spoken. Dim in the distance glimmered the
Bock of Gibraltar. For a century past it had shone
enticingly in English eyes ; for half a century it had been
an admitted end of their endeavour. Cromwell had
stretched out his hand to it. Under Charles II. English
careening hulks ha4 been stationed there in preference to
Tangier. William III. had marked it for his own, and
had never ceased in peace or war to work for its posses-
sion ; and since his death every admiral that had sailed
for the Straits had been instructed to capture it if he
could.
From whom the suggestion came we know not, but
it matters little ; for by this time the idea had b ecom e a
]i ! commonplace both in the cabinet and the service. It is
* generally attributed to Prince George of Hesse-Darm-
stadt, who was with the fleet still in hope of effecting
something in Catalonia. Sir John Leake, the vice-
admiral of Booke's squadron, says that he himself had
proposed it to the Prince some time before ' as the most
advantageous conquest that could be made for the benefit
of the trade as well as the fleet during a war with France
and Spain/ but that it could not be undertaken till the
two kings had agreed not to attempt Cadiz. 1 We know,
at any rate, that a memorandum from Hesse was laid
before the council of war, as soon as the decision of the
kings was known. If it did not contain the formal pro-
posal, it was certainly Hesse's sanction that was the
decisive factor. It is the custom of historians to credit
England's possession of the gate of the Mediterranean to
Booke's fearlessness of responsibility. But as a matter
of fact so long as he had the sanction of King Charles's
1 Leake's Life, p. 88.
Digitized by
Google
256 GIBRALTAR AND MALAGA 1704
representative, he was incurring no responsibility at all.
No one knew better than he, as William's most trusted
naval councillor, how long Gibraltar had been the secret
and the open aim of successive English governments. He.
knew the weakness of the place, and his own strength
was overwhelming. By the Queen's instructions he had
full authority to undertake the operation ; he had been
requested by the two kings to attempt some place on the
Andalusian coast; and he actually had in his pocket a
proclamation by Charles III. to his city of Gibraltar,
telling them the British admiral was going to call with
his fleet to receive their submission. 1 All that he required
was to satisfy his last caution from home about acting
only by consent of the two kings, and this consent had
been given by Hesse's action. If he had not seized so
favourable a chance of retrieving his waning reputation
and of saving another barren campaign, it would have
been sheer madness. Still, he must not be denied the
credit of having overcome some opposition. Byng, who
was Shovell's vice-admiral, has left it on record that the
proposal ' was lightly thought of by many at the council.'
He himself was one of them. But to his and his friends'
objections Booke had sharply replied that not only should
the place be attempted, but that Byng himself, the leader
of the opposition, should conduct the attack. 1
80 much and no more was the height of Booke's
decision; nor as a feat of arms was his exploit more
lofty. Benowned as that exploit became at the time for
political reasons at home, and afterwards for its lasting
effects on history, the truth is there was nothing in it
heroic either in the resolution of the admiral or in the.
1 Lopes am Ayala, But. of Gibraltar (trans. James Bell), p. 186, where
the proclamation is set oat
* Torrmgto* Mem oir *, p. 197.
Digitized by
Google
AlfUw and Xocact <M*p 4fftht City and Bay of
GIBRALTAR in Spain laksn, hy S^QILoomj:
VuirAJamrml *f JSnglancl ?ft* zf. gf July *7*+ .By 3CM.
Umt ******* fhmjm.iUijwmtittm+f*' ***** CL*>fmaUj&Kmm ~U
fi/£sfi*+*mUd iUlwi* &,*£&£*
GIBRALTAR
From *A Discourse concerning tmb Mkditekjmnkak Ska,*
rt Sir Hknkv Shrrb, 1705
Digitized by
Google
Digitized by
Google
1704 CONDITION OF GIBRALTAR 257
difficulty of ite execution. Gibraltar at this time
little more than it had been throughout the middle ages,_
'a third-rate seaport town with works designed to secure
it against the Barbary pirates. Charles V. had con-
structed the wall which included the Bock in the de-
fended area, and Philip II. had added a bastion or two.
Philip IV., it is true, had done something more. Till
his time it had had nothing but a galley harbour under
the Old Mole. By constructing to the south of the town
what was called the New Mole, he had provided it with.
a shelter for ships. Under him it had consequently
increased substantially in population and prosperity, and
during his war with Charles I. he had partially modernised
the fortifications. But this only meant that the mediaeval
battlements had been replaced by parapets, and the towers
cut down to the level of the curtains and filled in solidly
with the rubbish. 1 Indeed it may be doubted whether
some of these improvements, by extending the lines to be
guarded, were not at the moment a source of weakness
rather than strength, seeing how slender was the garrison.
There was not even a citadel : for the old Moorish castle
had been dismantled and nothing had yet replaced it;
while of the modern works recently designed by the
French engineers not one had been carried out The
regular force that held it at the time had been reduced
to under a hundred men, and with all the local militia
which the governor could collect he could not raise a
garrison of five hundred. Against Kooke's force, with ite_
^ five and forty of the line, its frigates, fire-ships, and bomb-
_ vessels, its two thousand marines and its overwhel ming .
. weight of metal, such a place Was but a nutshell.
1 Lopes de Ayala, op. ciL, andXuis Bravo's offioial report made la 1627.
Add. MSS. 16152. This manuscript contain* large plans and sketches in
water-colour of the condition of the fortress as it then existed.
vol. n. s
Digitized by
Google
258 GIBRALTAR AND MALAGA 1704
The contemptible condition of the fortress was well
known in the fleet, and this indeed may have been the
reason why the attempt was thought of so lightly by
Byng and his friends ; but Booke had always the grand
manner, and he approached it with all the pomp and cir-
cumstance of a great operation. In Tangier Bay, hard
by the ruined mole under which he had helped to bury
the hopes of the older Mediterranean school, the ela-
borate preparations for the attack were made. In four
days they were complete, and on July 21 the fleet stood
oyer to Gibraltar Bay. Byng and the Dutch rear-
admiral Yanderdussen led the way with the battering
squadron of seventeen of the line and three bomb-vessels,
and the following day came to anchor about a mile from
the town. Booke followed with the rest of the fleet and
the marines of Byng's squadron, and brought-to further
in the bay towards Point Mala. Here in the mouth of
the little river Guadarran the British marines, eighteen
hundred strong, were landed under Hesse without oppo-
sition, and at once marched to the north front of the
town, where they took up a position across the isthmus
from sea to sea, so as entirely to cut off Gibraltar from
the mainland. It was here, as was called to mind, that
Cromwell had intended to cut his canal, and the invest-
ment was complete. It had been arranged however that
Byng was not to open fire until the garrison had been
summoned by Hesse, and, accordingly, from the position
he had seized, the Prince sent in a trumpet together
with King Charles's proclamation.
No answer was received that night, and next morning
Byng signalled for the line of battle. While it was form-
ing the governor's reply arrived. It was a sturdy
defiance and a chivalrous declaration that he meant to
hold the place for the King to whom he had sworn
Digitized by
Google
1704 BOMBARDMENT OF GIBRALTAR 269
allegiance. On hearing the result Booke reinforced the
battering squadron with five more of the line, bringing it
up to twenty-two. Byng disposed his force in a line
stretching from the old mole to the new one. He him*
self, with a division of ten sail, occupied the centre oppo-
site the town and south bastion. Northward of him was
the Dutch division of six sail before the old mole, while
to the southward, facing the new mole and its defences,
was an English division of six under Captain Jasper
Hickes of the ' Yarmouth.' Outward of the line were the
three bomb- vessels. As there was no wind, every one had
to warp into position. The work proceeded all night, and
by daybreak they were so close in that Byng had only a
foot or two under his keel. As the first light of day
revealed what had happened, the shore batteries opened.
Byng promptly replied, and with so furious and well-
sustained a fire that in a few minutes nothing could
be seen but a stream of panic-stricken inhabitants hurry-
ing out of the town towards the southernmost point of
the Bock. It was the women and children flying for
safety to Our Lady of Europa. There all that terrible
Sunday morning, in the sanctuary of the old Mediter-
ranean power, they cowered and prayed beneath the
trophies of the great galley admirals while the roar of
Byng's guns sounded in their ears the knell of the dead
past.
Towards one o'clock the thunder of the bombardment
sank into silence. It had lasted nearly six hours, and
Byng had ordered a cessation to see what the effect had
been. But for the fugitives a new terror quickly suc-
ceeded the first. Captain Whitaker of the ' Dorsetshire 9
had been sent down the line to convey the orders to cease
fire, and by the time he reached the ' Lennox,' which lay
nearest to the new mole, both he and her captain, William
• 8
Digitized by
Google
280 GIBRALTAR AND MALAGA 1704
Jumper, could see that most of the guns in the works that
defended it were dismounted and the garrison had ap-
parently fled. Whitaker promptly hurried back to Byng
with the opinion that the forts and mole might be seized.
It was no part of the design, but Byng did not hesitate.
Signalling for all the boats of his own line, he sent
Whitaker off to Booke to ask for the rest. Without
waiting for a reply, however, he despatched Captain
Hickes with his own flotilla, under orders to land to the
southward of the mole head, and endeavour to take pos-
session.
Shortly afterwards Whitaker came back with word that
Booke had consented to the attack and that he himself was
to command it. But, before he could get up to the'mole,
Hickes and Jumper were already well on their way, and the
distracted suppliants of Our Lady of Europa, seeing the
new danger, were streaming in terror towards the town. A
gun or two headed them back, and under a misapprehension
that it was a signal to re-open fire, the bombardment broke
out again. Under cover of it Hickes and Jumper landed
their men. Resistance there \Vas none. During all this
time Hesse and his marines had been vigorously assaulting
the north front. It was consequently impossible to spare
reinforcements for the garrison of the new mole, and,
fearing to be cut off, they had retired into the town. Still
the loss was severe. As the seamen recklessly rushed into
the abandoned works with their matches burning in their
hands, they exploded a magazine, killing or wounding
about a hundred men, besides sinking a number of the
boats. 1 Every one believed it was a mine that had been
sprung, and for a moment there was a panic. But
Whitaker's flotilla came up immediately, and with re*
newed spirit the whole landing force pressed northward
1 Poeockt's Journal in Torrington Memoirs, App. p. 198.
Digitized by
Google
1704 GIBRALTAR CAPITULATES 981
along the sea wall. At a bastion half way between the
new mole and the great or south bastion at the southern-
most point of the town, they were compelled to halt, for
there Charles V.'s wall barred their way. Here, therefore,
and in the other works that he had taken, Whitaker
was content to secure himself, while, by arrangement
between Hesse and Bpoke, a fresh summons was sent in
simultaneously from both forces.
It demanded the surrender of the fortress in half an
hour on pain of the last severities of war. All that loyalty
could demand had been done ; the women and children
with Our Lady of Europa were at the sailors' mercy ;
and the governor decided to capitulate. On the morrow
the articles were signed; the women and children were
reverently escorted into the care of their own people in
the town, and the defenders were allowed to march out
with all the honours of war. So at last, after so many
years of longing, the gate of the Mediterranean was in
British hands, the sanctuary of Europa had been stripped
bare by Rooke's seamen, and the lamps of the Dorias and
the Colonnas were resting in the ship-chests of Jumper
and his friends. 1
Gibraltar was taken, and, to add to the rejoicing, a
1 The fullest accounts of the exploit will be found in the Torrington
Memoirs, pp. 138-145 ; in Chaplain Pooocke's Journal (ibid. pp. 190 5);
and in the despatch of the governor, Don Diego de Salinas, to the Marques
de Villadrias (Duro, vi. 03, Appendix). The other official Spanish docu-
ments are printed by Ayala (op. cit. Appendices xi.-xiv.). There is an old
story that the flag of Charles III. was hoisted by some one when the place
was taken, and that Rooke ordered it to be struck and the British flag to be
hoisted in its place. I can find no confirmation of this improbable tale.
Modern Spanish authorities reject it (Duro, vi. 58, n.). Rooke had orders to
act strictly as Charles's agent, and the garrison was certainly summoned in
Charles's name. The origin of the story may lie in the fact that the sailors
planted the British flag on the works they took before the final summons
and capitulation. It may well be that, when all was settled, Rooke ordered
it to be removed, and so the perverted legend might have arisen (Tom*? ton
Afemotrs, 14$ ; see also po$t, p. 964, noU).
Digitized by
Google
283 GIBRALTAR AND MALAGA 1704
frigate came in at the moment of victory with news of
Marlborough's success at Schellenberg and his capture
of Donauwdrth. It also brought letters from home, and
from Methuen at Lisbon which were less welcome. To
take Gibraltar was one thing, to keep it another.
Toulouse's fleet was still unbeaten, and Wilks, with a
squadron of observation, was cruising off Malaga on the
look-out for it. The letters just to hand, however, gave
Booke to understand that Toulouse was in so great an
inferiority to himself that there was little likelihood of his
venturing out of Toulon. 1 He was therefore urged once
more to attempt either Cadiz or Barcelona. Barcelona
was quickly rejected by the council of war on the old plea
that it was too late in the year to proceed so far up the
Straits ; but as for Cadiz, they felt bound to declare they
were ready to co-operate until the middle of September,
but no longer, and that only if an adequate force and siege-
train were provided by the two kings as well as a garrison
for Gibraltar. Such an answer was practically a refusal
to do anything but maintain the conquest they had made.
In this they were rightly absorbed, and to secure it they
resolved to remain in the Straits till an answer came from
Lisbon, and in the meanwhile to water the fleet by
squadrons on the Barbary coast. It would seem that
the admirals themselves were by no means easy about
Toulouse, in spite of the sanguine views of the home
Government. The reckless bombardment had made a
serious hole in their magazines ; they were obliged to send
Vanderdussen with five sail to Plymouth to fetch some
Dutch transports with reinforcements for Portugal ; an-
other squadron had been detached to the Azores to bring
in the Brazil convoy, and they may well have doubted
1 HX>. Admiralty, xiii. July 4, 1704 (o.«.). It wm reoeWed with Methuen'f
of Hhm »•* and *84h (ils.) on July 94, Torrington Memo**, 146.
Digitized by
Google
1704 TOULOUSE TO THE RESCUE 263
whether they were really so superior as to deter Toulouse
•from hazarding an action.
As a matter of fact the information which the English
Government had sent was incorrect. Instead of having
only forty of the line at his disposal, as they believed,
Toulouse, in spite of every difficulty that was put in his
way, had succeeded in getting fifty-one ready for sea, besides
a score of galleys. On the other hand, Rooke, instead of
having sixty as they thought at home, had now only forty-
one English and twelve Dutch of the line. He had
nothing to set against the galleys, which were still
regarded as formidable in giving mobility to a fleet in
calms or light airs and against crippled ships at the end of
an action. He was therefore really in inferior force, and
so far from Toulouse being afraid to come out, he had
actually put to sea a week before Rooke appeared at
Gibraltar. His destination was Barcelona, which the
French Court had been made to believe was Booke's real
objective, and there he expected to find the allied fleet,
or at least to learn its position. Of what was happening in
the Straits he was entirely ignorant, nor was it til! he made
Barcelona that he heard the stunning news that Gibraltar
had fallen. He could be at no loss what to do, for await-
ing him were orders from Madrid that without a moment's
delay he was to proceed to the Straits. The sudden loss >
of the bulwark of the Spanish monarch/, he was-told,
had filled the Court with dismay. Already an army was
on its march to the rescue, and between them they were
to retake the renowned fortress, cost what it might. 1 We
may well imagine the alarm that prevailed. In the minds
of Spaniacdsj&ibraltar was associated with the evil days,
when it was the well-head from which Moorish conquest
had flowed over the Peninsula. Its second fall was
1 De Jong©, it. ii. 806,
Digitized by
Google
261 GIBRALTAR AND MALAGA 1704
ominous of a new heretic dominion, and, sped by the
prayers and terror of the faithful, the deliverer hurried
again to sea.
Marlborough^ great symphony had reached its fullest
swell. Feverish as was the excitement in Spain, the worst
was not yet known. Far away on the banks of the Danube
a still more resounding blow had been struck. As Toulouse
sped southward in search of Rooke, Marlborough and
Eugene w$re crushing the most splendid of Louis's armies,
and in Blenheim village the white flag was flying over the
flower of his troops.
Meanwhile fi ooke, h aving secured his conquest as best
be could, had passed over toJTetuan.. Gibraltar had been left
to the care of Hesse and the British marines, and, screened
by a squadron of scouts, the admiral was anxiously watering
in hourly expectation of disturbance from Toulon. 1 Owing
to the swell that prevailed the operation took nearly
a week to perform. It was not till August 8 that he
weighed to return to Gibraltar, and even then a dozen
nnwatered ships had to be left behind. That night, with
light easterly airs, he held across the Straits, still in
ignorance of Toulouse's movement ; but at break of day
one of the scouts to windward was seen making the signal
for an enemy's fleet. Byng, who was the first to see it,
immediately hurried aboard the flagship to impart the un-
expected news. Sir James Wishart, Booke's first captain,
was for retiring at once into Gibraltar Bay to cover the
threatened fortress. Byng, however, vigorously protested
against so wrong-headed a proceeding. To say nothing of
the folly of receiving the French at anchor, the move-
ment would enable Toulouse to cut off the squadron that
1 De Jonge points out that, m the Dutch admirals mado no objection
to the fortress being occupied by a garrison that was entirely British, there
oaa hardly have been any dispute about the flag (op. dt. it. ii. 806).
Digitized by
Google
N \
1704 TOULOUSE DISAPPEARS 285
was still watering at Tetuan. Unable to decide, Booke
made the signal for the line of battle, and, while it was
being formed, summoned the council of war. It proved
as eager as Byng for a bold offensive. Most of the flag-
officers were unable to believe that Toulouse meant to
fight, the more so as there was still no sign of his coming
down. To confirm their views the scouts presently re-
ported that he was making off in the direction of Malaga.
The decision therefore was to endeavour to get half the
marines back on board the fleet, and then, so long as the
wind held where it was, to lie in the open water to the east
of Gibraltar to await the French and cover the place
against any attempt Toulouse might make to recover it.
If, on the other hand, the wind came westerly, they were
to follow the French as far as Malaga, but no further.
For if they were not found there it would be pretty certain
they had retired as usual to Toulon, whither it was too
late in the season to follow, them.
All that day, therefore, and the following night they
held on in battle order to the northward, Shovell and
Leake in the van, Booke and Byng in the centre, and the
Dutch in the rear. Meanwhile Hesse had handsomely
met Booke's request for the marines, and next morning
the fire-ships and sloops from Gibraltar appeared with a
thousand of them instead of only half. As soon as they
were distributed, Booke went about to the southward to
pick up the twelve ships that had been left on the Barbary
coast. The sound of the French signal guns, which all
through the night had been growing more distant, had
ceased altogether, and though the wind was fair for their
coming down, not a sign of them could be seen. Towards
evening Booke made up his mind that Toulouse must be
trying to get away from him, and, taking in the signal
for the line of battle, he ordered a chase to windward*
Digitized by
Google
266 GIBRALTAR AND MALAGA 1704
The wind held fresh from the eastward, and for two days
he heat against it in long boards across the mouth of the
Straits under a press of sail, and still not a sign of the
enemy could be seen beyond one small vessel which the
frigates chased ashore. During the next night it would
seem that Wishart's anxiety for Gibraltar increased, and
a fear arose that Toulouse by the help of his galleys might
have slipped past inshore, and if so he would have
the half-repaired fortress and all the fleet auxiliaries at
his mercy. At daybreak therefore on August 12 a fresh
council was called, at which it was agreed that, as it was
clearly hopeless to close with Toulouse if he meant to get
away, it was best to bear up for the Straits, lie there for
"\two days more, and then if the French did not appear to
/'devote their whole force to putting Gibraltar in a con-
' dition to defend itself. So, in no hope of a fight, the
council broke up. But scarcely were the flag-officers
aboard their ships again and the new course set, when
the whole French fleet was sighted off Cape Malaga to
the north-west of them and to leeward, speeding before
the wind towards Gibraltar.
Then the truth flashed upon them. To abandon his
mission was far from Toulouse's mind. The meaning of
his retrograde movement was merely that, having located
Booke, he wanted to pick up his galleys and water at
Malaga before bringing him to action. So soon as this
was effected he had hurried back towards the Straits, and
during one of Booke's long boards to the south-east had
passed inshore of him. It was a curious chance that
well exemplifies the almost incalculable hazards of the
sea. Both fleets were short of cruisers, and it was by
their inability to scout adequately that Toulouse lost the
weather gage and Booke gained it. Again it was by the
mere chance of an hour or two that Toulouse did not
Digitized by
Google
1704 THE FLEETS IX CONTACT *7
elude Booke altogether and find Hesse at his mercy in the
defenceless fortress. On the other hand, had he done so,
he would almost certainly have been caught by Booke at
a serious disadvantage that might well have involved the
entire destruction of his fleet. As it was, Fortune had
fairly divided her favour, and the superiority which
Toulouse had in the size of his ships and weight of metal
was almost balanced by his having lost the wind. 1
It was about five and twenty miles almost due south
of Cape Malaga that the French were sighted, and they
at once began to form line of battle with the wind abeam
and heads to the southward. Seeing them thus resolutely
interposing themselves between him and Gibraltar,
Booke called in his cruisers and, having re-formed line,
began to bear down to attack. But the wind was light
1 The remarks of the Marquis da Villette, who commanded the French
van, make it clear they did not deliberately ohoose the leeward station. He
says they lost the weather gage through the unfortunate necessity of having
to go to Velez Malaga for water after they first got contact— MonmeiquA's
M/ntoires du Marquis de Villette, 154.
As to the comparative strength of the two lines, in numbers it was
50 French to 51 of the allies, hut both Shovell and Booke said the French
had 17 three-deckers to their 7. Booke had not a single first-rate. Toulouse
had two or three. The French had also over 8500 more men than the allies.
Leake, however, considered the ships of the fleet pretty equally matched.
He shows the allies had actually more gnns than the French, and says the
English 80-gun two-deckers were as heavy in metal as the French 80-gon
three-deckers. Further, he says that more of the French were smalL He
tabulates thus :—
•s, 80 guns and upward .
60 ,* „ • •
Under 60 gnns ....
50 Tl
His opinion, however, must be a little discounted because his advice was
rejected and he thought the tactics of Booke and Shovell were not as bold
as they ought to have been. If the heavy calibres of the French first-ratef
and the large second-rates be taken into account, there can be no doubt
they were markedly superior in weight of metal (S. W. Leake, Life o/ Sir
Jolm Leake). All French accounts accuse the allies of having used their
bomb- vessels in the action, but this the allies deny.
French 18
AiUwie
.. M
n M
» 1*
n «
Digitized by
Google
2*3 GIBRALTAR AND MALAGA 1704
and fitful and little progress could be made. It remained
so all day, so that the French with the aid of their
galleys were able to form their battle order without falling
farther to leeward. Night fell with nothing done, but
with darkness the wind improved, and at daybreak on the
13th the French line was seen perfect three leagues to
lee ward, and as the sun rose Toulouse hove-to to await
Rooke's attack.
Then ensued an action which is now only remembered
as inaugurating a period during which naval tactics sank
to a hide-bound formality and rendered decisive engage-
ments impossible— a period during which unintelligent
admirals, pedantically absorbed in preserving their forma-
tion, contented themselves with fighting ship to ship and
attempting no manoeuvres for a concentration on part
of their adversaries* line. It is doubtful however whether
to dismiss the action so lightly is not to misjudge the con-
duct of the officers concerned and to create a misappre-
hension of the lines on which sailing tactics developed.
It must be remembered that it was only forty years since
the older group system had disappeared and the practice
of fleets engaging in two single lines had been fully
adopted at the battle of the Texel in 1665. About thirty
years later the Jesuit Paul Hoste embalmed the ideas of
his friend and patron Tourville in bis famous treatise
on naval evolutions. Since this work was published in
1697 no important action had been fought in the open,
and it may be taken as representing the thought of the
time. It shows us that the chief end of tactics, apart
from gaining the wind, was to isolate and double on a
part of the enemy's force. In the early days of the new
system the usual method of attempting this had been to
break through the hostile line by suddenly tacking upon
it in succession. This method had been the favourite
Digitized by
Google
1704 TACTICAL IDKA8 OF THE HOUR 269
one with Monk, who had used it with great boldness.
Recently however it had fallen into disfavour owing to
the risks it involved, and Hoste was of opinion it should
never be attempted except under very special circum-
stances to save a critical situation, or when the faulty
movements of the enemy gave a favourable opportunity
by leaving a gap in his line. So long as the enemy'e
formation was intact, be held that doubling was never
legitimate unless superior numbers enabled you to over-
lap him. You might then double on his van or rear.
In the absence of these conditions the proper method
was for the attacking fleet to bear down all together, each
for its opposite in the line, and then, if by hard fighting
a section of two or three ships could be forced out of the
line, doubling might be attempted by passing through the
gap that had been made.
It was this phase of expert opinion that underlay the
much derided 'Fighting Instructions' of the British
service. Ill-advised as they appear in the light of the
developed system of Rodney and his successors, they never-
theless represent a definite and logical stage of progress,
and history cannot afford to dismiss them with mere
contempt. To a period of active and almost fanatical
offence, that was perhaps largely due to the vigorous
personalities of Monk and Rupert, there was succeeding a
more cautious but equally well-founded period of defence.
Experts had been absorbed with the idea of doubling till
it had become a dangerous commonplace. By a logical
reaction they were now preoccupied with methods of
turning to disaster the rash or ill-judged movements which
an enemy might make in endeavouring to secure an advan-
tage by doubling. Experience had taught them that, when
fleets were approximately equal, the admiral who could
preserve his line the longest had the surest chance of
Digitized by
Google
270 GIBRALTAR AND MALAGA 1704
finding an opportunity for a crashing concentration ; and
thus in the naval thought of the hour the preservation of
the line was becoming a higher consideration than attempts
to secure a tactical advantage at the first onset.
It was with these ideas in the air that Rooke
went into action. For the formation which Toulouse
adopted, D'Estries, his first captain and the real com-
mander of the fleet, was responsible. The main strength
was massed in the centre, and here the line was allowed
to sag to leeward in a curve or 'bite.' The object is not
certain. The English officers believed it foreboded an
attempt to weather their van or rear. Possibly it was
accidental, but it is certain that a previous example of
the central curve occurred in Tourville's action with Tor-
rington off Beachy Head in 1690, and it is therefore more
probable it was deliberate. In order to facilitate a ready
response to the movements of the English, D'Estrees
formed his line with the wind abeam. This, according to
Hoste, was the most vicious of all formations, since in his
opinion it laid you open to be doubled in rear by an even
inferior enemy with impunity. Rooke made no such
attempt. To bis cautious nature the new defensive tactics
must have been peculiarly convincing. Moreover he
must have shared Shovell's opinion that, when fleets were
practically equal, a decisive victory was not to be looked for.
Nor was this the main object he sought. His preoccupa-
tion was to prevent the recapture of Gibraltar, and could
he inflict a severe enough blow on Toulouse to prevent
his supporting the threatened siege his work was done.
On the other hand, if, in seeking by hazardous tactics to
secure a decisive victory, he met with a disaster such as
those tactics were now generally recognised to court, he
would lose not only Gibraltar but the whole command of
the Mediterranean. For since he had no nearer port than
Digitized by
Google
1704 THE BRITISH ATTACK 271
Lisbon for retreat, and could not reach even that
without passing through the enemy's line, defeat would
mean annihilation of his fleet. That he should fight was
absolutely necessary, but under all the circumstances,
political as well as naval, to avoid defeat was of more
importance than to secure an overwhelming victory, and
it may well be doubted whether any course could be
better than that which Booke adopted.
Although he had fifty-three of the line to the French
fifty-one, and might have doubled with at least two ships,
he considered it necessary to have a reserve to watch the
galleys. He had therefore contented himself with equal-
ising his line to that of Toulouse and leaving two fifty-
gun ships in reserve. As he bore down, the usual trouble
happened. Owing to the long time he had had to pre-
serve his line abreast, and the fact that he had to approach
the French obliquely, the van ranged ahead of the centre
and the centre of the rear, and considerable gaps were
left between the divisions. Seeing this, Shovell, so soon
as he was within half gun-shot, hove-to to wait for Booke,
and the two opposing vice-admirals lay watching each
other in silence, ship to ship. Shovell however was
fourth in his line, and Villette third in his, so that the
English van was overlapping the French by one ship.
Here was an apparent threat to double, and Villette's
leading captain passed the word down to him that the
whole van must make sail to reach level with the head of
the English line. 1 It was now Shovell's turn to fear
being doubled, especially as he had in his division only
1 This wis certainly the meaning of Villette's movement, which wet so
▼ariously interpreted by both English and French observers. Villette him-
self wrote the day after the action, * On m'avait eri4 de main en main qnli
fallait que tonte Patent-garde fbrcast de Toilet poor gagner le reste des
ennemis.' See his despatch in lfonmorqut, Mtmoim du UarguU d$
VUUU$ t 850.
Digitized by
Google
272 GIBRALTAR AND MALAGA 1704
fifteen sail to Villette's seventeen. He therefore seems to
have made a corresponding movement ahead, with the
result that he still farther widened his distance from
the centre. It was an advantageous moment which
D*Estr6es was not likely to let slip, especially as he
believed, when he saw Villette making sail, he was already
about to profit by it. Toulouse's superiority in the centre
warranted some risk, and, if trouble came, there were
always the galleys to get him out of it. Toulouse there-
fore signalled for his whole line to make sail with
the intention of passing through the gap between Rooke
and Shovell with his own division, and doubling on the
British vah in order to crush it before the Dutch could
get into action. In the meantime, as he knew, his own
rear would have ranged up to hold the British centre in
check, and the Dutch would be left out of action. Rooke,
though he misunderstood Toulouse's purpose, was equal
to the occasion. Coming on under a press of sail, he had
got within extreme gunshot when he saw the French
making sail, and, believing they intended to weather him
ahead of his van, he made the signal to heave-to and
engage. His own two leading ships, under Rear- Admiral
Dilkes, fell on Villette's rear, and thus put the two vans on
an equality. He himself engaged Toulouse. The range
was much too great to please him, but it was enough to
stop the French movement. As the whole British line
opened fire and the shot tore through his rigging, Tou-
louse gave up his well-designed attempt, and the action
became general in centre and van, each ship pounding her
opposite in the line, and the rear divisions still too distant
to engage.
By his ^cautious tactics Rooke at the outset had
deprived Toulouse'dTahy real hope of a decisive victory.
It had^cqme down to sheer hard fighting and. Rooke had
Digitized by
Google
1704 BATTLE OF MALAGA 273
little to fear. Still he had work enough. Ship for ship
Booke's division was seriously overweighted, but stout
hearts and good gunnery told, and he held his own in a
manner that elicited the most enthusiastic admiration
from his Dutch colleagues. In the van, Shovell was able
to do better. After four hours' hard pounding, the stern
of Villette's flagship blew up, and he had to bear out of the
line to extinguish the fire. The rest of his division, as he
says, without any reason followed his example, and with
high exultation the British van saw their opponents
beaten to leeward. Leake was for closing in upon them
and pushing them till the French line was completely
broken, so that Toulouse would be compelled to fall
back with his centre to avoid the risk of being doubled.
There was much to be said for his advice. Booke by
this time sadly needed relief. Not only was the superior
weight of the enemy's metal telling severely upon him,
but several of his division, which had formed part of the
bombarding squadron at Gibraltar, had exhausted their
ammunition and had to haul their wind out of the line.
Seeing his opportunity, Toulouse began to work up to
the gap. It was this crisis that caused Shovell to reject
Leake's idea. The danger was acute, and he decided,
instead of following his advantage, to draw astern and
close up the broken line. It was a piece of seamanship
greatly admired at the time, and although, to Leake's dis-
gust, it left him and all the head of the British van with
nothing to do, it probably saved the situation for Booke.
About the same time moreover the Dutch got into action,
and for the remainder of the afternoon so pressed the
French rear that towards sunset it broke to leeward like
their van. To prevent isolation Toulouse himself had now
to fall back with the centre, and the action came to an
end as evening closed down.
VOL. II. T
Digitized by
Google
S74 GIBRALTAR AND MALAGA 1704
Each side had suffered severely, both in men and
ships, and all night the two fleets lay where they were,
repairing damages. As the hours wore on, the wind
began to back till at daybreak it was westerly, and the
French had the weather gage. The morning broke
with impenetrable haze. When it cleared away they
were seen forming line of battle with heads to the north-
ward, and Booke at once hove-to in line to receive them
with his disabled and useless ships to leeward. But it
was soon seen that the French did not mean to attack.
Galleys were towing shattered ships out of the line, they
were still busy repairing rigging, and the British began to
follow their example. So the day passed with light airs
and calms, and in the evening Booke called his council.
It was agreed that, damaged and short of ammunition
as they were, they could do no good by retaining the
position they were occupying. Having lain to leeward
of the French a whole day, challenging an attack, they
had done all that honour required, and no one could say
they had been beaten. There was nothing therefore to
prevent their making their way to Gibraltar to protect
it and complete their refit. Thither then, after distri-
buting through the fleet what shot remained, they resolved
to go, but only on the understanding that, if the French
fleet were found between them and their destination,
it was not to be avoided. They would reach Gibraltar
through the thick of it, or not at all.
It was one of those Quixotic resolutions which no
technical consideration can justify. It was thus that Sir
Bichard Grenville had founded the great tradition when
he lost the * Bevenge ' at the Azores. The same spirit
was still green, and who can say that the proud resolve
not to give way was not more than worth the risk it
involved ? Had the thing been done it would have lived as
Digitized by
Google
1704 A QUIXOTIC RESOLVE S75
one of the most heroic and inspiring pages in our history,
but fate decreed otherwise. At daybreak it seemed the
ordeal was at hand. Some four or five leagues to wind-
ward the French fleet shaped itself out of the lifting
mists directly across their path. An hour or two later,
a breeze came up from the eastward, and in stubborn
pride the allies bore on under easy sail as though no
enemy was there. / Each captain had been told to fight his
own way through as best he could, and when his lockers
were empty to press on for the rendezvous at Gibraltar,
and shift for himself. 4 Some at least had agreed to fire their
ships if they could not win through. As the allied fleet
came solemnly on, the French re-formed their line to the
northward, and in doing so gave ground to leeward. The
wind too continued very light, and the result was that by
four o'clock it was seen to be impossible to close before
dark. Booke therefore hove-to to let the crippled stragglers
close up, and ijhe desperate venture was deferred till the
morrow. But when morning broke there was not a sigi}.
of the enemy to be seen. Booke, concluding they had
gone to the Straits mouth or perhaps to Cadiz to refit,
at once made sail for Gibraltar. Still, not bo much as a
scout could be seen in the haze that prevailed, and Booke
held on blindly through the mists till he was forced to
bring-to for fear of the land. So they lay all night with
little wind and a great easterly sea. In the morning they
heard the French had not passed the Straits. Nothing
indeed had been seen of them, and the true state of affairs
began to be guessed. The bold front Booke had put on
might perhaps have frightened Toulouse into returning to
Toulon. Still no one could tell, and it was decided to lie
where they were, covering Gibraltar, for forty-eight hours,
/ to let the French attack if they would. The two days
t2
Digitized by
Google
2176 . GIBRALTAR AND MALAGA 1704
passed, and then, assured that Toulouse had abandoned
the enterprise, they put into Gibraltar Bay.
80 ended the famous episode of Velez-Malaga. Both
sides claimed the victory. Toulouse with his fleet cut to
pieces had returned to Toulon, boasting that he had
driven the allies out of the Mediterranean. Te Deums
were sung in city and camp, reaching. Marlborough's ears
on the Danube, and damping his satisfaction with the
crushing victory he had won ten days before Rooke
fought. But opposite rumours reached him too as he
was forming the siege of Landau. ' If the news we have
here,* he wrote, * of Sir George Rooke's having beaten
the French fleet ... be confirmed, we may hope that
our affairs in those parts, as well as in Italy, will soon
have a different aspect. 9 His hopes were certainly fulfilled.
( If battles are to be judged by their fruits, it was Rooke
' who had won. Toulouse had gone out from Barce-
/ lona to retake Gibraltar, and Rooke had successfully
) bairedjm way. Not only had he saved the fortress, but
I it was he who had driven Toulouse from the Mediter-
ranean. For all the Te Deums that were sung France
was quick to admit her failure. From the moment of
Toulouse's return with Jus object unfulfilled, all faith in
I .the navy was lost ; no grand fleet was again attempted,
• and the command of the Mediterranean was abandoned
( to the allies.
Digitized by
Google
CHAPTER XXXII
GIBRALTAR AND TOULON
By Eooke's stubborn fight, though the main hope of the
naval campaign had not been fulfilled, the hold of the
allies upon the Straits was secured. For the time at
least they were one step nearer the goal, and England
practically single-banded was clinging to it with an almost
desperate grasp. When the battle-torn fleet anchored in
the bay, the marines ashore fired a running salute round
the shattered fortress, and, as evening closed in, lit up
triumphant bonfires on its crumbling bastions. But for
all the good face they put upon it the future was very
dark, and the moment full of anxiety. The advanced
troops of the Bourbon army were already crossing the
neighbouring heights, the siege was about to begin, and
the admirals knew the marines must face it alone. The
state of the fleet made it impossible for it to remain.
The condition in which the too drastic bombardment
had left the fortress was almost as bad, but Hesse was as
ready as ever to undertake its defence. All he asked was
the marines of the fleet, sixty great guns and sixty gun-
ners, and a detachment of carpenters and armourers to
assist in the repair of the shattered works. All this, with
six months' provisions, and two bomb-vessels with their
tenders, the council-of-war agreed to give him. It was
further resolved that all the ships that were fit for winter
service should be formed into a squadron under Sir John
Leake and be left on the station. The rest were to go
Digitized by
Google
278 GIBRALTAR AND TOULON 1704
home with the exception of those which were too much
shattered for the voyage, and these, also under Leake's
command, were to stop at Lisbon to be repaired. In a
week all was ready, as far as could be, for the forlorn
garrison to defend itself. On August 28, to the 60und
of another salute, Rooke weighed, and for the first time
in history the Mediterranean fleet sailed homewards,
leaving a footprint behind it.
For the time it was little more. Even as Rooke sailed.
the Spanish army was gathered before it, and worse was
to be expected. That Louis and the Spaniards would
make a violent effort to recover it was a certainty. To
the Government in England it was equally obvious that
that attempt must not be allowed to succeed. Their pre-
carious hold must be confirmed. True, it was not yet a
British possession. It had been taken by an allied force,
and the flag of Charles III. floated over it. But it was a
British garrison that held it, and from the first there
seems to have been little doubt as to what the ultimate
fate of the fortress was to be. So small had been the
assistance of the allies that its capture was practically a
British exploit ; for years British statesmen had made no
secret of the price they expected for their share in the
work of preserving the balance of power ; and whether
Hapsburg or Bourbon was eventually to secure the
crown of Spain there was probably never much idea that
England would loose her hold.
So soon as Rooke came home, Sir Charles Hedges,
the Secretary of State, wrote to Marlborough for his
views. The Duke replied in words that show he already
regarded the place as a British possession. f I find it
generally agreed, 9 he wrote, 'that the post may be of
vast use to our trade and navigation in the Mediterranean,
and therefore that no cost ought to be spared to maintain
Digitized by
Google
1704 GIBRALTAR BESIEGED 979
it. But I fear the States will not easily be brought at
present to bear any share of the expense, nor do I believe
the King of Portugal will be willing to spare so many of
our men as may be necessary to relieve the present
garrison, though I know not otherwise how it can be done,
and am not in the meantime without some apprehensions
for the place, since it is certain it hath been besieged
for some time past, both by sea and land, and in my
opinion, nothing but a superior squadron can save it/ l
9 It was true that Hesse and his marines had been hard
pressed ; but, as Marlborough wrote, the immediate danger
was over. Before the end of September a French
squadron of ten of the line and nine frigates with three
thousand troops and a siege train appeared in Gibraltar
Bay. It had been detached from Toulon under the
Baron de Pointis to support the Spanish force that was
investing the place, and a fortnight later the siege was
opened in form. Hesse sent word to Leake begging him
to come to his aid at the earliest possible moment. But
Leake could not move. He had found the Lisbon dock-
yard bare. Spars, sails, cordage, everything was wanting.
Even the two regiments which, contrary to Marlborough's
expectation, the King of Portugal had ordered to Lagos
at the first call for help could not be transported to
the Straits. With Methuen, the indefatigable admiral
strained every nerve to refit his squadron, but it was nearly
a month after Hesse's first summons before he could patch
it up enough to get to sea.
Fortunately, for some reason that is not known,
Pointis did not remain at Gibraltar. Having landed the
troops and the siege-train, he passed on to Cadiz, leaving
only six frigates behind him. Hesse was thus spared an
attack by sea as well as by land, and was able to use one
1 Despatches, L 696, November 8, 1704.
Digitized by
Google
280 GIBRALTAR AND TOULON 1704
of his bomb-vessels with effect against the enemy's
trenches, till one night they pluckily burnt it. On the
land side he had not so much to fear. During the respite
that had been allowed him he had repaired the damage
of the bombardment and had much improved the de-
fences of the north front. Still day by day the enemy's
trenches grew nearer and their fire more crushing. Hesse
replied by dragging guns up the heights and pouring a
plunging fire into the French works, and was able to report
the garrison behind the crumbling walls as full of abun-
dant cheerfulness and himself without concern. Had he
known what was threatening he could hardly have been
so confident.
One dark night at the end of October, a ' forlorn ' of five
hundred men, led by a goatherd, landed unseen upon the
far side of the Bock, and, climbing by the aid of ropes
and ladders to the summit of the Middle Hill, concealed
themselves till the signal should be given for action.
Their lodgment was but the first step in a most formi-
dable plan of assault. They were to be supported by a
boat attack on the new mole, similar to that which had
captured the fortress. It was to be in overwhelming
strength, and while the garrison were absorbed in re-
pulsing it the concealed force was to fall upon their rear.
The design which had so far succeeded could hardly have
failed. Everything was ready. Hundreds of boats had
been collected about Algeciras; the troops were on the
point of embarking; the forlorn, still undiscovered, lay
in momentary expectation of the signal, when in the
very hour for action Leake came swooping into the Bay.
It was a complete surprise. Only one of the French
squadron which had been left on guard succeeded in
getting to sea, and she was quickly taken. The rest were
beached and fired by their crews. The flotilla dared not
Digitized by
Google
1704 A NARROW ESCAPE 281
stir, and the forlorn on Middle Hill had to be left to its
fate. Pinched by hunger, they soon had to come out of
their hiding place. Directly they were seen, Leake rein-
forced the garrison, and in an hour or two the whole of
the daring five hundred were dead or prisoners.
Thus for the second time Gibraltar was saved. It
was to the prompt vigour of the home authorities that
the success was largely due. Ten days previously, on
October 19, two convoys— one Dutch and one English —
had reached the Tagus with stores and transports, and in
less than a week Leake had been able to get to sea with
thirteen English and six Dutch of the line, besides
frigates and victuallers. Thus he not only relieved the
place but was able also to supply it, and by his restless
activity to afford incalculable help to the garrison.
With a naval brigade he undertook the whole defence of
the new mole, he enfiladed the enemy's trenches with
his frigates, he continually threatened their camp at
Algeciras with his boats, and generally harassed the siege
operations in every direction, and enheartened the dwin-
dling garrison with the presence of his ships. Constant
reports that Pointis was preparing to come out of Cadiz
told him his proper place was at sea. The winter storms
wasted half his ground tackle and made his position in
the Bay still more dangerous. Yet, in response to the
urgent entreaties of the hard pressed officers ashore, he
clung to Gibraltar and his galling work. Every day his
own danger and that of the garrison increased, yet it was
not till he heard that a second relief force had reached
the Tagus and was about to sail for Gibraltar with only
a couple of frigates to escort it that he put to sea to
cover the passage of the transports and storeships past
Cadiz. Even then, ill-manned as he was, he left a hun-
dred men behind him to assist the overworked marines.
Digitized by
Google
282 GIBRALTAR AND TOULON 1704
By this time the garrison was again reduced to ex-
tremity- Through sickness and casualties Hesse had not
a thousand men sound enough to mount guard. The
safe arrival of the relieving force was a matter of life and
death* and Pointis had a fresh fleet ready to stop it. Every-
thing had to be put to the hazard, and Leake, in spite of
the condition he was in, and although he knew Pointis
to be in superior force, had resolved to appear before Cadiz
and offer his adversary battle while the transports passed.
Bat fate was against him. Adverse winds kept him in
the Straits, nor could he get free before he heard Pointis
was out and had fallen upon the convoy. Seeing a fleet
off Cape Espartel flying English and Dutch colours, the
transports had borne up to join it. Fortunately it fell
calm, and the French, trusting too much to their false
colours, began prematurely to take up an enveloping
formation. The commodore of the escort immediately
took alarm. It was ' Out sweeps and boats I ' in a
moment, and, before Pointis could close, all the trans-
ports but two were out of his clutches. Some two thou-
sand infantry besides engineers and all kinds of stores
reached the Bay in safety, and Gibraltar was again
relieved. Pointis returned discomfited to Cadiz, and
Leake at the end of the year went back to the Tagus to
refit 1
The grip of the sea powers was closing on the gate of
the Mediterranean, and Louis began to grow desperate.
With the forces at his disposal he had looked upon the
recapture of Gibraltar as a matter of a few weeks. When
the first efforts, failed, the whole situation on the Portu-
guese frontier had been sacrificed to form the siege.
Still it not only held out but was growing stronger every
day, and it was clear that if it was not taken before the
i Letkrt Lift of L$dk$; Bayer, Hittory of Gibraltar, p. 188, note.
Digitized by
Google
1705 TESSfi TAKES COMMAND 288
spring the Bourbon position in Spain could not be main-
tained. Louis resolved therefore to supersede the Spanish
general by offering the services of his own commander-
in-chief, Marshal Tess6. The result was only to make
matters worse. The Spaniards were deeply hurt. In
January 1705 9 they twice flung themselves prematurely
upon the north front, determined to capture the place
before Tess£ arrived. Both attacks failed, owing — so the
Spaniards said— to the French regiments refusing to do
their duty. Meanwhile, disease and the terrors of a
winter siege were sweeping off their men in hundreds.
Leake at Lisbon, on the other hand, was in constant
touch with the garrison. He kept throwing in fresh
supplies and troops, and Pointis, idle in Cadiz, stirred no
finger to prevent him.
Tess6, the moment he arrived, took in the situation at
a glance. He saw that without the command of the sea
the enterprise was hopeless. Assuming the character of
Sancho Panza addressing his master, Don Quixote, he
wrote in humorous despair to the minister Pontchar-
train to tell him so. His disgust at the inactivity of
Pointis he unloaded upon Conde with equal playfulness.
1 The English/ he wrote, ' at any rate teach us that you
may keep the sea in all weathers, for they promenade it
like the swans in your river at Chantilly/ l Still his
advent gave things a more formidable turn. The siege was
renewed on more scientific lines, and, what was worse,
Pointis, upon peremptory orders from Madrid, hardened
his heart to come round to Gibraltar from Cadiz with
fourteen sail. The Marshal had now what he needed,
and he strenuously prepared for a grand attack by sea
and land.
1 Test* to Pontehartrain, Feb. 18, 1706 (u.), Lettr$$ ds Rett, p. 210.
Suae to Conde, Feb. 36, Mtmoiret <U Te$$4 t p. 188 et ejg.
Digitized by
Google
28* GIBRALTAR AND TOULON 1706
This was the one thing that Hesse feared, and both
Leake and Methuen grew no less anxious. Months before
they had been told that Shovell was at Spithead about to
sail with a squadron that would put Gibraltar beyond
danger. Now it was known that he was not coming for
the present. Instead, a division of his fleet was to be
detached under Sir Thomas Dilkes and Sir Thomas Hardy,
bat even of this there was as yet no news. In the
Tagus, though Leake and Methuen were stirring every
nerve, things were far from ready for sea. The ambassa-
dor protested to the home Government that since he had
been told to spare nothing, so that Gibraltar was kept, he
bad nearly ruined himself. ' The importance of Gibraltar
to England/ he wrote, ' hath made me boggle at nothing.'
Its importance, he ventured to add, would be as great
after the peace as during the war. ' My opinion/ he
urged, 'is that if the circumstances of Europe should
force a peace without the monarchy of Spain being left
in the possession of Charles the Third, England must
never part with Gibraltar, which will always be a pledge
of our commerce and privileges in Spain.' 1 Leake's
activity elicited his warmest praises; but for all the
admiral's efforts it was not till February 25 that he was
ready to put to sea. The very next day he was rejoiced
with the sight of Dilkes's squadron putting into the river
with a convoy, which brought everything he wanted.
And not only that, for Dilkes presented him with his
commission as Vice-Admiral of the White and Com-
mander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean. A Portuguese
squadron, such as it was, was also ready, and within a
week he was speeding for Gibraltar under a press of sail
with thirty-five of the line.
In vain the unhappy Pointis had protested against
1 8m his top** of llsr. 7, 1705 (n.s.) in Add. MS8. 28066.
Digitized by
Google
1705 LEAKE RAISES THE SIEGE
what would certainly happen if he was compelled to leave
Cadiz before he was reinforced from Toulon. Neither
Madrid nor Versailles would listen. Both courts were
desperate, and he had to remain at Gibraltar for Tessa's
combined attack. His own idea was to cruise in the
Straits and stop reliefs till his force could be strengthened.
Lying in the Bay, he knew he was at the mercy both of
the weather and Leake. All he could do by laying a line
of signal stations as far as Cadiz he did, but all was of
no avail. Both the dangers he feared fell on him at once.
Before the combined attack was ripe, a gale came up oat
of the Atlantic and drove two-thirds of his squadron from
their anchors away to leeward up the Straits. He him-
self with his flagship, the three-decker * Lys/ and four
others of the line managed to cling on under Cape Cabrita.
There he was still lying when suddenly, without a note
of warning from his signal stations, the head of a fleet
loomed up out of the blinding mist. It was Leake
coming down on the dying gale. To the wild swans of
the north it had come like a friend, and Pointis knew he
was doomed. He had scarcely time to cut his cables
before they were upon him. One ship immediately
struck ; two others were taken by boarding after a fair
fight; Pointis and the fifth vessel fought their way
valiantly through, but only to be driven ashore and forced
to burn. The rest were chased as far as Malaga, where
they had taken refuge ; but at the sound of the fight they
had made sail again and were soon beyond reach in
Toulon. With these tidings Leake returned to Gibraltar,
and as its deliverer entered the Bay a triumphant salute
from the guns of the fortress proclaimed that the grip of
England was set at last hard apd fast upon the Straits.
It was no less a thing than that. Tessi frankly recog-
nised that the game was lost. Whatever Madrid or
Digitized by
Google
286 GIBRALTAR AND TOULON 1706
Versailles might say, it was madness to add to the fright-
ful loss of life and resources which the attempt had cost.
Before the end of the month, therefore, he raised the
siege and returned to his task on the Portuguese frontier,
now almost as hopeless as the other. 1
Marlborough had so far achieved his aim, and the
situation for which he had been ready to sacrifice his first
campaign in Flanders was in effective operation. France
was faced on her furthest frontier in the Peninsula with
a war nourished from the sea; and the Mediterranean,
instead of being an easy means of communication
that would co-ordinate her operations in Spain and
Italy, had become for her an obstacle, and for her
enemies a pathway she could no longer bar. At the
time, the momentous revolution which had been set on
foot was barely recognised — at least by public opinion.
The capture of Gibraltar was rated at first far below
its true value — partly no doubt because of the injudicious
efforts of Rooke's friends to cry it up as a rival to
Blenheim, but more perhaps because by itself it really
was comparatively of small importance. As a station for
the protection of commerce it was of course invaluable,
and for this reason merchants highly valued it as they
had valued Tangier. But strategists had long recognised
that for the command of the Mediterranean a port in the
Straits only capable of receiving a cruiser squadron was
useless unless it was supplemented by the possession of a
place that could be made into a real naval port — a place,
that is, where a fleet could receive its winter refit. The
prospect of destroying Toulon seemed as remote as ever,
and each year it grew more evident that so long as the
1 Leake's Lift Leake ; Paul Methnen's 4 Aoconnt of hii Voyage from
Faro la Gibraltar,' March 19 to April 14, 1706 (n*), Add. MSB. 20098,
tfTiatatf.; Ooaria, it. 124 ; Doro.Ti.6S.
Digitized by
Google
1706 PORT MAHON 28T
winter squadron had to retire every autumn to Lisbon., it
was impossible to make the command of the Mediterranean^
tell effectively upon the war. So soon as the British
admiral's back was turned, the Toulon privateers and
cruisers, with Minorca for a harbour of refuge, could come
out and play havoc down the Carlist coast, while at the
same time the French transports and storeships could pass
where they were wanted without interruption, and the
commerce of Marseilles could proceed with scarcely less
disturbance. Under such conditions the war, both in
Catalonia and Italy, might drag on interminably, and the
Pope and the other Italian Princes of Bourbon sympathies
could never be made to feel the danger of their irrecon-
cilable attitude.
For those who knew, therefore, Gibraltar was but a
' ' savoury morsel to whet their appetite for more. British
Mediterranean officers had long coveted^Minorca. They
knew it well, and in the spacious mlet of Port Mahon
they recognised thefinest harbour in the Mediterranean,
Events were marking it still more clearly as the real'
key of the situation so long as Toulon remained intact.
Every seaman and every Boldier on the spot saw that
the course of the war was turning on its possession.
Louis had increased its defences and garrisoned them
with a picked body of his own marines, and the old
cry for its possession began to be dinned into the
ears of the British Government with ever increasing
importunity.
The very year after Leake had finally^ frustrated
the attempt to regain Gibraltar the ideas of the Medi-
terranean men were put forth in an anonymous pamphlet,
whose popularity and influence are attested by two rapid
editions. It was entitled ' An Inquiry into the Causes of . -
our Naval Miscarriages/ The trouble began — so the author
Digitized by
Google
GIBRALTAR AND TOULON 1706
asserts — immediately after the failure at Cadiz, when
we ought at onoe to have passed on up the Straits and
taken possession of Port Mahon. There, he argues, we
might always have kept a fleet in the Mediterranean
* superior to the French, and he proceeds to set out what
strategical results would have followed. n By stopping the
French communications with Italy, the war there could
quickly have been brought to an end. The trade of
Marseilles might have been ruined and our own have
taken its place. Majorca, with its hardy population of
mariners— most famous of privateersmen — being fervent
haters of France and Castile, would have declared for
Charles III. Naples, Sicily, and Sardinia, finding the
French unable to protect their trade, would soon have
followed suit. Not only should we have dominated the
Barbary states, but we could easily and naturally have
ousted France from the leading position at the Porte.
Other omissions he mentions — such as neglecting vigorous
enough action against the French and Spanish colonies ;
but before and above all he places this shortsighted failure
to seize an adequate naval station in the Mediterranean.
' I shall only add/ he concludes, ' that had we, according
to the maxims of all wise invaders, first secured ourselves
of a port and place of arms upon the skirts of their
dominion, as we might easily have done by seizing Port
Mahon, we should have prevented the fatal mismanage-
ment of the war. in Italy and Spain, where sometimes the
French and sometimes the allies have all the advantage
of one another by a sudden run, as happens in a game of
football; and had we kept that port after the war was
over, which could not well be denied us, we might have
made it a magazine and station for ships to command the
/ Mediterranean and protect our Straits trade, and should
; thereby have been in a condition by a naval power
Digitized by
Google
1706 MARLBOROUGH'S VIEWS »
< (without incurring any danger from standing armies) to
hold the balance of Europe in our hands, which, as it is
our natural province, is England's greatest security and I
glory.* 1
Here for the first tjme.We; havqf t -qft explicit public^
declaration of England's true position in Europe, and. oL-
the simple policy that was necessary to secure it. It is
no wonder that such sentiments rapidly carried conviction
and solidified into a settled purpose. But, clearly as the
expedient was indicated, it was long before circumstances -
permitted its achievement. One reason for this was
undoubtedly that it did not commend itself to Marl-
borough's drastic notions of warfare. Secondary or
masking operations never found favour with him so long
as there was any possibility of a blow direct at the heart
of things. He was still clinging to his original plan. I
No sooner was Gibraltar secure than he was for coin- ,
pleting what he had carried so far by flinging the whole _
weight of the British navy upon Toulon. This was his i
idea for the naval campaign of 1705, but the sailors pro- _
nounced the operation impracticable, and with his usual I
deference to expert knowledge he gave way.* But it was
only to bide his time, nor did he abandon his fund*-
mental objective and adopt Minorca as the nearest >
equivalent until he had actually tried Toulon and failed. .
/ Had the Emperor and Savoy been able to rise to his height \
f of thought and been ready to support the cardinal opera-
tion with all their force, there is little doubt, seeing the
condition Toulon was in, that success would have been
won. But they were each too intent on securing the
1 HarlHan Miscellany, vol. xi. pp. 5-28, 2nd edition, 1707.
* See Tease's * Memorandum of the projects of the enemy,' April 15, 1705
(Mtmoires, ii. 160). He had apparently received from Versailles a complete
report of what passed at the Supreme Council of War held before the
Queen early in 1705.
VOL. II. U
Digitized by
Google
290 GIBRALTAR AND TOULON 1705
fruits of victory to combine in an adequate effort or to
make the necessary sacrifices to achieve it. So, instead
_of dealing a blow that, if successful, must have brought
France to her knees, the energy of the maritime powers
was flittered away in a premature effort to place 'the
Hapsburg King on the Spanish throne.
So the war took a new turn, which kept England from
confirming her hold upon the Mediterranean. In the
first week in August, 1705, the Earl of Peterborough, to
whom was committed the new plan of operations, and
Shovell with their long-delayed fleet put into Gibraltar,
• the ruins of which place/ says a contemporary chroni-
cler, ' were a plain demonstration of the great courage,
industry, and indefatigable care wherewith the Prince
of Darmstadt had defended it against the united force
of France and Castile.' In the British flagship was
Charles EH., bound for Catalonia, to begin from there
the conquest of his kingdom. For awhile it is true the
astounding boldness of Peterborough's operations met
with a success that seemed to justify the enterprise.
Barcelona fell miraculously in September, and Shovell
went home, leaving Charles king in Catalonia. Leake
remained behind with the usual winter squadron, but as
there was as yet no British port within the Straits, it had
still to be based on^Lisbon^and little had really been done
to improve the situation in the Mediterranean.
It was there, in spite of the rejection of his design on
Toulon, that Marlborough's eyes were more earnestly
fixed than ever. It was there he saw more clearly each
campaign the vital point of the war lay, and he knew
_that if for the moment the allies had the best of it in
Catalonia, in Italy things were as bad as they could be.
Savoy was almost in despair, and Marlborough was doing
all he knew to strengthen the cause in the two seats of the
Digitized by
Google
1706 BARCELONA AND NORTH ITALY 291
Mediterranean struggle. Heinsius, the Grand Pensionary
of the States, who alone of Dutch statesmen could see to
Marlborough's horizon, entirely shared his view of their
importance. 'I am sure/ he wrote to Marlborough,
' that on these two points will turn the good or evil for-
tune of the common cause.' l The French were equally
alive to the situation, and it was known that a strenuous
effort from Toulon was to be made to recover Barcelona
before the allies could resume command of the adjacent
seas. Orders were sent down to Leake at Lisbon to do
his utmost to prevent it, and Byng was hurried to sea
with a squadron to reinforce him. Leake at once moved
down to Gibraltar, but there he heard that Toulouse was
before Barcelona with a fleet he could not hope to face.
Tessi moreover had suddenly invested the place by land
in overwhelming force. Peterborough was shut out and
powerless, and it was clear that it would be touch and go
whether the reinforcements arrived from England in time
to save the Carlists' capital.
At home, having done all in his power for Catalonia,
Marlborough was deep in a remarkable scheme for the
salvation of Savoy and Northern Italy. It was nothing
less than a design to transfer thither from the Netherlands
army twenty thousand men and himself to take the com-
mand. Apart from his growing conviction that the
struggle could only be definitely decided in the ancient
centre of dominion, the exasperating way in which his
late campaigns had been spoiled and even ruined by the
perversity of the Dutch Government and the German
generals made him long to be alone with Eugene. For
to Eugene was to be committed this year the command
of the Imperial army in North Italy, and together once
1 Heinsius to Marlborough, January IS to 29, 1706, Vreede, Com*
potj&ance Diplomatique tt MiUtaire to. p. 1.
o »
Digitized by
Google
293 GIBRALTAR AND TOULON 1706
more the Duke knew they could carry all before them.
With Lombardy and Piedmont in his hands and the main
fleet on the coast of Provence, he saw his way to a dash
into France which would give him Toulon, set the
Cevennes once more in a blaze, and cut Louis off from
the Mediterranean and all that it meant to the French
power. Bold and heroic as his proposal was, he had
almost succeeded in persuading the States to consent,
when the Margrave of Baden, not having received the rein-
forcements he expected, fell back behind the Rhine and
exposed the left flank of the Netherlands' position. The
Dutch at once took alarm. Ten thousand men were all
they would consent to detach for Italy, and that only on
condition that Marlborough remained to command in
Flanders. Without abandoning his idea, as we shall see,
Marlborough again bowed his head to the disappointment,
and, after his wont, set himself to make the best of things
as they stood. His reward was the immortal campaign
of Ramilies, which gave him the whole of Flanders from
the Meuse to the sea.
Meanwhile Barcelona was reduced to the direst ex-
tremity. The castle of Montjuich had fallen, and Peter-
borough and Leake were at Valencia, not daring to
proceed further with their inadequate fleet. It was not
till April that they saw Byng's welcome sails. By that
time Tease* had actually made his lodgment on the counter-
scarp of the city, and was preparing for the final assault.
There was not a moment to lose, and no sooner had Byng
joined than a general chase was ordered. With every
rag they could carry, the captains raced for Barcelona
without order or thought of the consequences, so long as
the leading ships could fasten their teeth in the French
fleet and prevent its escape. It was a well-judged risk.
Byng, having the cleanest ships, was the first to arrive,
Digitized by
Google
1706 SUCCESSES OF THE ALLIES
and it was to see Toulouse's rearguard hull-down towards
Toulon. The allied admirals had missed their fight,
but Barcelona was saved. At the first whisper of their
approach, Toulouse, repeating Tourville's move, had fled
and left Tess6 to his fate. For two days the gallant
marshal strove to snatch victory from defeat. But on
the third he was compelled to raise the siege precipitately,
leaving all his siege train, stores, and wounded behind.
The success was complete, and on May 10, two days
before Bamilies was fought, King Charles was able to
write to Marlborough an effusive letter of thanks for the
new and convincing proofs of zeal and concern for his
service that he had so successfully displayed.
The immediate result of this operation was that the
allies were able to advance from the Portuguese frontier to
Madrid and proclaim Charles in the Castilian capital. On
the Mediterranean side Cartagena surrendered, Alicante
was taken by storm, Ivica and Majorca tendered their
allegiance to Leake. Minorca was ready to do the same,
and Charles had particularly urged its reduction upon the
admiral. Peterborough had supported the King's proposal,
but Leake replied that the French garrison in Port Mahon
was too strong for his marines to master without the
assistance of a military force. To meet the objection .
Peterborough was for joining him with the necessary
troops, but, before he could act, orders arrived, so he said,
that he was to go to Italy to enhearten the Duke of
Savoy and consult with him and Eugene for the next c
year's campaign. The enterprise consequently had to be
postponed till his return. By that time it was too late.
With the approach of winter Leake had to leave the
Mediterranean, and the finest port within the Straits had
to be left in the hands of the French. 1
1 The papers relating to this incident are printed in Leake's Life of
Leaks, pp. 314, 269, 265. A letter from Wassenaar, the Dutch admiral, to
Digitized by VjOOQIC
• "I
294 GIBRALTAR AND TOULON 1706
Though every one recognised the strategical import-
ance of the place, the French sea power seemed too much
broken for it to cause much anxiety. Moreover there
was larger game on foot As the first fruits of bis
resounding victory, Marlborough at last saw his way to
realising the great idea towards which he had never
ceased to work. Three days before liamilies he had
written to disclose it to the Emperor and to explain
why he had been compelled to abandon it temporarily.
* I still keep my views/ he added, ' in that quarter, know-
ing how important it is to you and the allies to keep the
upper hand in Italy. We shall have twenty-eight thou-
sand men in the pay of England and the States, and I
shall try to increase them and go myself at the end of the
campaign so as to be early afield there next campaign.' 1
No sooner was Kamilies fought than he was busy
smoothing the way. Early in the year a French refugee,
the Comte de Guiscard, had proposed a descent upon
Rochefort and the Charente with the object of penetrating
to the Cevennes. Nothing could better prepare the
ground for Marlborough's great stroke, and to this object
the main fleet under Shovell was devoted. - The landing
force was to be composed mainly of French refugees;
but so soon as Marlborough saw his position secure in
Flanders he detached some of his own regiments to stiffen
it As the fleet was not ready for Shovell to hoist his
flag till the middle of July, there was small chance of its
doing anything effective. Every similar expedition in
modern times had failed, and we may well believe that
Marlborough expected but little directly. In any case it
would serve as a diversion for both Italy and Catalonia,
Leake on the subject ii misplaced among the Leake Paper* of 1708,
AU.JW&*449,L89.
1 Despatches, it 494, May 9. Cf. his letter to same effect to Sinsendorf ,
ML p. 497.
Digitized by
Google
1706 MARLBOROUGH'S GREAT DESIGN »5
and perhaps he foresaw how the move would play into
his hands. This it certainly did. Owing to the Dutch
contingent being behind time, Shovell missed the last of
the summer weather, and was kept windbound in Torbay
till the first week in September. By that time it was
obviously too late for a campaign in Guienne, and Marl-
borough astutely proposed that Shovell should cany on
and strengthen the cause in the Peninsula. The States
could find no reason for refusing, and Marlborough was a
long stride nearer his purpose.
At the same hour came news of still higher moment
for the great end. In Italy Eugene had crowned his
reputation with his most brilliant and successful campaign.
All the summer Turin had been besieged, and it seemed
that nothing could save it. But Eugene had achieved
the almost hopeless task. By manoeuvres of extra-
ordinary brilliance he had driven in the covering army,
•and as Shovell lay windbound in Torbay he had relieved
the beleaguered city. A fortnight later Charles III.- was
proclaimed in Milan, but Eugene did not rest. His
victory was followed by a series of rapid and effective
movements, which before winter set in drove the French
clean out of Northern Italy, and left the way open for an
invasion of France from the south-east as completely as
Marlborough's campaign had exposed it on the north.
Unfortunately, on the Catalonian side, things were
not so well. Even before Peterborough had left on his
real or assumed mission to Savoy, the tide had begun to
turn. Charles and his generals were learning that to
defeat Spanish armies was not to conquer Spain, and that
to'proclaim a king in her capital was not to detach her
people from the crown of their choice. The nation rose
in guerilla bands, Madrid had to be abandoned, and when
Leake was forced to retire to Lisbon at the approach of
Digitized by
Google
296 GIBRALTAR AND TOULON 1707
winter, the French were able to take full advantage of
the situation. Shovell did not reach the Tagus till
January 1707, but he at once hurried on and landed some
seven thousand men for Peterborough. It was all the
fleet could do, for a higher call compelled his immediate
return to Lisbon.
By this time Marlborough's long-deferred plan was
ripe, and the hour of Toulon had come. The great
Mediterranean arsenal was to be the main objective of
the coming campaign. Savoy and Eugene with the
subsidised troops and an Imperialist army were to attack
it by land. Shovell with the main fleet was to support
them by sea, and Marlborough, although he had been
forced to give up the idea of conducting the attempt
himself, was preparing to back it up by a simultaneous
invasion from the north. Shovell therefore was under
orders to return to his base at Lisbon and prepare the
fleet for its share in the work. In his absence Galway,
who was now commander-in-chief in Spain, made a
desperate attempt to recover Madrid, but it only ended in
the fatal day of Almanza, and the Hapsburg King was
once more confined to his Catalonian dominion. Such
warfare could indeed only be compared to the sudden runs
of a game of football, and could lead to no definite result.
It was feared that the crushing victory of the French would
allow Louis to detach troops from Spain to the defence
of Provence, and it was clear everything depended on
success, sudden and swift, at Toulon. Shovell returned
to the Carlist coast in time to pick up the fugitives from
the fatal battle, and then passed on up the Straits to join
hands with Savoy.
Had Marlborough been permitted to make his in-
vasion, had the Emperor been loyal, or had Eugene even
been left a free hand, there is little doubt that the coup de
Digitized by
Google
1707 THE TOULON SCHEME SPOILED »7
grdce would have been given. But the stare in their
courses fought against the great designCi The Dutch
would not consent to Marlborough's invasion from the
north, and the Emperor refused to co-operate adequately
with Savoy. The straits to which France had been
reduced in the last campaign had caused Louis to make
tentative efforts at peace, and the Emperor, mindful of
the partition treaties, was obstinately determined to get
Naples into his hands before negotiations could begin.
To this end, regardless of the common canse for which he
had done so little, he secured by a convention with Louis
the neutrality of Northern Italy, which left him free to
detach a force to the south. In vain the British Govern-
ment protested they could take Naples for him at any
moment when Toulon was once destroyed. The Emperor
would not listen. It was even believed in England that he
and others were by no means eager to see Marlborough's
plan succeed, since the destruction of Toulon would
leave the English and Dutch in complete command of
the Mediterranean. 1 The end of it was that Eugene
eventually joined the army of invasion with little beyond
his sword.
Even so he might have succeeded had he not been
hampered with the Duke of Savoy for a colleague. Tess6,
who was in command of the French army of the south,
had an interminable line of frontier to protect with a
wholly inadequate force. He could not tell where Eugene
meant to strike. By a well-conceived feint he was made
to believe that it was Franche-Comt6 that was threatened,
and it was not till the enemy were almost crossing the
frontier that he recognised what the real objective was.
So well had Eugene masked his aim, and so rapid was his
1 Alexander Cunningham, H%$L of Great Britain from ik* Revolution to
the Acc$**ion of Goorot I., ii. 108.
Digitized by
Google
296 GIBRALTAR AND TOULON 1707
advance with the' co-operation of the fleet, that but for his
colleague's hesitation he would certainly have reached
Toulon, which on the land side was practically undefended,
before Tesse could have gathered a garrison strong enough
to resist even his diminished force. As it was, it was a
Deck and neck race. So great was the danger that the
whole Toulon squadron to the number of over fifty of the
line were sunk to prevent their being burnt. Only two
were kept as floating batteries. But the last precious
hours were wasted by Savoy's stubbornness when Eugene
was actually within striking distance. Tesse was able to
complete an entrenched camp and to collect a garrison for
it that made surprise impossible. Without the force that
had been detached to Naples a siege was hopeless. For some
time, with no small skill and courage, both fleet and army
clung to the attempt, but a retreat soon became inevitable.
Thus one of the best planned and most necessary
operations of the war came to a fruitless issue. The
situation in the Mediterranean was still incomplete, and
it became clearer than ever that, until the French power
of disturbance was removed by some more feasible means,
the * game of football ' would never end.
Digitized by
Google
CHAPTER XXXIII
MINORCA
Toulon remained a thorn in the side of the allies. In
spite of the destruction that had been caused by ShovelTs
bombardment and by the drastic measures that had been
taken for the defence, its secondary possibilities remained
untouched. Marlborough's great design, which ought to
have lived as a worthy pendant to the immortal campaign
of Blenheim, had failed, and he and every one saw that
they must now fall back upon the minor expedient of
masking the fortress, they could not destroy, with a naval
force permanently on the spot.
Acutely conscious of the main source of their difficulties,
the English generals in Spain, in conjunction with the
Court of Barcelona, began urging the English Government
to keep a strong squadron all the winter within the Straits.
Marlborough, convinced that it was now the only possible
cure, was backing the proposal, and had given Charles's
agents to understand that the Queen would certainly
consent, if a suitable port were provided for a base.
This was the old difficulty. Spezzia was offered, but
Marlborough assured the powers concerned that it waa no
good, for the British admirals considered it unfit to provide
for the accommodation and requirements of ships of the
line. Again he showed he was no man to force naval
officers into action to which they objected on technical
grounds, and the danger of overriding their opinions had
just been emphasised in a way that could not be disguised.
Digitized by
Google
aOO MINORCA 1707-8
In returning home as usual in the late autumn, Shovell
had encountered the catastrophe which he and his school
had always foreboded. The difficulties of the navigation
caused him to miss the entrance of the Channel, and the
fleet fell among the Scilly rocks. Though most of them
escaped, his own flagship was cast away, and he himself
was found gasping on the shore of a lonely cove by a
wrecker and murdered for his rings. The loss of so fine
and renowned an old seaman could not but make a
profound impression. His place for the ensuing campaign
was to be filled by Sir John Leake, and though Marl-
borough keenly desired that he should have authority to
leave a winter squadron in the Mediterranean when his
campaign was over, he would not hear of so unprecedented
a measure being forced upon him against his better
judgment.
It is thoroughly characteristic of the greatest soldier
and war minister that England has ever produced, that
he fully understood where his own judgment ended, and
where he must bow to more expert knowledge. ' I am
making my utmost endeavour,' he wrote to King Charles
at the end of June 1708, 'to get the Queen to allow a
squadron to winter in the Mediterranean, although I per-
ceive the naval officers are of a contrary opinion, and
that they do not think that ships of war will be entirely
safe in the port of Spezzia, where they even fear lack of
provisions and other stores necessary to put the ships
from time to time in a condition for sea.' On such a
point as this the seamen's word was law to him, and he
took care, for all his fair words to the King, that the
navy men should not be forced from their legitimate
position by the insistence of the Carlist Court. A week
or two later he received the official memorandum of the
Admiralty on the practicability of the new proposal*, and
Digitized by
Google
1708 MARLBOROUGH ON NAVAL WARFARE 301
sent it on to General Stanhope, who had succeeded Galway
as British commander-in-chief in Catalonia. ' I send it/
he wrote, ' only for your information, that you may by
your insinuations prevent the Court's putting too great a
stress upon it, in case it should be found impracticable, for
it is certain our sea officers are the best judges of what
may be done with safety in this case/ Then in a post-
script he adds with his own hand, ' I am so entirely con-
vinced that nothing can be done effectually without the
fleet that I conjure you if possible to take Port Mahon
and to let me have your reasons for any other port that
I may continue to press them in England/
At the same time he wrote to Count Wratislaw, the
Emperor's minister, ' There is no one but admits the neces-
sity of having a winter squadron in the Mediterranean ; but
when all is said and done we must submit to the judgment
of the admirals and sea officers on the safety of the port and
other accommodation for ships of the line. It is certain
they are the best judges, and Sir John Leake has order for
it ; but I must tell you plainly that, so far as I can learn,
these gentlemen do not believe any port safe and fit
except that of Mahon. I have written to Mr. Stanhope
to do his utmost to make himself master of it, after which
there will be no difficulty. And pray permit me to tell yon
once more that all you can write on this subject and all the
orders that can be given in England must be entirely sub-
servient to the judgment of the fleet. That is quite simple
to understand/ To Count Sinzendorf, another Imperial
minister, he sent the same information and the same cau-
tion. ' The sea service,' he said, ' is not so easily managed
as that of land. There are many more precautions to take,
and you and I are not capable of judging them/ Still
of the paramount strategical necessity no one was a
better judge than himself, and on the sailors' conditions he
Digitized by
Google
302 MINORCA 1708
continued to press on the enterprise. Early in September
he assured the Marquis de Prie, the Imperial envoy to
the Pope, that he had long been convinced of the necessity
of the squadron, and that the only difficulty was the
admirals' insisting on a proper port being provided for it.
• But/ he added, ' I have made representations so strong
that I flatter myself we shall attain our object.' *
His confidence was not unfounded. Stanhope was
already in motion. Just as the campaign in Catalonia was
coining to an end he had received Marlborough's urgent
exhortation as well as orders direct from the Government
to the same effect, and, seeing the enterprise on which his
heart had long been set within his reach, he hurried
from the camp at Cevera with every man that could be
spared from the narrowed Carlist frontier, and in four
days was at Barcelona busy with transports.
From the fleet he had fair hope of assistance ; but
this can only have arisen from a knowledge that Leake
for some time past had been anxious to see Port Mahon
at the disposal of the fleet. The admiral, in spite of what
Marlborough wrote, had certainly no * order for it ' in
his official instructions. They contained nothing special
beyond general directions to do his best for the naval and
military situation in the Mediterranean.' On entering
the Straits therefore he had as usual busied himself with
supporting the c game of football ' in Catalonia by trans-
porting troops and stores, and cutting up the French
coastwise communications. While thus engaged he bad
received more definite orders from home. The Pope, he
was told, had been supplying funds for an invasion of the
Queen's dominions by ' the pretended Prince of Wales, 9
and had even been offering prayers publicly for his success.
1 Varlborvugh Despatches iii. 45, 471 ; iv. 81-2, 118-9, 918.
*hfk»'*IA/4cfL4ak*,v.m.
Digitized by
Google
• /
1706 LEAKE TAKES SARDINIA 303
It was an insult the Queen could not pass over, and he was
therefore to take the first opportunity of making a demon-
stration before Ci vita Vecchia and demanding the immediate
payment of four hundred thousand crowns on pain of the
last rigours of military execution in the Papal territory.
The orders were accompanied by a covering letter from
Sunderland explaining that he was really to carry them
out, if it could be done without prejudice to the main
object of the campaign, by which was meant the support of
the Court of Barcelona. 1 At the same time Charles, whose
Court and army were feeling acutely the pinch of his
straitened frontier, begged him to undertake the reduction
of Sardinia with its inexhaustible granary and its invalu-
able port of Cagliari. By the tenor of Leake's instruc-
tions he had no doubt that Charles's request should take
precedence of the demonstration at Civita Vecchia, and
especially as the Dutch admiral had insisted on referring
the matter home before he would consent to join it. To
Sardinia Jherefore the fleet proceeded. After a short
bombardment Cagliari capitulated, and Leake was .able
to inform Charles and his generals that the resources of
the island and all the war material he had captured were
at their disposal.
Leake's welcome report had just reached Catalonia
when Stanhope received his directions about Minorca.
With his own orders had come a sealed packet for Leake,
which he did not doubt contained instructions for the
co-operation of the fleet, and as it was now at liberty
Stanhope felt he could count on its support. Still Leake's
movements were uncertain. Charles had written begging
him, so soon as Sardinia was reduced, to fetch from
Naples, which was now in his possession, four thousand
1 Life of Leake, p. 884; Leake Papere, It. S8, in Add. U8S. S44S.
The order wta dated May 4.
Digitized by
Google
804 MINORCA 1708
troops of those which had been so unhappily detached from
Eugene's Toulon expedition. For the moment therefore,
when every hour was precious, Stanhope was in no little
difficulty. It is true, at the King's request, Leake had left
half a dozen ships behind at Barcelona for its protection,
but over these neither Stanhope nor Charles had further
authority. There were sufficient transports, however, and
Stanhope embarked in them what troops and guns he had
secured. At the same time he sent word to Majorca,
ordering more guns and troops to be ready to meet him, and
with the King's congratulations to Leake and the sealed
packet from home went a letter from Stanhope saying that
he assumed the secret despatch related to Minorca and
that he intended to make a lodgment there, and await the
arrival of his fleet. 1 Whether the captains at Barcelona
would take the risk of assisting him or not, he meant to
go. One of them fortunately was his brother, and he
and another resolved to stand by him. Seeing him so
determined, the others could not long resist the temptation,
and the last week in August the expedition sailed.
Meanwhile Leake had moved out of Cagliari Bay to
Pola to water his fleet and be ready for action. His
position was one of considerable difficulty. The Dutch
admiral had received orders forbidding him to assist in
coercing the Pope, the troops at Naples were not ready
to embark, and he had therefore sent to Barcelona for
further orders. It was already the middle of August,
fully lateior any new operation, and, as no orders came,
Leake made up his mind to deal with the Pope -at once
and alone. A council of war was already assembling to
formally confirm his resolve. Everything was ready for
sailing. His ultimatum to the Pope was actually drafted,
■ 8Uahope to Leake, Btioekma, Augwt 13-94, 170S, Mahon, War of
App.p.lxxL
Digitized by
Google
1708 LEAKE'S DILEMMA 305
when a felucca came in to the fleet with Stanhope's
summons and the sealed packet for the admiral. Jip far
from bidding him- support the- attempt on Minorca, it
contained a still more urgent order to punish the Pope
if he could do so without prejudice to the main scheme.
It was an extremely delicate situation, and so soon as
Leake had read the papers he laid the whole of them
before his council. Among others was an extract from
Sunderland's letter to Stanhope, in which he informed the
general of Charles's prayers for a winter squadron being
kept within the Straits. * Every one is ready to agree/
wrote the minister, ' that nothing could be of greater rise,
but the great question is : How shall such a squadron be
secure in any port of Italy from insults of the French
by a superior force from Toulon? . . I conclude upon this
head, unless we can take Toulon from the French or
Port Mahon, this thing is in no way practicable with
safety.' As there was no hope of Savoy's helping with
Toulon he concluded : ' It remains that you should dispose
yourselves to be masters of Port Mahon.' l
This and the general directions about the main scheme
were all the authority there was for supporting Stanhope.
Still, as the general frankly wrote, it was quite impossible
to reduce Minorca without Leake's assistance, since his
force, though strong enough to effect a lodgment, was too
weak to reduce Port Mahon. Under the circumstances it
is a high testimony to the sailor's grasp of the vital essen-
tials of the situation that there appears to have been no
hesitation as to what ought to be done. Naval strategists,
as we have seen, knew well enough that no Prince in Italy
could resist the pressure of a winter squadron acting from
a base within the Straits, and it was unanimously decided
as the matter of the first importance to proceed at once
1 Life of Leak*, June 89, 170*.
VOL. II. X
Digitized by
Google
906 MINORCA 1708
to Minorca and to leave the Pope and the troops at
Naples till Port Mahon was secured. It was a high and
locid resolution not only to the great credit of the officers
concerned, but worthy of remembrance as a lasting ex-
ample of sagacious naval judgment for all time. 1
Leake's action was as prompt as his. resolution. As he
had been on the point of sailing, there was no need for a
moment's delay. So the Holy Father, as the admiral called
him in his undelivered ultimatum, had respite from the
British guns, and so rapid was the admiral's movement on
his new quest that he was before Port Mahon on August
25. Stanhope was not there. Leake therefore sent two
third-rates on to Majorca to pick up the troops and stores
which Stanhope had told him were to be ready. They
returned with their charge on September 1, and two days
later Stanhope appeared with the main body of the force.
He found everything prepared for him. Leake had
already marked and surveyed a landing place, and had
ascertained the exact strength of the garrison. It
consisted of a thousand men, half of whom were picked
French marines, but the rest an old Minorca regiment
that could be counted on to do no mischief. But
Leake was still in a difficulty. The season was far
advanced, and, though he had authority to leave a winter
squadron behind him, he himself was under orders to go
home early enough to avoid a repetition of Shovell's
disaster. It was therefore high time that he was on the
1 These details are important in view of the fact that nearly all general
histories from Boyer's Queen Anne downwards practically ignore Leake's
and the fleet's share in the exploit Lord Mahon's account, which does not
mention the fleet at all, as though Leake had not been present, is particu-
larly disingenuous. General Stanhope's part was quite brilliant enough
without disguising his dependence on Leake for his success (War of Suc-
cession i* Spain, 866-5). In the Life of Leake the case for the fleet against
Boyer is set out with all the documents on which it securely rests. Burohett
tally supports it
Digitized by
Google
1708 LEAKE LANDS THE TROOPS 307
wing. Still he knew too well the high value of the enter-
prise in hand to spoil it if it could possibly be helped.
He therefore decided to place at Stanhope's disposal a
strong squadron under Sir Edward Whitaker, the officer
to whom Rooke had committed the main boat attack at
the capture of Gibraltar. 1 And not only this, for he also
took the responsibility of leaving behind him a large
number of the marines of his own ships and all the bread
and ammunition he could safely spare. In this way
Stanhope could muster two thousand six hundred men, of
whom not quite half were British, and with these a landing
was at once effected at the point Leake had prepared
about two miles from Port Mahon. The undefended
town was immediately occupied, and, having thus seen
everything in a fair way to success, Leake took his leave
and went home.
So difficult was the country between the landing place
and the castle of St. Philip which defended the entrance of
the Mahon inlet, that it was nearly a fortnight before
Stanhope could cover the ground with his siege train.
Whitaker employed the delay by sending two ships of the
line round to seize Port Fornells on the north side of the
island, in order to provide a safe retreat for the transports.
The little fort was quickly reduced, and the transports
were able to lie snug in a harbour almost as good as
Mahon. At the same time a few hundred troops and two
other vessels were detached against Giudadela, the capital
of the island. It surrendered upon summons, and thus,
when Stanhope appeared before St. Philip, its defenders
were already half beaten with bad news. Still it presented
no easy task. The works had been recently much enlarged
and strengthened, and were well armed. It was on
1 Whitaker's squadron was 18 of the lino and frigates, 1 firs-ship,
% bomb-vessels, and 2 hospital ships, besides 8 Dutoh ships.
13
Digitized by
Google
906 MINORCA 1708
September 17 that Stanhope's guns were able to open on
the outer lines, and they quickly made an impression.
In a few hours some breaches were opened, one of
them opposite to where was posted a brigade under
Brigadier George Wade, Stanhope's second in command
and afterwards famous as the great Scottish road-maker.
It had been Stanhope's intention to assault the next
day, but as soon as the fire ceased Wade's grenadiers
without orders rushed their breach. Seeing what was
happening, Stanhope moved on in support, with the
result that the disheartened enemy abandoned the
whole outer enceinte in a panic, and before night Wade
was securely established on the glacis of the castle. They
did not wait for more. A capitulation followed on the
morrow, and Minorca, so long desired and so long feared,
was thus almost miraculously in Stanhope's hands. The
Carlist sympathies of the native portion of the garrison
hadHncrlftmbt as much to do - with the" success of the
enterprise as the bold rapidity of Leake's and Stanhope's
movements ; but it was none the less a brilliant operation
that should rank at least as high as the capture of
Gibraltar. ~~
From the first it was at least as highly appreciated.
Marlborough, so soon as he heard of it, congratulated his
importunate correspondents all round that the question
of a winter squadron was now settled, and that the Pope
and the Italian Princes would have to lower their tone.
And this is what actually happened. True, the winter
Mediterranean squadron did not yet exist. Before Leake
left, Charles had begged him to order Whitaker to winter
at Mahon. But, still sticking to his first position, Leake
had refused on the ground that it was impossible till
•Mahon was properly furnished as a dockyard with all
naval or ordnance stores and conveniences for
Digitized by
Google
1708 STANHOPE LOOKS AHEAD 909
careening. With this Charles had to be content, but it
was enough. Without troubling Whitaker to call, the
Pope abandoned the French cause by solemnly recog-
nising the Hapsburg claimant as King of Spain. To
clinch matters, as soon as Stanhope's success was known
at home.. Sir George Byng received orders to take a
squadron there with all the necessary stores, and winter
in the Mediterranean. Thus not a moment was lost in
reaping the full advantage of what had been gained with
all the good effects that had been anticipated.
But it was not only from the point of view of the
war that the conquest was regarded. Before Stanhope
was well established at Mahon he had made-ttp-hig mind
that his prize must never go out of British hands. In
announcing his success to the Queen's Government he
gave it as his humble opinion that England ought never
to part with the island, since it would give the law to the
Mediterranean both in peace and war. To this end he
took immediate steps by astutely returning to Barcelona,
in evidence of his zeal for King Charles's cause, the whole
of his Spanish and Portuguese troops which he had
borrowed, and retaining only his own British. The Court
of Barcelona at once took alarm. It was one of the many
times when France, stunned by the blows she had received,
was making desperate overtures for peace, even to offering
Marlborough four million livres to secure it on terms that
would not completely paralyse her in the Mediterranean.
That Minorca was in British hands was therefore no little
cause of anxiety to the Hapsburg interest. ' Whether we
have war or peace/ wrote Stanhope again in sending home
'Wade with despatches, ' I cannot but hope we shall think
of preserving Port Mahon, and indeed the whole island.
Brigadier Wade will acquaint your lordship that I have
had some difficulties here about the government of it which
l
Digitized by
Google
*10 MINORCA 1708
are not yet over. Therefore I believe that it will be con-
venient that a commission were sent to Colonel Petit to
be Lieutenant-Governor of it, and instructions never to
admit any troops but English into the castle and forts/
Later he suggested that the confirmation of his arrange-
ments should be made a condition of giving the Portu-
guese and Carlists the further assistance they were
asking, and he never ceased to urge the strategical im-
portance of his conquest. 'Of what consequence it is/
he wrote, ' with respect to France, Spain, Italy, and Africa,
is not to be expressed,' and above all he valued it in view
of a recurrence of war with the Dutch. Indeed it was
the jealousy of the Dutch that was the main difficulty
of its being settled as part of the British reward.
Marlborough, with his wide diplomatic experience, was
particularly anxious. 'It is a very ticklish point/ he
wrote to Stanhope, 'and will need your greatest prudence
in the management of it; for as soon as it is known,
besides the improvement which the French Court and
those at Madrid will endeavour to make of it to the dis-
advantage of King Charles, I expect to hear loudly of it
from Holland for the very reasons you mention.'
Eventually Stanhope was clever enough to get bis
way, and England was to all intents in practical possession
of all that William had thought necessary to guarantee
her against the danger of a French prince on the throne
of Spain. Still the peace overtures failed and the war
dragged on. As blow after blow staggered Louis on his
throne, and the cry of his wounded people grew beyond
bearing, he again and again made almost abject bids for
peace. But the allies would not listen. Every year
Dutch, Hapsburg, and Carlist grew more grasping and
more feeble. Every year they departed more widely from
their engagements to the alliance, and more entirely left
.Digitized by
Google
1711-2 CONGRESS OF UTRECHT 811
the weight of the war upon England's shoulders. That
at last she grew weary both of her own war party and her
obstinate allies is no matter for wonder and little for cen-
sure. Holland, from sheer exhaustion, had practically
ceased to be a naval power. The war at sea had become
almost entirely a British war. So far as England was
concerned the victory had long been won, and when at
last Louis appealed to her directly she resolved to fotce
the allies to strike a balance.
The Congress of Utrecht was the result. Of all the
terms, uponwhich France won the intercession of Eng-
land, there were none that caused more bitter heart-
burning or were more obstinately clung to than those
which confirmed her in the possession of Port Mahon and
Gibraltar. Above all were the Dutch disturbed. It was
impossible to disguise from themselves tfraf their century
of naval and commercial rivalry with England was end-
ing in her becoming beyond question or reach the one
sea power. By securing the domination of the Mediter-
ranean that position would be established past hope.
Already in 1711, when Louis was trying to deal with the
Dutch as he was now dealing with England, the Grand
Pensionary had said that he was willing to treat mainly
out of suspicion of what England, was trying to get for
^herself within the Straits. 1
So soon therefore as it was known that Louis had
accepted the Queen's preliminaries the JDutchbecame
stubbornly hostile. For the Queen's .conditions, included
not only Gibraltar and Port Mahon but the concession
of the whole Spanish slave trade, thajAsiento' aa
it was technically called, and large commerciaTprivi.
leges in the Spanish colonies. It meant the complete,
supremacy of England, both as a naval and a com-
1 Swift, Last Year* of Qustn Amu.
Digitized by
Google
312 MINORCA 1712
mercial power, and they strained every artifice in concert
with the war party in England to wreck the negotia-
tions. On one condition alone were they willing to
withdraw their opposition, and that was that they should
garrison Gibraltar and Port Mahon jointly with England
and share-with her the commercial rights she was to
obtain. 1 The English would not listen for a moment.
The House of Commons bluntly declared that ever since
the year 1706 the Dutch had taken no part in maintain-
ing or acquiring the positions which had been won in the
Straits. Prom that time they had abandoned the war in
the Peninsula, contrary to all their engagements, and
had forfeited all claim to share its proceeds. Fortified
with the support of the House of Commons the Queen's
peace Government became more firm than ever. The
British plenipotentiaries were instructed, if the Dutch
persisted in the attitude they were taking, to make a
separate treaty with France. 4 For the Queen ' — so their
instructions ran — ' was determined never to allow the
States any share in the Asiento, Gibraltar or Port
Mahon; nor could she think it reasonable that they
should be upon an equal foot with her in the trade
with Spain, to the conquest whereof they had contributed
so little/
The Empire was almost as hostile as the Dutch
and sullenly supported their protests. A deadlock was
reached, "and Harley himself was sent over to break it.
On the main point there was not to be an inch of con-
cession. His instructions were ' that no extremity should
make her Majesty depart from insisting to have the
Asiento for her own subjects and to keep Gibraltar and
Port Mahon/ 1 From this attitude her Government never
• Swill, Lm$i Tmart pf Qu*n Amu.
Digitized by
Google
1718 WARD'S WORK COMPLETED 813
flinched. The panacea which William III. had been the
first to make definitely an object of British policy was by
this time thoroughly understood, and the plenipotentiaries
came out at last from the Congress bearing in their hands
that priceless treasure which has determined the position
of England in Europe from that day to this.
So in all the pomp of a European concert the seal was
set on the work which Ward, the pirate, had disreputably
begun. Timorously James I. had sown the seed without
knowledge of its nature, and scarcely aware that he had
let it fall. Cromwell, by an instinct almost as blind,
had tilled the pregnant soil, and Charles II., by a more
conscious move, had brought the fruit to his lips. But all
these efforts have more the colour of some unreasoned
intuition for dominion, some impulse of a quickening
destiny than of a real apprehension of the sources of
European power. It was not w till William III. brought
with him for British statesmen a real feeling for conti-
nental politics, that the truth took visible shape. Once 4
established in his island realm he was quick to see how
the ships could be made to give what his battalions
could not achieve. First of all men he saw that the
new and unsettled national system in Europe could
never be brought to a stable balance till the northern
sea power was free to assert itself in the ancient basin
of dominion. He saw how by that means the British
frontier could be carried unassailably up to the tenderest
borders of the old Mediterranean States which had been
wont to give the law to Europe and to count the nations
of the North Sea too distant for serious calculation.
Having divined the vital secret he never lifted his eyes
from the end, and in peace and war, by arms and diplo-
macy, he strove with unremitting effort to realise his aim.
It was not his hand that achieved it. Death called
Digitized by
Google
314 MINORCA 1713
a halt and the work was carried to completion by his
great disciple. When we think of all its wide results,
when we see how far it went to fix the European system
on its still existing lines, it seems too brilliant a jewel to
add to Marlborough's crown. We shrink from believing
that one human mind can have wrought so much. Yet
the truth is no less. To the unsurpassed richness of his
military renown we must add the greatest achievement that
British naval strategy can show. He failed, it is true, to
reach the goal he marked, but by his resolute and far-
sighted striving towards it, he gained all that was possible,
all at least that could be permanent. His failure went to
show that, for the purposes of practical strategy, France
was not seriously vulnerable from the south, but it proved
that with a dominant sea power well placed within the
Straits her Mediterranean frontier was useless to her for
offence, and that neither for her nor for any other power
could .the dream of the Roman Empire be revived.
This, as has been said, is after all the greet political
fact of the seventeenth century, and the highest claim
to its parentage rests with the British sea power. It
remains the abiding and perhaps the greatest attribute of
the Mediterranean Sea— an attribute that has become
obscured, but which is as living to-day as when the Peace
of Utrecht acknowledged it. A time was coming when
the Mediterranean was to have a wider meaning. As
the course of European empire spread eastwards to the
Indian seas, it became again the centre of the world — the
place o( arms which dominated the imperial movements
of the following century. From that point of view it has
a distinct history and a distinct import. In our day,
when the European system has grown so solid that it
seems as though nothing could seriously disturb it, the
new meaning has almost buried the old. The world*
Digitized by
Google
1718 THE FOUNTAIN OP DOMINION 816
wide empires dominate oar imagination. Yet their roots
still lie in the European system. If that is shaken, all
will shake. The main guarantee of its stability is the
British power in the Mediterranean and the general and
lasting acquiescence of Europe in the situation -which the
Peace of Utrecht founded within the Straits is a recogni-
tion of that vital truth. The Midland Sea remains still,
perhaps more than ever, the keyboard of Europe. What-
ever other attributes it may have gained, that one must
never be forgotten. In that lies the living reality of
those men of the seventeenth century whose work we have
followed. In that lies our duty, whatever distractions
may arise, to keep green the memory of those old
strategists who guided the hand of England to the
Straits.
Digitized by
Google
Digitized by
Google
APPENDIX
ORIGIN OP THE LINE OP BATTLE
Thb fighting instructions issued by Sir Edward Cecil in 1625
have a special interest as throwing a faint light on the origin
of the line of battle, which still remains one of the unsolved
problems of naval history.
The earliest instructions at present known which indicate a
close-hauled line ahead as a tactical formation are those issued
by Sir Walter Ralegh in 1617 for the fleet he took to Guiana. 1 "
It would be rash, however, to assume that they were designed
by him, or that they contain the first enunciation of the prin-
ciple. Fleet orders were almost invariably founded closely on
previous examples.- Ralegh was certainly not seaman enough
to have invented an entirely new scheme ; he had never even
been present at a fleet action in the open ; and there are many
indications that the principle he adopted was used in the latter
part of the reign of Elizabeth. The orders, in all probability,
were the common form current at the time.
The first orders which Sir E. Cecil issued followed almost
word for word those of Ralegh, which were also probably those
employed by Mansell in 1620, since there is no indication
that he drew up any new ones. As issued by Cecil they
clearly contemplate the fleet's acting in squadrons, in so many
distinct close-hauled lines ahead. The ships of each squadron
were intended to follow the squadronal flag into action within
musket-shot, 'giving so much liberty unto the leading ship,
as, after her broadside delivered, she may stay and trim her
sails ; then is the second to give her broadside, and the third
and fourth with the rest of the division, which done, they shall
1 8.P. Donu ooiii 70.
Digitized by
Google
818 APPENDIX
all tack as the first ship and give their other sides, keeping the
enemy in a perpetual volley. This you must do upon the
windermost ship or ships of the enemy, which you shall either
batter in pieces or force him or them to bear up, and so tangle
them or drive them foul one of another to their utter confusion.'
On the final day of sailing, however, Cecil amplified this order '
by a new one, which is very remarkable. It directed that
• the whole fleet, or so many of them as shall be appointed, are
to follow the leading ship within musket-6hot of the enemy, and
give them first their chase pieces, then their broadside, and
afterwards a volley of small shot ; and when the headmost ship
hath done, the next ship shall observe the same course, and so
every ship in order, [so] that the headmost may be ready to
renew the fight against such time as the sternmost hath made
an end* by that means keeping the weather of the enemy, and
in continual fight until they be sunk in the sea or forced by
bearing up to entangle themselves and to come [foul] one of
another to their utter confusion.'
Both these orders are set out in the Journal of the ' Swift-
sure/ the flagship of the Vice-Admiral Lord Essex, and are
apparently the work of his captain, Sir Samuel Argall of Virginia
fame, who was one of the most accomplished seamen of his
time. In 1617, when Balegh's orders were issued, he was
admiral on the Virginia Station and had since commanded a
ship under Mansell. The second order marks a distinct and
very noteworthy advance in tactics. For the first timo we have
unmistakably the idea of a fleet attacking not in separate
squadrons or groups, but in one column and in succession. It
is clearly a rude conception of the single line ahead. But,
curiously enough, having thus, by what means we know not,
stumbled on the final solution of the problem, Cecil im-
mediately abandoned it for something more to the taste of his
well-drilled mind. For some reason it did not please him, and
he took the first opportunity of a calm to call a council of
war and submit to it a scheme that was entirely different It
had been prepared, not by Argall but by Sir Thomas Love, his
own captain, whom Cecil had instructed to draw up articles
embodying his ideas. The fleet had already been organised in
three large squadrons, each composed of three royal ships with
some five-and-twenty merchantmen and transports. The Dutch
Digitized by
Google
APPENDIX 819
contingent was to form a fourth squadron. But beyond this
nothing had been done about ' the form of a sea fight ' in the
event of an enemy's fleet being encountered. Under the articles
which Love presented, there was to be a further sub-division.
Each of the three English squadrons was to be organised in
three divisions or ' sub-squadrons ' of nine ships, with one of
the King's ships leading. The system of attack was also
changed. For, instead of the nine vessels of the sub-squadrons
attacking in succession, they were to ' discharge and fall off
three and three as they were filed in the list ' — that is to say,
they were still to attack in succession, but in groups of three.
Such an arrangement was entirely new, and thus in the same
fleet we have not only the first mention of the principle of a
single line ahead but also of its extreme converse, the small
1 group ' unit. 1
Another noteworthy point in Love's proposal is that the
Dutch were not to be bound by it. They were expressly per-
mitted ' to observe their own order and method of fighting.'
What this was is not stated, but there can be little doubt that
the reference is to the boarding tactics, which the Dutch, in
common with all continental navies, continued to prefer to the
new English ' method ' of fighting with the guns alone. The
two ideas demanded wholly different tactics, and it is clear
that the Dutch ' method ' was already recognised as something
different from that of the English. The point is important.
For the fact that, in the Dutch fleet-orders at the outset of
the war of 1652, there is no trace of the conception of a line
ahead, or indeed of any order, has been taken as evidence that
up to that time no such system can have existed in the English
service. In face, however, of the above testimony, that the
English and Dutch methods were different, this evidence can
have little weight. 2
So. far as we have been permitted to view the scene in the
oounoil of war, the reading of Love's draft orders appears to
have been received with something like derision. 'It was
observed,' says the official account which Glanville drew up,
* that it intended to enjoin our fleet to advance and fight at sea,
much after the manner of an army at land, assigning every
1 Glnnville'B Journal (Camden 8oe. 1883, p. 15 et «?.).
* Garditur, Fint Dutch War (Navy Beoords Society), 1 MO.
Digitized by
Google
820 APPENDIX
ship to a particular division, rank, file, and station, which order
and regularity was not only improbable but almost impossible
to be observed by so great a fleet in so uncertain a place as the
sea.' The first impulse was to reject the orders in mass, but
Cecil stuck to his guns. The articles contained many excellent
orders for sparing the men, disposing them in quarters and the
like, and above all one strictly forbidding any one to open fire at
more than caliber and pistol shot, and yet another prohibiting
boarding without special order of the admiral, whereby was
enforced the cardinal principle of Drake's school, that the ship
must be first and last a gun carriage. The supporters of the
articles therefore pleaded that for the sake of the good in them
they might stand, it being understood that generally they were
to be regarded as a council of perfection and not to be strictly
enforced. This, after some discussion, was agreed to, and so
the articles were passed. As understood by those who had to
carry it out, the ' order of fight ' is thus summarised by one of
Cecil's officers : ' The several admirals to be in square bodies ' —
that is, each squadronal flag-officer would command a division or
sub-squadron formed in three ranks of three files, and they were
1 to give their broadsides by threes, and so fall off. The rear-
admiral to stand for a general reserve, and not to engage himself
in fight without great cause.' '
During the next generation there is no sign of any progressive
development. Even the tactical idea of Ralegh's instructions is
never again enjoined. Sir William Monson, writing about the
time of the Ship-money Fleets, repudiates any strict order of
battle. In Lord Iindsey's 'Instructions of 1635,' article 18,
which alone relates to a battle, is still in the Tudor form, and the
precedent is followed in the ' Instructions given by the Bight
Honourable the Committee of the Lords and Commons for the
Admiralty 9 on May 2, 1648, to Captain William Fenn, rear-
admiral of the Irish squadron. 2 These again contain but one
reference as to what is to be done in a fight. If occasion arise
to engage a hostile fleet, every captain is instructed ' to leave
the vice-admiral to assail the enemy's admiral and to match
1 • Journal of the Expedition, v 8 J*. Dom. z. 67.
• Liftdeey'f are in M<m*m'$ Tract*, bk. iii. ; Penn't are in Shane MSS.
1709, t *& O. Penn gives similar ones from an 'original MS.' which he
dales I647 f Li/4 of Pen* i. 40*.
Digitized by
Google
APPENDIX 821
yourself as equally as yon can, to succour the rest of the fleet as
cause shall require, not wasting your powder, nor shooting afar
off, nor till yon come side to side.' Thus we see that, up to
the advent of the soldier-admirals, no definite battle formation
was insisted on. The Elizabethan and Jacobean idea of an
attack in succession seems to have been practised, but the
only rule was to fight close with the guns, never to board
an unbeaten ship, and to stand by your friends.
No sooner, however, had the soldiers obtained the command
than we get at least an attempt at something more scientific
After the experience of one campaign of the first Dutch war,
the generals-at-sea issued a set of regular fighting instructions.
These are the next we have. They were signed by Blake,
Deane, Monk, and Desborough at Portsmouth in March 1653/
and contain a clear restoration of the line ahead and the germ
of a definite tactical system. Article 2 enjoins that at sight of
the enemy's fleet the vice-admiral and the rear-admiral shall
make all possible effort to come up respectively on the right and
left wing of the admiral, leaving a complete distance for the
admiral's squadron if the wind permit and there be room
enough. Here we have a picture of the fleet bearing down in
three columns at sufficient interval to allow the centre squadron
space enough to haul its wind and form line parallel with the
enemy, an evolution akin to the everyday military movement i
of advancing in column and deploying.
That a line was contemplated is clear from Article 3. It
provides that as soon as the general — that is the commander-in-
chief— is engaged, each squadron is ' to take the best advantage
it can to engage with the enemy next unto him, and in order
thereunto all the ships of every squadron shall endeavour to
keep in a line with the chief, unless the chief be maimed or
otherwise disabled, which God forbid. . . . Then every ship
of the said squadron shall endeavour to keep in line with the
admiral, or he that commands in chief next unto him nearest
the enemy/ Other articles provide signals for one squadron
relieving another that is ' overcharged/ and also for the fleet
ooming into line with the admiral under various circum-
stances.
It was on these instructions that the remainder of the war
1 Penn'i Naval Tract*, Sloans MSS. 8283.
VOL. II. Y
Digitized by VjOOQLC
322 APPENDIX
was fought. It is not surprising therefore that in the subse-
quent actions of 1653 we have the first definite statement of a
formation in a single line ahead. From the Hague we have it
recorded that on June 2, at the battle off the Gabbard, the first
action fought after the issue of the new fighting instructions,
the English ' having the wind, they stayed on a tack for half an
hour until they put themselves into the order in which they
meant to fight, which was in file at half cannon-shot.' The
suggestion is that this was certainly not the ordinary formation
of the Dutch, and there is no statement that they formed a
similar order. Again, for the next battle— that of the Texel —
fought on July 31 in the same year, we have the statement of
Hoste's imformant, who was present as a spectator, that at the
opening of the action the English, but not the Dutch, were
formed in a single line close-hauled. ' Le 7 Aoust [i.e. N.S.],'
the French gentleman says, ' je dfcouvris l'armto de l'amiral
eomposle de plus de cent vaisseaux de guerre. Elle 6tait rangta
en trois escadrons et elle f aisoit vent-arri&re pour aller tomber sur
les Anglois, qu'elle rencontra le m6me jour & peu pr&s en pareil
nombre rangez [sic] sur une ligne qui tenoit plus de quatre
lieues Nord-Nord-Est et Sud-Sud-Ouest, le vent 6tant Nord-
Ouesi. Le 8 et le 9 se passdrent en des escarmouches, mais le
10 on en vint & une bataille decisive. Les Anglois avoient
essate de gagner le vent : mais I'Amiral Tromp en aiant toujours
consent l'avantage, et l'6tant rang6 sur une ligne parallAle a
celle des Anglois arriva sur eux, &c.' This is the first known
instance of a Dutch fleet forming in single line, and, so far as it
goes, would tend to show they adopted it in imitation of the
English formation. 1
In this connection another point must be noted. In the
previous year several actions had been fought, but in no one of
them can be discovered any trace of the line on either side.
On the contrary, we have the distinct statement that in the last
action but one of the campaign, fought between Blake and
De With on September 28, the Dutch awaited the English
1 Hosts, Bvdlutumt NavdU* % p. 78. Dr. Gardiner declared himself
ccoptieal ss to the genuineness of the French gentleman*! narrative, mainly
oa the ground of certain inaccuracies of date and detail ; bat, as Hoete
certainly believed in it, it cannot well be rejected as evidence of the main
features of the action for which he used it.
Digitized by
Google
APPENDIX 325
attack, not in line or file, but ' in a close body.' l Three other ac-
tions were fought before the issue of the ' Sighting Instructions '
of 'March 1663, and those were the battle of Dungeness between
Blake and Tromp on November SO, 1652, that of Portland on
February 18, 1603, and that of Beaohy Head on the 20th. So
far as fleet tactics went the two former were probably the worst-
fought actions of the war. At Dungeness Blake was deserted by
half his fleet, and at Portland Monk, who had a flag for the first
time, was left out of action altogether. It is perfectly clear
that on none of these occasions either side formed a line. It
was immediately after these confused actions that the ' Fighting
' Instructions ' were issued— immediately, that is, after Monk's
first experience of naval warfare. We can easily understand
how galling to his strict ideas of order and discipline the lament-
able exhibition must have been. A professional soldier and
martinet of a pronounced order, he was regarded at this time as
perhaps the highest authority in the kingdom on the art of war,
and it may well have been his influence that produced the attempt
to institute a tactical system — a thing which Blake and Deane
had hitherto omitted to do. We cannot be certain, but we do
know that it was in the next action off the Gabbard on June 2,
when Monk commanded alone after Deane was killed, that we
have the first indication of a definite tactical system having
been attempted. That a substantial improvement was the
result is certain : ' Our fleet/ says an eyewitness, ' did work
together in better order than before, and seconded one another/
There is, moreover, the important testimony of a Boyalist
intelligencer writing from the Hague on June 9. After relating
the consternation which the English gunnery and refusal to
close caused in the Dutch ranks, he goes on to say: "Tis
certain that the Dutch in this fight (by the relation and
acknowledgment of Tromp's express sent hither, with whom
I spoke) showed very great fear and were in very great
confusion, and the English (as he saith) fought in excellent
order.' ' The next action was the one which Hoste's informant
described, and which an English officer present oommended as
1 a very orderly battle/
1 Captain John Mildmay't relation. Gardiner*! Pint Dutch War, U.
969.
* Clarendon M88. 46, f. 470.
x 2
Digitized by
Google
324 APPENDIX
It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that the efforts
of the soldier-admirals to introduce the line were at onoe
successful. Though it is pretty clear that, after the new orders
of 1653, the English practice was to form a true line of battle,
it is equally certain that, as a rule, it was not maintained long
after the action began. The evidence from the narratives of
the CromwelHan and early Restoration battles is overwhelming
that the old confusion soon set in, and there is really nothing
to contradict it.
The well-known passage in Pepys's ' Diary/ upon which
Granville Penn founded his argument that the line was regularly
used in Cromwell's time, has been shown by Dr. Gardiner to
be incapable of bearing the interpretation he placed upon
it. 1 Paul Hoste's definite assertion on the point is particularly
strong, and the fact that he admits the first battle of the Texel
began with the two fleets ranged parallel to one another in
single lines only adds weight to his statement that the second
battle of Texel, in 1666, was the first one in which this order
was strictly maintained. In the absence, therefore, of direct
evidence to the contrary, his statement will probably stand. 2
Nor does it stand alone. There is another little-known piece
. of testimony which thoroughly supports his assertion. It is
contained in a tract published in 1702, entitled ' The Present
Condition of the English Navy set forth in a Dialogue betwixt
Young Fudg of the Admiralty and Captain Steerwell, an
Oliverian Commander.' * They are discussing the comparative
merits of the present and the CromwelHan time, much to the
disadvantage of the former. Fudg, worsted at every point,
at last in desperation claims that anyhow the modern system of
tactics is better than the old. ■ What,' he asks, ' is your opinion
of fighting in line?' 'I don't approve of it at all,' Steerwell
replies. ' We never used it, and I think we fought desperately,
and did as good service as any that succeeded us. I'll give you
my reasons against your line. When the fleets engage in a
line, supposing the admiral's post to be in the centre and the
fight be begun by the windward squadron, the ship first begun
i O. Penn, Lift of Sir William Penn, 1 401 ; English BUtorical Review
xiii. MS ; Pepys'i Diary, July 4, 1666.
■ Evolution* Novate*, pp. 42, 78.
■ DriL Mu*. 686, d. 2 : a volume of naval tracts.
Digitized by
Google
APPENDIX 335
can only bo supported by its second ; for tbe admiral, by reason
of tho smoke, cannot see how to send her convenient succour,
for signals are useless soon after the commencement of tbe
action. Now, when we fought without a line, every one made
the best of his way to engage the enemy. We looked for no
signals, but when we saw one of our ships overcharged by the
enemy we immediately bore down to her assistance ; and if we
saw one of our own ships grappled by a fireship we came
immediately to her assistance, and, after we had cleared her, we
sheered off and stood away to the best advantage.' He then
cites La Hogue as an instance of the inflexibility of the line
preventing a complete victory. ' For my part,' says Fudg, ' I
don't understand fighting, but it is a strange thing that the
navy officers of all nations should be mistaken in the politic
part of fighting.' ' For my part,' answers Steerwell, ' I never
saw fighting in line ; but this I am certain of, that, if our
officers aro right in their method of fighting, they don't
manage their tacks to the best advantage,' meaning they are
too ready to haul out of action.
Tho evidence of this dialogue is not of course incontestable.
Wc cannot be certain of its authenticity ; still, the whole tone of
it suggests that it may well have been written by a man who
had served in his youth in the Gromwellian navy.
For the fleet of Penn and Venables that went to the West
Indies, a set of ' Fighting Instructions ' practically identical with
those of 1653 was signed by Blake, Monk, Desborough, and
Penn on March 31, 1655, and we may take it as certain that
they were tho same that were used by Blake and Montague off
the coast of Spain in the same war, although no copy of them
seems to be known. 1 What makes it certain that these in-
structions represent the lost word of the Gromwellians is that
they were adopted for the second Dutch war under Charles II.,
and formed the basis of those under which it was fought
This fact, which has a most important bearing on the whole
question, rests on tho secure basis of the ' Sea Book ' of the
1 Royal Charles,' the flag-ship of the Duke of York, which still
exists among the invaluable navy papers of Lord Dartmouth.
The first ' Fighting Instructions ' that it contains, which we may
presume were largely inspired by Sir William Penn, his Captain
1 G. Penn, Lift of Pmn, ii 76, where Penn's orders are set out in folL
Digitized by
Google
326 APPENDIX
of the Fleet, are practically identical with those of 1653 and
1655. They are not dated, but are immediately followed by
three 'Additional Instructions' which further emphasise the
importance of endeavouring to keep a single line. These are
dated April 10, 1665. Then follow a set of ' Sailing Instructions/
dated November 16, 1666, and these again are followed by a
further set of ' Additional Instructions to be observed in the
next fight.' This last set contain further directions for keeping
the line and, for the first time, instructions for a tactical move-
ment for cutting the enemy's line and concentrating on the
isolated portion. They also introduce an article imposing the
penalty of death upon a commander who, being out of the line,
endeavours to fire over it at the enemy.
These new provisions are clearly from their position in the
' Sea Book ' not earlier than the ' Sailing Instructions ' of
Nov. 16, 1666. This enables us to fix the date of the famous
• Fighting Instructions ' of the Duke of York, upon which it is
usually supposed the second Dutch war was fought. For
these • Instructions ' incorporate the second set of ' Additional
Instructions,' and were therefore subsequent to Nov. 16, 1666.
As no action wis fought after that date it is clear we must
regard the war as having been fought under Blake's and Monk's
' Instructions ' of 1653, as amplified by the ' Additional Instruc-
tions ' of April 1665. 1
Summing up the general results of this series of ' Instructions '
we may say, firstly, that the close-hauled line ahead appears to
have been a gradual and normal development, starting in
Elizabethan times, halting during the period of peace between
Charles I.'s war and the Commonwealth, and revived and
solidified when the soldier-admirals brought their instincts for
a tactical system to bear upon naval warfare.
Secondly, that although the line was conceived as a tactical
1 It is unnecessary here to set out the articles in detail, as it is intended
to publish the whole of Ihem in a forthcoming volume of the Navy Records
Society, at whose disposal Lord Dartmouth has kindly placed the originals,
and by whose courtesy I have been permitted to see them. A copy of the
complete set of ' Instructions ' will be found in Oranville Penn's Life of Penn t
iL 605. Another and amplified set is among the Dartmouth MSS. counter-
signed • W. Wren,' who was secretary to the Duke of York from 1667 to
167S. This is probably the final form. Copies of all the earlier sets are
also in HarUia* U8S. 1347, but in some chronological confusion.
Digitized by
Google
APPENDIX 327
system in the first Dutch war, its advocates were not able to
enforce it till practice and experience, about the end of the
second war, had produced minds that believed in it and the
skill to use it. This is all that can safely be extracted from the
famous conversation between Penn and Pepys about the 'Four-
Days' Battle ' in the first week of June 1666. The passage in the
1 Diary "is as follows : ' Sir William Penn came to me and we
talked of the late fight. He says we must fight in line, whereas
we fight promiscuously to our utter and demonstrable ruin, the
Dutch fighting otherwise, and we whenever we beat them/
The inference is clearly, not that the Dutch fought in line and
that we did not, but that, although the line was known and
approved by such men as Penn, it was observed in some actions
and not so well in others, owing to the fact, as Penn himself
explained, ' that our very commanders, nay our very flag officers,
do stand in need of exercising amongst themselves and dis-
coursing the business of commanding a fleet/
It must also ta remembered that Penn was not present at
the battle, and that after all this is only Pepys's gossipy report
of what be said. It could not in any case stand against the
clear and direct testimony we have that the battle was fought
in line. We know from the official narrative that, as the enemy
were sighted, Monk made the signal for ' line of batalia,' and we
have a contemporary plan showing the two fleets engaged in
parallel single lines. 1 We also know that it was in this very battle
that Armand do Gramont, Comte de Guiche, was so deeply im-
pressed with the l)oauty of the English line. ' Sur les six heures
du matin/ he says of the second day's proceedings, • nousaper-
(ftmes la flotte des Anglois qui revenoit dans un ordre admirable i
car ib marchent par le front comme seroit une armto de terre, et
quand ils approohent ils s'etendent et tournent leurs bords pour
combattre, parce que le front a la mer se fait par le bord du
vaisseau.' Again, later on he says : ' Ken n egale le bel ordre
et la discipline des Anglois : que jamais ligne n'a M tirfe plus
droite que celle que leurs vaisseaux forment.' He further makes
it dear that the Dutch captains neither approved nor observed
the rigid line, believing that a looser formation gave a better
chance for their boarding tactics. Later on in the action, how*
'+ » See • Narrative * and the plan entitled • A Model of the Fleets ss they
were drawn op to fight ' in Add. MSS. 32004, f. 1S7.
Digitized by
Google
-—^i
328 ^APPENDIX
ever, he says thai ' De Ruyter de son cdte appliqua toute son
industrie pour donner une meilleure forme a sa ligne ....
Enfin par oe moien nous nous remlmes sur une ligne parallele
.a celle des Anglois.' Guiche himself had no doubt as to
which was the better system. In his final criticism of the
actions he says : * A la verite 1'ordre admirable de leur armee
doit toujours etre imite et pour moi je sais bien que si je etois
dans le service de mer, et que je commandasse des vaisseaux du
roi, je songerais a battre les Anglois par leur propre maniere
et non pas avec celle des Hollandais et de nous autres, qui
est de vouloir aborder.' It is abundantly clear therefore that
Guiche at any rate regarded the new line of battle as an
English device to develop to the utmost their favourite method
of fighting — that is, crushing the enemy by gunfire— as opposed
to the boarding tactics adopted by a'll other nations. 1
We are further entitled to assume that the new battle
formation arose out of the ' Fighting Instructions ' of 1653,
since we now know that it was under these ' Instructions ' as
amended by the Duke of York the battle that Guiche describes
was fought, and that it was also under them was fought the
battle of June 3, 1665, off the Texel, at which Hoste says the
battle order of two opposing parallel lines close-hauled 'fut
ezactement garde pour la premiere fois.'
Finally we may say that the oft-repeated assertion that the
line ahead was invented by the Dutch and copied from them by
the English does not rest on any shred of direct evidence that
lias yet been produced. The impression appears to have arisen
from reading into Penn's remarks to Pepys something that he
certainly did not say, and disregarding something that he did
say. Against any such interpretation of Penn's meaning we
have firstly all the direct testimony given above that the English
were at least attempting to flght in a strict line when the Dutch
were still content with their old scrambling group tactics, and
secondly the unimpeachable fact that Tromp's orders of June 20,
1652, contain no reference whatever to a line of battle but only
to subdivision^ groups. 3
1 Htmoire* du Count* de Guiche conccrnant les Provinces- Units des Pays-
Bas\eic^ servant de supplimcnt d eenx tfAubry dn Maurier et du Comte
eTEsirades, pp. 249, 251, 255, 266, London, 1744.
■ Gardiner • First Dutch War, I 821.
Digitized by
Google
APPENDIX 329
The belief that the organisation of fleets into squadrons
was also a Dutch invention is still more difficult to account for.
Even Dr. Gardiner, whose caution in dealing with naval tactics
is exemplary, shared it. ' The division into three squadrons,'
he says, ' which had been first displayed in the battle off Port-
land (Feb. 1653), was imitated from the Dutch practice.' ■ Yet
nothing is more certain than that the division into three or
moro squadrons had been employod in every English fleet of
sufficient size for a century at least, and in every large Mediter-
ranean fleet from time immemorial. Apart from this it is
certain that Blake's fleet in 1652 was divided into the usual
three squadrons, under the admiral, vice-admiral, and rear-
admiral. In Vice- Admiral Pcnn's letter to an intelligence
officer of the Council of State, dated October 2, relating to
the action off the Kentish Knock, he says : ' Our General not
having above three of his squadron . . . and I with most of
my squadron very near him, I sent to know of the General if
I should leave him and bear up among the enemy with my
squadron.' And again : ' Wo ran a fair berth ahead of our
General to give room for my squadron to lie between him and
us.' * It is possible that Dr. Gardiner was thinking of the nine-
fold division which was established by the 'Fleet Orders' of
January 1653. By these orders each of the three usual squadrons
was assigned its distinguishing flag — red, blue, and white respec-
tively — and each was divided into three sub-divisions under
their respective admirals, vice-admirals, and rear-admirals.
Such an organisation was of course peculiarly well adapted to
the group system of the Dutch, and may possibly have been
adopted directly from them. We know, at any rate, that
Tromp had organised his fleet on this system as early as June
20, 1652. Still it may be doubtod whether even this idea was
purely Dutch, sinco, as we have soen, Sir Edward Cecil
attempted to introduce a similar system of 'sub-squadrons' as
early as 1625.
1 Commonwealth avd Protectorate, ii. 820, and ef. 156.
* Gardiner's Vint Dutch War, i. 276. For the squadronising of
Henry VllL's fleet in 1545 see Drake and the Tudor Navy, L 51 et $eq. ; for
that of 1588, ibid. ii. 177-8, 244-6 ; for that of Drake and Norrey* in 1580,
ibid. 824-6. For the first use of sqnadronal flags in 1596, Naval MueeUany
(Navy Becords Soc.), i. 28 et seq.
Digitized by
Google
Digitized by
Google
INDEX
AniOAiL,' the, i. 62
Actions, naval, i. 80, 31 ; Ribera .
ami Veniero (1617), 48, 64 ; off
Gibraltar (1618), 87, 88; Cape
Gata (1643), 160; Orbitello (1046),
172 ; Blako nnd De With (1652),
198 ; Monte Christo (1652), 251- .
253 ; Kentish Knock, 258; Leghorn, !
266-7; North Foreland, 270; Four !
Days' battle, ibid*; Dardanelles, J
297 ; Lowestoft, ii. 56 ; in Second '
Dutch War, 60, 61, 70; Solebay
and Texel (1673), 75 ; Stromboli,
93 ; Augusta, 95 ; Beachy Head,
145, 270; La Hogue, 146, 149,
163; Malaga, 271-8; Texel
(1665), 268
Adams, Captain Thomas, i. 283 n.,
303 n. *
Admiral, rank of, ii. 176 n.
Admiralties, Dutch, i. 239, 242;
French, 164-5, ii. 65; Spanish.
(See Almirantazgos) i
Admiralty (English), Cran field's
reorganisation of, i. 79-80 ; Henry
VIIL'fl, 164; Elizabeth's, 165;
Buckingham'^ 165; under Com-
monwealth, 189, 194. {See also
Cranfield)
Adriatic, i. 8, 14, 15, 86, 45<*seg.,
54, 59 ; wedding of the, 61, 64,
156, 171 ; French operations in,
ii. 217-8, 280-1, 237
' Advance,' the, i. 248
• Adventure/ the, i. 211, 217 u*, 229-
230
£)gean Sea, i. 299. (See also Archi-
pelago)
/Etna, ii. 95
Aix-la-Chapelle, treaty of, ii. 64, 66
Albania, i. 47
Albert, Archduke, governor of
Spanish Netherlands, L 55, 89,
101 i
Alboran Island, ii. 82 u.
Albucemas, i. 831, ii. 82 n.
Albuquerque, Duke of, ii. 86
Alcudia Bay, i. 120-1, 304, 314 n.
Alexandria, i. 14, 28
Algeciras, ii. 280-1
Algiers, i. 7, 12, 15, 17, 51-2, 93-4.
118; its reputation, 124; Blako
at, 812; Sandwich at, ii. 24-6;
Lawson at, 27,42; All in at, 70;
Duquesne at, 140; Dey of, i- 12,
311
— expeditions against, i.HSet aeq~*
169, 307-8, ii. 11, 22.5. 44, 70-1,
99
— naval power of, 1. 15, 51, 88
— redemption of captives at, L 240,
ii. 59
Alicante, i. 117-8, 121, 124, 127,
130, 218, 303, 318-4, 316, ii. 173,
179, 182, 293
Alicudi, ii. 90
Allin, Admiral Sir Thomas, com-
mander-in-chief in Mediterranean,
ii. 47, 49-50. 70-1, 112, 115, 184
Almanza, battle of, ii. 296
Almirantazgos, i. 147, 151
Almonde, Admiral Philip van, ii.
198, 211, 229, 238
Altea Bay, ii. 246
Amazons, North's expedition to the,
i. 102
America, North, English colonies in,
ii. 62, 66
• Amity,' the, i. 288 n., 306 ft., 814-5
• Andrew,' the, i. 283 n., 806, 822 m.
Anne, Queen of England, ii. 202,
230, 240-1, 298, 800
Anne of Austria, Queen Begent of
France, L 178
* Antelope,' the, i. 114, 180, 248,
259
Appleton, Csptain Henry, comman-
der-in-Chief in Mediterranean,
Digitized by
Google
INDEX
L 240, 243; at Leghorn, 244;
blockaded by Dutch, 247-254,
257-60; his mistakes, 261; de-
struction of his squadron, 264-6
Apuglia, L 287
Aragon, Don Otavio de, i. 25, 26, 69
Archipelago, i. 26. (See also iEgean
Sea)
Ai&dL Sir Samuel, i. 114, 152, ii. 318
Arlington, Henry Bennet, Earl of,
ii.130
Armada Invincible, La, Osana's
ode to, i. 21. 24
Armament of men-of-war, i. 29, 114,
197-8, it 267 ».
Army, standing, its influence on
navy, i. 195-6, 225. (See also
New Model. Soldiers)
Ascham, Anthony, murdered at
Madrid, i. 209
Asiento, the (Slave trade), ii. 311-2
•Assurance,' the, L 229-230
Aston, Sir Walter, ambassador at
Madrid, i. 104, 117, 122, 124
Augsburg, league of, ii. 144; war
of, 145 e t seq.
Augusta, battle of, ii. 95-6
Austria, Don John of. See John
of Austria
Aylmer, Admiral Matthew, Lord, ii.
135, 173
Ayscue, Admiral Sir George, i. 200,
237, 241-2, 263
Azores, I 15; expedition to (1597),
70, 151 ; Penn at, 228-9, 236-7,
tt\ 199, 262
Baas, Baron de, i. 279
Baden, Margrave of, ii. 253, 292
Badiley, Admiral Richard, renr-
admiral off Lisbon, i. 210-12,
215-6; sent into Mediterranean,
237, 240, 243, 245; tries to join
Appleton, 247; his antecedent^
248-9 ; intercepted by Van Galen,
249-54; tries to release Apple-
ton, 257-66; driven from the
Mediterranean, 267 ; comes home,
269; returns to Straits as Blake's
vice-admiral, 279, 282-3, 295,
297 ; at Porto Farina, 806-8; vice-
admiral to Blake and Montague,
822,327,330; death, 334
Balearic Islands, 1 294, 802, 813, ii
40,166,173
Ball, Captain, L 229-80
fiatie,L163,834,ii.24,31
Banks, Chevalier, i. 303 ».
Barbarossa (Turkish admiral), i. 7
Barbary States, naval power of, i. 6,
7, 13, 18, 19, 23, 298-9, ii. 70;
treaties with, i. 301,312, 825,339,
ii. 33, 47, 99, 230, 237. (See also
Algiers, Morocco, Tripoli, Tunis)
* Barbary,' the, i. 114
Barcalongas, ii. 79
Barcelona, 1. 169 ; taken by French,
245, 254; retaken, 256, ii. 87;
threatened by Noailles, 159,
I 161-2 ; relieved by Russell, 164-5,
( 174, 179 ; taken by French, 186 ;
I Booke at, 245 ; relieved by Byng,
| 291-3; 262-3, 299, 302-4
Barillon, French ambassador, con-
I cerned in evacuation of Tangier,
ii. 107-8, 110, 117, 127, 130, 137
Barker, Andrew, his book on Ward
and Danttkcr, i. 13
Barneveld, Johifcof, i. 36, 42
Barrier fortresses, the, ii. 193,195-6
; Bart, Captain, i. 252
Batten, Captain William, Vice-Ad-
i miral of England, i. 185; turns
i Royalist, 186-7; returns to Par-
I liament, 187
Battles. See Actions
Bavaria, Duke of, ii. 187, 190, 239,
253
Bayes, Marquis of, i. 332
• Bayona Islands, i. 160, 327
: Beaufort, Francois de Venddme, Duo
j de, ii. 84; at Gigcri, 47-9; at-
tempts concentration in Channel,
53-5,58-62; killed, 68, 70
Beaulteu, Sieur de, i. 18
Beckman (or Boeckmann), Sir Mar-
, tin, ii. 89-40, 178
t Belasyse (or Bellasis), John Lord,
governor of Tangier, ii. 50
— General Sir Henry, ii. 214
Belem Castle (Lisbon), i. 20
Belle Isle, L 167
Benbow, Admiral John, ii. 199,
j 212
' Bentinck. &* Portland
I Berkeley of Stratum, John, 8rd
| Lord, ii. 159-60
Berry, Adm. 8ir John, ii. 126, 184
' Betty,' the, L 813
Beuzus, i. 331 n.
Bishop, James, a pirate, i. 15, 18
Biserta, naval station of Tunis, i. 26,
89,235
Blake, Capt. Benjamin, L 229-80,
283*., 808 n.
Digitized by
Google
INDEX
333
Blake, CoL Robert, general-st-sea,
i. 191-8; at Kinsale, 201-3 ; pur.
sues Rupert, 205-6 ; before Lisbon,
807; arrests Brazil ships, 208;
joined by Popham, 209; blockades
Tagus, 210-2; in sole command,
213; engages Rupert, 218; cap-
tures Brazil fleet, 214 ; raises the
blockade, 215-6; his chivalry,
217; enters the Straits, 218-9;
effects of his work, 221, 224.7,
231; superseded, 222; his
triumph, 223 ; commander* in-
chief, 241-2; fights Tromp, 243,
245-6 ; seises the French trans-
ports, 253-5 ; in First Dutch War,
258, 261, 263, 266, 268; legends,
274 ; mission to the Mediterranean,
274-6 ; alann of the Powers, 278;
he sails, 281-2 ; his fleet, 283 n.\ m
its effect in France, 284-5; his*
objective, 286; holds the Straits,
287; his cruiser discipline, 288;
misses Guise, 289; at Leghorn,
291-3, 297-8; turns Crusader,
299-300; operates against Tunis,
300-6; bombards Porto Farina,
307-9; his further intentions,
311 ; ordered to Toulon, 312 ; his
orders changed, 313 and note ; at
Malaga, 314-5 ; end of his cruise,
316-7; its effects, 818-20; asks
for a colleague, 321 ; his abortive
campaign against Spain, 322-88 ;
its moral effect, 327-30; his
death, 834 ; his tactics, ii. 820-3
Blavet, i. 143
Blenheim, battle of, ii. 264, 286,
299
Blockades, i. 28, 827, ii. 88, 98. (Set
Kinsale, Lisbon)
Boer, Admiral van, i. 253
Bohemia, revolution in, i. 83, 96,
100, 108
Bomb-vessels, ii. 140, 153, 158 n.,
177, 230, 267 n., 286
Bombardments, i. 306-9, ii. 24
Bombay, ii. 5, 7, 9, 17.
• Bonaventure,' the, L 244, 257, 259
•Boneta' sloop, ii. 79*.
Booms as harbour defences, i. 128,
ii. 25, 71, 224
Booth, Captain Sir William, ii.
134-5
Bordeaux, i. 205, 220, 258
Bordeaux, Marquis de, i. 278, 381,
284-6, 291, 803 n., 805, 811
Boufflers, Marshal, iL 186
; Boyes, Captain, i. 127 n.
1 Bragansas, revolt of the, ii. 4;
| English marriage, 4-9, 7
Brandenburg, Elector of, iL 16
I Brazil, Dutch in, L 145, 151, iL
1 28
— fleets, L 208, 214, 221-2, 297-9,
231, 826, ii. 262
Brest, i. 240, 255-6, 278, 289, iL
149-50; attempt to destroy, 155-
160 ; in war of Spanish suooessioa,
199. 211-2, 218, 245
Breues, Monsieur de, hit mission to
• Barbary, i. 13 n.
Breze, Duo de. Grand Matter of
I Navigation, i. 168; his Mediter-
ranean campaigns, 169-72, 176
I Bridgewater, i. 192
1 'Bridgewater,' the, L 283 fk, 809,
323 n.
Brigantines, iL 158
. Brill, i. 36
Brindisl as naval station, L 45-9.
i 48, 58, 59, 60-8, 262
! Bristol, L 201; siege of, 192
Bristol, George Digby, Earl of, iL 7.
(See also Digby)
•Bristol,' the, i. 822
• Britannia,' the, ii. 156
Bruce, Colonel Henry, L 155-9, 890,
824
1 Bucentoro,' the, i. 61
Buckingham, George Villiers, Duke
of, i. 62, 69 ; Lord High Admiral,
79-80, 84-5, 98-4, 104, 129, 190
134, 187; as war minister, 199,
144, 147-50, 152 ft $eq., 189-90,
268
Buenos Ayres, ships from, iL 245
Burchett, Josiah, Admiralty Secre-
tary, iL 141, 167 n.; on origin of
the Marines, 906-9
Burghley, William Cecil, Lord, bis
naval administration, L 69, 165
Burlings, the, L 210
Burnet, Bishop, L 914-5, iL 17,
141, 210, 282
Business men at the Admiralty,
i. 75-81
Button, Admiral Sir Thomas, L 119-
114, 121, 128, 126-7, 180-1, 199,
152
Button, Lieutenant, his nephew,
L127is.
Buiemo. Su Albuoemai
Byng, Admiral Sir George (Viscount
Torrington), L 2; iL 78 m* 228-4,
287, 246, 256; bombards Gib-
Digitized by
Google
354
INDEX
raltar, 258-60; at Malaga, 264-
965, 991-9, 809
Gabbssa, L 808 «.
Cabrita, Gape, H. 985
Cadiz, L 85 ; its strategic Importance,
iL 85-6. 188-9, 197, 909, 917;
expedition against (1596), i. 69,
111, (1625) 146, 160, it 6;
ilanseU at, L 180-1 ; as British
naval base, L 910, 214-8, 931,
837, 986. 813, 316 -7, ii. 154, 160,
167-71, 174; as Dutch base, iL
28 ft sec- 85, 50, 80, 86, 147;
blockaded by Blake, i. 899-88;
in war of Spanish succession, ii.
194, 197, 909-4, 210; failure to
take, 914-9, 931, 984, 245, 259,
954-5, 969, 279-85
Cagliari, L 190, 919, 984, 986 ; as
British base, 809-4, 810-19;
taken by Leake, ii. 803-4
Calabria, L 987
Calais, L 955, 980, ii. 188
Callenburgh, Admiral Gerard van,
iL 151, 154, 160, 173, 189
Canaries, trade with, L 904
Candia, siege of, i. 297, 999, ii. 67-
69, 70 ; a school of arms, 114
Gandiote war, L 995-800, 804, ii.
67-70
Canea,L995
Cape Verde, iL 44, 47
Carew, Sir George (Earl of Totnes),
L139
Carleton, Sir Dudley (Lord Dor-
chester), L 89, 90, 105, 107, 157
Carniola, L 85, 48
Carracks, East Indian, i. 14
Cartagena (Spain), i. 19, 118, 198 ;
Blake at, 919-90, 813-4, 816,
IL993
— (Spanish Main), iL 186
Carteret, Sir George, Treasurer of
the Navy, ii. 13, 38
Casale,iL179,185
Cascaes Bay, L 906, 208
Caason, Edward, L 301, 311-2
Caatellamare, L 287-9
Cestleha ven, L 202
Catatonia, operations in or against,
L 168-9, 178, 199, 819, iL 87,
104, 148, 154, 157, 159, 174, 181,
941, 945, 949, 990 et **., 801-9
Catherine of Bragania, L 10
Catinat, Marshal, ft. 148, 196, 901
Cave, Captain Easabey, L 114 w.
Cecil, Sir Edward, Viscount Wimbler
don, L 152-60, ii. 6, 817-20; his
nickname, i. 161
Celidon, Gape (Cyprus), action off,
i. 31 36
• Centurion,' the, i. 62, 114, 313 n.
Cette, ii. 234
Ceuta, L 123, ii. 36, 189, 190
Cevennes, Protestant rising in, ii.
234-5, 237, 292, 294
Cevera, ii. 302
Gezimbra Road, L 807
Channel guard, i. 10, 240-2
Charente, River, ii. 294
Charles I. (of England), as Prinoe
of Wales, i. 34, 79, 113; his
marriage, 84, 89, 134, 137 ; King,
143 ; his naval policy, 162-3, 180-
182, 195, 248; his death, 188
Charles II. (of England), in exile,
i. 186-7 ; lands in Scotland, 241 ;
his marriage, ii. 4-9 ; his devotion
to Tangier, 10, 45, 116-7, 122-3,
142 ; said to favour its evacuation,
192-3; his farewell to it, 141;
his imperialism, 19-90, 39-8,
141-2, 313; tortuous relations
with Louis XIV., 83-4, 89, 102 ;
approached by William of Orange,
97-8, 102, 104; his political
triumph, 124; ceases to reign,
126-9; death, 144; as a naval
expert, 141-2
Charles V. (Emperor), i. 8, 9, 124,
ii. 257
Charles II. (of Spain), ii. 187 ; death
of, 193, 195
Charles III. (Archduke of Austria
and titular King of Spain), ii. 190,
904-5, 238, 245, 248-9, 278, 290,
293, 295-6, 299, 800, 303-5, 808-
810; authorises Books to take
Gibraltar, 956
' Charles ' galley-frigate, ii. 78
Charles Gustavus (of Sweden), L
329 ii 81
Chateau-Renault, Comte de, ii. 155,
161, 196, 199, 212-3, 218, 220-6
Chatham, i. 186, 242 ; Dutch at, ii.
62, 74
Chercel, i. 96
Chidley. See Chadleigh
Chios, i. 26
Chits, the, iL 107
Cholmley, Sir Hugh, engineer, iL
87, 64, 76
Christina, Queen of Sweden, i. 836
Chudleigh, Captain John, L 114, 152
Digitized by
Google
INDEX
335
Churchill, Admiral George, it 909,
282
Cinque Porte, i. 91
Cisneros, Don Josef, il. 222
Ciudadela (Minorca) taken, ii. 807
Civil war (in England), i. 164 j re-
newed at sea, 188
Civita Veechie, L 278, 292, 880;
Anne orders naval demonstration
at, ii. 808-5
Clarendon, Edward Hyde, Earl of,
attitude to the Bragansa marriage,
ii. 7-9; and to sale of Dunkirk,
12-14, 16 »., 182
Gobham, Capt Nathaniel, i. 288 w.,
806
Coke, John, at the Admiralty, i.
75-6; 'his report on the navy,
76-9; on naval administration,
80; his minute as Secretary,
91-2 148
Colbert, Jean Baptiste, i. 257 n., ii.
8, 82, 85, 47, 54-5, 57, 64-5;
covets Tangier, 72-8, 84, 96, 207
Colonies as subjects of reprisal, i.
275
Colonna, Admiral Fabrisio, i. 1
Commerce destruction, heresy of, i.
231
Commerce protection, theory of,
revolutionised, i. 225-8; Dutoh
system of, 239, 242; English,
240, 243 ; under Commonwealth,
ii. 22 ; under William III., 152-8
Commissions, Royal, on corsairs,
i. 51 ; on navy, 70 et seq.
Commonwealth, the, its position
in Europe, i. 179, 199, 204, 224-5 ;
threatened by naval coalition, 201,
207, 215 ; takes a high tone, 214,
219, 221; naval administration
of, 242-8
Como, Lake, i. 108
• Concepcion,' Nuestra Seftora de, i.
30 n.
Conde, Louis II. de Bourbon, Prince
of, i. 172-8 ; tempted by Masarin,
174-5, 177
Conde 1 , Henri Jules de Bourbon,
Prince of, ii. 288
• Consilium JEgyptiaoum,' Leibnitz's,
ii. 60
'Constant Reformation,' the, L 85,
114, 180, 186, 211-2, 219, 282,
286
'Constant Warwick,' the, i. 188-4,
186-7, 195, 210, 244, 249, 250-1,
Constantinople, L 7, 28, 810
Contraband of war, i. 131, 827
« Converting ' the, i. 114
Convoys, West Indian and American,
i. 15, 25, 84, 228-9; growth of
system, 226-8. (See also Plate,
Smyrna, and Brazil fleets)
Conway, Sir Edward (Viscount
Conway), Secretary of State, L
148
Coote, Sir Charles, i. 200
Corsairs, the Barbery, rise of their
power, i. 7; success of, i. 20;
defeats of, i. 20, 24-6, 89, 99,
124-5, 285; political aspect of.
i. 51-2, 62, 86, 88, 90, 9*-7, 116,
119, ii. 11, 99-100, 102; treaties]
with, i. 90, 92; coalitions against,
i. 90, 91, 108, 105-7, 115. (See
also Barbery States, Algiers.
Tunis, Tripoli, Salee, 6c)
Corsica, i. 8, 150, 173, 285, 250; as
a possible English base, 281
Corufla, ii. 27, 57, 208, 210-11,
218
Cottington, Francis, Lord, at Madrid,
i. 05
Cotton, Sir Robert, as naval re-
former, i. 72 et **g.
Cotton, Sir Thomas, i. 72
Council of war, the supreme, L
139-40, 145-50
' Cooronne,' la, i. 180
Cox, Captain Owen, 1. 249-61, 257,
259, 260, 262-8
Cranfield, Sir Lionel (Earl of Mid-
dieses), i. 74 ; his naval reorganU
sation, 75 et ate., 84-5, 92, 165
Craven, Captain,!. 282
Crete, i. 6. (See Candia, Candiote
war)
Crews, organisation of, i. 29
Cromwell, Oliver, influence on and
use cf the navy, i. 154 ; his Irish ex-
pedition, 200-8; in Scotland, 241;
Protector, 270; his foreign policy,
271 et $eq. ; his use of the Medi-
terranean, 278-4, 276, 281-2, 819,
ii. 2, 15; as crusader, i. 296-8;
his relations with Blake, 804,
815-7 ; his Protestant policy, 811,
829, ii. 2, 16 ; promotes Montague,
i. 821 ; his designs on Cadis and
Gibraltar, 828 et ass.; abandons
them, 888-4, 841, ii. 5, 206;
permanence of his influence, ii
1-8, 20-2, 88, 67, 818
Cromwell, Richard, i. 840
Digitized by
Google
396
INDEX
Groston, Captain, a pirate, i. 14
Peter, L 57
Cruisers, L 181, ii. 214 n.
Curtis, Captain Edmund, i. 308 n.
Cattanee, Captain Roger, i. 288 w.,
808 n.
Qjprua, L 6, 14, 81, 86, 295
Dalsutia, L 47
Dan, Father Pierre, his ' Hist, de
Barbaric,' i. 13 n.
Danbr, Thomas Osborne, Earl of, ii.
107-9, 168
Danube, ii 289, 248-4, 248, 253, 276
Danzer, Simon, the pirate (also
Dansker and Le Danseur), i. 12,
13, 15-18, 20, 71 ; his end, 18 n.
Dardanelles, L 89, 297, 299
Dartmouth, George Legge, Lord,
commands at the evacuation of
Tangier, ii. 129-40
Dams, John, a writing master, i. 59
Deal L 185
Deane, Sir Anthony, shipwright, ii.
78, 176 tk
— Colonel Richard, general-at-sea,
L 191 ; at Kinsale, 201-4; in the
Forth, 241, 268; ii. 321, 823
* Defiance ' sloop, ii. 79 n.
Delaval, Admiral Sir Ralph, ii. 146,
150
Denbigh, William Feilding, 1st Earl
ot L 152
Deptford, i. 86, 185, 194, 242
'Destiny,' the. Set 'Convertine'
« Devil of Denmark,' the, i. 62
•Diamond,' the, L 283 n M 80S n,,
806 n.
Dieppe, i. 144-5, 255
Digby, George. See Bristol
— Sir John (Earl of Bristol), i.
51-2, 73, 90, 105 ; rebuffs Gondo-
mar, 108-9; his reliance on the
fleet, 131, U. 7
Dilkes, Admiral Sir Thomas, ii. 272,
284
Dodge, Captain, L 127 n.
•Dolphin,' the, L 283 n.
Donauwdrth, iL 262
Doria, Giannandrea, L 1, 7, 24, 27
Dorset, Charles Sackville, Earl of,
ii.168
• Dorsetshire,' the, it 259
Double-sloops, ii 79 n.
Dow Castle, i. 99, 185
— treaty of, iL 88, 106
•Dragon,' the, L 62, 313 n.
Dragones, small French cruisers, 1.
181
Drake, Sir Francis, i. 1, 23,84, 42, 45,
68, 81, 98, 102, 110-1, 134, 146,
189, 191, 200, 231, 301, 320, ii. 21 ;
publication of his exploits, i. 101
'Dreadnought,' the, i. 129, 180
Dryden, John, his epitaph on Fair-
borne, ii. 120
Dunbar, battle of, i. 233
Dunkirk, i. 102, ii. 72, 132 ; as naval
centre, i. 147 ; new frigates of,
181-4; taken by France, 245;
retaken by Spain, 255-6; Crom-
well's views on, 280, 283, 838 ; in
English hands, 339; as a sub-
stitute for Gibraltar, ii. 2, 15;
relinquished for Tangier, 11-16;
real intention of its sale, 17-21;
disposal of its .garrison, 26, 132
Dunkirkers, piracies of, i. 148
Du Quesne, Admiral Abraham, i.
174, 176, ii. 81, 84-5, 47-8, 53, 59,
86, 88, 104, 124; his campaign
against De Ruyter, 89-96; on
English warfare, 103 ; bombards
Algiers, 140
Dussen, Admiral van der, ii. 258,
262
Dutch, successes of, i. 22, 27, 251-3,
258, 266-7 ; defeats of, 258, 264,
270 ; naval power of, i. 27, 67, 179,
! 236, 24?- 3 ; its exhaustion, ii. 283,
2 17, 310-1 ; policy of, i. 36, 37 ; sup-
! port Venice, 45 et sec., 55, 60-4, 86
et seq. t 94, 101 ; hostility to Portu-
guese match and Tangier, ii. 7, 23,
24 etseq. ; blockade Tangier, 51 ; ob-
struct Marlborough's stratcgy,291-
292, 295, 297; relations with Bar-
bery corsairs, i. 90, 94, 97-8, 105,
111, 118, ii. 23, 67 ; with England,
i. 129-80, 238 et seq., 270, ii. 44, 73,
74, over Gibraltar and Mahon,
310-2; with France, i. 143, 170,
245-7, 254-6, ii. 62 ; with Spain,
i. 100, 123, 131 ; renewal of war
with, 145 ; peace with, 178, ii. 46-7;
league with, 84, 97; with Portugal,
ii. 23 ; East India Company of, i.
129, 151, ii. 44
Duteil, Sir John Baptist, ii. 76-7
Eirxino, Captain Anthony, L 283 n.
Edward, an English corsair, i. 13 n.
Egypt, fleet of, i. 27-8; strategical
aspect of, ii 69
Digitized by
Google
INDEX
337
7
El Araish, i. 20
Elba, i. 178, 338, ii. 103. {See also
Porto Longone)
•Elias,'the7T.388n.,818
Elisabeth, Queen of England, L
33-4
Elisabeth, Princess of England,
Queen of Bohemia, i. 83, 60, 96,
131 188
• Elisabeth,' the, 1. 345, 363
Elisabethan traditions. See Navy,
British
Emperor, the. See Charles V„
Matthias, Ferdinand, Leopold
Empire, the, i. 83, 143. {See also
Hapsburgs)
Enemy's goods, dootrine of, L 13,
338,346
England, sea power of, i. 7, ii. 84
' Entrance/ the. Set * Happy En-
trance*
Espartel, Cape, ii. 163 ; action at, 383
Essex, Robert Dcvcrcnx, 2nd Earl of,
i. 53, 68, 70, 111, 151, 160
3rd Earl of, i. 153, 158, ii.
818
Estimates, Navy, (1618) i. 76-9
Estrades, Godef roi, Comte d\ ii. 14 n.,
15, 33 ; his warning about Tangier,
73-3, 106, 109
Estrees, Jean, Comte d\ ii. 74
- Victor Marie, Due d\ ii. 149, 154,
870-3
Eugene of Savoy, Prince, it. 196,
301, 317, 335, 338, 381, 343, 364,
391,393; his attempt on Toulon,
395-6
•Europe,' Tangier careening hulk,
ii. 100
Evelyn, John, ii. 118
Evertsen, Admiral Cornells, the
« Elder, 1 i. 37, 71
the •Youngest, 1 ii. 81, 103
• Jan, i. 343
Exterritoriality, i. 831
Fairbornb, Sir Palmes, deputy*
governor of Tangier, ii. 144-5 ; his
heroic defence. 118-9 ; his death
and epitaph, 130 ; his son, 311
— Admiral Sir Stafford, ii.311, 318.
315 ; on naval strategy, 334, 336,
346
•Fairfax/ the, i.195, 339
Fajardo, Admiral Don Luis, i. 15-
30, 87, 57-8
Fame,' the, L 803
Far East, the, Cromwell's policy as
to, ii. 3, 6 ; Charles It's, 17, 33
Faro, ii. 330-1
Faversham, i. 10
Favignano, i. 387
Fearne, Sir John, an English corsair,
i. 41, 57, 114, 131 «., 153
Ferdinand of Grata, Duke of Styria,
i. 35, 87, 47, 156 ; King of Bohe-
mia, 50; Emperor, 96, 157
Ferriere, Chevalier de la, L 346, 348,
354
Feuillade, Marshal d'Aubusson, Due
de la, ii. 103
Fes, Emperor of, ii. 39 (tee Guy-
Ian) ; Colonel Kirke at, 131-3
Filicudi, ii. 93
Finale, ii. 178, 193
Finisterre, Cape, ii. 155, 318, 331
Fire-control, i. 353
Fireships, L 135, 137 *k, 167, 169,
173, ii. 54-5, 79 fk, 158; as light
cruisers, 160 n.
Fitsgerald, Colonel, at Tangier, ii.
45, 47
' Five Wounds,' the, Osuna's squad-
ron, i. 39
Flags, i. 118
Flanders. See Netherlands, Span-
ish
Fleets, Doris's (1601), i. 7; Spanish
(1609), 16-7, 19, (1611) 34, (1614)
37 ; Dutch (1616), 36 ; Mansell's,
113-4; Blake's, 383 n.
Florentines, their sympathy with
England, i. 393
Fonteny, Chevalier de, i. 311 a.
Food supply, i. 87
Forbin, Comte de, 11. 317
* Foresight,' the, i. 383 n\, 803 n.,
306 n.
Formentara, i. 319, 813-6, ii. 173
Fornells (Minorca) taken, ii. 807
'Four Points,' resolution of the, L
139 et $eq., 144
Frampton, Captain, i. 137 n.
France, policy of, i. 50, 135 et seq^
148 et $eq. t 158, 199, 383, 373;
lawless treatment of English
commerce by, 1. 304, 316, 338-9,
234 ; Cromwell's attitude to, 273-3,
305 ; in the Candiote war, ii. 67-
68; growing power in the Medi
terranean, ii. 143, 149; domina
tion of, under Louis XIV., 84-5.
Naval power of, 1. 138; revival
under Richelieu, 164 et $eq.; in
the Mediterranean, 17U8, 330
VOL. II.
Digitized by
Google
INDEX
226, 319; Colbert's revival, ii.
8,9; hi* failures, 30, 33-5, 65. 74.
75 ; his success, 84 ct see;., 96, 101 ;
its decline, 175, 200
Franche Comte, ii. 297
Francis L (of France), L 8
Fregatss. See Frigates
Frewen, Lieutenant, i. 127 n.
Frigates, new type of, i. 181-8, 195,
197
Foentes, Conde de, at Dunkirk, i.
181
Gaeta, i. 171
Galeasse of war (Venetian), i. 14
Oaleazze di Mercantia, i. 14, 48
Galen, Admiral Johan van, i. 238 ;
commands in Mediterranean, 247 ;
his operations against Applcton
and Badiley, 248-54
Galleons. See Sailing men-of-war
GaUey-frigates, ii. 78-9
Galley-slaves, i. 24-5, ii. 77
Galleys, 1 15, 25-6; 31, 36-7, 94-5,
130-1, 166, 170-2, 174, ii. 54,
58. 65-6, 69, 91-3, 111, 181, 266,
274; last, in the English navy,
i 77. it 76-9
Gallixabras, 1 182
Galway, Massne de Ruvigny, Karl
of, ii. 178-9 ; on value of Mediter-
ranean fleet, 184-5; commands
in Spain, 296, 301
Gata, Cape, i. 169, 218
Genoa, i. 8 t 38, 49, 214-5, 249, 258,
262, 279, 282, 292, 303, ii. 32,
230-1; strategic importance of,
L 8, 33, 35, 50, 108, 135-8, 280-1,
292, ii. 148; galleys of, i. 34,
ii. 76 ; designs to occupy, i. 38 ct
tq^ 108, 135-8, 143, 146, 150,
161 ; Longland's proposals as to,
L 280-1, 292
Gentillot, M. de, French Envoy,
i.256*.
George of Denmark, Prince, Lord
High Admiral, ii. 202, 209
George of Hesse-Darmstadt, Prince.
Set Hesse-Darmstadt
• George' (or 'St. George '), the,
Blake's flag, i. 210, 283 »., 322 n. I
Gerona, ii. 161, 164
Gibraltar, L 86, 45, 115, 117, 123, |
230, iL 110, 186, 148; flrst pro-
poaal to take (1625), L 155-9 ;
BUke at, 287-90, 813; Crom-
well's design on, 823 ct s*g., ii.
t, 206 Spanish tears for 27 ;
Allin's disaster at, 49 ; Wheler's,
135 ; Louis's anxiety for, 194,
197 ; Rooke's first instructions as
to (1702), 203-4, 212; decision to
attack (1704), 255-6 ; capture of,
258-61 ; attempts to recover,
262-76 ; defence of, 277-86 ; its
value, 286-7, 289; as English
naval station, 290-1, 811-2 ;
military and naval works at, i.
159, ii. 197-8, 257
Gibraltar, Bay of, i. 1 ; disaster in,
ii. 153
— Straits of, i. 40, 60, 87, 123-4 ;
Penn in, 236 : strategic signifi-
, canoe of, 319-20, ii. 2, 5, 15
Gilford, Captain, i. 12
Gigcri, French disaster at, ii. 48, 50
Godolphin, Sydney, Earl of, ii. 233,
240-1
Goes. Admiral Philips van dor, ii.
147-8
* Golden Lion,' the, i. 11
' Golden Phoenix,' the, i. 114
GoleU, La (Tunis), i. 18, 20, 805, 310
Gondomar, Don Diego Sarmiento de
Acuffa, Conde de, i. 37, 39, 41-2,
52, 56, 61-2, 81, 83-5, 89, 99- 104,
106-9, 115, 119, 129, 130, 132-4
Gorec, i. 186
Gorges, Sir Ferdinando, i. 57, 144,
146
Gradisca, sioge of, i. 37, 43, 48. 156
Grand Alliance, ii. 144, 149 ; (1701)
196, 198
Grand Master of Navigation
(French), i. 165, 168, 172-3
Gravelines, battle of, i. 68; taken
and retaken, 245
Gray, Colonel, i. 99, 100
Grcbnerus, prophecy of, i. 201, 205
Greenwich, Naval School at, founded,
ii. 135
Grenville, Sir John (Earl of Bath),
i. 241
— Sir Richard, Admiral, i. 241, ii.
274
— Colonel Sir Richard, ii. 6
Greville, Sir Fulke (Lord Brooke),
Treasurer of the Navy, i. 68, 70,
75, 77, 139
Guiehe, Armand Comte de, on Eng-
lish tactics, ii. 826-7
Guienne, operations against coast of,
ii. 232, 295
• Guinea,' the, i. 195
Guinea, English factories destroyed
in, U. 49
Digitized by
Google
INDEX
Ouiscard, Com to de, ii. 394
Guise, Henri II., Duo de, bis first
Neapolitan venture, i. 175-6 ; bis
second, 278, 280, 282, 284 ; its
failure, 288-91, 811, ii. 86
Gulf squadron (Venetian), i. 14, 48
Gunnery, i. 178, 214, 252
Gunpowder plot, i. 44
Guns. See Armament
Oustavus Adolphus, wants English
fleet in Baltic, i. 162; allied with
France, i. 166
Guylan, Sultan of Morocco, ii. 86;
beaten by Teviot, 37-8 ; intrigues
with Spain, 39; again defeated,
40-3, 52, 60, 119
Hirn, Admiral Jan de, ii. 96
— Captain, i. 253
Halifax, Goorgo Saville, Marquis of,
ii. 128, 130
Hall, Captain Edward, i. 227-82,
235-6, 239, 240
Hamilton, Captain, i. 156 n.
Hampden, Sir John, i. 114
•Hampshire,' the, i. 283 n., 808,
ii. 98
'Happy Entrance,' the, i. 85, 248,
822 n.
Hapsburg system, i. 9, 17, 85, 43,
73, 84, 89, 134-7, 161, 166 ; broken
by Mazarin, 179; revived, ii 84,
149
Hapsburgs, the, i. 8, 38, 83, 162,
ii. 187
Hardy, Admiral Sir Thomas, ii.
222-3, 225, 284
Harley, Sir Edward, governor of
Dunkirk, ii. 16 n.
— Robert, Earl of Oxford, ii. 812
Harman, Captain John, i. 283 n.,
303 n.
— Captain Thomas, ii. 81
Harris, Captain Christopher, i. 114
Haughton, Captain Robert, i. 114,
127 n.
Haultain, Admiral William de Zoete
so called, i. 105, 123, 144
Havre, i. 18
Hawkins, Sir John, Treasurer of the
Navy, i. 23, 25, 68-70, 102, 165,
189
— Sir Richard, i. 98, 109, 112-4,
123, 126-7, 180-1, 139, 152
• Hector,' the, i. 283 n.
Hedges, Sir Charles, ii. 278
Heidelberg, L 184
Heinsius, Grand Pensionary, ii 170,
291
Helvoctsluys, i. 189, 269
Henri IV. (of France), i. 18 si, 17
Henrietta Matia, Queen of England,
i. 137-8, 144; opposes Portuguese
match, ii. 7-8
• Henrietta Maria,' the, i. 190
Henrietto d'Orleans, ii. 83
Henry, Prince of Wales, i. 113
Henry VIII. (of England), his navml
reforms, i. 164, 183
Herbert, Admiral Sir Arthur (Earl
of Torrington), oommands in the)
Straits, ii. 114-6, 1256, 270; at
relief of Tangier, 118-9; recalled,
128 ; his school of Mediterranean
officers, 184 5
• Hercules,' the, i. 62, 114
Hesse-Darmstadt, Prince George of,
ii. 214-6, 220, 222, 225, 249-30 ;
at Gibraltar, 255 6, 264-5, 277-86,
290
Hickes, Captain Jasper, ii. 259-60
Hill, Mr. Richard, Envoy to Turin,
ii 247—8
— Captain William, i. 288 fk, 800
Hispaniola, i. 821
Holmes, Admiral Sir Robert, reprisals
by, ii. 44, 46, 56, 108
Holy League, i. 7
• Honest Seaman,' the, i. 232
' Hopewell,' tho, ii. 110
Hopsonn, Admiral Sir Thomas, L>
153, 215, 218; at Vigo, 224-5
Hospital ships, ii. 158, 230
Hostalrich Castle, il 161
Hoste, Pere Paul, on tactics, ii. 264-0
and Appendix
Howard of Effingham. See Notting-
ham
Howards, party of the, i. 75, 81
Hughes, Captain Thomas, i. 114,
126. 127 n.
Huguenots, i. 143 ei atg n 153, 162,
311, ii. 178
Hungary, ii. 228, 281
Hyeres Islands, as naval position,
i. 167, ii. 178, 250, 258
Illyriax pirates. See Usoocchi
Imperialism, Cromwell's, L 1 ;
Monk's, ii. 18-21; Charles H/a,
ii. 17-18, 74, 141-2
Imperialist armies, ii. 196, 281, 248 :
weakness of, 251, 891-2, 296-7
Inohiquin, William O'Brien, 2nd
it
Digitized by
Google
MO
INDEX
Earl of, governor of Tangier, ii.
106,114
Ireton, Major-General Henry, i. 194
Italy, neutralisation of, ii. 185
Ivica,iL293
Kinsale, i. 118 ; Rupert at, 200
Kirby, Captain Robert, i. 288 n.
Kirke, Colonel Percy, ii. 120-2
governor of Tangier, 124-6
Kirke's Lambs, ii. 121
Jamaicl, L 821, 828 ; rumour of its
■ale, ii 107
James L, reign of, i. 8, 4, 10, IS ;
Osuna's estimate of, 22 ; as bead
of Protestants, 88-4, 87-9, 41-2 ;
his corsair commission, 51 ;
Mediterranean policy, 56, 62, 65,
84, 88; interest in navy, 67, 85,
142; sacrifices Ralegh, 81; vacil-
lation of, 89, 98, 107-9 ; promotes
coalition against corsairs, 90 et
sec., 96-8, 147 ; his false strategy,
140 ; death, 141 ; naval results of
his reign, 141-2, 821
James DL, deposition of, ii. 144;
invades Ireland, 145; attempt to
invade England, 183. (See York)
James Stuart, • the Old Pretender/
ii.802
* James ' galley-frigate, ii. 78
Jenkins, Sir Leoline, ii 126
Jennings, a pirate, i. 15
Jersey, i. 241
'Jersey,' the, L 822 n.
Jesuits, L 16
Jews banished from Tangier, ii. 126
Jigelli f iL48
John of Austria, Don (at Lepanto),
i i, 7, 108
Don (1650 Ac), i. 209, 220, 254
Jones, Colonel Michael, i. 200
Jordan, Admiral Sir Joseph, i. 187,
229, 282-8, 818 n.
Jumper, Captain William, ii. 260-1
i (Tunis), L 24
Kara Osman, Bey of Tunis, i. 12, 14,
18
Kaston. See Croston, Captain Peter
Kats, Captain, i. 245-7
Kendal, Captain William, i. 288 is.
•Kent,' the, L 288 n* 802 ft,
Kerkenna Islands, L 24
Kerkhoven, Admiral Melchior van
den, L 61
Keroualle, Louise do. See Duchess
of Portsmouth
Ketches, iL 79
EHUpew, Admiral Henry, IL 146, 150
Kin^s Own Regiment, the, iL 120
Ladenbobg, ii. 248
Lagos Bay, i. 210, ii. 147, 220-3, 279
Lande, Chevalier de.la, i. 217
' Langport,' the, i. 283 n., 303 n.
Languedoo canal, Richelieu's pro-
ject, i. 106 ; revived in reply to
Tangier, ii. 35, 111; commenced,
64-6; opened, 124
Lanzerote (Canaries), i. 88
Larache. See El Araish
Lawson, Admiral Sir John, i. 822 ;
at Algiers, ii. 25, 27, 29, 33 ; his
confidence trick, 28 ; at Tangier,
28-9; harries corsairs, 33; at
Toulon, 34; saves Tangier, 36;
contracts for the mole, 37 ; re-
newed activity against corsairs,
42 ; again saves Tangier, 43, 44 ;
shadowing De Ruyter, 46-7 ; death,
56
Lea, corsairs at, i. 58
Leake, Admiral Sir John, ii. 236,
245, 255 ; at Malaga, 265, 267 n,,
273; saves Gibraltar, 277-86;
commands in the Mediterranean,
290-6, 300-2 ; takes Sardinia, 303 ;
ordered to coerce the Pope, 803-4 ;
his dilemma, 305; prepares cap-
ture of Minorca, 806-7, 308
Leghorn, i. 234-5, 244, 289 ; Apple-
ton blockaded in, 247-54, 257-
266; action off, 266-7; Blake at,
291-4, 297-8; Stokes at, 835-6;
works at, ii. 82, 64, 76; English
galley at, 77; Shovell at, 280-1,
237-8
Leibnits, Gottfried Wilhelm, Graf
von, his advice to Louis XIV., ii.
69
• Lennox,' the, u. 259
•Leopard,' the, i. 244, 259
Leopold I., Emperor, ii. 144, 201,
208-9, 241, 294, 296-7
Lepanto, battle of, i. l r 6, 7, 19,
ii. 103
Lerin Islands taken and lost by
Spain, i. 166-8
Lesdiguieres, Marshal, i. 188, 146
Levant Company, i. 51, 246, 248-9,
266 *., 262, 277, 297, 810, iL 67,
117
Digitized by
Google
INDEX
841
Levant convoys i. 215, 280, 287,
244-5, 275
•^ Levenatein, Count, t. 48, 58, 54, 50
Leveson, Admiral Sir Richard, i. 70,
76, 202, 307
'Lion,' the, i. 114, 180
Lionello, Venetian ambassador, i.
38-40
• Lion's Whelp ' pinnace, i. 10, 11
Lions, Gulf of, ii. 148
Lisbon, Hupert at, i. 206-18, 281 ;
Nieuohese at, 288; as English
naval station, i. 327, 832, 834, ii.
5, 204, 236, 238-40, 245, 252-4,
270, 290-1, 295-6
•Little John/ the, i. 12, 14
Lloyd, Captain John, i. 283 n.
— Captain (query same as above),
i. 325-6, 333
Loekhart, Sir William, i. 883, 336,
838—9
Lombardy, i. 8, 33, 43, ii. 292. (See
also Milan, Milanese)
London, charter of, ii. 128
. Longboats, i. 119
Longland, Charles, navy agent at
Leghorn, i. 243; his advice dis-
regarded, 246-8; during the block-
ade, 248-9, 253-4, 257-9, 262, 264 ;
urges a new fleet, 276-7, 279 ; his
remarkable suggestion to Crom-
well, 280-3; on Guise's escape,
289; his design on Naples, 330,
341 ; 295-7, 804, 811, 818, 327
Lord High Admiral, office in com-
mission, ii. 125
Loretto, i. 327
Louis XIII. borrows English ships,
i. 143^6, 147
Louis XIV., i. 250, 284; relations
with Cromwell, 311 ; supports Bra-
ganza marriage, ii. 8-9; covets
Dunkirk, 13 ; slarmed at Tangier,
31-2 ; seeks a footing in Barbary,
84, 47-9, 50 ; joins Dutch, 52, 55,
63; his naval strategy, 59-61;
war with Spain, 62 ; begins ship
canal, 64-6 ; his increasing power,
66; Levant policy, 68-9; entan-
gles Charles II., 72 et wg., 83,
124; Sicilian policy, 84 et eeq.;
his senith, 143; policy against
Grand Alliance, 144, 149 ; his re-
spect for Tourville, 168-4, 174;
his position shaken by Russell's :
fleet, 175-6, 179, 182; his counter-
stroke, 183 ; secures peace, 185-6 ; |
negotiates Partition treaties, 187 I
et eeq. ; foiled by William 13L,
192-3; prepares for war, 194-7;
recognises James IIL, 900; in
war of Spanish succession, 234,
237, 280-3 ; tries to make peace,
297, 309, 311
Louvois, Marquis de, ii. 69, 84
Love, Captain 8ir Thomas, L 114,
152, ii. 31&-0
Lucca, duchy of, L 817
Lyme, siege of, i, 192
•Lys,'the,ii.285
Madagascar, ii. 20
Madeira, i. 235
Madrid, congress at, L 43, 46 ; peace
of, 50; Carlist occupation of, ii.
292, 295-6
Mahon, Port See Port Mahon
• Maidstone, 1 the, i. 288 n., 808
Mainwaring, Sir Arthur, L 118-4,
128 n.
— Sir Henry, i. 56-8, 86, 99-100;
remarkable proposal of, 98-4
Majorca, i. 802-4, 811, 827-9, IL
293, 804, 306
Malaga, i. 117, 128-5, 160, 215,
218, 280; Blake at, 814-6;
Captain Smith's attack on, 821 ;
Booke at, 258-4, 262; battle of,
270-6
Malta, i. 7, 27, 235 ; as English baas,
ii. 100, 230-1; knights of, L 7,
287, 295, 802, ii. 67, 101 ; galleys
of, i. 24, 801
Mamora. See Mehdla
Man, Isle of, i. 241
Manchester, Edward Montagu, Earl
of, i. 821
Mansell, Sir Robert, Treasurer of
the Navy, i. 70 et eeq. ; resigns,
76 ; Vice-Admiral of England, 98 ;
expedition to the Straits, 108-4,
106-9; its object, 110-2; officers
and fleet of, 112-4 ; his instruc-
tions, 106, 115-7, 121-2; his
proceedings, 1 16-7 ; before Algiers,
118-9 ; retires and cruises, 119-
125; attacks Algiers, 125-8; his'
force reduced, 180; recalled, 131-
138 ; on council of defence, 189 ;
action in Parliament, 148-50,
152, 276, 801; compared with
Blake, 807-«; 817-«
Mansfeldt, Count, L 141, 145
Mantua, L 887
Mardyok, i. 245
Digitized by
Google
34S
INDEX
Man claosum, i. 8
•Margaret 'galley, ii. 77
Marlborough, John Churchill, Duke
of, his use of the navy, i. 154 ;
betrays Brest design, ii. 160, 1G7;
in command in * Holland, 196 ;
negotiates Grand Alliance, 198-
200; successes of, 216, 235; his
naval projects (1703), 227-9, 236;
his great design (1704), 238-45,
251; Blenheim campaign, 248,
253, 264, 276 ; on retaining Gib-
raltar, 278.9; wants to operate
on Toulon from Italy, 289-92,
294-7; presses occupation of
Minorca, 299-802 ; Louis tries to
bribe, 809 ; as promoter of Medi-
terranean policy, 199, 204-5, 209,
217-8, 228-9, 231-3, 247; his
conception of naval strategy, 242-
243, 248, 314; his respect for
naval opinion, 300-1
Marseilles, i. 17, 166, 235; revolts,
245; Stokes at, 336, ii. Ill, 149,
177-8, 181
Mattel, Marquis de, ii. 48
Martin. Captain Stephen, ii. 224
Mary, Queen of England, ii. 98, 169
•Marygold,'the,i.U4
Masaniello, his revolution at Naples,
i. 172-5
•M&thew,*the,i.62
Matthias, Emperor, i. 96
Maurice, Prince, i. 187, 192, 200,
220
Maxaim, Cardinal, his naval policy,
L 169-170, 173, 175, 232 ; designs
on Naples and Sicily, 171-8, ii.
192; attempts naval coalition
against Commonwealth, i. 201-2,
205; his growing fear of it, 233 ;
courts the sea powers, 245; his
naval efforts, 246; seeks Crom-
well's alliance, 257, 305, 829, 333 ;
alarmed at Blake's fleet, 277;
fresh design on Naples, 278-9,
280-5 ; Blake frustrates it, 290-1,
819, 803 n. ; seeks co-operation of
English fleet, 836-9; and forces
peace on Spain, 841-2; death,
iL8
Medals,!. 22
Medina-Celi, Duke of, ii. 25, 39
Medins-SidonU, Duke of, i. 58, 323
Mediterranean, strategic aspects of,
L 4 1 weq „ 150, 166, 170-1, 271 et
sef ^ 128, iL 18, 69, 84, 148-4,
184-8; balance of power in, i.
98, 101, 112, 135, 188, 156, 164-8,
170, 294 6, ii. 73, 166, 179, 188-
192, 314 5; English expelled
from, i. 267 ; communication
with, 313 u. ; true policy as to,
begun at Restoration, ii. 33, 813 ;
growth of English power in,
62-3; its founders, 135; main
fleet in the, 162-3; proposal to
winter in, 166 ; as a French lake,
192 ; the final settlement, 813-6 ;
concentrations in or from, ii. 63-
62, 85-6, 146, 152, 154 etseq.. 161,
183.4. 234, 243, 245, 251-3
Mediterranean squadrons (English),
origin of, i. 51 ; used as diplomatic
weapon, 91 -4, 98, 108-9, 130-3, 134,
224-5 ; growth of the idea, 238-9 ;
made permanent, 240; re-estab-
lished, 274 et aeq.; proposal of
Charles II.,ii.73 5; under William
III., 151-3; as division of one
main fleet, ii. 229
Mehdia, t. 27, 67-8
Melazzo, ii. 89-90
Mendosa, Don Bernardino de, i.
81
4 Merchant Bonaventure,' the, i. 114
1 Merchant, Rojal,' the, i. 62
Merchantmen, English armed, i. 54,
56, 62, 65, 86, 114, 248-54 ; as
naval reserve, 66-7, 77-8; dis-
credited, 195-6, 209, 226-7 ; re-
fuse to serve, 258, 262
1 Merlin/ the, i. 306 n.
1 Mermaid, 1 the, i. 283 n., 302 n.,
30G n
Messina! i. 7, 24-7, 46, 49, 89, 95,
220, 235, 249, 260; revolt of, ii.
86-7; occupied by French, 88-
103, 166, 190, 244
Methuen, Sir Paul, ii. 219-23, 225,
250, 262, 279, 284
Midland Sea, ii. 110. (See Mediter-
ranean)
Milan, i. 85-7, 135, ii. 295
Milanese, the (Spanish Province of
Milan), i. 43, ii. 190, 193, 199.
(See also Lombardy)
Milford Haven, i. 203
Minorca, i. 120, 125, 234, ii. 173,
191, 287, 293; occupation of, by
English, 303-8. (See also Port
Mahon)
Mitchell, Admiral Sir David, ii. 178,
182-8, 217
Mocenigo, Lussaro (Venetian ad-
miral), i. 295-7, 299
Digitized by
Google
INDEX
M
Modena, i. 887
Monaco, Prince of, i. 174
Monk, General George, Duke of
Albemarle, i. 101, 200, ii. 63;
general-at-sea, i. 268; his ante-
cedents, 268-9 ; his naval strategy,
269-70, 277; defeats the Dutch,
270, 277; promotes Bragansa !
marriage, ii. 4.6; Duke of Albe- \
marie, 7 ; on Tangier and Dan- ,
kirk, 9 ; advises sale of Dunkirk, l
12-16, 18-21; as war minister,
27; on Tangier council, 88; in I
Second Dutch War, 56-61; his
influence on tactics, 269, 328, 326
Monmouth, James, Duke of, i. 99,
104
Monson, Sir John, ii. 76
— Admiral Sir William, on Mediter-
ranean power, i. 41, 150; naval
criticisms by, 114, 128 n., 151,
152, 307, 320
Montague, Colonel Edward, joint-
admiral with Blake, i. 321 et acq, ;
his 'defeat at Gibraltar, 328-6,
833; on blockade, 327; despatch
of, 331; ordered home, 333; his
Mediterranean opinions, 340, ii. 7.
(See Sandwich, Earl of)
— Ralph (afterwards Duke of), ii.
72-3, 106-9
Monte Christo, Badiley's action at,
i. 251-3, 258
Montjuich Castle (Barcelona), ii. 292
Mootham, Captain Peter, i. 283 n.
Morca, the, i. 299
Morice, Sir William, ii. 13
Moriscos, expulsion of the, i. 19,
35 m„ 71, 111
Morocco as source of supply, i. Ill
Moy Lambert (Dutch admiral), i.
97
Muley Ishmael, Sultan of Morocco,
ii. 114, 121, 135
Munden, Admiral Sir John, ii. 199,
210, 212
Munster, i. 200, 202-3
Mutiny, naval, of 1648, i. 185-7 ; at
Lisbon, 267
Namuh, ii. 143, 159, 180, 182
Naples, port of, i. 24, 260, 260,262-3,
813, ii. 166; in war of Spanish
succession, 201, 227, 281, 244-5,
297-8, 808-4
Maples, Kingdom of, i. 6, 87, 101 ;
Masarin's design on, 170-7, 278-9,
287; Longland's, 880. 841, ii.
190 ; fleet of, i. 24
Narbonne, Gulf of, ii. 234, 287
Narbrough, Admiral Sir John, com-
mands in Straits, ii 88-9, 98-103,
104, 112, 115
* Nastby,' the, i. 322
Nassau, Count Ernest of, i. 86, 89,
40, 43, 45, 47
National Defence, i. 189-40; Com-
mittee of. See Council of War
Naval brigade, ii. 119
— construction, i. 181-5, ii. 78-9,
104 ; Pepys on, 101
— science, i. 27, 29, 86, 87, 184,
195-6, ii. 65 ; Blake's advance in,
i. 320 ; Cromwell's influence on,
ii. 1-2; Monk's, 20. (See William
III., Marlborough, and Appendix)
Navarino, i, 6, 27, 95
Navigation Acts, i. 242
Navy, British, decline of, L 67-72;
commissions for reform of, 71
et seq.; report on (1618), 76 et
scq. ; increase of, 84-5 ; under
Charles I., 180-2; under Long
Parliament, 182-6; under Com-
monwealth, 187-8, 198, 240, 243;
under Charles II., ii. 104, 125, 142 ;
under William III., 150 n., 159,
200 ; ohanged conception of, L
195-6, 225-8; distribution of,
under Cromwell, i. 275 ; politics in,
i. 184-6, ii. 146. (For foreign
navies, eec Dutch, France, Spain)
Nelson compared with Blake, L 800
•Neptune,' the, i. 114
Netherlands, the Spanish, L 8, 55,
273, ii. 104 ; as buffer state, &
193
Neutral righto, i. 18, 181, 188, 946,
258-40, ii. 827
Nevell (or NeviU), Admiral John,
ii. 154, 157, 160, 173, 178
New Model Army, its influence on
navy, i. 188, 185, 190, 196. (See
also Soldiers)
• Newcastle/ the, L 283 i^ 802 w.,
806
Newfoundland, ii. 56; fish fleets
from, i. 286, 288-9
Newmarket, ii. 98
Nice, Masarin's views on, L 171;
Cromwell's, 829; in war of
Spanish succession, ii. 240-1,
244-5, 248, 250, 254
Nioholsburg, i. 157
•Nieodemus,'tho,i.l82
Digitized by
Google
S44
INDEX
Kieuehese, Admiral de. i. 278, 380, I
282-4, 286-8, 290, ii. 80 I
* Nightingale,' i. 245 j
Kixon, Captain. I. 813 n. |
Noailles. Marshal Anne Jules, Duo
de, U. 148, 154, 159, 161, 174-5 !
* Nonsuch • ketch, i. 283 n.
Konnanbr, Marquis of, ii. 168
Norreys, Sir John, i. Ill i
North. Captain Roger, i. 102
North Sea, strategic aspects of, ii. 5ft
Northampton, Henry Howard, Earl ,
oti.73 I
Northern Sea Powers, their influence j
in Europe, i. 5, 43, 50-1, 60, 88,
96. 110-2, 138, 224, 238, ii. 103,
143
Northumberland, Earl of, Lord High
Admiral, L 182
Norwood, Colonel, ii. 60, 62
Nottingham, Charles Howard, Earl
of. Lord High Admiral, i. 52, 165 ;
his eril influence on nary, 68 et
*q.\ fall of, 79-81
Kymwegen, peace of, ii. 104-4}
Oaks, transition from, to sails, i. 2,
36-7 ; continued use of, in sailing
Teasels, 235, ii. 78-9
Ocean squadron (of Spain), i. 16, 27,
39, 40, 45-6, 71, ii. 203
Oeiras Bay (Lisbon), L 207, 211
Officers, L 29
Oran, ii. 178, 189, 190
Orange, Frederick Henry, Prince of,
L146
Orbitello, L 172, 827, ii. 192
Ormonde, James Butler, 2nd Duke
of, iL 203, 214-5, 218-9, 220, 225-6
Ossory, Thomas Butler, Earl of, ii.
117-8
Ostend, siege of, i 21 ; as a naval
station, 205
Osuna, Don Pedro Telles Oiron,
3rd Duke of, his youth, i. .21-8 ;
Viceroy of Sicily, 23-4; naval
reforms of, 25 et sea. ; Viceroy of
Naples, 29 ; adopts English naval
orjpuiisation, 29 et aw., 84, 86, 87 ;
bis design against Venice, 44 et
sag., 52-5, 59, 60, 78, 84, 86-9, 95,
100-1, 124, 151, 156-6, 820
Facx, Captain Henry, L 288 n.
Paddle-Teasels, 1 181
Padilla, Don Martin da,
Palamos, ii. 169, 161, 181
Palatinate, i. 99, 101, 108, 131-2,
134 et srq., 145
Palatine, Frederick, Elector, i. 83,
50, 83 ; King of Bohemia, 96-9,
110, 146
Palermo, i. 17, 209, ii. 88-9, 96-7,
244
Palmer, Captain Sir Henry, i. 114,
127 n., 128 n., 152
Palos, Cape, i. 218, 308
♦ Paragon,' the, i. 245, 264
Partition treaties, ii. 186-92; hos-
tility to, 195
Paul, Chevalier (Frenoh admiral), i.
170, 173, 176, 284, 826-7
Pay in the navy, i. 194
Peacocke, Captain, i. 127 ft.
* Pearle,' the, i. 806 n.
Pembroke, Thomas Herbert, Earl of,
ii. 212
• Pembroke,' the, ii. 222
Penington, Admiral Sir John, i. 114,
144-6, 152, 183
Penn, Admiral Sir William, i. 200,
222-3; his cruise (1651), 228-32;
of the old school, 222, 232 ; in
chase of Bupert, 234-6, 244; holds
the Straits, 236-9; goes home,
243; in the West Indies, 304-5,
812, 810, 320; ii. 320, 325-8
Pepwoll, Captain, i. 127 n.
Pepys, Samuel, Secretary to the Navy,
his error regarding introduction of
frigates, i. 183-4; on increasing
the navy, ii. 100-1 ; on the Tan-
gier council, 115 and note ; in the
Tower, 125, 129 ; his part in the
evacuation of Tangier, 129-38;
his strictures on the Cabinet,
139-40; on French in the Medi-
terranean, 140; receives report
on Gibraltar, 197; comments by
him, i. 322, ii. 11, 78, 104, 106,
142, 823, 826
1 Percy,' the (or • La Pence '), i. 802
Personnel. See Crews, Officers,
Soldiers
Peterborough, Henry If ordaunt, Earl
of, 1st Governor of Tangier, i. 11 ;
his fleet, 26, 28, 30; his instruc-
tions, 32-8 ; superseded, 86-7
— Charles Mordaont, Earl of, ii.
290-3, 295-6
Petit, Colonel, ii. 810
Peyton, Sir Henry, i. 56, 62, 86
Pheasant Island, ii. 8
Philiben of Savoy. See Savoy
Digitized by
Google
Digitized by
Google
Digitized by
Google
INDEX
345
Philip II. (of Spain), i. 00; naval
revival under, 226, ii. S, 257
Philip HI., i. 15-6, 23, 26, 89, 90 ;
death, 124
Philip IV., i. 124 ; recognises Com-
monwealth, 221, 223, 233, ii. 257
Philip V. of Spain and Duke of
Anjou, ii. 189, 193
Philippeville, ii. 34
'Phamix,' the, flies Blake's flag,
i. 217; in the Mediterranean, 245;
capture of, 252-8; recaptured,
260-1, 263, 822 n.
Piedmont, ii. 148, 241, 292
Pierre, Captain Jacques, i. 27, 80,
31, 44 ; at Venice, 49, 55, 60, 68 ;
his execution, 64
Piombino, i. 173, 264
Pirates (English), i. 13-6, 18, 28, 67,
241. (See also Corsairs, Barbary
States)
Pisa, i. 261
Plague in London (1G25), i. 145;
(1665), ii. 57
Plate fleet, i. 155, 160, 161, 840;
Blake's orders as to, 313 ; escape
of, 322-3; taken, 832; fears for,
ii. 23-9 ; in war of Spanish
succession, 196, 199, 210-3,219-
222 ; at Vigo, 223 et eeq.
Plymouth,!. 10, 12, 151, 153, 155
• Plymouth,' the, i. 288 n., 802, 306,
322 n.
Pointis, Baron de, ii. 186 ; operate
to recover Gibraltar, 279-85
Pola, ii. 804
Ponta Vedra, ii. 208
Popes : Clement VII., i. 7 ; Paul V.,
24, 43, 46; Urban V1IL, 135;
Innocent X., 171, 278-9, 292;
Alexander VII., his fear of the
English sea power, 328-30, ii. 7 ;
Clement IX., 67; Clement XI.,
threatened by Leake, 303-6 ; sub*
mits, 308-9
Popham, Colonel Edward, general-
at-sea, i. 190-5, 201-2, 205 ; sails
for Lisbon, 208, 256 n. ; demands
revolted ships, 209; returns to
Channel, 213, 215 ; death and
burial, 241 ; 227, 268
Popish plot, ii. 88; its effect upon
Tangier, 105 et seq.
Porter, Captain Thomas, i. 114
Portland, William Bentinok, Earl
of, ii. 87-8, 186, 191
Port Louis, ii. 212, 215
Port Mahon, ii. 29, 40; as English
base, 70, 166, 191; as French
base, 194 ; design to secure, 299*
293, 301, 305-6 ; capture of, 306-8 ;
its retention, 309-12; its stra-
tegical importance, 286-7, 805-6,
310
Porto Farina, Blake's operations
against, i. 300-2 ; bombarded,
805-7, 317 n. ; reconstructed, 885
Porto Ferrajo (Elba), i. 262-5
Porto Longone(EIba),i. 251-4, 257-8,
262, 837, ii. 78
Portsmouth, i. 11, 186, 204
— Louise de Keroualle, Duchess of,
ii. 107, 127
Portugal, revolts from Spain, L 179,
199 ; its attitude to the Common-
wealth, 207-10; changes front,
216, 221, 228; supported bj
France, 279 ; overawed by Blake,
326, 328 ; English alliance with,
ii. 2, 4, 66; makes a bid for
Tangier, ii. 130-1, 186-7 ; attitude
to Grand Alliance, 208-4, 215,
219-20, 225, 227, 284; joins it,
286-9, 243, 251
— King of, John IV., i. 174, 206-7,
214-5
Prague, battle of, i. 110, 121
• President,' the, i. 195
Preston, battle of, i. 187, 191
Prie, Marquis de, ii. 802
• Primrose,' the, i. 114
« Prince! Royal,' the, i. 80 *., 77, 248.
(See also * Resolution ')
• Princess,' the, i. 801
1 Princess Mary,' the, i. 288 *., 806 «.
Prize money regulated, i. 189
Protestant Leagues, i. 88, 99, 135-6,
153, 162, 272, 280, 829, ii. 16, 144
Provence, i. 8, 165-8, 246; operations
against coaBt of, 804, 811, ii. 182,
240, 292
Pyrenees, peace of, i. 841-2, ii. 8,
13,22
Qvast, Admiral Hildebrant, i. 58
Raousa, i. 47, 48, 58
• Rainbow,' the, i. 114, 180, 822 n.
Rainsborough, Colonel Thomas,
naval commander-in-chief, L 185,
191
Ralegh, Sir Walter, released, i. 84;
his last expedition, 87 et *eq.;
his views on the Mediterranean,
Digitized by
Google
346
INDEX
40-1; hit dying declaration, 42;
his death and canonisation, 81-3 ;
44. 4&-7, 113, 136, 280, ii. 317-8
Bamilies, battle of, ii. 292-4
Bamming, i 318
Bating of ships, i. 77, 196-7
Batisbon. trace of, ii. 143
Baymond, Captain George, i. 114
Recusant a Catholic, i. 11
•Reformation.* the. See 'Constant
Reformation '
Beggio,ii96
Benaud, a French engineer at
Gibraltar, ii 197-8
Reprisals, French and English, i.
209, 216-8, 228, 233, 235, 238,
246 - Blake's, 254-6; on colonies,
275
* Resolution,' the, i. 208, 248. (See
also • Prince Boyal ')
Restoration, the, connection of
Mediterranean policy with, ii 4
e/stg.
•Restore,* the, i 114
Bets, Due de, L 166
" Revenge,' the, i. 241
Rhe\ Isle of, i. 261, 268
Rhodes. Island of, i. 6; knights of.
See Malta, Knights of
Ribera, Donna Catarina Enrique*
de,L30n.
— Admiral Francisco de, i. 30-3,
36, 45-6, 4*-9, 50, 54, 151
Rich, Robert, Lord, i. 38
Richelieu. Cardinal, i 137-8; his
naval policy, 146, 164-8, 170, 173,
180, 232
— Due de, as admiral, i. 176
Rieqnet, projects Langnedoc Canal,
u.85
Riff coast, i 831
Riviera, L 8
Rochefort, ii. 212, 294
Rocbelle, La, i. 143, 146, 153, 162,
255, ii 210
Rochester, i 67, 185
Rochester, Robert Carr, Viscount, i.
73; John Wilmot, Earl of, ii 128
-Roebuck, 9 the, i 218
• Romagna,' the, i 829
Rooks, Admiral Sir George, i. 2 ; at
eradiation of Tangier, ii 185-6 ;
with Smyrna convoy, 146-8; at
the Admiralty* 154, 167-8, 176,
179-80; relieves Russell, 182-8;
recalled, 183 ; commander-in-
chief, 196; objects to winter
198, 209, 218; his
orders, 199 ; his obsolete strategy,
201-2; his instructions, 202-4;
opposes Marlborough's plans, 209-
213; sails for Cadiz, 213; his
obstruction there, 214-6; his
fresh orders, 217-6 ; reprimanded,
219; starts home, persuaded to
try Vigo, 223; refuses to hold
it, 225; whitewashed, 226; on
council of defence, 227-8 ; refuses
Mediterranean command, 229-
230; again obstructs, 282 ; in Bay
of Biscay, 235 ; at Lisbon, 239-
240; his instructions (1704), 240-
244 ; enters the Straits, 245-6 ;
feints at Barcelona, 249-50;
forced to fall back on Shovell,
251-3; attacks Gibraltar, 255-
262 ; his difficult position, 262 ;
brings Toulouse to action, 204-8 ;
his tactics defended, 268-70; at
battle of Malaga, 270-6; goes
home, 278, 286
Rosas, ii. 148, 159, 161
1 Boyal Catherine,' the, ii. 252 n.
1 Royal Charles,' the, ii 825
'Royal Exchange.' the, i. 162
Royalists, rising of, 1648, its naval
aspect, i 185; fleet of, 185-8,
241 ; in the Highlands, 273
•Ruby,' the, i 223 n., 306 u.
Rupert, Prince, i. 187 ; at Kinsale,
200, 202-3 ; his escape, 203-4 ; at
Lisbon, 206-10; tries to break
out, 211-3; engaged by Blake,
213- 4 ; allowed to escape, 214-7 ;
enters the Mediterranean, 218-
222, 225 ; at Toulon, 229, 832-4 ;
Mazarin's attitude to, 233 4;
puts to sea, 233; evades l'enn,
234-5; his failure, 236-7; as
British admiral, ii 56-7, 60-1,
269 ; mentioned, i. 238, 244, 248,
261, 263, 313, 816, ii. 20, 88, 70
Russell, Admiral Edward (Earl of
Orford), ii 146, 149 ; commander-
in-chief, 150-3; his instructions
for the Straits, 154-5 ; his action
thereon, 156-60; ordered to re-
main out, 165-71 ; his objections,
171-8 ; winters in Cadiz, 174-7 ;
attempts Toulon, 178-82, 192;
resents his orders, 180; goes
home, 182; thwarts an invasion,
188
— Sir William, Treasurer of the
Navy, i 76
Russia, rise of, i. 2
Digitized by
Google
INDEX
347
Rutherford, Lord, 2nd Governor of <
Tangier. See Teviot
Buvigny. See GsJway
Bay tar, Admiral Michiel Adrians-
soon de, defeated by Blake, i. 258 ;
sent to watch Sandwich, ii. 23-9; |
his great cruise, 44, 46-7, 49-50 ;
his opportune return, 50 ; in chief
command, 60-1, 75 ; in the Medi- i
terranean, his last campaign, 88-
96
Bye House plot, its effect on Tan-
gier, ii. 128
Byswick, congress of, ii. 185-7, 198, '
200
Sackvillk, Colonel, Governor of Tan-
gier, ii. 119-120, 122
Sailing vessels as men-of-war, L 2,
18, 27 e* sec.., 36-7, 155
St. Angelo, castle of, i. 330
St. Helen's Road, ii. 131
St. John, Oliver, Viscount Grandison,
i. 139
St. Julian's Castle (Lisbon), i. 207
•St. Louis,' the, i. 167
8t. Mary, Cape (Portugal), ii. 253
St. Maryport (Puerto Santo Maria,
Cadiz), i. 159, ii. 215
St. Philip (Mahon), ii. 307
St. Sebastian, ii. 192
St. Vincent, Cape, i. 12, 15, 116, 160,
ii. 147; its strategical aspect, i.
320, ii. 27
Sakell, a pirate, L 15
Salamanca, i. 21
Salee, rise of, i. 20, 27 ; as corsair
port, 57, 148, 247, 327, 331, ii. 36,
38,99
Salina, ii. 90
Salvetti, Amerigo (alias Alessandro
Antelminelli), Tuscan envoy in
London, i. 91, 101-2, 107
Samos, i. 26
• Samuel,' the, i. 114
San Domingo, i. 812
San Lucar, i. 155, 157-9
San Salvador (Brazil), i. 151
Sandown (Kent), L 185
Sandwich, Edward Montague, Earl
of, commander-in-chief, ii. 11 ;
supports sale of Dunkirk, 12-14,
18-21 ; sails for the Straits, 22 ;
watches Tangier, 23-9; occupies
it, 80-1, 82 ; fails as admiral, 56 ;
ambassador to Spain, 57, 64, 66,
176. 'See also Montague)
8anta~Crus, 2nd Marquis of, L 24-
25, 36, 45-6, 49, 87, 161; *
the Lerins, 166
Santo Maria delta Letters,
of, ii, 102
' Sapphire,' the, i. 822 n.
Sardinia, i. 7, 18, 116, 150, 173, 219,
221, 234, 250, 285, ii. 190; Sir
W. Temple's suggestion as to, iL
53 ; occupied by Leake, 803
Savoy, i. 9, 33, 85, 38-9, 48;
Ralegh's opinion on, 40-1 ; policy
of, 184-9, 279, iL 149, 175, 181-2,
192, 235, 238-9, 247-8, 289, 290,
297-8; strategical value of, iL
148
— Prince Emanuel Philibert of, L
27, 95 7
— Prince Eugene of. See Eugene
— Dukes of, Charles Emanuel I.,
i. 35, 39, 97, 186, 329; Victor
Amadeus II., ii. 148, 178-9, 185,
192, 235, 240, 247, 293, 297-8
Sawkeld. See Sakell
Scandinavian Powers, i. 184-5, 162,
174, 201
Scarnafissi, Count of, Savoyard
envoy, i. 38-40
Schellenberg, battle of, ii. 258, 262
Schiedam, i. 192
8chomberg, Frederic Armand, Duke
of, opposes sale of Dunkirk, iL
15-16
Schonenberg, Count, ii. 197
8cilly, i. 12 ; Rupert's intended base,
203 ; taken, 241
Seamanship, French, ii. 59 ; Condi
on English, 288
Seamen, their objection to land
service, i. 323
Search, right of, i. 18, 257 ft. (See
also Neutral Bights)
Sebu lliver, i. 57
Self-denying ordinance, its effect on
navy, i. 188
Seville, i. 155
Seymour, Sir Francis, arraigns
Buckingham, i. 149
• Shackerloo,' the, ii. 80-1
Sheathing of ships, i. 286
8here, Sir Henry, engineer, ii. 76,
79; on Tangier, 80; demolishes
its works, 187-9
Ship-money fleets, L 168, 182, 190,
195, ii. 320
Shirley, Sir Anthony, L 16-18, 90
— Sir Robert, L 57
— Sir Thomas, L 17 n.
Digitized by
Google
S*S
INDEX
Sbowell, Sir Cloudeslcy, ii. 98, 125 ;
resists evacuation of Tangier, 135-
136, 146; at Brest, 159-60; on
vsdue of numbers, 211 ; operates
against Plate fleet, 212-3, 218,
221-5; commands in Mediterra-
nean (1703), 230 ; bis instructions,
230-6; bis campaign, 237-8;
shadows Brest fleet, 246-8 ; junc-
tion with Rooke, 252-4 ; in Malaga
auction, 270-3; again commander
in Mediterranean, 290; his attempt
on Toulon. 294-7 ; death, 300
Shrewsbury, Charles Talbot, Duke
of, ii 150-1 ; correspondence with
Admiral Russell, 156-7, 162, 165,
170-2, 176; favours Mediterranean
policy, 168-9
KcOj, evil slate of, i. 23-4, 87;
Mazarin's designs on, 170, 278-
279; threatened by Blake, 828;
Louis XIV.'s invasion of, 86-103 ;
he fears English interest in, 190 ;
in war of Spanish succession, 281,
244-5, 284; fleet of, I 24; stra-
tegic importance of, L 6, 23, 174-
175; revolution in, i. 173
Sidney, Henry, Earl of Romney, il
158-9
Sinzendorf, Count, iL 301
Skager Back,!. 239
Skippon, Major-Gencral, L 191
Slaves, liberation of Christian, i. 26,
301, 312. 835
Sloops, introduction of, ii. 79 ft.
Smith, Admiral Sir Jeremy, ii. 54-5,
58-60
— Captain John, L 288 «.; his
exploit at Malaga, 331
Smyrna, 1 245, 301
— fleet (Dutch) seised, iL 49-50,
103-4 ; (English) disaster to, 146,
179,181
8myth, Sir Thomas, naval reformer,
L76
Soldiers, in Spanish navy, L 29 ; as
reserve crews in English, ii. 177,
207; as naval officers, i. 152-4,
161-2, 184-*, 188-96, 222-8, 288,
ii.20
•8ophia,' the, L 283 n.
8oubise, Benjamin ds Bohan, Duo
de,L143
8ound,the,ii31
Southampton, Henry Wriothesley,
3rd Earl of,L 52, 68, 95
— Thomas, 4th Ban, ii 12-13, 18-
21,38
* Southampton,' the, i. 62
* Sovereign of the Seas/ i. 180, 243
Spain, maritime power of, i. 5-7, 15,
23-4, 30-2, 320 ; its weakness, 34,
87, 84, 100 ; its revival, 147, 151,
226 ; declines, ii. 3-4, 184 ; Medi-
terranean policy of, i. 100, 209,
220, 226; courts the Common-
wealth, 221, 223, 225, 255 ; Crom-
well's relations with, 272 ct sea. ;
big war with, 321 et seq. ; position
after peace of Pyrenees, i. 8-4;
opposes occupation of Tangier, 7
et uq.; proposed alliance with,
62 ; declining power of, 166
Spanish Main, i. 35
Spanish succession, ii. 187-8; war
of, 200-314
Spartivento, Cape (Sardinia), i. 116
* Speaker,' the, i. 195, 822 n.
Spezzia, ii. 299, 300
Spinola, Ambrogio, Marquis, i. 21,
55, 101 ; invades Palatinate, 108
— Frederigo, i. 21, 22, 26, 70
' Sprag,' double-sloop, ii. 79
Spragge, Admiral Sir Edward, ii. 70 ;
at Bougie, 71-2, 115
Stanhope, General James, 1st Earl,
ii. 301-10
SUyner f Adm. SirRichard,i.283 n.,
287, 302, 806 ; captures Plate fleet,
332, 334 ; occupies Tangier, ii. 30
8tokes (or Stoakes), Captain John, 1.
283 n. ; succeeds Blake in Mediter-
ranean, 834; demonstration at
Tunis, 335; at Tripoli, 838-9;
recalled, 340-1, 342, ii. 2
— Captain (? same as above), i.
127 n.
Stora, ii. 34, 47
Strategy, i. 27, 93-4, 134, 136-40,
150-1, 205; radical change in,
227, 236, 299, 319-20, 327, ii.
144-6; French defensive, 163,
182-5, 200-2
Stroinboli, ii. 90 ; battle of, 93-5
.Stuarts, their relation to continental
politics, i. 199 ; privateers of, 204.
232, 241
Submarines, i. 181
* Success/ the, i. 283 n., 806
Saltan of Turkey, Achmed I., i. 13 ;
Mustapha L, 94
Sunderland, Robert Spencer, 2nd
Earl of, proposes sale of Tangier,
ii. 106-7, 109, 116, 127-8, 130
— Charles Spencer, 3rd Earl of, ii.
303,806
Digitized by
Google
INDEX
649
• Swallow,' the, i. 191, 119, 23*
• 8wan,' the, i. 183
Swart, Captain (Dutch), i 252
Sweden in the Triple Alliance, ii 68.
(See Christina, Charles GosUtos)
1 Swiftsure,' the, ii. 318
Symonds, Captain John, L 283 n.
Syracuse, ii. 95, 97
Tactics, i. 81 »., 54, 118, 125-6, 154,
167, 19G, 251-2, ii. 91-4, 268-73
and Appendix
• Talent,' the, i. 256 *.
TaU, Captain, i. 127 n.
Tanfield, Sir Francis, i. 114, 127 n.
Tangier, i. 325 ; offered to Monk, ii.
5 ; importance of, 9 ; preparations
to occupy, 11, 22-9 ; substitute for
Dunkirk, 12-15: symbol of im-
perial policy, 17-21 ; occupation
of, 80-1 ; first attempt to oust
England from, 35-6 ; naval workB
begun, 37-8, 45; new design
against, 39-40; Teviot's defence
of, 40-2 ; disaster at, 42-3 ; grow-
ing importance of, 45-9, 51-2;
reported sale of, 50 ; during Second
Dutch War, 51-3, 55, 59-60 ; pro-
gress during Triple Alliance, 63-4,
69 ; mobile defence of, 76-9 ; French
fleet at, 86; Louis XIV.'s design
against, 104 el seq-, 122, 194;
jealousy of Parliament as to, 106-
107, 122-3 ; the last siege, 113-20 ;
its knell, 122-3; Portuguese bid
for, 130-1, 136-7. Evacuation
of, decided on, 126; its political
object, 127-8; secret preparation
for, 128-33; naval opposition,
183-5 ; overcome by Pepys, 136 ;
demolition begins, 137-8 ; lamen-
tations of merchants, 188-9 ; eva-
cuation complete, 139-40 ; its epi-
taph, 141; the sequel, 143-4;
Booke at, 258
— council, ii. 88, 64, 129
— garrison of, ii. 26, 63, 113, 117, 128
— governors of. See Peterborough,
Teviot, Belasyse, Middleton, Fair-
borne, Ossory, Sackville
— municipality of, ii. 63, 139
— naval works at, ii. 82, 87-8, 68-4,
74, 76, 80, 138-4, 187-40
— as naval station, ii. 80-2, 98, 110-
113, 115, 124-5, 184, 186
— as harbour of refuge, ii 51-2, 112,
188
Tangier as trading centre, ii. 113, 188
— regiments of (the Queen's), ii. 114,
(King's Own) 120
Taormina occupied by French, iL 97
Taranto, Gulf of, i 287
Tarpaulin officers, ii. 184-5
• Tartan,' small sailing vessel, i. 29
Taunton, siege of, i 192
: 'Taunton,' the, i 283 ^ 802**
I 322n*
! Temple, Sir William, ii. 68, 88, 116 ;
j on Mediterranean power, it 52-3
: Teneriffe, i. 334
Ter River, iL 161
Tesse, Marshal, ii. 288-6, 291-8
Tetuan, i. 124, ii 86-7, 178; as
English victualling depot, L 884,
ii. 364-5
Teviot, Andrew Rutherford, Earl
of, Governor of Tangier, ii 86-7 ;
defeats Guylan, 88 ; terror to the
Moors, 40-1 ; death, 42-8
Texel, the, i 86, ii 28, 56. (Sat
Actions)
Thames, Barbery corsairs in, i 58 ;
blockaded by Royalists, 186;
Dutch in, ii. 61-2, 70
Thirty Tears' War, i 88, 50, 88, 96,
110, 161, 166, 201; end of; 287,
295
Thorowgood, Captain Charles, i 240
Three-deckers, the first, i. 180 ; un-
seaworthiness of, ii 162, 180, 209,
213
* Tiger,' the, ii 81
Toledo, Don Pedro do, Governor of
Milan, i 85, 86, 64, 107
Tollemache (or Talmash), General
Thomas, ii. 160
Tor, Captain de, i 18
Torbay, i 322
Torre Annunciate (Naples), i 289
Torrington. See Byng and Herbert
Toulon, naval port begun, i 166-7;
its squadron established, 168, 172,
176 ; Rupert at, 221, 229, 282-4 ;
rebellious, 245-6, 250; action of
its squadron, i 176, 254, 278, 812,
ii. 47, 53, 77-9, 87 et a*., 104,
236, 276 ; as English base, i 838,
340-2, ii. 34; its progress as a
naval port, ii 124, 140, 149, 164,
234 ; naval architecture at, ii.78;
projects of attack on, ii 165, 168,
177-82 ; Marlborough's, 205,
217, 281, 285, 248-5, 247-8, 250,.
286-7, 289-92; Eugene's
Snovell's failure at, 296-9, 806
Digitized by
Google
960
INDEX
Toulouse, Louis de Bourbon, Comte
de, ii. 217, 234, 246-8, 250 ; evades
Booke, 252-3; attempts to re-
cover Gibraltar, 262-76
Tourville, Admiral Anne Hilarion
de Cotentin, Comte de, ii. 145;
surprises Smyrna fleet, 146-8,
149, 152, 154-6, 161 ; his strategy,
163-4, 167, 173-5, 177, 268-76,
291-8
Trapani (Sicily), L 25, 80, 235,
293-4, 298, 300, 306
Trieste, i. 35, 100, 156 ; ii. 201
Triple Alliance (Sir W. Temple's),
iL 68-4, 66, 83 ; (Hapsburgs and
Dutch), 84, 88
Tripoli, L 298, 312, 827 ; Stokes at,
338-9; Lawson at, ii. 38; Nar-
brough at, 98-9, 100
Tromp, Admiral Marten Harperts-
xoon, threatens Scilly, i. 241 ;
fighU with Blake, 247-8, 255;
defeat* him, 258 ; killed, 270
— Cornelia Martenszoon, i. 239 ; in
the Mediterranean, 253, 260
Tunis, i. 7, 12, 28, 30, 57, 294,
298-9 ; Blake at, 300-11 ; Stokes
at, 885 ; Lawson at, ii. 33 ; Bey
of, Kara Oaman, i. 12, 14, 58
Turenne, Henri, Vicomte de, L 285,
291
Turin, capital of Savoy, i. 136 ; ii.
247,295
Turks, i. 16 ; naval power of, 6, 27,
31; defeated, 31, 36, 267; English
attitude to, 297. ii. 67; they
assist the French, 148. (See also
Gandiote War)
Turner, Captain, i. 127 n.
Tuscany, Grand Dukes of (Ferdinand
I.), i. 12, 91, 174, 244 ; his be.
haviour during First Dutch War,
248-84, 261, 263; trims again,
278; his reception of Blake,
292-8; of Stokes, 336 ; (Cosmo
m.) v ii. 76, 280, 287-4
— Spanish ports in, i. 171, 209,
257, ii. 192. (See also Orbitello,
Piombino, Porto Longone)
Two Sicilies, i. 6. (See Maples and
Utrecht, congress of, ii. .811-2;
peace of, 313-5
Sicily)
Tyrol the,
its relation to the Medi-
L 108, 134
•Umoonff,' the, L 283*., 306, 822 n. i
Uscoochi or Isoocohi, L 47, 49, 156
Usheni,ii.l83
Valbrlle, Admiral de, i. 802 n., ii.
86-8
Valencia, i. 89, ii. 292
Vallis, Captain Thomas, i. 283 n.
Valtcllina, i. 108, 134-5, 146
Vano, Sir Henry (the younger),
President of the Admiralty, i.
194
— Charles (brother of above), envoy
to Lisbon, i. 206-7, 209, 210
• Vanguard, 1 the, i. 114, 144
Vauban, Marshal de, his work at
Toulon, ii. 124
Vaudois, the, i. 329
Velasco, Don Francisco do, ii. 249
Velez-Malaga, Rupert at, i. 218;
battle of, ii. 270-6
Venablcs, General Robert, i. 820
Vemlome, Ct'sar, Due de, i. 232, 245-
246, 255-6, ii. 34
Venice, naval power of, i. 6-8, 14,
60, 156, 295-7 ; strategic position,
35, 59, 65, 90, 96 ; as bulwark of
Christendom, 295-7, ii. 67; polioy
of, i. 8, 9, 33, 35, 87, 135-7;
diplomacy of, i. 84-38; relations
with England, i. 13, 43-4, 55-6,
60-2, 66-7, 86, 93, 162, 259, 262-
264, 295-9, ii. 230
Venice, gulf of, i. 8, 33, 101. (See
Adriatic)
Veniero, Venetian admiral, i. 47-8
Vero, Sir Francis, i. 21
— Sir Horace, i. 56
Veres, the fighting, i. 139
Verney, Sir Francis, i. 16, 18
Verschoen, Dutch admiral, ii. 96
Viareggio, i. 337
Vice- Admiral of England, i. 76, 149
'Victory,* the, i. 129, 130
Vidasabal, Admiral Don Miguel de,
i. 87-8
Vienna, i. 108
Vigo, i. 228-30, ii. 208 ; Plate fleet
at, 221-5, 229
VillafTanca (Savoy), i. 829, ii. 240,
245, 246, 250
— Marquis of, i. 85
Villetto, Marquis de, ii. 267 n^ 271-8
Virginia, i. 73, 114
Vivonne, Due de, ii. 86 ; French
Viceroy of Sicily, 88-9; recalled,
102
Vulcano (Lipari Island), i. 90
Digitized by
Google
INDEX
861
Wade, General George, ii. 308-9
Waiter of the Wool fleet, i. 72
Wake, Sir Isaac, enyoy to Savoy,
i. 136-7
Walmer, i. 185
Walsingham, Captain, i. 127 n.
Ward the pirate, i. 10 et seq., 18, 21,
34, 71, 155, 294, ii. 313
Warwick, Robert Rich, Earl of, Lord
High Admiral, i. 183, 185-9, 259
* Warwick ' pinnace, i. 314 n.
Watte, Sir John, i. 152
West Coast (of Africa), ii. 56. (See
also Guinea)
West Indies, llupert's designs on, i.
233; Ayscue sent to, 237, 241-2;
Cromwell's design on, 275, 279,
282, 304-5, 316, ii. 20 ; English
conquests in, 62, 66 ; in the par-
tition treaties, 189-92 ; in war of
Spanish succession, 204, 220
Westminster, peace of, ii. 80
— Abbey, burials at, i. 241
Westphalia, peace of, i. 239
Wilder (or Wheeler), Admiral Sir
Francis, ii. 135 ; sent to the
Straits, 151-3
4 Whelps,' small cruisers, i. 181. 190
Whetstone, Captain, i. 835 ; at Tou-
lon, 338 9 ; arrested, 3 40
Whitakor, Admiral Sir Edward, at
Gibraltar, ii. 259-61 ; at Mahon,
307
Whitby, ii. 37
Wliitclocke, Sir James, i. 73
Wilks, Ren r- Admiral, ii. 250, 262
William III. (of England), his influ-
ence on naval science, i. 154 ; seeks
English wife, ii. 97-8, 104 ; effect
of his accession, 144 ; first cam-
paign as King, 144-6; national
confidence in, 150 ; his orders to
Admiral Russell, 155-9, 165-71,
179-80; abandons the Mediter-
ranean, 184-5; makes peace, 188;
demands guarantees in Mediter-
ranean, 188-92; distrusted in
England, 194-5 ; prepares for war,
196-200; his death, 209; and
work, 313; as a naval strategist,
144-6, 149-58, 165-72, 176-7, 191.
202, 247
Wiiloughby of Parham, Lord, L 161-
162, 186
Wimbledon, Viscount See Cecil,
Edward
Windsor, ii. 130
Winker, Captain, i. 127 n.
Win wood, Sir Ralph, I 36-7
Wishart, Admiral Sir James, ii.
222; at Malaga, 264.6
With, Jan de, Grand Pensionary, ii.
97
— Admiral Witte Cornelia de, on
English gunnery, L 198; fights
Blake, 258
Witheridge, Capt Edward, i. 283 is.
Witte, Captain Passchier de, ii. 80-1
Wolstenholme, Sir John, natal re-
former, i. 76
Woolwich, i. 242 ; dockyard at, 322
1 Woolwich ' sloop, ii. 79 n.
Worcester, battle of, L 236
* Worcester,' the, i. 240, 283 *., 300,
306
Wratislaw, Count, ii. 301
Wynter, Admiral Sir William, i.
189
See
' Takmouth,' the, ii. 259
York, Charles, Duke of.
Charles, Prince of Wales
— James, Duke of, in exile, i. 187 ;
as minister of marine, ii. 18,
38; as admiral, 56, 61, 76; bill
to exclude, 113, 128, 125, 127-
129 ; forces the evacuation of
Tangier. 128-9, 137 ; his ' fighting
instructions,' 825-6. (Set Ja
II.)
Zaxttb, i. 249; as English
385
1 Zouch Phoenix, • the, 1 114
nUXTKD BY
axd co. ltd, xsw«mucKr SQCASS
LOKDO*
Digitized by
Google
Digitized by
Google
Digitized by
Google
Digitized by
Google
Digitized by
Google
